Domestic Factors

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with China, its overall response is to develop domestic industrial competitiveness rather than to channel it to the surplus-generating country like the US (discussed below).

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leading to its not-to-join decision. In Vietnam, the voice for support is quite dominant from the state actors while the opposition is almost unheard of, probably because the one-party system causes the former to be the only ultimate voice. In Malaysia, the supporter and challenger are on equal par. The situation leads to a different domestic atmosphere in both countries. In Vietnam, it is no less than enthusiasm to TPP with its potential to export more labor-intensive products to the US, but without sufficient balancing views. After the global financial crisis that weakened Vietnam‟s economic performance, the country also aggressively engaged in many FTA negotiations along with TPP. Now, it negotiates the Vietnam-EU, Vietnam-EFTA, Vietnam-South Korea, Vietnam-Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan Custom Union FTA and RCEP. It is important to note here that the perception of the VCP, especially from the reformist faction, that global economic integration will ensure the very survival of the regime. In their mind, it continually provides economic growth and employment and, henceforth, performance legitimacy in the eye of the Vietnamese. Vietnam seems to show a hasty, if not reckless, behavior in this regard since economic globalization does not always lead to the intended result. Unfortunately, without any challengers willing to speak up, there is nothing stopping, or at least moderating, the optimism and passion of the Vietnamese leader. The only challenge appears on silent resistance from subnational government and SOE manager, but only later when Vietnam finds it difficult to implement TPP‟s reform measures. Meanwhile in Malaysia, the nuance is of both optimism and skepticism. Optimism is casted by the leader (especially PM Najib) and MITI while skepticism is voiced by the

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intra-UMNO business politician, opposition parties, and NGO. Therefore in Malaysia, there is a lot more balanced view on responding to TPP unlike in the Vietnam case. Malaysia appears to be a lot more cautious with many articulating demands for a longer transition period, flexibilities, or even rejection. It is also worth noting that in Malaysia, unlike in Vietnam, the leader has institutional constraints in two ways. First, as the opposition parties improve their electoral performance, the ruling party (UMNO) can no longer easily implement any desired policies. Sensitive issues like TPP that can be easily manipulated into a political attack. Second, as the high-quality TPP gives a potential threat to the intra-UMNO business politician, the leader (PM Najib) must also consider not antagonizing the traditional Bumiputera constituent if he wants both to remain in power and to sustain the political regime.

Another important finding is the fact that the state should not be seen as a unitary actor, as assumed before in many existing literature. In the TPP case, the state is far from unitary with many competing ideas and stances among their components. This is very clear in the Malaysian case where the leader and MITI are in one camp, while intra-UMNO business-politician, opposition parties, and several bureaucratic agencies are in the other. The so-called reform measures entailed within TPP actually trigger such division, which in the past state‟s components were in stable relations under the dual approach of export-oriented industry and bumiputera policy. The case is also very clear in Indonesia where there are two important views, the pro-ASEAN and the protectionist group, which luckily desire similar outcomes for not participating TPP. State apparatus like the

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MoFA is on the pro-ASEAN camp while another like MoT and leader are on the protectionist (or nationalist) camp. It is interesting to observe other cases where these two groups have diverging stances and how it leads to the outcome.⁹² Even in the one-party rule of Vietnam, such state division is also observable although less clear. According to Masina (2006) and Painter (2006), Vietnam‟s authority is more of a decentralized nature than centralized one that leads to the silent resistance from the subnational government (and SOE manager). They might not articulate opposition to TPP by the time the decision was taken (pre-negotiation) since it would put them in undesired opposition with the leader. However, they are expected to cast resistance once TPP is implemented.

As for the non-state actor, there are several actors worth mentioning here, the domestic business entrepreneur, NGO and academic. For domestic business entrepreneurs, it is clear that their view on TPP is divided: the export-oriented industry supports the TPP while domestic-oriented one does not support it. This is very clear in Malaysia and Indonesia but only to a lesser extent in Vietnam.

However, in the latter country there are still reservations on how TPP may affect the SMEs. The influence of domestic business entrepreneurs on trade policymaking is also worth mentioning here. Vietnam is a case where their voice is not very important since in their system such private entity only lives as the state allows them to. In Indonesia, they are of a lesser importance than the state since there are many precedences in which state can act on its own without full acknowledgment from a business. In Malaysia, business entrepreneurs have a

92 A potential case study for the diverging interest is the ASEAN-China FTA where, on one hand, protectionist demanded for renegotiation and, on the other hand, pro-ASEAN group wished for continued implementation.

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much stronger position since they heavily intrude into the political sector by becoming a UMNO member. For NGOs, their very influence in the observed case studies is even less. This is very true in Vietnam and Indonesia. For the former, it is very understandable under the one-party system while, for the latter, there are other actors such as leaders and bureaucratic agents voicing their stances more vocally. However, it must be noted that the relatively calm behavior of NGOs in Indonesia in the TPP issue is not necessarily because they are impotent. It is more because they do not feel the need to put pressure as the state already acts in line with their interest. There is a possibility that they will be more active if the state commits a controversial action, such as joining the TPP. For Malaysia, although NGOs here are very dynamic in voicing opposition thanks to the government‟s decision to join TPP, their relative importance is quite moderate. They function well to give technical input to government and promote awareness to the people, yet not necessarily to influence the trade policy making itself as they face many constraints under the authoritarian system of Malaysia. As for academics, it is particularly dynamic only in the Indonesian case, especially within the pro-ASEAN group. In democratic Indonesia, academics relatively enjoy more room to exert their influence as opposed to Vietnam and Malaysia where academics must fully comply with the state‟s interests.