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The Presence of Green Consumers

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If the emission tax is high, aggregate pollution may be the smallest in the no-diffusion scenario. In addition, the presence of green consumers narrows the range of emissions taxes and the level of new technology leading to an efficient equilibrium of full diffusion, and widens the range of parameters for which aggregate pollution is the smallest in the no-diffusion case. We then show that partial diffusion of new technology can naturally occur in equilibrium.

Fourth, we demonstrate that there exists a range of emission taxes for which full diffusion of the new technology is the equilibrium, but that total pollution is lower under partial diffusion. Without green consumers, full diffusion occurs in equilibrium and produces the lowest level of total pollution for any level of the new technology if an emission tax is set below a certain level. On the contrary, the presence of green consumers narrows the range of parameters for which full diffusion is obtained in equilibrium and the lowest level of total pollution is reached.

A number of studies have examined the relationship between environmental policy and the development and diffusion of cleaner technology (Requate and Unold Requate, 2005; Perino and Requate, 2012; Br'echet and Meunier, 2014). In addition, market power in the upstream R&D sector plays a major role in determining the rate of technology diffusion. We extend this stream of studies by examining how the presence of green consumers affects the relationship between the stringency of emission taxes and the rate of technology diffusion.

The second stage: Technology choices of the manufacturing firms

Thus, forτ ≥(a−c)/(2−g), the firm that does not adopt the clean technology stops producing the good and thus the market structure changes from an oligopoly to a monopoly. Similarly, ω2 indicates the adoption benefits of the producers when their competing producer also implements the clean technology. Since ω−1 is negative, it represents the loss of the rival firm's unilateral technology adoption, implying that even if all the adoption benefits are seized by the R&D firm, producers still tend to buy the new technology, if possible, to the possible loss generated by their competitor's implementation thereof.

For τ > 0, the adoption advantage is greater when only one firm uses the new technology. That is, the adoption advantage for a firm is the same regardless of whether the rival firm uses the clean technology. Proposition 1 shows that the degree of technology diffusion depends on the price of the pure technology charged by the R&D firm.

However, since the two producing firms are ex ante identical, the outcomes in these two equilibria are effectively the same; only the identity of the company changes. If we assume that firms choose A or N sequentially, then the Nash equilibrium is also unique in case (ii).

Table 1: The normal form game of technology adoption
Table 1: The normal form game of technology adoption

The first stage: Pricing the technology

The relationship between Ω and the state of clean technology diffusion is as follows: (1) if Ω<0, the R&D firm chooses Ψ = ω1 so that only one manufacturing firm adopts the clean technology in equilibrium, leading to a partial diffusion equilibrium and ( 2) if Ω > 0, the R&D firm chooses Ψ =ω2 so that both production firms adopt the clean technology and thus full clean technology diffusion is the equilibrium. When consumers are not green (i.e. γ= 0), since τ∗= (a−c)/(2−g) holds, the R&D firm always sets Ψ =ω2 and therefore perfect diffusion is the only possible outcome for all stages an emissions tax that enables a duopoly market structure. Conversely, when consumers are green (ie, γ >0), partial clean technology diffusion becomes a possible outcome in a duopoly.

Furthermore, an increase in τ facilitates the diffusion of clean technology at lower levels of τ but hinders the diffusion of clean technology at higher levels of τ. As shown in Figure 1, the ceiling on the emission tax rate that allows for the full diffusion of clean technology decreases as consumers become greener. When consumers are green, an increase in the emissions tax can change the state of technology adoption from full to partial adoption.

Clean technology level and technology diffusion

Partial diffusion, namely when only one producer uses the clean technology, is the equilibrium if the emission tax is higher than τD∗, where τC∗ < τD∗. There exists a region of τ ∈(τC∗, τD∗) in which the gC technology is only partially diffused, whereas that ofgDis is completely diffused.

4 The effects of the clean technology on consumer surplus and total emissions

Diffusion of clean technologies and consumers

Proposition 4 implies that CSN < CSP < CSF, for kF < kP < kN, where the subscripts N, P, and F denote the cases of no adoption, partial distribution, and full distribution, respectively. We next look at the case in which τ >(a−c)/(2−g) holds, where the firm adopting the new technology produces the good as a monopolist. In this case, the average technology level in the industry, which is the same as when the clean technology is fully used, while the value of kisg and 2g respectively.

Let dCSP represent the consumer surplus when one firm possesses technology level g while another stops producing. Thus, even when the market structure becomes a monopoly, a lower emissions tax and cleaner technology increase consumer surplus.

Diffusion of clean technologies and the environment

The expressions of total emissions EN, EP and EF are strictly decreasing functions of γ, implying that green consumers can help reduce pollution at every state of technology deployment. The following proposal shows that a greater spread of the clean technology does not necessarily reduce the total emissions. The first part of Proposition 5 shows the relationship between total emissions at different conditions of technology diffusion and levels of the emission tax.

For the same emissions tax rate, full diffusion of clean technology leads to the lowest total emissions, while no adoption results in the highest total emissions. Then EP < EF < EN applies for τ1< τ < τ2, which means that full diffusion of clean technology generates higher total emissions than partial diffusion. In this case, a full clean technology divestment actually increases total emissions compared to the case of both companies using old technology.

Thus, in this case, even the partial diffusion of the clean technology generates higher total emissions than no technology adoption. Therefore, the second part of Proposition 5 reveals the relationship between the state of technology.. distribution and environmental consequences under a duopoly market structure. We have already demonstrated in Proposition 2 that the full diffusion of the clean technology occurs if and only if τ≤τ∗.

However, the full spread of the clean technology does not necessarily lead to lower total emissions, as shown in Proposition 5. Furthermore, Proposition 5 shows that there is a series of emission taxesτ∈[τ1, τ∗) for .. which total emissions are lower than partial diffusion, whereas the equilibrium result is full diffusion. In this figure, the EP line indicates total emissions under partial dispersion and the EF line total emissions under full dispersion. The relationship between the emission tax rate and the technological level and the ranking of the total emissions at different technological dispersion states are shown in Figures 3 and 4.

The existence of green consumers (ie γ >0). i) narrows the range of (g, τ) for which the clean technology is fully blended in equilibrium and leads to the lowest total emissions, and. ii) extends the range of (g, τ) for which the lowest total emissions are obtained when the clean technology is not used by any of the firms. A smaller region II means that the range of parameters falling in the inefficient full-diffusion equilibrium is reduced due to the existence of green consumers. However, the existence of green consumers also reduces the range of parameters for the effective full diffusion equilibrium (i.e. region I).

Thus, the range of emissions taxes and clean technologies that allow full distribution to be achieved in equilibrium and lead to the lowest total emissions narrows if consumers are green.

Figure 2: Environmental effects, emission taxes, and technology level
Figure 2: Environmental effects, emission taxes, and technology level

5 Conclusion

When the emission tax is high, the cost-reducing effect of adopting the new technology is strong and, as a result, total emissions may increase even when only one firm adopts it. Indeed, the existence of green consumers amplifies such an effect, as Area III is larger in Figure 4. Our findings suggest that when the market demand for the good responds to total emissions, an emission tax should be set at a low level is to ensure that a newly developed, clean technology is fully disseminated and achieves the lowest level of total pollution.

Moreover, the emission tax rate must be adjusted according to the level of the new technology. In general, as the new technology becomes cleaner, the rate at which the emission tax emerges for the efficient full diffusion equilibrium falls. An important policy implication of our analysis is that environmental policy must be properly adapted as consumers become more and more environmentally friendly and as green innovation makes production technology cleaner and cleaner.

If such regulation does not occur, green innovation may not achieve the intended result (ie, total pollution reduction), or may be discouraged altogether. In short, the importance of this information for policy decision making is emphasized and policy makers should be sensitive to such changes in society.

Appendix

Proof of Lemma 1

It is clear that f(τ) reaches its minimum whenτ= (a−c)/(gγ+g+ 1), and the maximum must be obtained at any of the endpoints ofτ.

Proof of Proposition 2

From this we can see that Ω is an inverted U-shaped curve and that the positive solution Ω = 0 must be on the right-hand side of τ∗∗. Then we first consider the situation γ= 0. Solving for τ with Ω = 0 we derive that. ii) When γ >0, there is only one positive solution τ:. Noting that the second term increases in g and that it is easy to obtain g ≤2−(a−c)/τ, we have

Proof of Proposition 3

Proof of Proposition 6

Market Equilibrium in the Presence of Green Consumers and Responsible Firms: A Comparative Static Analysis." Resource and Energy Economics. The Behavioral Response to Voluntary Provision of an Environmental Public Good: Evidence from Residential Electricity Demand. Internalization of Externalities in the Production of Electricity: Willingness to to pay for the characteristics of a renewable energy policy."

When the rate of technology adoption is inverted U-shaped.” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management.

Table 1: The normal form game of technology adoption
Figure 1: Emission taxes, green consumers’ behavior, and technology diffusion
Figure 2: Environmental effects, emission taxes, and technology level
Figure 3: Clean technologies and policy design: without green consumers
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