The Role of the Organizational Sources

To reach Egyptian society, the Brotherhood used the organizational structure as channels of consolidating and recruiting members and sympathizers, especially in the lower and the middle classes. This structure allowed the organization to maintain its structure and activities at the same time, even when it was formally dissolved by the state and subject to continuous police surveillance and efforts to destroy it in 1948, 1954 and so forth. While some scholars believed that much of the organization was destroyed by the raids and arrests of certain periods, Munson explains that “data contains considerable evidence that the Muslim Brotherhood was relatively successful in surviving repressive efforts by the Egyptian

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authorities. As an example, the government dissolved the Society in 1948, but the U.S. State Department received reports of secret mass meetings, Society organizing in mosques, and pamphleteering throughout Egypt during this time” (Munson 2001, 499). Based on the U.S Department Document, “[T]he group was still sufficiently organized after three years of formal dissolution, to produce a demonstration of over three thousand members on less than a day’s notice in early 1951, and to carry out well organized rallies at every branch office in Egypt. The day after the ban on the organization was lifted on May 1, 1951” (USDS 1954, 2439).⁴⁶ Munson provides another example of the powerful role of the organizational aspect of the Brotherhood. He says,

In 1954, the Society (EMB) was operating again within ten days of the major wave of arrests following Nasser’s 1954 dissolution of it and imprisonment of its leadership and thousands of its members. By June, there were reports of a public resurgence of the Society’s activities.

The Muslim Brotherhood was clearly not dismantled by government efforts. Its organizational structure was a key to its ability to resist state attempts to eliminate it. The organizational structure of the Brotherhood not only provided advantages to the group in the traditional ways described by a basic resource mobilization model, but it also provided an important avenue through which the ideology of the organization could contribute to the group’s success. The Muslim Brotherhood, like any other social movements, faced the task of mobilizing the support and resources of individuals with a variety of different beliefs and levels of motivation for collective action. (Munson 2001, 499)

Comparatively, in Egypt, Communist groups were organized in a strictly hierarchical fashion, without independent branches or federated offices. Consequently, this inadequate structure led to constant factionalism and limited the national presence of the communists in the country. “Several studies of the Egyptian communist party suggest that the movement was also decimated by government crackdowns on several occasions” (Goldberg 1986; Botman 1988; Ismael and El-Sa’id 1990). Munson notes that both Beinin and Lockman (1987) mentions the fact that “communist organizations were concentrated and one-dimensional only.

Once infiltrated, they had little defense against the security agencies of the state. Unlike the Muslim Brotherhood, the communist presence in Egypt was virtually eliminated in the 1920s and 1930s as a result of state repression” (Munson 2001, 500).

In contrast to the Muslim Brotherhood’s four-tiered membership, ⁴⁷ communist organizations seldom made institutionalized distinctions between members and their levels

46 U.S. Department of State (USDS) (1949). Confidential Central Files. Egypt: 1945-1949. Washington, DC.

47 The three-tier memberships are: (a) ‘assistant’ (musa`id); (b) ‘related’ (muntasib); (c) and ‘active’

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of commitment. Tasht, one of the most influential communist groups in Egypt during the 1940s, had a ‘nomination’ process for new recruits that could last as long as two years, during which time the individual was continually investigated and tested. A communist leader who was critical of this system equated the process to entering the priesthood. (Ismael and El-Sa’id 1990, 45)

Munson (2001) argues that there were severe ideological blockades to entry into the communist membership, and the structure made no place for members with varying stages of promise; the movement accepted only the most devoted and dedicated individuals. In contrast to the gradual way in which the Muslim Brotherhood’s structure brought its ideas to members, the beliefs of potential communist recruits had to be entirely transformed before they were given any access to the movement. Thus, the communist groups made it extremely difficult for potential recruits to move from their ordinary lives to active participation in the movement (Munson 2001, 501).

During the confrontation with the royal power backed by colonialism, the EMB used similar political techniques to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) during the pre-Soviet Union Revolution in 1917. The recruiting strategies and mechanisms of both the Muslim Brotherhood and the Communist Party were mainly similar for the purpose of avoiding the brutal suppression from the state. However, the most important common recruiting strategies of both are: 1) the centralized and the organizational patterns and 2) understanding political tactics. There are several organizational aspects both the Communist Party and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood share for the purpose of recruitment and avoiding state security as it has been highlighted and analyzed by Hosking (1985), Rigby (1968), Mitchell (1969) and (Al-Anani 2007).

With regard to centralized and the organizational patterns, Lenin stated, “If the autocracy was to be overthrown and a socialist order ultimately created, the party must be a highly centralized and disciplined organization, functioning conspiratorially where necessary, and directing and coordinating the trade unions and all other ‘mass’ organizations of the workers in a unified struggle consistently guided by Marxist theory” (Rigby 1968, 4). For the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, Munson (2001) states that “the successful mobilization of the Muslim Brotherhood was possible because of the way in which its Islamic message was tied to its organizational structure, activities, and strategies and the everyday lives of Egyptians”

(Munson 2001,487).

In regard to the second common recruiting strategy, underground political tactics were and often used by both movements. In the case of the Communist Party, Rigby (1968) states that the tricky aspect of the Communist membership structure system is the fact that the party apparatus (highest) is not visible in the political scene rather than the second category,

(amil).

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which is holding no formal party offices in the organizational structure (Rigby 1968, 8).

Identically, the Brotherhood was known for its Secret Apparatus which was abolished in the period of the EMB’s second leader, Hasan Isma’il al-Hudaibi, who held the position from 1949 to 1972. In this regard, Mitchell (1969) states,

The Secret Apparatus by this time appears to have become fully structured, with appropriate rules delineating functions, commands, authority, and responsibilities, and appropriate symbols, oaths, and an equipment. Its numbers, never very large, were qualitatively increased by recruits from among army officers, probably including some of those who later participated in the revolution of 1952. Al-Banna’s relationship to the group was technically that of Supreme Leader, but he kept in touch with it through selected representatives. (Mitchell 1969, 54-5)

In comparing the two organizations, the study arrived at the tentative conclusion that the Communist Party moved very carefully and more strategically than the Brotherhood, since it sought power from the very beginning, while the EMB did not, while the EMB became involved in political activity only after being accused of being a political threat by the state during the Israeli-Palestinian crisis.

This chapter only examines the existing organizational structure of the EMB, and its functions. The chart in [Figure 3] summarizes the organizational structure, from the General Headquarter to the family section. The General Headquarters in Cairo represents the center of the entire organization, both in terms of structure and activity. The family section in turn, represents the first step in structure and activity. From the Headquarters to the family section, a detailed explanation is provided.