トップPDF Lec1 13 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
Lec1 13 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... An aggregate production plan y maximizes aggregate profit, if and only if each firm’s production plan y j maximizes its individual profit for all j ∈ J. The theorem implies that there are two equivalent ways to ...
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Final1 13 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... (a) If a consumer’s preference satisfies completeness and transitivity, her prefer- ence can be ALWAYS represented by some utility function. (b) It is POSSIBLE that an expenditure function is a convex function of ...
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Lec1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... 囚人のジレンマ：注意点 このゲームでは個々のプレーヤーが最適戦略を持つ 【最適戦略（支配戦略）】 他のプレーヤーたちがどのような行 動を選択しても、自分がある特定の行動Aを選ぶことによって 利得が最大化されるとき、行動Aを「支配戦略」と呼ぶ。 ...
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Midterm 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Ann and Bob are in an Italian restaurant, and the owner offers them a free 3- slice pizza under the following condition. Ann and Bob must simultaneously and independently announce how many slice(s) she/he would ...
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PS1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... (a) Show that the above data satisfy the Weak Axiom of revealed preference. (b) Show that this consumer’s behavior cannot be fully rationalized. Hint: Assume there is some preference relation % that fully ...
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PQ1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ...
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PS1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... u(x 1 , x 2 ) and v(x 1 , x 2 ) are both homogeneous of degree r, then s (x 1 , x 2 ) := u(x 1 , x 2 ) + v(x 1 , x 2 ) is also homogeneous of degree ...u(x 1 , x 2 ) and ...
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Micro1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... ◮ A set S in R n is called compact if it is closed ( 閉 ) and bounded. Thm A1.10 (Weierstrass) Existence of Extreme Values Let f : S → R be a continuous real-valued function where S is a non-empty compact subset of ...
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Lec1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... “Soon after Nash ’s work, game-theoretic models began to be used in economic theory and political science,. and psychologists began studying how human subjects behave in experimental [r] ...
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PS1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... with x = (y, z) where y is a scalar, z is an n-dimensional consumption vector, and V (·) is a real valued function. The consumption set X = R n +1 + . (a) Show that if V is concave, U is quasi-concave. (b) Show ...
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PQ1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ...
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EX1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ...
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PS1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... with x = (y, z) where y is a scalar, z is an n-dimensional consumption vector, and V (·) is a real valued function. The consumption set X = R n+1 + . (a) Show that if V is concave, U is quasi-concave. (b) Show ...
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Final 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... 2. Duopoly Game (20 points) Consider a duopoly game in which two firms, denoted by Firm 1 and Firm 2, simultaneously and independently select their own prices, p 1 and p 2 , respectively. The firms’ ...
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Lec2 1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... prize s, where P s∈S p(s) = 1 (here p(s) is the objective probability of obtaining the prize s given the lottery ...with 1 − ...
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Final1 12 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... 4. Exchange Economy (12 points) Consider the following exchange economies with two agents and two goods. Derive competitive equilibrium prices and allocations in each case. (a) Two agents, 1 and 2, have the ...
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Midterm1 14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... (a) Suppose % is represented by utility function u(·). Then, u(·) is quasi-concave IF AND ONLY IF % is convex. (b) Marshallian demand function is ALWAYS weakly decreasing in its own price. (c) Lagrange’s method ...
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Final1 14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... is increasing in x 1 , the marginal product of x 2 must be negative. (c) Let (x, p) be a competitive equilibrium. Suppose u i (y i ) > u i (x i ) for some bundle y i . Then show that p · y i > p · x i . Does ...
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en 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Introduction to Market Design and its Applications to School Choice.. Yosuke YASUDA.[r] ...
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PS2 1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Explain. (b) Show that any risk averse decision maker whose preference satisfies indepen- dence axiom must prefer L 2 to L 3 . 3. Question 3 (4 points) Suppose a monopolist with constant marginal costs prac- tices ...
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