Based on discussions conducted by the GOJ in its decision-making process (see 3.3.1.
and 3.3.2.), this section will examine whether the GOJ took the two normative principles, necessity and proportionality, into consideration before deciding to participate in OEF. To separately consider this issue, this section will be divided into two parts. This first part
will examine the reasons for the GOJ’s decision to participate in OEF with reference to the principle of necessity in jus ad bellum. As states should have the right intention or a just cause for taking military action against others from the legal and moral-philosophical perspectives, the first part will examine whether the Diet found a justified reason for providing logistical support when the related discussions were held. We will then examine the permissible measures in contributing to OEF with reference to the principle of proportionality in jus ad bellum. As measures must be balanced to be justified from the moral-philosophical perspective, it is necessary to examine whether the Diet considered this issue when deciding to provide logistical support to the US.
3.4.1. The Principle of Necessity
As analysed in 2.2.1.i., the principle of necessity demands consideration of justification.
According to jurists and philosophers’ analyses on the principle of necessity in jus ad bellum, an operation is justified if there is a just cause; i.e. self-defence is justified when an armed attack occurs. Therefore, this subsection will first analyse whether there was a just cause for conducting OEF, and then determine whether the GOJ found the necessity to participate in the operation with just cause.
(a) Just Cause for Conducting OEF
As the US was the victim of the 9/11 attacks, OEF seems to meet the condition of the
principle of necessity (see 3.1.). Therefore, the US had the right intention in taking military action against the offender, al-Qaeda. However, although there was a clear just cause for executing defensive action, the most controversial issue was whether attacking Afghanistan was necessary. Since Afghanistan, a sovereign state, was legally distinct from al-Qaeda, the US did not have the right intention in carrying out OEF in Afghanistan.
The US explained that the operation targeted Afghanistan because al-Qaeda members were hiding there. However, this rationale would only justify an operation targeting al-Qaeda members, and not the ordinary people of Afghanistan, as the violation of human rights of innocent people contravenes the normative principles of Just War Theory (Cooper, 2011). Thus, judging from the final result alone, OEF can be considered an unnecessary use of force because it was supposed to target only the members of al-Qaeda.
Therefore, it is difficult to classify this operation as having a just cause.
(b) Japan’s Justification for Participating in OEF
This finding demonstrates that Japan did not have the right to attack Afghanistan. The aim of this dissertation, however, is to clarify whether the GOJ’s decision to participate in OEF met the principle of necessity in jus ad bellum. As discussions on the necessity of Japan’s OEF participation were examined in 3.3.1., this part will seek to answer whether the GOJ considered the principle of necessity in jus ad bellum when discussing Japan’s participation in the operation.
As PM Koizumi expressed his opinion that there was no right intention for Japan to participate in OEF, we may conclude that Japan did not have the right intention for its attack on Afghanistan. This also means that Japan had no right intention for providing logistical support to the US either. As seen in 3.3.1., the main reason given by Cabinet members for providing logistical support was to strengthen the relationship with the US. As examined in 1.3., this reason can be explained by the theory of IR: realism (neo-realism), liberalism (neo-liberalism), and constructivism.
For all, it is evident from the Diet record and the interview results that some Diet members pointed out that Japan had no right intention to participate in OEF from a moral-philosophical perspective. At the same time, we also discover that many Diet members favoured relying on the decision-making of others, such as the UN Security Council, the US, and other coalition allies of the US. However, the GOJ should rely neither on the UNSCR nor the decision of the US, but rather on the principle of necessity in jus ad bellum.
3.4.2. The Principle of Proportionality
The second consideration factor for jus ad bellum, the principle of proportionality, guides judgment as to whether the quality and quantity of the military power used by the JSDF for OEF was proportional. Since the JSDF did not take any military action during OEF, some pointed out that the GOJ did not have to consider the principle of proportionality in
jus ad bellum. However, the GOJ should have considered the proportionality of the support provided to the US with reference to the principle of proportionality in jus ad bellum. To judge proportionality, this subsection will examine whether or not OEF fell within the scope of self-defence by comparing the norm and practice, before examining the issue through Japan’s participation in OEF.
(a) Quality and Quantity of OEF
It has been reported that approximately 26,270 civilians7 became casualties of OEF. Thus, the number of innocent civilians killed far exceeded the number of victims of 9/11 (see 3.1.). Human life is uncountable, however; therefore, the number of victims is not the only way to judge whether the quality and quantity of OEF was justified. The length of the war is also an important factor in determining an answer to this question. Given that US military personnel remain in Afghanistan today (see 3.1.), the US military has been in the country for more than fifteen years. Evidently, OEF became a larger operation than was supposedly originally intended.
(b) Quality and Quantity of JSDF Personnel
With the number of victims and the length of OEF, this dissertation examines whether the
7 According to Crawford (2015), 26,270 civilians were killed and 29,900 injured in the 2001 Afghanistan War. With other factors causing civilian deaths, e.g. unsafe
environment, approximately 92,000 civilians in total suffered from the violence of war.
GOJ determined the quality and quantity of JSDF personnel focusing on the balance between 9/11 and OEF.
Based on this analysis, this dissertation concludes that Cabinet members did not sufficiently consider the principle of proportionality in jus ad bellum because the quality and quantity of force used was explained merely with the words “minimum and only necessary use of force;” however, the meaning of “minimum and only necessary use of force” is seemingly not shared among Diet members (interview with a then DPJ member of the House of Councillors, 6 July 2015). This leads to the result that Diet members used the words of “minimum and necessary use of force” like a mantra so that they can pretend to be conscious of quality and quantity in operation. Although they did demonstrate some consciousness of the issue, the dialogues in the Diet and the interview results demonstrate that Diet members did not pay attention to the principle of proportionality in jus ad bellum when deciding to participate in OEF: participating in OEF to strengthen the relationship with the US was more important than paying attention to the quality and quantity of the operation.