Diet concerns compliance with the restrictions imposed by the JCL, the focus of debate was domestic legal matters.
The possibility of JSDF personnel using military force was mentioned in the Diet; however, the quality and quantity of military weapons were not mentioned when members were discussing the issue of legitimate JSDF activities in OEF. While the words
“minimum and only necessary use of force” were heard many times in the Diet, the quality and quantity of military force to be used were not made sufficiently clear. Overall, we can conclude that the GOJ did not sufficiently consider the principle of proportionality in jus in bello.
perspectives to which the GOJ paid insufficient attention.
To identify the gap, it is necessary to highlight the principal reason behind the GOJ’s policy: contrary to PM Koizumi’s declaration that this participation would contribute to maintaining international peace and security, the most likely reason for participation was to strengthen Japan’s relationship with the US. Two grounds support this conclusion: first, Japan’s consideration of participation in OEF focused solely on Japanese domestic law, despite the contemplated military operation being international;
and second, the GOJ failed to consider the protection of human rights in general. By clarifying these two explanations, which characterise Japan’s intention to participate in OEF, we can identify the gap between factors considered by the GOJ and the normative principles applied to participating in international military operations.
The first characteristics was the lack of consideration given to the justification for OEF. Although some Diet members raised the necessity to consider this issue before deciding to participate in the operation, the Japanese Cabinet did not address this point clearly: instead, they focused on responding to the US’s request to participate in OEF rather than clarifying the right intention for attacking Afghanistan. In addition, discussions on enacting the ATSML addressed concerns over how Japan would participate in OEF without revising the JCL. From our analysis of the related Diet discussions, it is clear that no consideration was given to the moral justification for OEF.
The most important factor for the GOJ was to strengthen the US-Japan relationship, as
Asō specified in the Diet (see 3.3.1.). The gap between the factors considered by Japan in this instance and the normative factors demonstrates that the GOJ did not consider the moral-philosophical perspective.
The second characteristic of the GOJ’s decision-making procedure was the lack of consideration regarding the protection of human rights in general. The GOJ focused in particular on protecting the lives of JSDF personnel, contrary to the normative principles that states should not violate human rights in general. As seen in 3.3.3., the Diet discussion concerned not violating the lives and bodies of JSDF personnel and the collaborators and complying with the JCL restriction. If the OEF participation was premised on maintaining international peace and security, the GOJ should have considered the protection of human rights in general, particularly the rights of civilians in Afghanistan. However, no such discussion took place in the Diet when the issue of participating in OEF was discussed.
Thus, in reaching the decision to participate, the GOJ seems not to have paid sufficient attention to the normative ideas of Just War Theory.
Since OEF was the first case of the GOJ deciding to participate in an international military operation, it might be argued that they lacked sufficient knowledge regarding the theory. Therefore, the next chapter will analyse another case in which the GOJ decided to participate in international military operations. This will clarify whether the GOJ improved its consideration of the normative principles of Just War Theory in the second case.
Chapter Four. Japan’s Participation in OIF: the 2003 Iraq War
This chapter will examine the GOJ’s decision-making process in deciding to participate in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), also known as the 2003 Iraq War (2003 - present). This is the second case of international military operations in which Japan participated. This chapter uses the term OIF, as this encompasses the 2003 invasion of Iraq (20 March 2003 - 1 May 2003) and the post-invasion reconstruction operation (2003 - present). When the GOJ decided to participate in OIF on 1 August 2003, the 2003 invasion of Iraq was already completed. Although the GOJ was unable to reach a decision on participating in the 2003 invasion, related discussions continued with respect to participating in the reconstruction activity. Therefore, Japan’s participation in OIF is suited to the second examination as to whether Japan took the normative principles into consideration when deciding to participate in international military operations.
This chapter will commence by introducing the background of OIF. Compared with the previous case study of OEF, the purpose of OIF was more complex because there was no clear rationale for invading Iraq. Therefore, it is necessary to clarify what prompted the US and its coalition allies, such as the UK, to invade Iraq and to conduct reconstruction activity there. By elucidating the reasons for each, we will clarify the rationale for OIF.
After completing the invasion of Iraq on 1 May 2003, the US and its coalition
allies engaged in reconstruction activity there. The GOJ had been unable to reach a decision on participating in the 2003 invasion before this operation concluded, despite Japanese Cabinet members, particularly PM Koizumi insisting that JSDF personnel should be dispatched to support the US military. Therefore, the second section will analyse why members of the Koizumi administration, in particular, sought to participate in OIF.
Based on the background of OIF and Japan’s intention to participate therein, the related debates in the Diet will be analysed. To facilitate comparison with the previous chapter, the same issues as those in Chapter Three will be investigated: whether Diet members found the right intention for participating in OIF (4.3.1.); whether the OIF was proportional to Iraq’s supposed possession of WMDs (4.3.2.); what the role of JSDF personnel was while reconstructing Iraq (4.3.3.); and whether the measures taken by JSDF personnel in the reconstruction of Iraq were proportional (4.3.4.).
Based on the results of analyses, the examinations will explore compliance with jus ad bellum (4.4.) and jus post bellum (4.5.). As specified in Chapter Two, the principles of jus ad bellum and jus in bello should be considered when determining participation in OIF as these principles demonstrate what requirements it is necessary to justify before taking military action and supporting reconstruction activity. However, the GOJ could not reach a decision to participate in OIF before the invasion was completed, it was unnecessary to consider the normative principles of jus in bello. Despite considering the
normative principles of jus in bello, the GOJ should have considered the normative principles of jus ad bellum as the GOJ originally contemplated participating in the invasion of Iraq. Furthermore, the principles of jus post bellum should have been taken into consideration as the GOJ determined to participate in the reconstruction activities in Iraq. Therefore, this chapter will examine whether the GOJ considered the normative principles of jus ad bellum and jus post bellum by comparing what issues were actually discussed by the GOJ and what issues they should have considered.
In the final section of this chapter, we will clarify what issues the GOJ, particularly the Koizumi administration, should have considered when deciding to participate in the 2003 invasion of Iraq and to dispatch the JSDF to participate in the reconstruction activity.