[PDF] Top 20 Lec1 13 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website

... An aggregate production plan y maximizes aggregate profit, if and only if each firm’s production plan y j maximizes its individual profit for all j ∈ J. The theorem implies that there are two equivalent ways to ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... (a) If a consumer’s preference satisfies completeness and transitivity, her prefer- ence can be ALWAYS represented by some utility function. (b) It is POSSIBLE that an expenditure function is a convex function of ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... 囚人のジレンマ：注意点
このゲームでは個々のプレーヤーが最適戦略を持つ
【最適戦略（支配戦略）】 他のプレーヤーたちがどのような行 動を選択しても、自分がある特定の行動Aを選ぶことによって 利得が最大化されるとき、行動Aを「支配戦略」と呼ぶ。 ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Ann and Bob are in an Italian restaurant, and the owner offers them a free 3- slice pizza under the following condition. Ann and Bob must simultaneously and independently announce how many slice(s) she/he would ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... (a) Show that the above data satisfy the Weak Axiom of revealed preference. (b) Show that this consumer’s behavior cannot be fully rationalized. Hint: Assume there is some preference relation % that fully ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... u(x 1 , x 2 ) and v(x 1 , x 2 ) are both homogeneous of degree r, then s (x 1 , x 2 ) := u(x 1 , x 2 ) + v(x 1 , x 2 ) is also homogeneous of degree ...u(x 1 , x 2 ) and ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... ◮ A set S in R n is called compact if it is closed ( 閉 ) and bounded. Thm A1.10 (Weierstrass) Existence of Extreme Values Let f : S → R be a continuous real-valued function where S is a non-empty compact subset of ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... “Soon after Nash ’s work, game-theoretic models began to be used in economic theory and political science,. and psychologists began studying how human subjects behave in experimental [r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... with x = (y, z) where y is a scalar, z is an n-dimensional consumption vector, and V (·) is a real valued function. The consumption set X = R n +1 + . (a) Show that if V is concave, U is quasi-concave. (b) Show ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... with x = (y, z) where y is a scalar, z is an n-dimensional consumption vector, and V (·) is a real valued function. The consumption set X = R n+1 + . (a) Show that if V is concave, U is quasi-concave. (b) Show ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... 2. Duopoly Game (20 points) Consider a duopoly game in which two firms, denoted by Firm 1 and Firm 2, simultaneously and independently select their own prices, p 1 and p 2 , respectively. The firms’ ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... prize s, where P s∈S p(s) = 1 (here p(s) is the objective probability of obtaining the prize s given the lottery ...with 1 − ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... 4. Exchange Economy (12 points) Consider the following exchange economies with two agents and two goods. Derive competitive equilibrium prices and allocations in each case. (a) Two agents, 1 and 2, have the ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... (a) Suppose % is represented by utility function u(·). Then, u(·) is quasi-concave IF AND ONLY IF % is convex. (b) Marshallian demand function is ALWAYS weakly decreasing in its own price. (c) Lagrange’s method ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... is increasing in x 1 , the marginal product of x 2 must be negative. (c) Let (x, p) be a competitive equilibrium. Suppose u i (y i ) > u i (x i ) for some bundle y i . Then show that p · y i > p · x i . Does ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Introduction to Market Design and its Applications to School Choice.. Yosuke YASUDA.[r] ... 完全なドキュメントを参照

... Explain. (b) Show that any risk averse decision maker whose preference satisfies indepen- dence axiom must prefer L 2 to L 3 . 3. Question 3 (4 points) Suppose a monopolist with constant marginal costs prac- tices ... 完全なドキュメントを参照