The Yogacara-madhyamika R
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Moriyama
CONTENTS 1.Abbreviations. 2. Introduction. § 1.Kamalasi:la’s and Haribhadra’s philosophical point of view. § 2. Haribhadra’
s Abhisαmayiilarhkiiriilokii Prajiiiipiiramitiivyiikhyii (AAPV).3. Kamalasila
’
s and Hari bhadra’
s refutation of the Satyakara and Al1・ kakara-vadins. I.The characteristics of these two schools. I.A. The theory of Satyakara-vadin. I.B. The theory of Al1kakara-vadin. II. The method of refutation. III. The essential focus of the refutation. III. A. The focus of the refutation of the view of Satyakara-vadin. III. A. A. Refutation of the view of CITRADV A YA.III. B. The focus of the refutation of the view of Al1kakara-vadin. IV. Conclusion. 4. Contents of Portions of Haribhadra’s Abhisamayiila的kiiriilokiiPrajiiii -piiramittivyiikhyti. 5. Translation with Annotations. 1
-梯教大皐大事院研究紀要第12競 1. ABBREVIATIONS AAPV ・. . :.Abhis.amαyala仇kariilokii. Prajiiiipiiramitiivyiikhyiiof Harib・ hadra. BCAP : Bodhicαryiivatiirapa先Uikiiof Prajfiakaramati, ed. by P.L. Vaidya, BST, No. 12. Bh K : Bhiivaniikramαof Karnalasila, Minor Buddhist Texts part I & II, ed. by G. Tucci 1798 Rinsen Book Company Kyoto. BhK
p :
Bkiivαniikramα，ch. II. P. Vol. 102, D. No. 3916. BhK III : ThirdBhiivaniikramα. Minor Buddhist Texts, part III., SOR XLIII, Roma 1971. Bibl. Bud. : Bibliotheca Buddhica. Bibl. Ind. : Biblitheca Indica. ~ST : Buddhist Sanskrit Texts, Darbhanga. C : The Co ne edition,U.S.A.,IASWR.D : The sDe dge edition, preserved at the Faculty of Letters, University of Tokyo, ed. by Hayashirna, Takasaki, Yarnagu・ chi, and Ejirna.
HOS : HARV ARD ORIENT AL SERIES, ed by Daniel H. H. Ingalls.
JIBS : Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies (Indogaku Bukkyδ・ gaku Kenkyu), Tokyo.
LAS : Lankavatiira-Sutra,ed. by Bunyu Nanjo.
MAK :Mαdhyαmakiilamkiira-kiirikiiof S五ntarak~ita (P. No. 5258. Vol. 101. Sa48b7-52b1 D. No. 3884. Sa53a1-56b3).
Mal : Madhyamakiilokiiniimαof Karnalasila (P. No. 5287. Vol. 101. Sa 143b2-275a4 D. No. 3887. Sa133b4-244a7).
MAP : Madhyαmakiilamkara-paiijikiiof Kamalasila (P. No. 5287. Vol. 101. Sa 84b7-143b2 D. No. 3887. Sa84a1-133b4).
MAV : Madhy.αmakala1カkiirα，
−
vrttiof Santarak号ita (P. No. 5285. Vol. 101. Sa 52b1-84b7 D. No. 3885. Sa56b4-84a1).M K : Madhyαmakα
−
karikiisde N五g互rjunaavec laPrasannαραdii commentaire de Candrakirti, pub. par Louis de la Vallee Poussin, Bihl. Bud. IV. 1903-1913.M M K : Mftlamαdhyamakα
−
kiirikiiof Nag五rjuna,Bihl. Bud. IV. N : The sNar-than edition, preserved at Kyoto University andToyobunko. NB : Nyayαbinduof Dharmakirti. om : The edition omits the letter or the word. P : The Peking edition ed. by Daisetz Suzuki. PV : Prama1Jαvartikα
−
kiirikaof Dharmakirti. SDK : Sαtyαdvαyαvibhαえ：ga-karikaof Jfianagarbha, (D. No. 3881 Sa lbL3b3). SDNS : S，αrvαdharmanihsvαbhavasiddhiof Kamala釘la(P. No. 5289. Vol. 101. Sa 312a4-338a5 D. No. 3889. Sa 273a4-291a7 N. No. 3280. Sa30la6-323a4 C. Tanju Vol. 28 (Sa)ff269a5-288a7). SD NS (1) (2) : Seitetsu Moriyama, Translation and Tibetan Text of theSαrvαdharmαni去svαbhiivasiddhiof Kamalasila, Memoirs of the Postgraduate Research Institute Bukkyo University. No. 9. (1981) pp. 60-100. No. 10. (1982) pp. 109-158. SDP : S,αtyαdvαyαvibha均：ga
−
ρα先ijikaof Santarak号ita, (D. No. 3883. P. No. 5283). SDV : S,αtyadvαyαvibhα先gα−
vrttiof J負anagarbha,(D. No. 3882). SOR : Serie Orientale Roma. 3-俳教大事大事院研究紀要第12旗
TS, TSP : Tattvasa先grαhαofS， antaraksita with the Commentary
？
αルjika' of Kamala釘la,ed. by S. D. Shastri, Bauddha Bharati Series-1, Varanasi, 1968.
TSWS : Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series.
V : AAPV, ed. by P.L.Vaidya, Buddhist Sanskrit Texts No. 4. Vs : vimsatika (karikii) of Vasubandhu, ed. by Levi.
W : AAPV, ed. by U. Wogihara.
WZKSO : Wiener Zeitschrift for die Kunde Siid-und Ostasiens.
2. INTRODUCTION
§ 1.K A九IALASiLA’S AND HARIBHADRA’S PHILOSOPHICAL POINT OF VIEW.
Buddhist epistemological theory, which was formalized by Dign互ga
(1〕
(circaA.D. 480-540) and significantly advanced by Dharmakirti (c. A.
(2)
D. 600-660), is closely related to Buddhist logic. Some scholars have
(3) .,
therefore called this the school of Buddhist logicians. Santarak号ita (c.
(1) Concerning this date see Massaki Hattori. Dignaga, On Perception, being the Pratyak号apariccheda of Dignaga’s Prama1Jαsαmuccαya from the Sanskrit fragments and the Tibetan versions, HOS. 47. (1967), EDITOR’S FOREWORD.
p.V.
(2) Concerning this date see E. Frawallner. LANDMARKS IN THE HISTO-RY OF INDIAN LOGIC, WZKSO, Band V. (1961) p. 137. However, D. Malvania places the time of Dharmaki:rti somewhere between 550-600A. D. (Durveka Miむa’sDhαrmottαrapradipα，TSWS, Vol. II. Patna 1955). Introduction p. XVI. While S. Chandra Vidyabhusana places his date about 635-650 A. D. (A HISTORY OF INDIAN LOGIC, 1978, p. 303ふ
(3) Matsumoto Shirδ 絵本史朗．
BukkyδRonrigakuha no Nitai Setsu (Jδ〉仏教論理学派の二諦説（上） (Contra -versies on the Theory of Twofold Truth (Satyadvaya) between Buddhist logici -ans (1)). Nanto Bukkyδor Journal of the Nanto Society for Buddhist Studies 南都仏教Dec. (1980) No. 45, p. 101.
(4) (4)
A. D. 725-788), his disciple Kamala釘la(c.A. D. 740-795) and
Harib-(5)
hadra (c.A. D. 800) are now known as the major philosophers of the Yog互cara-madhyamikaschool. They were not only greatly influenced by Buddhist logic, but they also tried to apply it to prove that all things are devoid of intrinsic nature (ni/Jsv.αbhavα．〉
During their period the Buddhist philosophical systems, such as those of the Vaibh匂ika,Sautrantika, Y ogacara, and Madhyamika, had already arrived at their highest point, and at the same time, Buddhist logic was also flourishing. Inthese circumstances, even within Buddhists schools themselves, heated debates were common. Thus the formalism developed by Dignaga and then Dharmak1rti for judging the validity of a proposition
the two valid means of cognition(pramatJ,a) by direct perception
(6)
(pr.αtyαh宇α）and inference（αnumatJ,α） was employed in deciding such theoretical disputes by the major philosophers of the Y og互C．五
ra− 亙dhyamil王aschool.
Oki Kazufumi沖和史．
Musδ，yuishiki to Usδ，yuishiki無相唯識と有相唯識（Thetheory of the Satakara
and Alikakara-vadin). Kδza DaijδBukkyδNo. 8 Yuishikishisδ 講座・大乗仏教 8唯識思想 ed.by A. Hirakawa, Y. Kajiyama,
J
.
Takasaki, p. 179 (Shunju sha 春秋社， 1983).(4) Concerning these dates see Katsumi Mimaki,BLO GSAL GRUB MTHA．’ ZINBUN KAGAKU KENKYUSYO, UNVERSIT立 DE KYOTO (1982). INTRODUCTION, p.5.
(5) Concerning these dates see Kajiyama Yuichi梶山雄一， Chugan Shisδno Rekishi to Bunken中観思想の歴史と文献（Historyand Bibliography of Philosophy of Madhyamika), Kδza DaijδBukkyδNo. 7 (Nov. 1982), Chugan Shiso講座・ 大乗仏教7中観思想.p. 21.cf.Note 3.
(6) Yuichi Kajiyama. An Introduction to Buddhist Philosophy : An annotated translation of theTarkabhasa of Mok守akaragupta. Memoirs of the Faculty of
Letters, Kyoto University, No. 10, Introduction p. 2. koki Indo Bukkyδno Ron -rigaku,(cf.Note 33) p. 248.
併教大事大事院研究紀要第12競
Santarak号itaand his followers were therefore in the position to prove the proposition that all things are devoid of an intrinsic nature （ηi'1,sv
-abhiiva)through the use of these two valid means of cognition(prama・
~a). In other words, had this logical procedure been disregarded, the proposition that all things are devoid of intrinsic nature(nil;svαbhava) could not be shown. In this sense, we can understand them as philoso -phers of the Y og互cara-m互dhyamikaschool who were put in a position to prove that all things are devoid of intrinsic nature(nilJ,sv.αbhav，α〉 according to the formalism of logical examination. However, even though they adopted Buddhist logic to prove their philosophy, this does not mean that they endorsed completely the philosophy and logic of Dhar-makirti, since, in the end, they refute this view from the standpoint of highest truth of the Madhyamika. Their obligation was to prove that all things are devoid of intrinsic nature(nilJ,svabhav，α） and, at the same time, to show that there are good grounds for refuting the various views of the other schools which were influential at the time. Accordingly, it was to these purposes that Kamalasila wrote hisMadhyamαkalokα
−
nii・(7)
ma (M五1)and Sarvadhαrmαnihsvabhiiva-siddhi(SD NS) which consist of debates between the Yogacara-madhyamika and other schools of Buddhism, the Vaibha号ika,the Sautrantika, and the Y ogac互ra, on the subject of whether or not all things have intrinsic nature(svabhavα．〉
It is obvious that Kamalasila
’
s philosophy was greatly influenced by ,, cs〕
his teacherS互ntarak号itawho wrote such works as theMadhyα makala-(7) SD NS (1). (2).
Seitetsu Moriyama. A Synopsis of the Sarvadharmanihsvabhavasiddhi of Kama-la釘la(1).JIBS Vol.XXX No.2,Mar.1982.
(8) Yuichi Kajima. Later Madhyamikas on Epistemology and Meditation Maha-yana Buddhist Meditation : Theory and Practice. ed. by M. Kiyota, (Honolulu :
mkiira-kiirikii(MAK), Mαdhyamakiila的kiira-vrtti(MAV) and Tattvα−
s
αmgraha (TS), since he wrote theMadhyamakiil的kiira-jうα宛iikii(MAP) and Tattvasαmgraha-pa
売
jika(TSP) as a commentary on these texts.It is this logical proof that all things are devoid of intrinsic nature ( ni}Jsvabhiiv.α） and the logical refutation of the views of the other schools in portions of Haribhadra
’
s Abhisαmayiilamkiiriilokii Prajiiiipii・ ramitiivyiikhyii(AAPV) that were written on the bases of S互ntarak号ita’s M A K and MAV and Kamalastla’s MAP, Mal and SDNS, which are parallel to Haribhadra’
s work.It should thus be pointed out that the following translation of Harib -hadra
’
s AAPV shares much in common with the MAK, MAV, MAP, and Mal, which I have indicated in my notes to the translation.§ 2. HARIBHADRA
’
S ABHISAMAY瓦
LA.MK瓦
R瓦
LOK瓦
PRAJN-瓦
p瓦
RAMIT瓦
VYAKHY瓦（
AAPV)The AAPV was written, of course, as a commentary on theA$fiisα−
hαsrikii-prajiiiipiiramita,according to theAbhis.αmαyiila的kiiraof Maitre -ya.
I
n
this respect the design of the AAPV differs from such works as the M A K and M A V of Santar叫csita, which were written with the purpose of demonstrating his own philosophical position as a Yog互cara -madhyamika.This is true also for Kamalas'ila
’
s commentary (MAP) onS
互ntaraksi・ University Press of Hawaii,1978)pp.114-143 Ichigo Masamichiー郷正道． “Chugan-Shδgonron-chu’＇no Wayakukenkyu (1) 『中観荘厳論註』の和訳研究（1) (Japanese tranlation of MAV). Kyδtosangyiidaiqaku Ronshu京都産業大学論集， vol.2 ; Jimbunkagaku Keiretsu人文科学系列 vol.1,pp.182-204.Idem (2), Mikkyδgaku C密教学） 9,pp.42-55.A Synopsis of the Madhyamakalankara of Santarak容ita.JIBS No.XX-2, pp.995-989. 7-併教大事大事院研究紀要第12挽
ta’s works, as well as his Mal and SDNS, which were also written as independent philosophical expostions. However, since Haribhadra is a successor to the Y ogacara-m互dhyamika tradition of S五ntarak号ita and Kamalaslla, he has inherited much from the previous masters of this
(9)
school. This is clearly seen in those portions of the AAPV where Haribhadra defines his stance as a Y ogac互ra-m互dhyarnika through his logical proof that all things are devoid of intrinsic nature(ni"f;,svαbhifoα〉 and the logical refutation of the views of the other schools, (portions of the commentary that actually have no direct relation to thePraj元iipiira -mitii sutrαon which he is supposedly commenting), since these logical proofs and refutations correspond largely to those of the M A K and MAV of Santaraksita and Kamalas1la
’
s MAP, Mal, and hisSDNS. Even beyond the selections translated below, for example, Haribhadra’s refuta-(10〕 tion of the various sorts of causation is the same as that appearing in (9) AAPV ¥i¥「pp.6245-6425 V pp. 45732-45323 These portions appear as a commentary of following sentences from theAぞ~asa hasrika Praj宛a1うaramita-sutraand verses 27 and 28 of theAbhisamαyala幼kra: (W62322ー26V15416-19) yaiva ca Bhagavato bodhisattva-bhutasya tathata saiva Bhagavato' nuttaram samyaksambodhim abhisambuddhasya tathata / iya血 sa tathata yaya tathataya bodhisattvo mahasattvo’nuttararh samyaksambodhim abhisambuddhal_i sams tathagata iti namadheyath labhate / 1.W. om. Tr. by E. Conze (Bihl. Ind. No. 284, Calcutta 1958) pl1435-38 hitarh sukharh ca tral).a出 ca saral).a血 layanarhnrl).am / par五yar:iarhca dvi:yam ca pari♀ayakasarhjfiakam
I
I
27 / / anabhoga血 tribhir yanial_iphalasak~互t kriyayatmakarh / pascinarh gatikaritram idarh karitralak与al).am/ / 28 / / c. f. Edward Conze Abhisamayalaft・ kara introduction and translation from original text with Sanskrit-Tibetan Index, SOR VI p.13 cf.P. S. Jaini. Saratama A pa色jika on the A号tasahasrika Prajfi.aparamita sutra by Acarya Ratnakarasanti, TSWS No. XVIII p. 4, Kashi prasad jayaswal reserch institute, patna 1979. (10) AAPV W pp. 96926-97618 V pp. 54922-55325 Amano Kouei天野宏英． - 8ー(11)
the SD NS. It is then the appearance in Haribhadra
’
s writings of passages found also in the works of S互ntarak号ita and Kamalasila that shows his indebtedness to the latter two masters. Thus, in the transla -tion to follow, I have attempted to indicate those passages which are found also in the MAK, M A V, and MAP. Generally speaking, the proof that all things are devoid of intrinsic nature(ni/Jsvabhiiva)is accompli -shed through the refutation of the views of various school in the writings of Santaraksita, Kamalasila, and Haribhadra, and in most cases the refutation begins with confuting the views of non-Buddhists and Buddhists that the external world is real.Inthis first case, it is pointed out that atomic theory is the necessary basis for asserting that the external world is real. There are then three
(12)
varieties of atomic theory, those of the Vaise号ika, Vaibha号ika and Sautrantika, which are then refuted in that order. Basically, these Yog互cara-m互dhyamikaspropose that a real external world cannot be proven so long as atomic theory cannot be established. Such atomic theories depend on the concept of intrinsic nature(svαbhavα，） and by logically confuting atomic theory the proposition of things possessing an intrinsic nature is destroyed. Such a refutation of atomic theory seems to have originated in the Vimsatika (Vs) of Vasubandhu, verse XI
Ingaron no Ichi Shiry6一Haribhadrano Kaishaku一 因果論のー資料一ノ、リノイド ラの解釈ー（Onesource of causation-interprtation of Haribhadra).Kanakura Hakase Koki Kinen Indogaku B叫ん；yogakuRonshu金倉博士古稀記念印度学仏教学 論集（1966)pp. 323-50 P.S. Jaini,(cf.Note 9) p. 5. (11) SDNS (2), pp 119-129. (12) Mimaki Katsumi御牧克己． Shokiyuishiki Shoronzyo ni okeru Sautrantika setsu初期唯識諸論書に於ける Sautrantika説. Deux theses philosophiques del
’
ecole Sautrantika, discutees clans les premiers traites des Vijfi.aptivadin du Grand Vehicule. Tδho Gaku (Eastern Studies）東方学 No.43, pp. 88-89 Jan1972 9-併教大事大事院研究紀要第12挽
(13)
and its .commentary.
The Yog互cara-madhyamika then uses this manner of refuting the ex恰rnal world to deny the subjective reality ( vijfiiinαmiitra) of the
Yog五caraschool represented by the Satyakara and Alikakara-vadins.
3. KAMALASiLA
’
S AND HARIBHADRA’
S REFUTATION OF THE SATYAKARA AND ALIKAKARA-VADINSI
.
The characteristics of these two schoolsWe may explain this subject from the following three points of view : Their respective view of〔1〕image( akar，α〉，〔2〕self-cognition(svasa・ 3おvedanα）and 〔3〕thethree natures (trisvabhava). To begin with, it is helpful to refer to the explanations given in theJ先aniisar，αsamuccayα・
(14〕 （15)
nibαndhαna of Bodhibhadra (c.A. D. lOC∼llC). According to this work, the Satyakara-v互dinmaintains that the images ( iikiira) of cogni
-(13) Vs pp.625ー72 na tad eka:rh na caneka:rh vi号ayaるp⑫rama♀usaる／na ca te sa:rhhata yasmat paramai;i ur na sidhyati / / 11
i
J
Kim uktam bhavati / yat tad rupadikam ayatanam rupadivijfiapfinam pratyeka由 vi守ayal}.syat tad ekam va syad yathavayavirupa由 kalpyatevaise号ikaih/ anekam va paramar.i usal}. / samhata va阻 eva paramar.iava);i / na tavad eka:rh vi手ayo bhavaty avayavebhyo’nyasyavayavirupasya kvacid apy agraha:i;iat / napy anekam parama♀i:ina血 pratyekamagraha宇部／ napi te sa:rhhata vi守ayobhavanti/ yasmat parama:i;t ur ekalil dravyalil na sidhyati / / ct DaijδButten15Seshinronju大乗仏 典15世親論集 tr.by Nagao G. Kajiyama Y. Aramaki N. p.361-2Vs Note16.published by ChuδKδron sha中央公論社 1976.SDNS (1)p.63. (14) A commentary of
J
だanasarasamuccayawhich was written l y Aryadeva(?) Katsumi Mimaki. La refutation bouddhique de la permanence des choses (sthirasiddhidu号a:i;ta)et la preuve de la momentaneite des choses (k号a:i;iabhangasiddhi). Publications de l'Institut de Civilisation Indienne, Fascicule41,Paris.(1976)pp.190-207. (15) Concerning this date see Katsura Syoryu桂紹隆， Dharmakirti ni okeru Jikoninshiki no Rironダルマキールティにおける「自己認識」の理論（Dharmakirti’s Theory of Svαsα仇vedana). Nanto Bukkyδor Journal of the Nanto Society for Buddhist Studies南都仏教， No.23.p. 8 Nov.(1969) 1 0-(16)
tion possess a dependent nature(Pαratαntra-svabhava), while the Al"ika -kara-vadin maintains the images of cognition are imaginary by nature (parikαlpita-svαbhava ). This explanation suggests to us one way in which we might understand the differences in the theories of the Satyakara and Alikakara-vadins.
I
.
A. According to the theory of Satyakara-vadin :〔1〕Images(iikiira) such as the color blue, are real
O
α
tya). However, when these images are wrongly interpreted as being either subjective or objective, or when they are misunderstood as being either eternal or(17)
temporary, such discriminations are unreal. Nevertheless, images (iikiira) themselves are always real and existent.
〔2〕Independentself-cognition(svαsamved，αna) apart from images, such as the color blue, cannot exist. Self-cognition is none other than the very manifestation of images themselves. Therefore, self -cognition and images cannot be separated from each other, because
(18)
they are identical.
〔3〕Images(akiira) are inseparable from cognition (vij五anα，）which has a dependent nature(pαratantrα，
−
svαbhiivα） because it depends uponthe immediately preceding moment of consciousness (samαn仰itara
-pratyaya). Accordingly images (akiira) also possess a dependent nature (paratantra-svabhava). It is the misconceiving of these images, which
(16) Yuichi Kajiyama.
Controversy between the福 岡ra and nirakara-vadins of the yogacara school -some materials. JIBS Vol. XIV No. 2 pp. 424-425. Hirakawa Akira平川彰． Indo Bukkyδshi (Ge】can）インド仏教史下巻.p. 233.
(17) Oki Kazufumi. ibid Note 3. p.181, 197, 198. (18) MAK. XLVII and MAV cf. Note (205).
Mal P200b5 Dl83b1 cf. Note 32.
-11-俳教大事大事院研究紀要第12競
have a dependent nature, as something that may be seperated into an external world and internal world, or as things which are eternal or temporary, that imparts to these images an imaginary nature (parikal -pita-svabhiiva). When self-cognition (svasa1仇1edanα） accompanied by
images, which has a dependent nature (paratantra-svαbhiiva), is separa -ted from an imaginary nature (parikalpitα
−
svαbhavα，）it becomes absolute perfection (parini$Pαnnα−
svαbhiiva). Therefore, independent self-cogni -tion (svasamvedanα） which has a dependent nature apart from images (iikiira) is impossible. Accordingly images (iikiira) themselves exist as a reality even in the self-cogniton of sages. The distinction between the direct perception (pr.αtya勾α）of an ordinary person and the direct perception of sages actually lies in whether or not imaginarythought-〔19)
constructions ( vikα争α）are projected on real images (satyiikara).
I
.
B. According tothe theory of Alikakara-vadin :〔1〕Boththe images of the perceived and the perceiver (griihyα
−
griihα−kakara) are unreal （αlika), or imaginary. Those images are produced
(20)
through dependence on error (bhriinti), and therefore, they could not
(19) Katsura Syoryu. ibid Note15,p.13. (20)AAPV W 63125-6328V 46220ー28
〔objection〕：A thing whose nature is erroneous (bhriinti) makes an unreal image（αlikiikiira) manifest. Therefore, even though an image (iikiira) is non-existent（αsat), perception (sαmvedanα） would appear due to this error (bhriinti).
〔Answer〕：Yourstatement is incorrect. What does the word “error (bhriinti）” mean? Does it imply : l)a latent impression (viisana) which produces confusion
(vibhramα） and which remains as a cognition (jnina) of a cause (hetu-bhuta); or2)nothing more than the erroneous cognition (bhrantam eva jiianam) which remains as a result (kiirya) of and produced from such a latent impression (viisana)? Let’s examine which one is correct. 1)Ifthe first alternative is maintained, it is illogical (ayukta) that they (viz., images) are perceived through that〔latentimpression，〕sinceits cause (as a latent impression) does not have a necessary connection (apratibαddhαtva) with〔those〕images (iikiira). Also, -12ー
be real(satya ).
〔2〕Onlyindependent self-cognition (svasa1仇1edanα）which is detached from the images of both the perceived and the perceiver is real and this means the nondual cognition 〈αdvαyα
i
n
i
i
n
α）• Accordingly both images and self-cognition are independent of each other. Infact, the difference between the perception of ordinary people and thesupermu-(21)
ndane cognition (nirvikαlpalokottaraj先anα）of sages lies in whether or not the images of the perceived and the perceiver exist in their cognition.
〔3〕Bothimages of the perceived and the perceiver which are based
otherwise unwarrantable consequences would follow(atiprasang，α）. Nor is the necessary connection (Pratibandha) with a causal relation (tad-utpatti) possible 〔betweenimages and latent impression，〕becauseotherwise a dependent nature (p，αratantratva) would follow as before. 2)If, on the other hand, the second alternative is maintained, the necessary connection (pratibandha) between image
(akara）〔andcognition (vij宛iinα〕〉isnot a causal relation(tadutpatti), but a
relation of identity (tadatmya). This is because they (viz., images and cognition) are simultaneously perceived. It is impossible that a relation between two things (viz., images and cognition) existing simultaneously should be a causal relation (hetu-phalatvα）.For this reason, it is hard to avoid the problem that these 〔images〕wouldcome to have a dependent nature (paratantratva), since these 〔images〕are not separate from it〔viz., cognition，〕like error(bhriinti
仰
の
．
Otherwise what would they be? Mal P202b3-6 D185a4-6ses pa de ni ji ltar myoli. ba de ltar gnas pa yali. ma yin te / gcig la gfi.is kyi no bo nid ’gal ba’i phyir ro / / gal te de ni’khrul pas de lta bu ses so乏ena /
’khrul pa’di gali. yin / gal te ses pa de丞idyin na ni／’o na de mli.on sum sum ma yin te / mli.on sum gyi mtshan fi.id ni ma’khrul pa yin pa’i phyir la/ de rtag tu bdag ii.id la bdag ii.id kho nas’khrul pa’i phyir ro / / gfi.is kyi bdag ii.id du yali. de’i bdag ii.id snaiJ. ba'i phyir gfi.is med pa'i no bo ii.id ii.ams par thal ba kho na yin te / gfi.is dali. g負isma yin pa dag ni phan tshun
’
gal ba’
iphyir ro ／／’khrul pa don gzan yin yaiJ. de yali.1 ran rig pa’i mthar thug pa
(2… …2)
flid yin pas des gflis med pa de ltar ses pa ni ma yin no / / 1.D daft 2. P om. PV. II. 212.
paricchedo 'ntar anyo’ya出 bhagobahir iva sthita}:i / jfianasy互bhedino bheda -pratibh互soby upaplava}:i. / / (See Tosaki Hiromasa戸崎宏正.BukkyδNinshiki・
ron no Kenkyu (Jδkan）仏教認識論の研究上巻 p.313.) (21) Katsura Shδryu. ibid Note 15, p. 13.
-併教大事大事院研究紀要第12挽
on error(bhranti)have an imaginary nature （
ρ
arikαlpita-svabhavα．〉 When cognition(vij元ana),which depends upon the immediately prece -ding moment of consciousness and thus has a dependent nature(pαra -tantra-svabhavα，）is seperated from the two images of the perceived and the perceiver which have an imaginary nature(parikαlpitα，−
svabhavα〉， it becomes absolute perfection(pαrini手;panna-sv.αbhavα）. To put it in another way, self-cognition(svasa的ved，αnα，）which is only the operation(22)
of perception, is absolutely perfect(parini手pαnna-svαbhava).The cogni -tion of ordinary people is always accompanied by the images of the perceived and the perceiver, which have an imaginary nature. On the other hand, the self-cognition of sages is the nondual cognition〈αdvaya -jiianα，）which is only the operation of perception and is detached from an unreal image, and is absolutely perfect, because it is seperated from the images of the perceived and the perceiver(grahyα
−
griihakiikara), which are imaginary by nature.II. The method of refutation
,
, (23〕
The purpose of Santarak号ita's, Kamala釘la
’
s,and Haribhadra’
s refuta -ting the various views of other schools, such as atomic theories of Vaise号ika,Vaibh勾ika,and Sautrantika, or the epistemology of Satyakara and Alikakara-vadins, is to prove that all things are devoid of intrinsic nature(ni'IJ,svabhiiva).To do this, they begin by refuting the views that admit some intrinsic nature(svabhiiva),in other words, they proof that all things are devoid of intrinsic nature(ni'/J,svabluiva ). This method of refutation itself as a proof that all things are devoid of (22) Oki Kazufumi. ibid Note3,p.181, 187, 199. (23) Yuichi Kajiyama. ibid Note8,pp.114-143. 1 4-intrinsic nature, is actually indirect, in the sense that they negate the views of other schools. This negation proceeds by dividing the various views that admit some intrinsic nature (svabhiivα） into classes of
(24)
alternatives and refuting them in order. This leads to the M互dhyamika
(24) Mal P198a6-b5 D181a6-b4
yan <lag pa’i tshad ma負idkyis sgrub po / ／’di ltar dnos po rnams la don dam
pa'i Iio bo負idcigl yod par gyur na rnam pa gfiis kho nar 'gyi.lr te / thams cad rgyu dan rkyen la rag las te / skye ba’i phyir mi rtag pa’i no bo丞id yin te / dper na mdo sde pa dan / rnal
’
byor spyod pa pa rnam’
clod pa lta bu zig gam / rail bzin gyis yan dag par grub pa’i bdag fiid kyi phyir b討an2 pa’ikho1'ls su gtogs pa zig yin te / dper na mu stegs can la sogs pa dog gis3 bdag la sogs pa kun pa rtags pa rtags pa lta bu zig yin grail / rtag pa dan mi rtag pa dag ni phan tshun spa白s te gnas pa’i mtshanid yin pa’i phyir phun po
gsum pa ni med do ／／会obo fiid’dir rnam pa gfii ga yaii don dam pa par mi run ste / de sgrub par byed pa'i tshad ma med pa’i phyir clan / gnod par byed pa yan srid pa’i phyir ro ／／’di ltar mnon sum mam4 / rjes su dpag pa zig sgrub par byed pa’i tshad ma yin par 'gyur gran na / de la dnos po’i白o
bo長iddan po ni gfii gas kyan yan dag par ’grub pa med do ／／’di ltar rgyu clan’bras ba’i dnos po grub na / de ’grub par’gyur ba zjg na / rgyu clan
’bras bu'i dnos po de yan re zig mnon sum gyi sgo nas ni don dam par mi
’grub po // de ni dban po las byun ba'i mnon sum mam / ran rig pa'i mnon sum gyis ’grub grail5 tshu rol mthon ba rnams rnal’byor pa’i mflon sum gyis the siiad mi ’dogs pa’i phyir clan / yid kyi m企on sum gan la ya白 ma grags
pa’i phyir de dag gis ni de ’grub par ni mi bsam mo //1.D. gcig2.D. brten 3.P has / bdag la sogs pa dag gis / 4.P 'am 5.P has /
“
〔TheY ogacara一madhyamika〕prove〔that all things are devoid of intrinsic nature(ni!J,svabhava）〕bythe method of the valid means of cognition (Prama1Ja). This is because,ifall things have intrinsic nature (svabhava) in absolute truth, there would be two kinds of intrinsic nature. That is to say, 1) because all things are produced by depending upon cause (hetu) and condition (Pratyaya), they have a temporary (anityα） intrinsic nature such as that which Sautrantika or Y ogacara school assert, or2)because all things can be established as a real by nature, they are belonged to the class of immovables (drdha) such as the self(iitman) which is imagined by non-Buddhist. It is impossible that a third alternative can be established because the eternal(nitya) and the temporary
（αnitya) are mutually exclusived(paraspara-parihara-sthiti-lakfa1J(l). The two kinds of intrinsic nature are not reasonabk with resp~ct to view of this intrinsic nature from the standpoint of absolute truth (paramiirthatas). This is because there is no the valid means of cognition (Pramii1J(l) to prore these two and because there is also way of rejecting them. The reason is that either
Fhu
梯教大事大皐院研究紀要第12競
truth that all things are devoid of intrinsic nature. Although this method of negation itself characterizes the tradition of the Madhyamika
begin-(25)
ning with N互garjuna (circaA.D. 150-250) and continued by his
(25)
followers Arya-Deva (c.A.D. 170-270), Buddhapalita (c.A.D.
470-(25) (25)
540), Bhavaviveka (c.A.D. 500-570) and Candrakirti (c.A.D.
600-(25) .,
650), it was Santarak号ita, Kamala釘la, and Haribhadra that embraced this method and integrated with it the formal logic of Dharmakirti. Applying this new synthesis with systems of debate, they sought ・to establish the principle of all things being devoid of intrinsic nature (ni/Jsvabhavα） and refuted the two theories within the Y ogacara school of Saty五k互raand Alikakara. They went on to refute even the view of
(26〕
Dharmakirti as a Satyakara-v互din, though the latter vacillates between the position of the Sautr互ntikaand Satyakara-vadin depending on the
(27)
context. Kamala釘la,in his Mal, seeks to demonstrate that all things are direct perception (pratyak~) or logical inference（αnuma1:ta) is〔necessary〕to prove them. In this case, the first intrinsic nature cannot be proven by means of two kinds 〔ofthe valid means of cognition〕as a true existence. This is because if a causation can be established, it〔viz.,a temporary intrinsic nature〕 could be proven. Firstly cousation cannot be proven as a real existence from the standpoint of absolute truth by means of direct perception (pratyak戸）. Ifit 〔viz.,causation〕canbe established, it could be proven by means of the direct perception of either the sense organs (indriya-pratyakfa) or self-cognition (svasa治vedana-pratyaksa). The two kinds of the direct perception of a seer (yogi-pratyakfa) and mentarity (rnano-pratyak~), because ordinary people do not judge depending upon the direct perception of a seer and the direct perception of mentality, cannot be acknowledge in any case.” (25) Concerning these dates see Kajiyama Yuichi, ibid Note 5, p. 2, 7, 9. (26) cf.3. III. A. A. Refutation of the view of CITRADV AYA. Tosaki Hiromasa戸崎宏正． Prama1:tαvarttika Genryosho no Wayakukenkyii (16）プラマーナ・ヴ− ）レティ カ現量章の和訳研究（16) (Japanese Translation with Annotation of PV][ K K
。
320-340), Tetsugaku Nenpδ 哲学年報（1979).p 46. Note (50). PV ][, K 328. (27) D. Malvania. Durvekamisra’s D harmsttarapradi pa 〔Beinga subcommentarydevoid of intrinsic nature by the dual method of the valid means of cognition (pramii'JJ,α） and testimony (iigama).
I
n
particular, he gives much attention to proof by the valid means of cognition（ρ
rama'}J,a).As he stated
，
“
It is not only by testimony or a reduction to absurdity (prasαngα，） that we〔Yogacara-madhyamika〕 intend to prove that all things are devoid of intrinsic nature (nil}svabhiivα，）but by the method(28)
of the valid means of cognition （
ρ
rama'}J,α〉．”Kamalasi:la and Haribhadra demonstrate that assertions of the Satya -kara and Alika-kara-v互dinscannot be proven by the two valid means of congnition (prama'JJ,α，）that is to say, direct perception (pratyak$a) and
(29)
inference （αnumana) respectively.
It is especially causation that they scrutinize by these two valid
(30)
means of cognition (prama'JJ,α，）because if causation can be established, some intrinsic nature (svαbhavα） would be allowed as a reality, for
(31)
instance, either an eternal or a temporary intrinsic nature would be established.
III.τhe essential focus of the refutation
I
I
I
.
A. The focus of the refutation of the view of Satyakara-vadin on Dharmottara’s Nyayabindu(ika, a commentary on Dharmakirti’s Nyayabindu．〕 (TSWS, Vol. IL Patna 1955) Introduction pp. xxii-xxiii.Tosaki Hiromasa, Idem (17). p. 46. Note (51), Idem (18), (1981). p. 104. Moreover Dharmakirti takes the position of the Ali:kakara-vadin, too. Cf. Tosaki Hiromasa. Idem (17), p. 17. Note (70). PV llI, K 354, 355, 357, 358. Idem (16). PV JII, KK。330-331.Tosaki. Ibid. (BukkyδNinshikiron no Ke-nkyu) pp. 312-015. PV l[,K 212, 213, 217. Mimaki Katsumi. Ibid. (BLO GSAL GRUB MTHA’）.XI : Yogacara. pp. 101-103.
(28) Mal P198a5-6 Dl81a6 kho bo cag kyati. tshig tsam gyis chos thams cad no bo fiid med par sgrub pa yati. ma yin la / thal bar sgru b pa tsam gyis kyali. ma yin no / ／’o na勾 na/ yati. dag pa'i tshad ma負idkyis sgru b po / / (29) (30) (31) cf.Note 24 - 17ー
俳教大事大事院研究紀要第12挽
lies in pointing out contradictions that occur when they assert that images ( akara)such as color ・ blue are always real.
The focus of refutation in the Mal of Kamala釘lais as follows :
(32・．．
“
Ifyou〔viz.,Saty五kara-vadin〕assertthat images ( akara)are real, then 〔thecognition ( vij先anα）that should be expected to be unitary(ekatvα〉〕 would become manifold just like the nature of images themselves because images (akiira)of cognition with respect to such
(32a〕
things as pictures and so forth are manifold. Ifit is correct to understand that manifold cognition(vij先ana)arises in order to establish the principle of manifold images (akara),then it would be impossible to have a cognition (vij先ana)which grasps images
(akara)that exist as if they cover an object. This is because it is impossible for cognition(vijniinα）， as something non-material （α mu-rtαtva),to occupy space. It is also not reasonable for something which does not occupy space to have any distinction such as north (32) Mal P200b2-6 D183a6-b2
gzan yali. gal te rnam pa rnam pa rnams ya企<lagpa ii.id du ’dod na de’i tshe
ri mo rkyali. pa la sogs pa dag la ses pa’i rnam pa sna tshogs yin pa’i phyir rnam pa b三indu tha dad par thal bar’gyur ro / / gali. gis na rnam pa sna tshogs ii.id gzuli. gzugs pa’i phyir ses伊 du ma skye bar rtogs2 pa legs par
’gyur ba rnam par三espa yul la bkram pa lta. bur’dug par yonsSU’dzin par
skye ha yan med de / lus can ma yin pa la yul na gnas pa mi srid pa'i phyir dan / yul na mi gnas pa rnams kyati bya企clan/ sar la sogs pa'i phyogs kyi
bye brag tu skye bar mi run ba'i phyir ro // de ltar mi skye na yali.3 yul la bkram pa lta bur snali ba mi srid pa
’
i phyir ro ／／おspa gcig da白no bo thadad pa ma yin pa’i phyir ses pa’i Iio bo bzin du rnam pa rnams企o bo ii.id
gcig par thal ba yali. yin no / / tha dad pa yin na ni de dag kyan don bzin du
三espas 'dzin par mi’，thad de / don gZan yin pa’i phyir ro / / de’dzin par bya ba’i phyir rnam pa gzan dan gzan du rtog na ya:ri rnam pa rnams thug pa med par’gyur ro / / rnam pa gzan dan gzan myoli. ba yan nam yan med do / / 1.D brkyan ha 2. P togs 3. P om.
(32a) PV. II. 205ab
and east. And this is because, since cognition ( viJ・nana)does not
have any direction, it is impossible that〔images( iikiira）〕canappear 〔withincognition ( vij免anα〕 a〉 sif they are spread over an object. Since images ( iikara）〔that should be expected to be manifold （αnekα〕 don〉 ot differ from unitary cognition ( vij先iinα）by nature, they must then have a unitary nature, like the nature of cognition (vij宛iina-svarupavat).On the other hand, if〔images( iikarα，〕 d〉 iffer from 〔cognition争力・nanα〉〕 bynature, they could not be grasped by cognition, like an object.
I
n
the latter case，〔cognitionand images〕 differ from each other.If,in order to grasp〔animage， you〕 〔Satya -kara-vadin〕requirethe imagining of images one after another, this would mean an infinite regress（αnαvastha). For images (akara) can・ ・ ・32】
never be perceived in succession.
”
This method of focusing on the incompatibility of unity(ekαtva) and manifoldness（αnekα） between cognition (viJ万anα）and images ( akara) is found in the writing of Santaraksita, Kamalasila, and Haribhadra. It was also adopted by Ratn互kara釘nti(c. 11c), who was a Alik互
kara-(33)
vadin, when he refuted the view of
J
賃anasrimitra (c.980-1030),who(34)
was a Satyakara-vadin. Kamalasila and Haribhadra have inherited this
(35)
manner of debate from Santarak号ita who had adopted it when refuting the four kinds of causation. Going back further this refutation of the
(36) four kinds of causation can be traced to the Sαtyadv.αyαvibhαng，α (33) Concerning this date see Kajiyama Yuichi梶山雄一， KδkiIndo Bukkyo no Ronrigaku後期インド仏教の論理学 (IndianBuddhist Logic in the Later Period.) p.245. Koza BukkyδShiso No.2 講座仏教思想 Ninshikiron Ronrigaku認識 論論理学 (1974). (34) Katsura Shoryu. cf.Note15p.32 (35) SDP D 28b6 (36) SDNS (2)pp.119-128 -19ー
梯数大事大事院研究紀要第12競
(37) (38)
(SDV) of
J
貰anagarbha (c. 700-760), verse XIV. How then is the incompatibility of unity (ekαtvα） and manifoldness (anekα） with respect to cognition ( vijfiiinα） and images ( iikara) established?
I
n
the Mal of Kamala釘la,this incompatibility is used to refute the view of Satyakara-v互dinwhen he demonstrates that causation cannot be proven by means of direct perception (pratyak$a) as sense perception(39)
(indriya-pratyαk$a ). Incompatibility is shown to occur when cognition (vij必iinα）that should be expected to be a unity (ekαtvα） logically becomes manifold ( anekαtva), like the nature of images (akara-svαru -patvα，）. The model for this argument has been directly taken from the
(40)
refutation of atomic theory. He makes it clear that the errors(do$α〉 which were found in the case of examining an atom （
ρ
α
riima'IJu) pertain also in this case, because cognition ( vij先iina)that should be expected to be unity (ekαtva) and immaterial （αmurtatva) would have extension (desα−
vitiina) or portions(siivayavatii), like an atom, and would be(41)
devoid of a single nature ( ekatvα．〉
In conclusion, Kamala釘lapoints out that the Satyakara-vadin’s view involves a contradiction of direct perception (pratyαk$α） itself in that
AAPV W pp. 96926-97618 V pp. 54922-55325cf.Note 8
(37) Concerning this date see Katsumi Mimaki cf.Note 3, INTRODUCTION p.4.
(38) SDK XIV D2a5-b1, SDV D7a6, SDP D 28b6
du mas gcig gi d白osmi byed / / du mas du ma byed ma yin / / gcig gis du
ma’i dftos mi byed / / gcig gis gcig byed pa yaft min / / cf.SD NS (2) p. 119. (39) Mal P198b5 D18lb5 de la re乏igdbaft po'i mfton sum gyis ni de mi ‘grub ste／……Mal P200b2-5 D183a6-b2cf.Note 32 (40) cf.Translation II-1-A-2∼II-1-A-2-4 Concerning Santarak守itasee Yuichi Kagiyama.cf.Note 8 pp. 127-8 (41) cf.Note 32, Translation II-1-A-2-1∼Il-1-A-2-4 - 20ー
direct perception, in this case, includes imagingary thought-construction (vikαlpa) because it grasps not only the unique particular (svαZak$α
。
α〉 that is the object of direct perception (pratyαk$α） but also the universal(siimiinyalak$α
。
α）that exists by definition within imaginarythought-(42)
construction ( vikalpα）. In the same manner, Haribhadra also refutes their view by pointing out that it is contrary to the definition of direct
(43)
perception, which is devoid of imaginary thought-construction (vikalpα．〉 This is because cognition itself involves imaginary thought-construction when multiple cognitions（αnekaj:先iinα）occurs at the same time (yuga
-(44)
ρ
α
d). III.A
.
A. Refutation of the view of CITRADVAYA Citradvaya means that cognition ( vijniinα） which possesses manifold ( 42) Mal P202b6イ D185a6-7 gal te mrion sum ni rtog pa’i Iio ho iiid tsam zig yin no乏ena ／‘o na ni mrion sum ran gi mtshan iiid kyi yul can ma yin te / rtogs1 pa’
i no ho iiid ni spyi’
i mtshan iiid kyi yul can yan yin pa’
i phyir ro / / 1.D rtog Massaki Hattori. ibid. Note 1, pp. 79-80. ( 43) NB, I. 4. tatra pratyak守arhkalpanapoc;lham abhrantam. Th. Sthcherbatsky, Nyiiyabindu of Dharmakirti with Nyiiyabindufikii of Dharmottara, Bihl. Bud. VII, 1977,13. 6. Masaaki Hattori. ibid. Note. 1. p. 25. Perception (pratyakra) is free from conceptual construction (kalpana): pratyak -卵 白 kalpanapoc;lham.And pp. 82-83 cf.Note 20. Mal P. 202b3-6 Dl85a4-6. On the other hand, Dharmakirti proves 'patyak~am kalpaniipo<!,ham’on the ground that a unitary cognition perceives manifoldness. (See Hiromasa Tosaki, ibid. Note 20, p. 307.) PV. II. 207 nanarthaika bhavet tasmat siddhato'pi avikalpika / vikalpayann apy ekartharh yato’
nyad api pasyati / / ( 44) cf.Translation〔II-1-A-2-5，〕PV.II. 197ab. athaikayatanatve’pi nanekarh grhyate sakrt /-21-梯教大事大事院研究紀要第12挽
(45)
(citra) images is unitary. The Satyakara-vadin school asserts that cognition is always accompanied by a number of images (akiira) which are real(sαtyα） ; however, any imaginary thought-constructions ( vikα争α〉 with respect to these real images ( akara) such as concepぉ like the external world or the internal world, or“permanent
”
or“temporary，
”
are in themselves always unreal additions to the images. They then had to answer the question of how a unitary cognition can possess(46)
many images. That is why they advocate the theory of citradvaya. This
(47)
position was taken by Praj宣互karagupta(c.A. D. 700-750) in his com-mentary, the Prama:JJ,avartikabhii$yam, on verses 200 and 221 of chapter
(48)
II(Pr.αtyak手α）of Dharmak1rti’s Prama1;tαvarttika.
(49・・・
“
Although cognition has manifold images, it is none other than unitary. This is because cognition, having manifold images, differs by nature from the manifoldness of the external world itself. The manifoldness of the external world is distinguishable, but manifold -images of cognition such as the color blue are indistinguishable. The reason is that the images such as the color blue that are the contents of perception itself cannot be perceived independently. Accordingly, although cognition is maniford, it is unitary because・ ・ ・49)
images such as the color blue cannot be seperately discriminated.円
(50)
How did Haribhadra then . refute this theory? As mentioned above, ( 45) ( 46) ( 48) Oki Kazufumi.沖和史． “Dharmakir,~i no Citradvaita rin;m; Dharmakirtiの《citradvaita》理論”（Theory of Dharmakirti’s citradvc1.ita). JIBS Vol. XXI No. 2, Mar. 1973 p. 975 ( 47) Concerning this date see Kajiyama Yuichi, ibid. Note 33. p. 245. ( 49) Oki Kazufumi沖和史． “Citradvaita riron no tenkai-Prajfiakaragupta .no Ronjutsuー《citradvaita》理論の 展 開 −Prajnakaraguptaの論述一”（Developmentof theory of citradvaita). Tokai Bukkyo東海仏教 No.20, Dec. 1975, p. 921与−22and Note 8. (50) cf.Translation II-1-B∼II-1-B-4 - 22ー
Kamala釘laand Haribhadra reached their refutation of the Satyakara -v互dinview by pointing out that the Satyakara-vadin assertion involves a contradiction with respect to direct perception(pratyak手α）. Inthe case of citradvaya as well, Haribhadra refutes this stance by utilizing the same method. Namely, their ground of asserting that a unitary cognition possesses manifold images (akara) is based upon the notion tha:t manifold images such as the colors blue, yellow, and so forth which manifest at . one moment, cannot be distinguished from one another by direct perception (pratyak手α）. However, Haribhadra refutes this as follows : the presumption that manifold images cannot be distinguished
(51)
by direct perception also cannot be ascertained by direct perception.
III. B. The focus of the refutation of the view of the Alikakara-vadin.
The Alikakara-vadin defines image (iikiira) as the images of the perceived and the peceiver (griihyα
−
griihαkiikiira ). According to their theory,an image (iikiira) is none other than imaginary and unreal （αlika), while only self-cognition(svasamvedanα，） which is detached from both the images of the perceived and the perceiver, is real. Accordingly, self -cognition means a nondual cognition 〈αdvα，yα−
jfiiinα）and has only the operation of perception. Therefore, unreal images have nothing to do with real self-cognition, because unreal things cannot have any relation to some other thing. This is because,i
f
self-cognition has some relation to unreal images, it would become unreal, like the image (iikiira). Then, how can the nondual cognition （αdvαyaτjfiiinα） asserted by them, which is devoid of both the images of the perceived and the perceiver,(51) cf.Note42, 43.TranslationII-1-B-3(Conclusion1).Direct perception
(Pratyak~a) does not grasp both distinction and nondistinction.
-f弗教大事大事院研究紀要第12競
be proven?
(a) Kamala釘lashows that nondual cognition（αdvaya-j必iina)cannot be proven by inference（αnumii'IJ,α）.Namely, he states that none of the logical reasons (hetu),a relation of identity(svabhiiva),effect(kiirya),
or non-perception (anupαlabdhi),can be used to establish a proof.
Ifimages that manifest as two 〔viz.,griihya-griihakα〕arealso unreal,
〔as Alikakara-vadin asserts，〕howcan cognition exist as something with a nature apart from these in absolute truth? A real cognition that is devoid of both the images of the perceived and the perceiver cannot be perceived by ordinary people. Otherwise everyone could obtain the truth.
It〔viz.,self-cognition that is devoid of both images of the perce -ived and the perceiver〕cannotbe proven by inference（αnumii'IJ,α．〉
This is because any logical reason to prove it cannot be established.
(52) Mal P180b6-181a3 D166a1-5
gfi.is su snan ba yan brdzun pa fl.id yin na ni ses pa’i Iio bo gaii don dam par srid par’gyun ba gzan ci zig lus / ses pa de kho na fl.id gzuii ba dan’dzin pa'i rnam pa daii bral ba gzan ni tshu rol mthoii ba rnams kyis yaii dag par
1
…
…
1myoii ba med de / thams cad de kho na fl.id mthoii ba kno na fl.id du thal bar
’gyur ro / / de ni rjes su dpag pa’i sgo nas Iies pa yaii ma yin te / de lta bu'i rtags負idma grub pa'i phyir ro／／’di ltar re zig ran bzin gyi rtags las byuii bas rjes su dpag pa ni mi srid de / d’i ra企bzin負id bsgrub par bya ba yin pa’i phyirro／’bras2 bu'i rtags kyaii ma yin te / gfi.is su med pa daii’ga’ya企 lhan cig rgyu daii’bras bu'i diios por ma grub pa’i phyir te / de ni dbaii pas mi sod pa'i phyir ro // de las ma gtogs pa’i’bras bu g乏an yod pa ya企mayin te
I
’di ltar khyed kyi ltar na gfiis su med pa de kho na ’bras bur’gyur ha zig na de fl.id bsgrub par bya ba fl.id kyi skabs yin pa’i phyir de yaii tshad mas grub pa ma yin no / gfi.is su snan ba ga企yinpa de ni ri bori gi rva daii’dra ba’i phyir’bras bu ma yin no / / gaii gis na miion sum dari mi dmigs pas sgrub pa rgyu daii’bras bu'i diios po ’grub par 'gyur ha don dam par gfiis su med pa'i三espas kyaii’ga’yaii’dzin pa med do // mi dmigs pa yari dgag pa sgru b pa yin pa’i phyir yod pa sgrub pa'i skabs ma yin no // 1.P om. 2.P
’bas.
川 泊
To begin with, inference based on a relation of identity (svabhava) is impossible. This is because the identity of it 〔self・’ ognition as a
nondual cognition〕withsome other thing is the very thing to be proven.
Inference based on an effect (karyα） is impossible. This is because it is untenable that a non-dual thing (viz., self-cognition being devoid of both images of the perceived and the perceiver) has a causal relation with something else. It (viz., self-cognition as a nondual-cognition) cannot be perceived by a sense organ (indriya). A diffe -rent result apart from it (viz., self-cognition) does not exist.
The reason is that, according to your theory, the nondual thing (viz., self-cognition being devoid of both images of the perceived and the perceiver) itself would become the result, but that is the very thing to be proven. Neither can it be shown by the valid means of cognition （
ρ
rama'}J,α）.Because the two manifestations 〔ofthe images of the perceived and the perceiver〕areequivalent to the horns of a rabbit 〔viz.,non-existence〕〔accordingto your theory〕， it is not a result. Otherwise，〔ifboth images of the perceived and the perceiver exist in self-cognition〕， causality, which can be proven by direct perception(pratyαh手α）and non-perception （αnupαlabdhi), could be established. However, nothing can be perceived by non-dual cogni -tion（αdvαya-j先ana)from the point of view of absolute truth (pαra -marthatas). Non-perception （αnupαlabdhi) is not an inference to prove the reality 〔ofnon-dual cognition〕， because it is a proof of nonexistence.(b) Moreover, Kamala釘larefutes the view of the Alikakara-v互din that non-dual cognition （αdvαya-jnanα） is real by means of pointing
俳教大事大事院研究紀要第12強
out that there is neither the relation of identity (tiidiitmya) nor causa-tion (taduザatti) between the n~ndual cognition and unreal images （αlikiikara). Even though images (akiira) are unreal （αlikα，）the identity of cognition and images should be acknowledged as long as these unreal images manifest in cognition. If so, both cognition and images would become unreal. Thus Kamalaslla points out that the view of Alikakara-vadin involves contradiction.
(53・・・
Ifthe nature of cognition (j舟ana)is real(satyα，） there is neither the relation of identity (tadatmyα） nor causation (taduφαtti) between a thing which truly manifests・ and images ( akara) having an unreal nature. This is because it is incompatible for the real Qαtyα） and the unreal・（αlikα，）which are mutually exclusive (pαraspara-parihara -sthiti-lak手αpα）， to have the relation of identity (tadatmyα） and this does not explain how the unreal is produced from something. Even though it (viz., the unreal) is produced by something, the two (viz., cause and effect) cannot be produced as a relation of identity
(53) Mal P182b3サ D167b3-7
三espa’i bdag負idbden pa’i no bo de la ni gan gis na de la de ltar gsal rah
tu snan bar’gyur ba brdzun pa'i bdag負idkyi rnam pa rnams de’i bdag fi.id
daft / de las byuti. ba'i mtshan fl.id kyi’brel pa’ga’yari med be / / bden pa da企mibden pa phan tshun spans te gnas pa'i mtshan色id dag ni de’i bdag fiid du 'gal ba’i phyir la / mi bden pa yari gari las kya企skyebar khas mi len
pa’i phyir ro / / de skye na yari’di dag dus gcig tu de’i bdag fl.id du snati. bar ni mi ’gyur te / rgyu clan’bras bu dag ni dus da企nobo負idtha dad pa yin
pa’i phyir ro // de lta bas na gdon mi za bar rtogs pa'i no ho dati. tha mi dad pa’i rati. gi rio bo’i rnam pa mi bden pa’i bdag fi.id rnams snafl bar khas blati.s ba’i phyir de’i bdag fi.id k~i mtshan負idkyis’brel bar2 khas blan dgos so / / de’i
phyir gfi.i ga' ati. brdzun pa fi.id du gyur to / / de lta ma yin na ni ji ltar brdzun pa'i rnam pa rnams dari lhan cig rtogs pa’i li.o bo負idde’i bdag fiid du
fiams su myofl bar’gyur / de bas na bden pa la miion par zen pa'i勾gspa’di ’or cig / 1.P om.2.D par
(tiidiitmyα） at the same time. This is because cause and effect are different from each other with repect to time and their own nature. 〔Accordinglythere is no causation(tadu砂αtti) between a true nondual cognition （αdvaya-j先anα）and an unreal image ( iikiira）.〕 It is unreasonable that the manifestation 〔ofimages〕iscertified in spite of no relation between the two. Such would be over reductio -nistic （αt争rasα均gα）. Accordingly you should surely acknowledge a relation of identity (tadiitmyα） between them, since the manifestation of unreal images 〔inthe present case，〕 which do not differ from the nature of cognition, are acknowleged. Thus both of them become unreal （αlikα）. Otherwise 〔if there is not a relation of identity between cognition and images，〕howcan an unreal image ( iikiira) and the nature of cognition be perceived as an identity? Consequently cut this string of attachment to 〔onlynondual cognition〕asreal.
IV. Conclusion
The method and contents of refuting the views of the Satyakara and Alik五kara-vadinare common to the M A K and MAV of Santaraksita, the MAP and Mal of Kamala釘la,and the AAPV of Haribhadra.
In the case of refuting the view of the Satyakara-vadin, the incompa-tibility of unity(ekα） and manifoldness ( anekα） between cognition (vij先ana)and images （αkara) is pointed out.In conclusion, Kamala釘la and Haribhadra show the error that this view involves, which is a contradiction with respect to direct perception (prα，tyα勾α）in thatclirect perception that should be expected to be devoid of imaginary thought -construction ( vikα争α）becomes related to imaginary thought-construction. On the other hand, in case of refuting the view of Alikakara-vadin, ヴ ’ つ 臼
f
弗教大事大事院研究紀要第12強they show that the nondual cognition （αdvaya-jfiiina) which is devoid of the images of the perceived and the perceiver (griihyα
−
griihaka -kiira) cannot be proven by inference （αnumii1J,α） such as a relation of identity(svabhiivα），， effect(karyα） or non -perception （αnupalabdhi). Moreover itis pointed out that there is neither the relation of identity (tadatmya) nor a causal relation(tαdu砂αtti)between the nondual cog-nition and unreal images (alikakara).Inlight of these refutations, Kamalasila and Haribhadra cannot be considered as belonging to either the Saty亙kara-vadinor the Alikak互ra -vadin. This is also true for
S
亙ntaraksita. Nevertheless we should examine the sound basis on which they have been called the major philosophers of the Yogac五ramadhyamika school and how they are distinguished from other philosophers of the Madhyamika school, such as Bh互vaviveka who is a Sautrantika-madhyamika and Candrakirti who is a Prasan.gika. At the same time, we should ask what the philosophy of Y og互cara means in the context of Kamala釘la’s philosophy. At the outset we should note that Kamala釘ladescribes the philosophy of Y ogacara in the sense of a school accepting only subjective reality (vij先anα−
miitra) or mind-only (citta-miitra), as suitable for the attainment of the final (54) truth of all things being devoid of intrinsic nature (nih,sv.αbhiiva). Namely, he conceives of the philosophy of Yogacara as a good approach(54)
to the absolute truth of the Madhyamika. However this philosophy seems to be insignificant for Kamalasila, apart from its context as a theoretical (55) means to arrive at the highest Madhyamika truth. (54) cf.Note 56. (55) Mal P194a8-b1 D177b5 mar me la sogs pa phyi rol gyi don gyi no bo'am ses pa’i Iio ho yan dag par -
28-This may be seen in the Mal of Kamala釘la. The Y ogacara depend-ing on scriptures such as the Sa的dhinirmocanaand the Gahanavyuha
asserts that all things consist in subjective reality(vij先iina-miitra)or mind-only (citta-miitra),that only mind is an absolute e玄istant, and
that except for mind nothing exists. Therefore, they object to the position that all things are devoid of intrinsic nature (ni/J,svαbhiiv，α） can be proven. Kamala釘lahas replied to this objection of Yog五cara.
(56・・・
These 〔scriptures〕arenot suitable for testimony. The existence of
ni ma grub ste / Whether a lamp has the nature of an object(artha)as the external world or of cognition(vijnana)cannot be decided from the standpoint of absolute truth.
BhK ll.P53b6 D49al
don dam par na sems kyaii bden par mi run ste / It is impossible from the point of view of the highest truth that mind 〔aswell as objects of the external worlod〕isreal.
BhK 亜.pp. 6-7.
Cittam api parama1幼atomayavad anutpannam / Mind is also non-arising just like illusion from the viewpoint of the highest truth.
(56) Mal P170bL171a7, D156b7-157bl
de ya企khunssu mi run ba負idde / ji ltar sems yod pa fi.id du bstan pa de
bzin du gzugs kyaii mdo de dar'l. de las rnam pa du mar yod pa負iddu bstan
pa kho na ste / de'i phyir de yaii ci ste don dam par yod pa fi.id du mi bzuri /
’on te don tshad mas gnod pa’i phyir dan / mdo gzan dag las kyaii bkag pa'i phyir don dam par yod par rnam par mi gzag1 ste / ga也zagla bdag med pa
~~~~｝a gzug pa la Idem por dgoiis pas gtul bar byabade lta bu'i 1:-sam pa la ltos te / de bstan pa’ha’a乏igtu zad do zes bya bar brjod na gal te de lta na ni sems kyaii’og nas’byuii ba’i tshed mas gnod pa’i phyir daii / de mdo gzan las kyaii / Iio bo負idmed pa fi.id du bstan pa’i phyir don dam pa fi.id
du ma
’
dzin par sems tsam po fi.id de ni rim gyis don dam pa’
i tshul gyi rgya mtsho la gzur'l. ba’i phyir bstan pa’ba’a乏igtu zad do sfi.am du zur'l. sig3/
4
'di ltar ga白三igcig car chos ma lus pa Iio bo flid med pa flid du rtogs par mi nus pa de re zig sems tsam la brten nas / rim gyis phyi’i don rio bo fi.id med pa ii.id la’jug go / / de flid kyi phyir / rigs pas rnam par lta na rnams kyi / / gzuii dan 'dzin pa 'gag par’gyurI
I
乏esgsur'l.s soI
I
de’i’og tu rim gyis sems kyi rio bo fi.id la so sor rtog na / de yaii bdag med pa flid du khor'l. du chud nas zab mo’i tshul la’jug par 'gyur te / de skad du / bcom ldan 'das kyis /併設大事大事院研究紀要第12競
color-form(r
・
め
α〉as well as mind is explained in various manners in several different scriptures. Accordingly why don’t you understand that it〔viz.,color-form(riipα〕
〉
also exists from the standpoint of absolute truth?〔Objection〕：Theobject of the external world cannot be established from the standpoint of absolute truth (pαramarthα
仰
の
，
since it involves a contradiction with respect to the valid means of cognition(prama1Jα） and since it is denied in other scriptures also. The object of the external world is just stated according to the aim of disciples ( vineyα） who want to arrive at only the non-existence of the essential nature in a person (pudgaZα
−
nαiriitmya ),because of the secret purpose . of the scriptures of leading them there.〔Answer〕：Ifso, since mind (citta)is also refuted through the valid means of cognition(prama'JJ,α）， which will be stated l~ter on, and since it is explained as devoid of intrinsic nature(ni/Jsvαbhavα〉 even in other scriptures, you should understand that this theory of mind-only (citta-matra)was taught only to help one comprehend the ocean of the theory of absolute truth without regarding it as an
56a・・・
sems tsαm la ni brten nas su / / phyi rol don la mi rtog go / / de bzinnα 必d
la dmigs nas ni / / sems tsam las kya必bzlabar byα／ / sems tsam las ni bzlas
nαssu
I
I
snαn bαmed la bzla bar byαI
I
snan med gnaspα’i rnal 'byorpα ／／des ni theg pa chen po mthon
I
I
'jug pa lhun gyis grun cin ziI
I
smon lam dag gis rn~"'m par sbyansI
I
ye ses dam pa bdag meρaI
I
snα必 ba med la miooa mthon no
I
I
乏esgsu白ssoI
I
gzan dag na re sems tsms ni ran gis rah tu grub pa’i Iio bo負idyin pa’i phyir kun rdzob tu gnas pa kho na yin la / phyi’i don ni kun rdzob tu yaii mi gnas te / sems kyi rnam pa las ma gtogs par de grub pa med pa’i phyir roI
I
de’i phyir de rah tu bstan pa’i ched du beam ldan 'das kyis dnos po rnams sems tsam fiid du bstan gyi / de don dam par yod pa fl.id ni ・ ma yin te / mdo gzan las de ya色 白obo iiid med pa fiid du bstan pa’iphyir te / (1)P hass bzag (2)P has las bltos(3)P has乏ig (4)P om.
absolute existent. The reason is that those who cannot recognize all things as devoid of intrinsic nature (ni/Jsvabhiiva) in one moment, recognize gradually that an object as the external world is devoid of intrinsic nature by firstly depending upon the theory of mind-only
(56-1・・・
(cittα−matra). Therefore，〔theBlessed One〕taughtthat the perceived and the perceiver (grahyα
−
grahαhα） are destroyed by those ・ who ex -amined〔theexternal world〕bymeans of reason (yuk ti). After that, when they gradually scrutinize the nature of mind, recognizing its being devoid of intrinsic nature too, they would comprehend the profound theory. The Blessed One taught as followE>:(56a・・・
Depending uρon mind-only (cittα
−
matra), the Yagin does not imα：gine αn object in the externαJ叩orid. Observing truth, he should triαnscendmind-only. After transcending mind-only, he should transcend non-manifestation〔ofthe perceived and the perceiver〕.The Y ogin who thus αbide in non-mαnifestα，ifion beholds the greαt vehicle (mahiiyana). The spontαn， eous stage （αnabhoga) which he reaches is tranquil and is purified by his devout vo切 .He observes that even
ρ
erfect wisdom is devoid of intrinsic nature by means of the non-manifestα，tion〔of ・ ・ ・56a) non-dual cognition〕． Some other scholars advocate as follows : (56-1) LAS, X-154ab yukty五vipasyamanan互rb.grahagrahyarb. nirdhyate / (56a) Lank X. 256-258 BhK I. p. 2109-14 cittamatrarh samaruhya bahyam ar也arh na kalpayet / tathatalambane1 sthitva cittamatram atikramet / / cittamatram atikramya nirabhasam atikramet / nirabh・ asasthito2 yogi mahayanarh na3 pasyate // anabhogagatiJ.:i sant互praIJ.idhanair 5… …
5 visodhita / j箱namanatmakarh4 srestharh nirabhase na pasyati / / 1.BhK. tat -hatalambane 2. BhK. nirabhase sthito3.BhK. sa 4. BhK. nir互tmakarh5. BhK. nirabhasena - 31ー梯教大事大皐院研究紀要第12競
The theory of mind-only (citta-matra) is reasonable from the stand -point of conventional truth (sαmvrtya) since it is inherently establi -shed. On the other hand, the object of the external world is not reasonable even from the standpoint of conventional truth since the external world independent of the mind 〔orinternal world〕cannot be established. Therefore, although the Blessed One (Bhαgαvat) teaches that exis -tences are product of the mind-only in order to indicate the above meaning, still he does not teach that it〔viz.,the existence of mind-only〕isreasonable from the standpoint of absolute truth (paramar-thatas). This is because it is taught in other scriptures that the mind 〔aswell as colorform(rupα〕〉 is devoid of intrinsic nature (ni/J,svabhava /
。 血
q u4. Summary of the contents of Harihhadra
’
s Ahhisamayふ lamkir忌lokiPraj負尋paramitivyikhyaThe logical formula （
ρ
rayogα，・〉H・H・..W6245 V 45732 A thing capable of effect implies ：〔I〕athing which has a nature that is knowable (jiieya-riipα） which belongs to the external world ; or 〔II〕athing which has the nature ofcognition(jiiiina-rupa）.…
・
.
.
W62411 V4584 I. A thing capable of effect is a thing which has a nature that is knowable (jiieya-rupa)which belongs to the external world.…
…
W62412 V4585 Haribhadra refutes the view of the three kinds of atomic theory formulated by those who maintain that the external world is real, such as〔I-1〕Vaise号ika，〔I-2〕Vaibha号ikaand 〔I-3〕Sautr互ntika.I-1. The Vaise号ikahold that things which have a knowable nature (jiieya-rupa) are atoms which have intrinsic natures that are connected to one another(paras-pαra-samyukta-svabhiiva)and form a unitary nature.
…
…
…
W62416 V 4587This view is refuted by the following arguments :
I-1-1. It is contradictory that an atom combines with the other atoms at one spot (eka-desa)
.
.
.
.
.
・
H・
.
W62416 V 4587I-1-2. It is contradictory that an atom combines with the other atoms to form a whole C sarvatm仰の．・・H・H・.W62418 V 4589
I-2. The Vaibhasika hold that the atom in the center is surrounded by atoms that have the nature of nonadhering （αsamiiSli$fa),and that there are intervals remaining between them(santara）.
…
…
W62427 V 45814This view is refuted by the following arguments :
併教大事大事院研究紀要第12競
I-2-1. It is contradictory that the atom in the center by a single nature faces the other atoms in the very same manner that it faces a single atom
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
…
W6258 V45820This same refutuation is also applied to the case of the Satyakarava -din
’
s view.(cf.II-1-A-2-1)I-2-2. It is contradictory that the atom in the center by a single nature faces the other atoms in a different manner than it faces a single atom.(cf.II-1-A-2-2)
.
.
.
.
・
H・
.
.
W62518 V 45827I-3. The Sautrantika hold that atoms are an aggregation without intervals remaining between them (nir-antara）
・………
W62521V 45829This view is refuted by the following arguments :
I-3--1. The directional characteristic of the atom in the center would be decided only by the side which is combined (sα鈎yog，α
−
pak手α）because‘having no interval(nairantarya）’is equivalent to‘combination(sαmyogα，〉．’
... W62521 V 45829
I-3-2. It is illogical that an uncombined （αsamyukta) atom is surr.o・ unded by the many atoms which are in contiguous locations (sam争αtara -desavαsthitα） that are suitable to be called the side(dik-s
α
bd，α−
vacy_α．〉... W62524 V 45831
I-4. 〔Conclusion：〕 Distinction(bhed，α，） which means the external
world and which is produced by thought-construction, (kalpano1うαracito)
is not an essential component of efficiency（αrthαkriya均：ga).
.
.
.
・
H・
.
.
W62527 V4593II. Haribhadra refutates the view of the Yogacara school (viz., Satya -kara and Alikak互ra-vadins):They assert that a thing capable of effect （
