qu
4. Summary of the contents of Harihhadras Ahhisamayふ lamkir忌lokiPraj負尋paramitivyikhya
The logical formula （ρrayogα，・〉H・H・..W6245 V 45732
A thing capable of effect implies ：〔I〕athing which has a nature that is knowable (jiieya‑riipα） which belongs to the external world ; or
〔II〕athing which has the nature of cognition(jiiiina‑rupa）.
… ・ . .
W62411 V4584I. A thing capable of effect is a thing which has a nature that is knowable (jiieya‑rupa) which belongs to the external world.
… …
W62412 V4585Haribhadra refutes the view of the three kinds of atomic theory formulated by those who maintain that the external world is real, such as〔I‑1〕Vaise号ika，〔I‑2〕Vaibha号ikaand 〔I‑3〕Sautr互ntika.
I‑1. The Vaise号ikahold that things which have a knowable nature (jiieya‑rupa) are atoms which have intrinsic natures that are connected to one another (paras‑pαra‑samyukta‑svabhiiva) and form a unitary nature.
… … …
W62416 V 4587This view is refuted by the following arguments :
I‑1‑1. It is contradictory that an atom combines with the other atoms at one spot (eka‑desa) ...・H・.W62416 V 4587
I‑1‑2. It is contradictory that an atom combines with the other atoms to form a whole C sarvatm仰の．・・H・H・.W62418 V 4589
I‑2. The Vaibhasika hold that the atom in the center is surrounded by atoms that have the nature of nonadhering （αsamiiSli$fa), and that there are intervals remaining between them(santara）.
… …
W62427 V 45814This view is refuted by the following arguments :
‑ 33ー
併教大事大事院研究紀要第12競
I‑2‑1. It is contradictory that the atom in the center by a single nature faces the other atoms in the very same manner that it faces a single atom ...…W6258 V45820
This same refutuation is also applied to the case of the Satyakarava‑ dins view. (cf. II‑1‑A‑2‑1)
I‑2‑2. It is contradictory that the atom in the center by a single nature faces the other atoms in a different manner than it faces a single atom. (cf. II‑1‑A‑2‑2) ....・H・..W62518 V 45827
I‑3. The Sautrantika hold that atoms are an aggregation without intervals remaining between them (nir‑antara）・………W62521V 45829
This view is refuted by the following arguments :
I‑3‑‑1. The directional characteristic of the atom in the center would be decided only by the side which is combined (sα鈎yog，α−pak手α）because having no interval(nairantarya）is equivalent tocombination(sαmyogα，〉． ... W62521 V 45829
I‑3‑2. It is illogical that an uncombined （αsamyukta) atom is surr.o・ unded by the many atoms which are in contiguous locations (sam争αtara‑ desavαsthitα） that are suitable to be called the side (dik‑s
α
bd，α−
vacy̲α．〉... W62524 V 45831
I‑4.〔Conclusion〕： Distinction(bhed，α ，） which means the external world and which is produced by thought‑construction, (kalpano1うαracito) is not an essential component of efficiency（αrthαkriya均：ga)....・H ・..W62527 V4593
II. Haribhadra refutates the view of the Yogacara school (viz., Satya‑ kara and Alikak互ra‑vadins):They assert that a thing capable of effect
（
α
rthakriya‑yogya) means a thing which has the nature of cognition (jiianα−rupa) ....・H ・..W6267 V45910‑ 34ー
II‑1. Haribhadras refutuation of the view of Satyakaravadin (ones who assert that images are real) : They explain the production of cognition (vij先anα）according to the casual relation with images (iikiira) of both the perceived and the perceiver(griihya‑grahαka）・………W62617 V45916
II‑1‑A. According to this theory, cognition (vijiiiinα） would become manifold (anekatva), like the nature of images (iikara‑svαrupavα，t). On the other hand, images (akara) would become a unity (ekαtva), like the nature of cognition (vij克iinα−svαruραvat）・………W62617V 45917
II‑1‑A‑1. It is contradictory that cognition, which has a unitary nature, perceives manifold images
O α
ictryakiira）・・H・H・..W62620 V 45919II‑1‑A‑2. It is contradictory that diverse cognitions (vij先iinα）of the same kind Oαmanαjiitiyα） occur simultaneously like different kinds of cognition (vijatiyα−jiiiinαVαt) ....・H ・..W6272 V 45923
II‑1‑A‑2‑1. It is contradictory that the cognition (vij必iinα，）which is thought to be situated in the center (mαdhyα ，）like an atom, faces by nature the other cognitions in the very same manner that it faces a single (eka) cognition. This is because the other cognitions would mutually occupy the same point. (cf. I‑2‑1・）H ・H ・..W6278 V 45927
II‑1‑A‑2‑2. It is contradictory that the cognition, which is thought to be situated in the center, like an atom, faces other surrounding cognitions in a different manner. This is because it would have parts and it would thus be devoid of unity (ekαtva). (cf. I‑2‑2）・・…….W62711 V45929
II‑1‑A‑2‑3. Cognitions would be regarded as if they manifest having extension (desa‑vitana) in as far as they are multiple (bahu) but contrary to the fact that they do not have space （α
d e s
α） according to‑ 35ー
梯教大事大事院研究紀要第12号
your theory that cognition has a manifold nature ...・H・.W62713 V 45931 II‑1‑A‑2‑4. The refutation of the view of the atomic theory can be applied to cognition （均・iiiina）・・・H・H・.W62722V4605
II‑1‑A‑2‑5.〔Conclusion〕： Your statement that multiple cognitions (anekαifiiina) occur at the same time (yugapαd) involves a contradiction with respect to direct perception(pratyak$a‑virodhα〉．…...W62728 V 46010 II‑1‑B. The refutation of CITRADVAYA (the view that a cognition possessing manifold images is itself a unity) ....・H ・..W6287 V46014
II‑1‑B‑1. It is contradictory that a single cognition (vijfiiinα） includes a manifold nature (citra‑rupα〉・・・H・H・.W6287 V 46014
II‑1‑B‑2. Manifoldness (citra) is incompatible with unity(ekatva）・…
….. W62812 V46017
II‑1‑B‑3.〔Conclusion 1：〕 It is contradictory that manifoldness appears as a unity in direct perception (pratyαh手α）since direct perce‑ ption does not perceive a distinction.…... W62822 V 46024
II‑1‑B‑4.〔Conclusion2：〕 It is contradictory that manifoldness (citra) also is single (ekα） since concentration (yogα，） and tranquility (k$emα） are not distinguished 〈αbhinna).This is because the fact that concentration and tranquility are not distinguished from each other is not grasped by direct perception （ρfαtyak手α）....・H・..W6291 V 46028
II‑2. Refutation of the view of the Alikakara‑vadin (ones who assert that images (iikiira) are unreal）.………62910 V46l2
(To be continued)
‑ 36ー
5. A Translation of Haribhadras Abhisamayilaritkiriloki Prajiiipiramitavyikhyi
〔Major〕：Whateverdoes not possess a single nature or a plural nature (ekaneka‑svαbhava), does not have an intrinsic nature (sむαbhavα）from the standpoint of the highest truth (paramar‑
thatas): such as an illusion (maya).
〔Minor〕：Thingsset forth by some Buddists and others (svα
−
ραra) are devoid of a single nature or a plural nature ( ekanekα−
S℃αibha・℃α．〕
〔Conclusion: Therefore, things set forth by some Buddists and others are not capable of having an intrinsic nature.〕
〔Thisinference〕isbased on the principle of the perception of the incompatibility with the pervasive element (vyapαkaviruddhopalabdhi). This means that the Tathagata is like an illusion (mayoραmα）. The logical reason (hetu) of this inference is not inadmissible (asiddhα，〉 since the action (prα，vrtti) of a sage (prek~avat) is pervaded by having purpose (pr，αyoj.αηα一旬αt).A thing くpαdarthα〉capable of effect くαγthα・ (101) cf. MAK 1. P48b8 D53a1‑2 M A V P52b5‑6 D56b7
bdag clan gzan smraγdrios di dag / yari dag tu na gcig pa clan // du mai rari b乏inbral bai phyir // rari bzin med de gzugs brfian bzin // 1. M A V. PD smras
BCP, p. 173
nil;isvabhava ami bhavas tattvatal:i svaparodita}:i / ekanekasvabhavena viyogat pratibimbavat / /
MAP P89a4‑6 D87b2‑3
gari dag1 gcig dari du mai ran bzin ma yin pa de dag ni don dam par2 ran bzin med de / dper na gzugs brfien bzin no // bdag dari gzan gyis smras pai dnos po rnams kyari gcig dari du ma'i ran bzin ma yin pas zes bya ba ni khyab par byed pa mi dmigs pa yin te / gcig pa負iddan du ma負id dag gis ran bzin la khyab pai phyir ro / / 1. D zag 2. P om.
‑ 37‑
｛弗教大事大事院研究紀要第12強
(102) (103)
kriyii‑yogyα） should be examined ( viciiryα） as an object
O
勾αya). Otherwise, what sort of purpose (prayoj,αna) can those who pursue effectiveness (arthαkriyarthin) attain by means of investigating useless things （αsαd−
αrthα−
padartha‑viciirα，〉？Therefore, the thing which has an effect （αrthα
わか
ii‑kiirin)should be pursued.Does it (viz., a thing capable of effect) imply ：〔I〕a thing which has a nature that is knowable (jneya‑rupα〉〔which belongs to the external world；〕or〔II〕thenature of knowledge (jnanα−rupa), because they (viz., a thing cognizable and cognition) are also mutually incom‑
patible （αnyonyα−vyαuαcched
α
，−rupatva)?〔I〕Ifthe first alternative is maintained, does it ( viz., a nature which is knowable (jneya‑rupα ）） imply ：〔I‑1〕intrinsic natures which are connected with one another (paras−ρara‑sαmyukta‑svabhαva); or〔I‑2〕
~0~h-ing which is surrounded by atoms (paramii'}Ju）出atare homogene‑
ous compositions (sαmiina‑jatiyα ，）that are separated from one another by means of potency (samarthyα ，）that have the nature of nonadhering
（αsamasli$fα−svariipα ，）and that have intervals remaining between them (102) Read thus insted of paramiirthα〔
w
〕accordingto don byed pα〔P279b8〕 (103) Read thus instead of viciira{t〔V〕.cf. P 280arnam par dpyad par bya (104) MAV P55a2 D59a2phrad de 'tshogs nas dgos pa rtsom mo乏eszer ba lta bu' am / MAP P94b7‑95a1 D92b1
de la kha cig na re rdul phra rah rnams1 phan tshun reg go乏eszer ro / / 1. D has lαphra rah
(105) MAV P55a2‑3 D59a2
yan na phan tshun mthus dzin gyis ma byar bai ran bzin bar1 yod cin bskor ha ste / 1. D par
乱tIAPP95a1 D92b1
gzan dag na re rigs mthun pa man pos1 bskor ba rnams ni bar daft bcas pa kho na yin la / 1. P has por
‑ 38ー
…105) (106) (107…
(santαrα） ； or〔I‑3〕a thing which is surrounded by atoms without intervals remaining between them (nir‑a仰 ra）
う
Then，〔I‑1〕inthe first case，〔I‑1‑1〕ifX (viz., an atom) is combined with Y (viz., the other atoms) at one spot (eka‑desα） , then X would have parts (savαyαvatv，α）. Therefore, the single nature (ekatvα〉〔ofan atom〕isdestroyed, since it〔theatom〕is combined with other atoms
.... 108〕
〈α苧u)having natures different from one another （αραraραra‑svabhiivα．〉
〔I‑1‑2〕Ifyou assert that an atom combines with other atoms to form a whole (sarvatmanii), when the atom in the front (purva) is combined
(109a)
with another in the back （αραra1J,u) to form a whole (sαrvatmαnii), the atom in the back also is combined with yet another in front of it. Therefore, no sort of atom can ever be established as a single entity (ekα
−
svabhavatii) since their intrinsic natures (svαbhiiva) are mingled with each other on the ground that their combination Oαmyog，α〉 depends on the two.(106) Read yad va according to〔W〕instedof yada〔V．〕 (107) MAV P55a4 D59a3
ji ltar rdul phra rah rnams mi reg kyafl bar med pas reg par du免sso //11. Dom.
MAP P95a5 D92b4
gzan dag na re reg pa yafl ma yin la bar dafl bcas pa dag kyafl ma yin mod kyi / 'dab1 chags pa kho nar gnas so乏eszer te / 1. P mdab
(104) (105) (107) MAK. XI ab M A V P55as D59a6
byar ba dafl ni bskor bam // bar med rnam par gnas kyan run / / TS 1989 ab
sarhyuktarh dilradesastharh nairantaryavyavasthitam / (108) M A V P55a5‑6 D59a4‑s
phyogs gcig gis byar na ni cha sas yod pargyur te / ra企bzingzan dafl g乏an dag gis rdul g乏andafl byar hai phyir ro /
く109) MAV P55a5 D59a4
bdag白idthams cad kyis byor na ni rdzas rnams dres par 'gyur te / rdul gyi ran b乏ingcig pu gafl gis byar ha de iiid g乏andafl yafl byar tai phyir ro / (109a) W apαre'}Ja仰na
‑39‑
｛弗教大事大事院研究紀要第12披
This is because the atom in the front abandons its own nature (svα
−
svαbhava) and produces, in all respects, the nature of another at the back on the grounds that it is combined with another at the back to form a whole. And though it〔viz.,atom in the front〕is combined with 〔anotherat the back，〕itis non‑existent 〈αsattva).In the same way, an atom at the back is also combined with another in the front.
For this reason, the foundation of combination (samyogasrayα〉〔viz., atom at the back〕is non‑existent （αsattva) because an atom at the back abandons its own nature (svα
−
svαbhavα） and it produces, in all respects, the nature of the atom in the front. Therefore, since it is unreasonable for unity (eka) to be affirmed (vidhi) and to be denied (prati$edhα ，）which have the characteristics of excluding each other (paras‑pαra‑parihara‑sthitα，−lak$α。
α）at the same time ( ekαda), how can・
・
・109)
〔anatom〕beof a single nature (eka‑svabhavata) ?
〔I‑2〕官・・thesecond C蹴 where〔the knowable (viz., an atom〕） is surrounded 〔byatoms with intervals remaining between them，〕 even though contact (sα
m
ゆαぽα）with the same sorts (sαmanα−jiitiyα〉〔of (110) MAP P95a8‑95b2 D92b7‑93a1phyogs gfiis pa ltar na yari rigs mthun1 pa rnams clan reg par mi clod du chug
2……2
kyari / phrag ni snaii :la daii mun pai Iio ho yin pai phyir rigs mi mthun pa snaii ba daft 3 mun pai rdul phra rah rnams da企nireg par clod pa負id do / snaii bas mnon pai mun pa daii bral ba fiid dam4 / mun pas gnas su ma byas pai snari ha dari bral ba負idni rigs pa daft ldan pa ma yin ・ te / de gftis5 byuri ba ni yul la sogs pa phan tshun bral ba tsam la rag las pai phyir ro / 1. p thun pa 2. P noi 3. D has / 4. P clan 5. P de ii.id
MAV P55a6ー7D59a5
bar yod pa yan bar dag tu snan ba dari mun pai rdul phra rab rnams kyi go skabs yod par gyur te / phrag ni mun pa dari snari bai bdag fiid yin pai phyir de dag clan byar bar gyur ro /
‑40ー
atoms〕isnot acknowledged，〔contact〕withthe different sort (vijatiya) of atoms (parαma'JJ,u) of light (alokα） and darkness (tamas) is necessa‑ rily acknowledged since the dividing space (chidra) has both the natures of light and darkness (alokα−tamo‑rupatvat). This is because it is not reasonable that a location which is not reached （αSαmakrantα，〉 by light (alokα） is devoid of darkness (tαmαs) or that a location which is not covered （αn一aspαdi‑
This is why the two〔viz.,light and darkness〕produce an inevitable connection (pratibaddhα） only at the location, and so forth separated
・
・
・110)
from each other. In the same way, the same error (do$α） as stated immediately above would follow that.
If the connection (sa仰ゆαrsα）with different sorts (vijatiya）〔ofatoms〕 is not acknowledged, then the atom in the center (mαdhyαuαrtin) either
〔I‑2‑1〕faces,by a single nature, one atom and all other atoms in the
V町 sameway, or〔I‑2‑2〕facesall the other atoms in different way
よ
Thus there are two alternative (vikα争α）ways of dealing with the problem.
(111) MAP P95b4‑5 D93a3
de la dbus na yod pai rdul phra rah gari yin pa de ran bzin gari gis rdul phra rah gcig la bltas te gnas pa de fiid kyis gzan la bltas sam ／on te ma yin zes bya ba brtag pa gfiis so /
MAK. XI cd M A V P55as D59a6‑7
dbus gnas rdul phran rdul gcig la // bltas pai ran bzin gari yin pa / TS 1989 cd
ekai:iuabhimukharh rupa血 yadal)or madhavarttinal;i / MAK. XII M A V P55bl D59a7
rdul phran gzan la lta ba yari / / de fiid gal te yin brjod na / / de lta yin na de lta bu / / sa chu la sogs rgyas 'gyur ram / /
TS 1990
al)vantarabhimukhyena ted eva yadi kalpyate / pracayo bhudharadinam evam sati na yujyate //
‑ 4 1 ‑
梯教大事大皐院研究紀要第12競
〔I‑2‑1〕Inthe case. of the first :
〔Major〕： Whatever has an intrinsic nature which faces the other atom of a single nature (ekα−
r u
ρα） would occupy a same spot ( ekα−
desa）〔thatthe surrounding atoms occupy〕： e. g. the very atom 〔inthe center〕would occupy the same spot that the atom in the front occupies.〔Minor〕：All the surrounding (pαrivarakα〉〔atoms〕have a nature which faces a single atom ( ekα
−
pαrama'}Ju).〔Conclusion:Therefore, all the surrounding atoms occupy the same spot.〕
〔Thisis an inference〕formulated on the logical characteristic of
・
・
・112)
essential identity (mαbhavα
−
hetu). The logical reason (hetu) of this inference has not the fallacy of inadmissibleness （αsiddhαta), since it〔theatom in the center〕is acknowledged to face 〔anotheratom〕by having the very same nature. Neither is this contradictory (viruddhαta), since the logical reason (hetu) is present in homogeneous examples
C s
α，pa
勾α．〉ち
：
theother hand, if〔thesurrounding atoms〕occupypoints different (112) MAP P95b7‑8 D93a5‑6sbyor ba ni rdul phra rab kyi no bo gcig la bltas pai rail bzin gan yin pa de ni phyogs gcig pa can yin te / dper na dbus na gnas pai rdul phra rab de ftid kyi sar phyogs na gnas pai rdul phra rab lta buam sar phyogs kyi khan la khan pa gcig bltas pa lta bu ste / bskor bai rdul phra rab thams cad kyan rdul phra rah gcig la bltas pai rail bzin yin pasゑesbya ha ni ran bzin gyi gtan tshigs so // 1. Pom.
(113) MAP P95b8‑96a2 D93a6ー7
phyogs tha dad pa na gnas pa yin na ni milon par clod pai rdul phra rab gcig pu la bltas pa'i ran b乏indag tu mi gyur te / rdul phra rah te la ran bzin gzan med pai phyir ro / / ran bzin med na bltas pa yan mi run hai phyir gtan tshigs ma Iies pa ftid ma yin no / / dei phyir yaii dag par na1 bskor te gnas pa med pas rdul phra rab rnams rgyas par mi gyur ro / / 1. P om.
‑ 42ー
from (bhinnα−desα） one another, it would be impossible for them to face the single atom which is sought. This is because that atom does not have a diverse nature （α:pαra1りαra‑svαbhiiva).Neither is the logical reason (hetu) inconclusive （αnaikantikαta), since it is not reasonable to face one another, if devoid of identity (svαbhavα，）. Therefore, the surrounding (parivarakα） atoms would be located at the same point (ekα−desαta) because 〔theatom in the center〕islacking the condition
・
・
・113)
to be surrounded 匂αrivaryavαsthαnα）.When an assemblage (pracayα〉
〔ofatoms〕does not exist from the standpoint of the highest truth (tα，ttvatas), it is not reasonable for the atom (pαrama1Ju) to be acknow‑
ledged as having a single nature (ekα−svabhavα，） simply because of their being devoid of the effect （αrthα
わか
a)that is to be proved (sadhyα ．）〔I‑2‑2〕Thenin the second case, since the atom 〔in the center〕 separately faces and combines with the other atoms having a different nature from one another, it would have portions (savα，yαuαta). Therefore, it is just evident加 atoms are devoid of a single nature （伽tvaj. This is because the discrimination of an entity (vastu‑bheda) is defined by its having an intrinsic nature (svαbhavα−bhedα，．〉
〔I‑3〕Onthe other hand，〔I‑3‑1〕ifyou maintain the third alternative (114) MAK XIII M A V P55b4‑s D59a3
rdul phran g乏anla lta hai nos // gal te gzan du dod. na ni // rah tu phra1 rdul ji lta bur I I gcig pu cha sas med par 'gyur I I l. MAK. P. phra bai TS 1991
anvantarabhimukhyena riipa血 cedanyad i号yate
I
katharh nama bhaved ekah paramaQ.us tatha sati I IMAP P96a2‑3 D93a7‑93b1
phyogs gfiis pa ltar na yan yan lag dan bcas pa fiid du thal bar gyur bar gsal bar1 bdag gis rnam par ma phyeo I I 1. D has rab tu
(115) MAV P55a7 D59as‑6
bar med pai phyogs kyan byar bai phyogs dan tha dad pa med pa負id de/
‑ 43 ‑
｛弗教大事大事院研究紀要第12披
where 〔anatom in the center〕issurrounded by atoms without intervals remaining between them (nairantaryα〉，〔thenature of the atom in the center〕isdecided by the side which is combined (sαinyoga‑pak$α．〉
'Having no interval (nairantα，ryα〉 is a synonym of combination (sa的yog，α）＇.
This is because there is no other alternative (gα，ti) for a thing which is devoid of intermediate space (antarala‑deお） except mutual combina‑
(116)
tion (paraψαrsainsle$α）. Even though the same sense is expressed by other words ぽαbdα，，）it does not mean to exist in a different manner
（αnyαtha). This is because otherwise unsuitable consequences would follow (at争rasa先:gat).
〔I‑3‑2〕
〔Objection〕： Onthe other hand, only that uncombined （αsainyukta)
(117)
atom is surrounded by the many stoms which occupy an adjacent location
(118)
(samipαtαra‑desavαsthitα） which should be called the side (dik‑sαbda‑
vacyα．〉
〔Answer〕：Itis not reasonable. This is because this word 〔side〕 is not established in practice （αrthavαtta) when this side and that side (arvak‑para‑bhaga) do not exist 〔inatom．〕
bar med pa ni phrag med pao I I phrad pa dan byar ba乏es bya ba ni don tha dad pa ma yin te /
(116) W paraゆαfαsarhslefamuktvii,V Pαrasparasarhsle~a幼 muktvii
(117) This atomic theory is also a theory of the Sautrantika. cf. Yuichi Kajiya・
ma. ibid. Note 5. p. 40.
Yuichi Kajima. Sonzai to Chishiki‑BukkyδTetsugaku Shoha no Ronsδ一存在と 知識一仏教哲学諸派の論争−II.(Existence and Cognition‑Debates of the Budd・ hist Philosophical Schools) Kyδryδbu no Konponteki Tachiba (the Fundamental position of the Sautrantika school). Journal of Philosophical Studies (Tetsugaku Kenkyu哲学研究） No. 505. (1967), p. 1153.
(118) V. samipetar，α
‑44‑
〔I‑4〕
(119．．・
〔Objection〕：Whateveris determined to have a different nature by another thing is false （αsαt) from the point of reality: e. g. distinctions
(119a） …119)
such as this side" and that side" (para1うaradi‑bheda‑vαt).According to this reasoning，〔anatom〕isnot truly endowed with portions (sava‑ ツα℃αt℃α．〉
〔Answer：〕〔Your statement〕is incorrect. This is because it is impossible for those who admit the external world Oαhir‑arthαvadin) to
(120… …120
confuse this with that due to distinctions of mutual relation ( vyape勾a‑
bhedα） : e. g. father and his son.
Only the true (tattvikα） should be acknowledged as a nature (ruρα〉． This is because when it is the further shore （ρar，α） that depends on
(121)
something, it is never the nearer shore （αpara) that depends on it〔the further shore．〕
Otherwise, how can the two which are called the nearer and further
(122)
shoresく企αrapαrabhidhanα
−
tα？
α）exist without the confusionくαsii仇 初ry.α〉(123)
when both the nearer and further shores are not established from the point of view of absolute truth （αpar，αmarthikatvα〉？
(119) I cannot identify this source. cf. MK. XIV‑5
anyad anyat prati:tyanyan nanyad anyad rte nyatal;t / yatprati:tya ca yat tasmat tad anyan nopapadyate / /
MK. XVIII‑10
prati:tya yad yad bhavati na hi tavat tad eva tat / na canyad api tat tasman nocchinnaril napi句会vata血／／
(119a) Read piiriipiira according to〔V〕．〔W〕haspiiriiviira. (120) Read piiriipiira according to〔V〕．〔W〕haspiiriiviira. (121) Read αρiiram according to〔V〕．〔W〕hasapiiram. (122) Read piirapiira according to〔V〕．〔w〕hasρaraviira. (] 23) Read parapiira according to〔V〕．〔W〕hasparavara.
‑ 45ー
俳教大事大事院研究紀要第12競
This is because it is said that the other thing from what is thought to be the further shore (parlibhimαtα） is none other than the nearer
く124) (125)
shore 〈αparatva)which 〔you〕wantto call (viv.αk$itα） the nearer shore. If it (viz., the further shore) is also thought to be a thing which is imagined, the two ( viz., the nearer and the further shore) would be identical 〈αikyα）. And in the same way things which are dependent upon something 〔viz.,the nearer shore〕（tad‑asritα）would not exist without confusion 〈αsαmkir'JJ,α）. This is because distinction (bhed，α） which is produced by thought‑construction (kal,panoparacito) is not an essential component of efficiency （αrthαkriylHzgα，．〉
〔II〕
(201・・−
That thing which is established by itself (svαta/J siddhα−rupa) IS
none other than nondual cognition （αdvαyαmjnanαm) which has a single nature ( ekα
−
svabhavα） and which is separate from the relationship pertaining between cognitum and cognizer (grahyα−grahaka‑bhava‑rahita) from the standpoint of highest truth (paramarthatαs), because : 1) an object (vi~αya) exists by means of perception (sαmvedanα ，） 2) (]24) Read aparatvam according to〔V〕．〔W〕hasαvaratvam.
(125) Read aparasya according to〔V〕．〔W〕hasαvarasya. く201) cf. MAV P61 a 7 ‑6J b1 D64b6‑7
ran gi sde pa sems tsam gyi tshul la brten pa blo gros dkar ba1 gan dag rnam par会espa ni mthun pai bag chags yons su smin pa la rag las nas byu白ste
I
byuri ma thag tu jig pa dan don du tshor bar bya ba dali tshor ha poi rnam pa med do zes smra ba de dag gi lugs la dogs pa bsu ste / ] . D pa
Santarak号itasums up his view of the Y ogacara‑school before beginning his refutation of the view of the Satyakara and Ali:kakara‑vadins.
I take up the views of Yog互cara‑schoolthat hold that cognition (vij必ana)is produced by the force of the maturation of latent impressions (vasanii), and these arise in succession. Immediately after being produced, cognition perishes. In truth，〔theY ogacaras maintain〕the images (iikiira) of the perceived and the perceiver〔producedby the force of latent impressions〕arenqn‑existent.
‑ 46ー
an object （αrthα） is entirely invisible 〈αtyanta‑parok$αtviit)when it is not being perceived, 3) a particular adapted effect is produced （ρrati・
niyαtasya kiiryαsyodayiit) by means of the immediately preceding moment of mind (sαmanantara‑pratyaya), 4) it is impossible to conceive of
〔theproduction of a particular adapted effect〕whenits (the immediately preceding moment of mind) is excluded.
This is because if〔nondualknowledge〕weredevoid of cause （αhetu‑ hαtve ), it would always exist, etc.
Because it is impossible that an eternal thing (nityatvα） has efficiency
（αrthakriyii), etc., a thing which perishes as soon as it has been produced (udayanαntαrapav，αrgin) has a connection with its own cause (sva‑hetu).
(202・・・
Images (iikiira) merely manifest there (viz., in that cognition) by means of the maturation of latent impressions which adhere to a thing which has been existing as an entity in the world of transmigration since the beginningless past （αniidi‑bhαuα−bhiivi‑bhiivabhinivesα−viisanii‑
・
・
・202)
par争iikα−prabhiiviit).
Therefore, Y ogacaras consider that an entity (bhiivα，） consists of
・
・
・201〕
cognition (jfiiinatmakα ．）
In this case also，〔Yogacaras〕discriminate between 〔II‑1〕those images ( iikiira）〔ofcognition〕whichare real (tattvika）；〔II‑2〕those
(202) cf. MAK. XLIV. MAV P61b1 D64b7
ji ste thog ma med rgyud kyi // bag chags smin pas sprul pa yi // rnam pa
<lag ni snail ha yan // nor bas sgyu mai ran bzin dra // MAV P61b3 D65a2
dmigs pa bden par clod pai ses pa la snail bai rnam pa di <lag kyaii thogs ma med pai srid parbyun ba can dnos po la mnon par zen pai bag chags yo白Ssu smin pai mthus snail no / /
司4a品官
梯数大事大事院研究紀要第12競
which are satisfactory as long as they are not examined by any means (203) (203a)
（αvicaraika‑ramya) such as reflection (pratibimba ), etc.
〔II‑1〕Letus suppose that those images (akara) are real. (204・・・
〔II‑1‑A〕Inthat case, since cognition (vijnanα） is inseparable from images ( akara) which are real (tattvika) and manifold （αneka), it (viz.,
(204a〕
cognition) would become manifold
（
αnekatva ), like the nature of images (akiiriα−svarupαVαt), how could it〔cognition〕bea unity (ekta) ?On the other hand, if cognition ( vij先anα）can be defined as having a unity (ekatvα） since it is perceptible for only one moment (sakrt),
(204b)
then it is hard to avoid the problem that images (akara) would become a unity (ekatvα ，） like the nature of cognition (vij先ana‑svαrupαuαt),
・
・
・204) because they are inseparable from a unitary cognition (eka‑j元anα．〉
〔objection〕：Itis so.
〔II‑1‑A‑1〕
(203) MAK, XLV. MAV P61b4 D65a2‑3
de dge1 on kyari de dag gi3 //2 drios de yari dag fiid dam ci ／／on te ma brtags gcig pu na / / dga' a bar khas len di bsam mo / / 1. Reform dge from dαg according to MAP (P107a1, D102b勺2.D. MAK, MAV have / 3. M A V P. has gis MAV P62a1‑2 D65a7
on kyaii 'di la dpyad par bya cuii zad tsam di yod de / ci rnam pa de dag de kho na fiid yin nam on te ci gzugs brfian la sogs pa ltar ma brtags pa gcig pu na dgaa ba zig yin /1 1. p om.
(203a）〔W〕pratibimbaka〔V〕pratibimba (204) MAK, XLVI. MAV P62a2‑s D65a7‑bl
gal te yari dag rnam par ses / / du mar gyur ro ya会 na ni / / de dag gcig 'gyur 'gal ldan pas / / gdon mi za bar so sor 'gyur / /
MAV P62a3‑4 D65b1‑2
yari dag pai rnam pa dari tha dad pa ma yin pas rnam pai rari gi rio bo bzin du rnam par五espa du mar gyur baam yari na rnam par ses pa gcig pu clan tha mi dad pas rnam pa rnams kyari rnam par ses pai rari gi rio bo bzin du gcig pu負iddu gyur ba bzlog par dkao1 / / 1. P has dkαα o
(204a）〔W〕anekaitva〔V〕anekatva (204b）〔W〕durnivararh〔V〕durnirv互ram
‑ 48
一
〔Answer〕：Thisis incorrect.
(205・・・
This is because if one image ( iikiira) manifests as a thing which has a quality which is unstable, etc. (calanαtvadi‑visi$fα） , then the rest of the images also would have the very same nature (tαthii‑vidhii ev，α） as the former image (purvakiira), because both of them would have an undifferentiated nature (avyatiricyamiina‑murti‑wαbhiivα，tvα．〉
Therefore, it is contradictory that 〔cognition which has a unitary nature〕perceivesa manifold of images ( vaictryakiira).
Hence, because it follows that images (iikiira), which are not only various (niiniitva) but also particular （αikantikα ，） are incompatibly combined with each other (pα mゆαra‑viruddha‑dhαrmadhyasα−yogat) as both a unitary and a manifold nature (ekanekatvayo/J), then the variety (naniitva) of both images (iikiirα，） and cognition ( vijfiiina) could be proven as a highest truth (piiramiir幼ika).
Because of this, the acknowledged doctrine of non‑duality （αbhyupα−
gatadvayαnαyα） would be disproved.
〔II‑1‑A‑2〕If〔you〕thinkthat〔we〕neverfall into such mistakes as (205) MAK. XLVII MAV P62a5‑6 D65b2‑3
rnam pa tha dad ma yin na // g•yo daii mi g•yo la sogs la1 // gcig gis2 thams cad g • yo la sogs / / thal bar gyur te lan3 gdab dkaa // 1. M A V D. pa 2. P. MAV gi 3. D. MAV len
MAV P62a6ー7D65b3‑4
tha dad pa ma yin zes bya ba ni de負idyin no zes bstan par gyur ro I I de bas na gal te rnam pa gcig g•yo ba la sogs pai byed pa zin tam / ser po la sogs pai bdag ii.id du gyur na lhag ma rnams kyaii rnam pa de lta bur 'gyur ro I I de lta ma yin na gdon mi za bar sna tshogs fl.id du gyur ro I I (206) M A V P62a8‑62b1 D65b5‑s
gaii dag1 bde ba la sogs pa ltar s企onpo la sogs pai rnam pa rnams kyaii myo合
bai bdag ii.id kho na ste /2 ses pa de dag ni man la de dag kyan rigs mthun3 pa sa stag ste / rigs mi mthun pa'i ses pa bzin du byun Iio zes smra ba de dag gi ni I I ]. P om. 2. D om. 3. P has 'thun pa
‑ 49 ‑
併教大事大事院研究紀要第12挽
stated above because oneness (eka) is not understood as manifoldness (citratva) on the ground that images (akara) such as the color blue, etc., like happiness (sukhα ，）etc. are none other than a thing which consists of immediate experience （αnubhαuα ，）and if〔you〕explainthat diverse cognitions (vij宛anα）of the same kind (samanajatiyα） occur simultaneously like different kinds of cognition (vijatiya‑j先anavαt),you would commit another mistake (do手a).
This is because the cognition (vijfianα ，） which is thought to be situated in the center (madhyα ，）is acknowledged to be like an atom
（α1Ju) which is surrounded 〔byother atoms．〕
We can divide it〔intotwo cases〕：〔II‑1‑A‑2‑1〕Whether，〔likean atom in the center，〕itfaces by nature the other 〔cognitions〕in the very same manner that it faces a single O初〉〔cognition),or〔II‑1‑A‑
・
・
・207〕
2‑2〕whetherit faces other surrounding cognitions in a different manner?
〔II‑1‑A‑2‑1〕Letus suppose that it faces 〔by a single nature the other cognitions〕in the very same manner 〔that it faces a single cognition〕.Since 〔thecognition in the ce!lter〕is not situated in the point where it could be surrounded by the others, it is incorrect that others would mutually occupy the different point.
Therefore, it would be impossible that a thing which does not exist as possessing the directions ( dなbhag，α）of front and back (purvapαra), etc. manifests in the form of a circle (mα1J4ala) of blue, etc.
〔II1‑A‑2‑2〕Letus suppose that 〔itfaces other surrounding cogni‑ (207) MAV P63a1‑2 D66a4‑s
di ltar dbus su clod pai rnam par ses pa rdul gyis bskor ha lta bur clod pa gat'l yin pa dei
r a n
bzin gat'l gis gcig la mt'lon du phyogs pa de iiid kyis ci gzan la yat'l phyogs sam on te gzan gyis1 phyogs zes rnam par rtog pai負espa de iiid do / 1. D has gyi‑50‑
tions〕ina different manner.
How can it〔viz.,cognition〕havea single nature (ekata) since the distinction of a thing ( vastubhed，α） is defined by means of it having its own nature (svabhavα，bhed，α〉？
(208・・・
Therefore, the errors (do$α） which were found in the case of exami‑
ning an atom (pαramti'JJ,u) would pertain to this case, also.
〔II‑1‑A‑2‑3〕
〔bjection〕：Cognitions(jniina) do not have a front part or a back part (pαurvliparya) which consists of points ( de手α）because of their immateriality (amurtatviit).
Therefore, how can cognitions (jniinα） be located in the center (madhya) in the very same way as atoms （α'J},uvat) ?
〔Answer〕：Althoughyour opinion 〔thatcognition is different from an atom by nature〕istrue (sαtyα ，）it (viz., your statement) contains another kind of error (do$a).
Cognitions (jniina), since you have admitted that images (iikiira) manifesting extension C desα−vitiinα） are true (sα，tyαtvα ，） would be
(209)
regarded as if they manifested with extension ( desa‑vitiinα） in as far as they are multiple (bahu) but contrary to the fact that they do no occupy space （αdesα） • Otherwise, even though the appearance of manifold cognition ( anekα‑jniinα） is allowed, a thing which manifests by appearing as an extension (desa‑vitiinα） like 〔anatom〕would be false (mithyii).
(208) MAK. XLIX M A V P62b7‑s D66a3‑4
ci1 ste rnam pai graiis bzin du // rnam par ses pa khas len na // de tshe rdul phran 'drar2 gyur ba3 // dpyad pa di la4 bzlog par dkaa// 1. MAK.D ji 2. P. MAV dra 3. P. MAV bar 4. MAK. P. D. las
(209）〔W〕desavitanotpadal;i〔V〕desavitanasthanenotpad功
‑51‑
梯教大事大事院研究紀要第12競
In this case, allowing the appearance (u
ψ
iidα） of manifold cognition〈αneka‑vij宛iina)would be definitely meaningless （りαrtha）〔if the various manifestations of cognitions do not mean their having extension．〕
And the perception of the color blue, etc.〔withoutextension〕being different from manifestation (pratibhiis.α） of the color blue, etc. which has extension ( desα−vitiina) would not be true (sαtyα．〉
And if they (viz., the color blue together with extension) are unreal
(210)
（αlikatvα， ，）what else would be true (sαtyα〉？ Therefore, whatsoever is this ?
〔II‑l‑A‑2‑4〕
(211・・・
〔Objection〕： Atoms（α1J,u) have material bodies (murtα）. while cognition (vijniinα） is immaterial （αmurtα，．〉
In this case (viz., of cognition) how is there the very same error (do$α） that〔theatomic theory] 'i~as?
〔Answer〕： Thereis never an error ( do$α〉〔if we treat a fault concerning atoms as one of cognition．〕
(212・・・
This is because the color blue, etc. which manifests as a unity (ekα） without intervals (nairantaryα） is definitely understood as being compo‑
sed of atoms (pαramii苧v‑iitmaka).
co:h‑erwise, a thing which is thought of as the nature of cognition (210）〔W〕ali:katve〔V〕ali:kakatve
(211) MAP P109b3 D105a3
rdul phra rah rnams ni lus can yin la rnam p紅 白spa ni lus can ma1 yin pa ma yin nam / de ji ltar na dir fies pa di負iddu 'gyur siiam pa la / 1. P om. (212) MAV P63a3‑4 D66a6
siion po la sogs pa bar med par snaii ba de iiid kha cig ni rdul phra rah kyi bdag iiid du khas len /
く213) MAP P109b4‑6 D105a4‑5
miti tsam tha dad pa haa zig tu zed kyi / yuldab chags par gnas pai mtshan
‑52‑
(sα幼vid‑rupa).is definitely distinguished as name‑only (nama‑matra).
However, there is no difference between a thing which is characterized by continuous extension (desα−nairantaryα〉〔and an atom〕. A thing which exists by virtue of function （ρravrtti) as name‑only (namα
−
matra) is not subject to the same error (tulya‑do$αta）〔thatan atom is，〕 but that which exists as continuous extension is subject to the same error.Its 〔continuousextension〕isalso an attribute of a thing which is distinguished as name‑only.
Therefore, why shouldnt the same error〔as in atomic theory〕be found 〔incognition〕？
〔II‑1‑A‑2‑5〕（Conclusion)
〔Objection〕：Because,even so, the cognition (jnanα） and the cogni‑ zable (jneya) are not similar ( vαisadrsyα ，） and refutation (dil$a1J,a) pertaining to the cognizable (j先eya)is not admitted for the cognition (j舟ana).
〔Answer〕： Inthis case also, we reply that if multiple cognition
〈αnekajnanα）occurs at the same time (yugapad), discrimination (vikalpa) which is the recognition of an object (vi$αyα） such as a pot or cloth, etc. would not be secondary (krcimαbhiivin).
〔Therefore,discrimination (vikalpα） would come to be produced with perception at the same time.〕
It is impossible to say that only cognitions, having no thought‑const‑ ruction (nirvikα
か
αhα一jnanα，）occur at the same time (yougapαd) since flid kyi don la ni tha dad pa med do / / min tsam la jug pai sgos byas pai fies pa mtshu合spar bsgrub1 pa ni ma yin gyi / yuldab chags par gnas pas2 byas pai負espa mtshuiis par byed pa de la ya企mintha dad pa yod kyali j i ltar fies pa mtshuiis par mi gyur zes bya ha yin no / / 1. P has sgrub 2. P has par‑53 ‑
併教大事大事院研究紀要第12強
discrimination(vikalpa) is produced by means of a determined immediate experience (anubhαuαniscaya).
Therefore, these imaginary thoughts Oα争αnii)are indeed not produced as something with an unknowable nature （αsαmviditα−rupα） of their own (svayαm).
So 〔ifmultiple cognition is produced at the same time, as you say
J ,
it would mean that a direct experience （αnubhαva) is determind imme‑
diately (sakrt)〔includingimaginary thoughts〕. Accordingly, it could not be that discrimination (vikα争α）is perceived as a secondary thing (kramαbhiivin） 〔butthat this discrimination is simultaneously determined along with perception．〕
As a result 〔yourstatement〕involvesa contradiction with respect to direct perception (pratyak$α
−
virodhα．〉〔This is because direct perception (pratyαh手α）is defined as a
(214)
cognition having no discrimination.〕
〔II‑1‑B〕
〔II‑1‑B‑1〕
〔Objection〕：A single cognition definitely (ekαm
m α
vij先iinαm)grasps manifold nature (citra‑rupa) just as in the case of the manifestation (pratibhiis，α） of a jewel which is dark‑blue in color (mecαhα−mα。
i).〔Answer〕：Yourstatement is incorrect. The reason is as follows :
(216・・・
〔Major〕：Whatever is manifold (citra) is not single (ekα） : e.
g .
(214) NB, I. 4. ibid. Note. 43. (215) MAV P63a4‑5 D66a7
gari du nor bu gzi bzin du rnam par ses pa gcig kho nas sna tshogs kyi rio ho bla企sso zes bya de dag gi ・ lugs la dogs pa brjqd pa /
(216) MAP P110a3‑4 D105b1‑3
‑ 54ー
notion (pratyαyα） in the plural stream of consciousness (niinii‑samtiinα．〉
〔Minor〕：Thiscognition (vijniinα） is manifold (citra).
〔Conclusion:This cognition is not single.〕
This inference is based on the . principle of the perception of in com‑
patibi弘 匂 ヤiruddhopalα，:bdhi).
The logical reason (hetu) of this inference is not inadmissible
〈αsiddha), since 〔cognition〕isperceived as a manifold nature (citrava). Neither is this contradictory (viruddhα ，） since it is present in
・
・
・216)
homogeneous examples (sapα勾α．〉
〔II‑1‑B‑2〕
〔Objection〕：Whyshould manifoldness (citra) and unity (ekαtva) be incompatible ( virodhα） , since manifoldness ( citratva) manifests as a unity (ekatvα〉？
(2I7・・・
〔Answer：〕〔Yourstatement is not correct〕becausethere is no other sbyor ba ni gari乏igsna tahogs yin pa de ni gcig pu ma yin te / dper na rin po che rigs sna tshogs pa lta bu'am / dper na sems kyi1 rgyud sna tshogs la yod pai ses pa dag lta bu yin no / / rnam par免spa di yari sna tshogs pa2
3
…
3yin te / ra白b乏in gal ha dmigs pa yin no / ／di la ji ltar gal ha grub sfiam pa la / 1. 2. 3. P om.
(217) MAP P110a4‑8 D105b3‑6
rari b乏insna tshogs pa ma gtogs pa gzan sna tshogs pai sgrar brjod par bya ha ni med do / / sna tshogs pa dari gcig pa gfi.is kyari Iio bo phan tshun rnam par bcad1 pa med na med pa yin pai phyir phan tshun spans te gnas pai mtshan fi.id kyi gal ha yin pas gal ba grub2 po ／gal ha gfi.is kya白 rari bzin gcig3 pa fi.id yin na ni gro ba mthaa dag rdzas gcig tu gyur te / dei phyir lhan cig skye ba dari jig pa la sogs par thal bar gyur ha b zlog dkao II de lta ma yin na ni gcig ces bya ba miri tsam kho nar 'gyur te / mi白lani brtsad pa med pas gtan tshigs ma ries pa fi.id ma yin te / dpe4 rin po che rigs sna tshogs ni nam mkha'i gos can gyi lugs kyis blta bar byai / rnal byor spyod pai lugs kyis ni ma yin te / rnal byor spyod pa la ni 5 rin po che ma grub pai phyir ro I I l. P gcad 2. D grub 3. P cig 4. D dper na 5. P om. PV. II. 208
citravabhase甲varthe号uyady ekatvalh na yujyate / saiva tavat kathalil buddhir eka citravabhasini I I
RU RU
｛弗教大事大事院研究紀要第12挽
meaning of the word manifoldness（ citra) except for a plural nature"
（ηana‑sv.αbhavα）. Because variation (nana) and singless (ekαtva) constitute an invariable relation (nantariyakαtva), which are opposites by their own nature （αnyonyα
−
svarupa‑vyav.αcched，α〉；〔thus,these two〕 are contradictory 〔terms〕 （virodha) which are mutually exclusive (para学αra‑pαrihara‑sthiti‑lak手a'JJ,a). As a result, incompatibility (viro・ dha) is established 〔inyour statement．〕If the two, which are contradictory (viruddha), exist as a single nature (eka‑svabhav.αtvα， ，）then all the universe (sakαla的visvam)would be a single substance ( ekα
m
dravyαm).Therefore，〔givensuch reasoning〕itwould be hard to avoid (durni‑ vara）〔aconclusion〕thatsuch would mean that〔onething〕has both the characteristics of production (uφada) and destruction ( vinasα ，）etc. at the same time (sα，hα〉．
Otherwise, the singleness (eka) is none other than name‑only (nama‑
miitra). Neither is this logical reason (hetu) inconclusive (anαikantikαtii), since there is no dispute ( vivadα，） with respect to name (niima).
You must not say that, first of all, the manifestation (pratibhas，α） of a jewel which has a dark‑blue color (mecαhα
−
ma'JJ,i) is established as・
・
・217)
an example (dr$fantα．〉
Even in this case, this is because 〔athing which consists of a single nature〕isincapable of such things as manifesting （αvabhasitvα） plural nature (nanii‑rupα） on the ground that a single nature is not pervaded
（αvyaptαtva) by various natures (nanii‑rupαtii）
〔
since these two are mutually exclusive.〕Therefore，〔thatreasoning〕involvesthe same kind of criticism (tuらぽー pαryanuyogα，tva）〔thatwas stated above.〕
‑56‑
〔II‑1‑B‑3〕（Conclusion1)
〔Objection〕：Itis not recognized that by direct perception （ρrαtyak$a) such things as the color blue, which appear before us (pratibhiisamiina), are distinguished (bheda) from a thing which exists in another place caesα） and time (kiilα，．〉
This is because X is not perceived as different (bhinna) from Y because of the absence of the manifestation （αpratibhiisαnα） of two 〔di‑ stinguisha ble〕things〔indirect perception (pratyak$a) at the same time．〕
Even if X is not differentiated from Y, since they manifest at the same time and place (s，αmana‑kiila‑desα ，） there is such a cognition
（ρratyaya). This is because direct perception （ρratyak手α）can not ascertain 〔distinction〕onaccount of the absence of thought‑construction (nirvikα争α．〉
Therefore, a cognition which is both manifold and non‑dual at the same time ( citrlidvαyα） manifests as a single nature (eka‑ruρα） in direct perception (pratyαh手α，） since distinction (bhed，α） between the things perceived (griihya) and between both the perceived and the perceiver (griihya‑griihakα） are not mutually perceived.
〔Answer：〕〔Yourstatement〕isrefuted as follows : This is because unity (ekα） is incompatible with manifoldness (citratva).
〔II‑1‑B‑4〕（Conclusion2)
〔Objection〕：Manifoldness( citrα，） also is single ( ekα） since concent‑ ration (yogα，） and tranquility (k$emα） are not distinguished （αbhinnα．〉
〔Answer〕：Yourstatement is not reasonable （αyukta). This is because it is contradictory (virodhα） that something ( viz., manifoldness) has a single nature ( ekαtva) because of possessing a mutually distinctive nature C vyavrtta‑rupatvα）. And that concentration (yog.α） and tranquility
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