トップPDF Final Solution 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
PS2 1 solution 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Explain. (b) Show that any risk averse decision maker whose preference satisfies indepen- dence axiom must prefer L 2 to L 3 . 3. Question 3 (4 points) Suppose a monopolist with constant marginal costs prac- tices ...
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Slide2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... elimination of strictly dominated strategies can never be selected (with positive probability) in a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.[r] ...
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Lec3 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... payoff) while M gives 1 irrespective of player 1’s strategy. Therefore, M is eliminated by mixing L and R . After eliminating M , we can further eliminate D (step 2) and L (step 3), eventually picks up ( U , R ...
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Lec1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Prisoners’ Dilemma: Analysis (3) (Silent, Silent) looks mutually beneficial outcomes, though Playing Confess is optimal regardless of other player’s choice! Acting optimally ( Confess , Confess ) rends up ...
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Lec2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Prisoners’ Dilemma: Analysis ( Silent , Silent ) looks mutually beneficial outcomes, though Playing Confess is optimal regardless of other player’s choice! Acting optimally ( Confess , Confess ) rends up ...
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Lec9 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... 3(a - e)/4, is greater than aggregate quantity in the Nash equilib- rium of the Cournot game, 2(a - e)/3, so the market-clearing price is lower in the Stackelberg game.. Thus, i[r] ...
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Lec10 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... If the stage game has a unique NE, then for any T , the finitely repeated game has a unique SPNE: the NE of the stage game is played in every stage irrespective of the histor[r] ...
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Midterm2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... (a) If an agent is risk averse, her risk premium is ALWAYS positive. (b) When every player has a (strictly) dominant strategy, the strategy profile that consists of each player’s dominant strategy MUST be a Nash ...
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PS3 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... (c) Solve for the total saving S by all types who save and the total borrowing B.. by all types who borrow.[r] ...
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Final14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... 5. Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (12 points) There are three different bills, $5, $10, and $20. Two individuals randomly receive one bill each. The (ex ante) probability of an individual receiving each bill is therefore ...
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Midterm14 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Find (all) pure‐strategy Nash equilibrium if it exists. iii.[r] ...
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Final1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... e z . The prices of the three goods are given by (p, q, 1) and the consumer’s wealth is given by ω. (a) Formulate the utility maximization problem of this consumer. (b) Note that this consumer’s preference ...
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Slide1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Combination of dominant strategies is Nash equilibrium. There are many games where no dominant strategy exists[r] ...
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Lec5 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... elimination of strictly dominated strategies can never be selected (with positive probability) in a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.[r] ...
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PS2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Prove that if a firm exhibits increasing returns to scale then average cost must strictly decrease with output. 4.[r] ...
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PS1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... (a) The intersection of any pair of open sets is an open set. (b) The union of any (possibly infinite) collection of open sets is open. (c) The intersection of any (possibly infinite) collection of closed sets is closed. ...
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EX3 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ...
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EX2 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ...
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EX1 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... Solve the following problems in Snyder and Nicholson (11th):. 1.[r] ...
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Lec8 最近の更新履歴 yyasuda's website
... A tree starts with the initial node and ends at2. terminal nodes where payoffs are specified..[r] ...
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