Opposition Failure in One-Party Dominant Japan

Democracy Without Competition :

Opposition Failure in One-Party Dominant Japan

Ethan Scheiner

Stanford University

2

Party Competition Failure:

Challenges to Democracy

• Problem of one party dominance – “Uncommon Democracies”

• If the party is popular Æ not a problem

• If the party is unpopular Æ failure of

democracy

Ruling Party Unpopularity:

Failure of Democracy, the Japanese Case

Japan

• Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) Rules

• Economic Collapse

• Political Corruption

• Voter anger

– 55% of public: no party affiliation – Only 20-30% support for ruling LDP – Typically low cabinet approval

– 44% dislike LDP

¾But no successful challenger to LDP

The Puzzle: Party Competition Failure in Japan

What can explain opposition party failure in a democratic system where the ruling party is very unpopular?

4

Outline

I. Introduction – Party Competition Failure: Challenges to Democracy

II. Framework

III. Background on Japan

IV. Candidate Experience as Key to Party Success V. Analysis of Local Opposition Failure

A. Japan

B. Comparative Typology

VI. Implications for New Democracies

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Part II –Framework

The Impact of Candidacies:

Explaining Party Competition Failure in Japan

• Key to party success: strong candidates – Japan: Weak opposition candidates

• Underlying problem: opposition weakness at subnational level

• But, WHY subnational opposition failure?

Central Argument

Clientelism

+

Financially Centralized Government Structure

Failure in Subnational Office Elections by Parties not in the National Government

8

Part III – Background on Japan and Existing Explanations for Opposition Failure

A History of LDP Dominance

1955-1990

• LDP: majority of the seats in every House of Representatives (HR) election

• But slow decline in LDP support

1990-1995

• Growing Anti-LDP sentiment

• LDP split and temporary loss of power (8/93-6/94)

1996-Present

• Anger toward LDP remains

• Birth of centrist Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ)

• BUT LDP dominance continues

Past Failure to Explain

LDP Dominance/Opposition Failure

I. Party Popularity

• Miracle Economy

• Japanese Culture

• LDP Policies Problem:

¾ LDP is not popular. It has not won majority of the vote since 1963.

II. Electoral Institutions

• Opposition coordination problems Problems:

¾ Electoral system affected opposition and LDP.

¾ Opposition failure continues under new electoral system.

Part IV – Candidate “Quality”

or Experience is Key to Party Success

Chart 1: LDP Success: It’s the Candidates, not the Party

P r o p o r t i o n o f P a r t y V o t e s W o n

0 5 1 0 1 5 2 0 3 5 4 0 4 5

1 9 9 5 ( H C ) 1 9 9 6 ( H R ) 1 9 9 8 ( H C ) 2 0 0 0 ( H R )

E l e c t i o n

Percentage

L e a d i n g O p p o s i t i o n P a r t y

P r o p o r t i o n o f C a n d i d a t e V o t e s W o n

0 5 1 0 1 5 2 0 2 5 3 0 3 5 4 0 4 5

1 9 9 5 ( H C ) 1 9 9 6 ( H R ) 1 9 9 8 ( H C ) 2 0 0 0 ( H R )

E l e c t i o n

Percentage of District Vote L D P

L e a d i n g O p p o s i t i o n P a r t y

2 5 3 0

of PR Vote

L D P

0

10

Implication: The Importance of Candidates

LDP Has Candidate Advantage

• Confirmed by opposition

• LDP has more incumbents

The Importance of “Quality” New Candidates

• Jacobson (1990): “Quality”/experienced U.S. Congressional candidates more likely to win

• Best source of “quality”: subnational level office

• LDP advantage in “quality” of new candidates too?

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What is a “Quality” Candidate?

• Former local office holders

• Other: Former member of Upper House of

parliament, former bureaucrat, former television newscasters, those who “inherited” seat from

family member

Chart 2: All “Quality” Candidates Do Well,

But LDP Has Higher Proportion of Quality Candidates

LDP DPJ

Total Candidates 280 242

New Candidates 56 139

% of New Candidates

Who Were “Quality” 59% 18%

% of “Non-Quality”

New Candidates Who Won

22% 12%

% of “Quality”

New Candidates Who Won

42% 48%

Chart 3: LDP As A Party Is Not More Popular

LDP Success Is Due To Its Candidate Advantage

Former Local Office Holders More Likely To Win (Predicted Probabilities of Victory)

58.2%

31.1%

No Incumbent Opponent

19.2%

5.8%

Runs against DPJ or LDP

Incumbent

Former Local Office Holder Non-Quality

¾ LDP advantage is in its higher proportion of quality candidates and former local office holders.

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Part V – The Underpinnings of the Recruitment Problems of Japan’s Opposition

Q: Why doesn’t the opposition run more candidates with local office experience?

A: Few office holders belong to opposition parties at the subnational level.

The Reason

Clientelism +

Financially Centralized Government Structure

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Definitions

Clientelism

• Contrasts with “issue-based” politics

• Patronage and pork barrel

Financially Centralized Systems

• Subnational reliance on central government financing

• Transfers to localities: politicized

Clientelism + Fiscal Centralization Encourages Local Pols To Affiliate With Nat’l Ruling Party

Clientelist Systems

• Mainstream local politicians must show they can bring in patronage

Financially Centralized Systems

• Local level politicians’ primary function: help deliver benefits from center

Clientelist + Financially Centralized Systems

• To gain central funding, local politicians have incentive to

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Chart 4: Local LDP Hegemony,

Utter Opposition Failure at Local Level

P r o p o r tio n o f L e g isla tiv e S e a ts H e ld b y th e L D P (1 9 7 0 -1 9 9 7 )

0 % 1 0 % 2 0 % 3 0 % 4 0 % 5 0 % 6 0 % 7 0 %

1 9 7 0 1 9 7 1 1 9 7 2 1 9 7 3 1 9 7 4 1 9 7 5 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 7 1 9 7 8 1 9 7 9 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 8 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7

Y e a r

Percentage L D P N a tio n a l H R S e a ts

L D P P re fe c tu ra l A s s e m b ly S e a ts

P r o p o r tio n o f S e a ts H eld b y N o n -L D P P a r ties (1 9 7 0 -1 9 9 7 )

0 % 1 0 % 2 0 % 3 0 % 4 0 % 5 0 % 6 0 % 7 0 %

1 9 7 0 1 97 1 1 9 7 2 1 9 7 3 1 97 4 1 9 7 5 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 7 1 9 7 8 1 9 7 9 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 8 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 19 9 6 1 9 9 7

Y e a r

Percentage

O p p o s itio n N a tio n a l H R S e a ts

O p p o s itio n P re fe c tu ra l A s s e m b ly S e a ts

National-Local Pipelines of Pork:

The Reason for Local Opposition Failure

• LDP local hegemony due to efforts to maintain

“pipeline” between center and localities

• LDP patron-client relationships at core of pipelines

• Pipelines

– Discourage local party defection from LDP

– Encourage local party defection to the LDP

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If Pipelines Are Important, What Should We See?

• If fiscal dependence is important to local elections

¾ Opposition most successful where the pipeline is less important

The opposition’s greatest success should

occur in the most autonomous prefectures.

Definition of “Autonomy”

Local Fiscal Capability Index

Autonomy Index

Needs"

"

Spending s

Locality'

Taxes) Local

(i.e., Revenues

s Locality'

Note: Central government caps local tax rates across country

Opposition Wins More Assembly Seats In Autonomous Prefectures

Chart 5: Opposition Prefectural Assembly Success by Level of Autonomy (1967-1991)

0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7

0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8

Local Autonomy Index Proportion of Prefectural Assembly Seats Held by Opposition Parties

R=.57 ²²

Greater Opposition Local Success in Autonomous Prefectures: Review of Statistical Results

Mayors

• During periods of greater autonomy:

– More opposition mayors

• During periods of lesser autonomy:

– Fewer opposition mayors – Rise in number of

opposition mayors who also sought LDP endorsement Prefectural Assemblies

• Even controlling for other variables,

– More opposition assembly members in places and times of greater autonomy

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Comparative Perspective:

Japan Is The Rule, Not The Exception

Chart 6: Comparative Typology

• Local one-party dominance common in Clientelist/Financially Centralized cases.

– Exceptions similar to Japan’s

Level of Financial Centralization

Decentralized Centralized

Programmatic-

Issue Based

Party-Voter Linkages

Clientelist

Italy Austria Mexico

Japan

Part VI: Conclusion Summary of Key Points

(1) Importance of “quality” candidates (2) Major Contribution:

Clientelism

+

Fiscal Centralization

Local Opposition Failure

(3) Explanation for opposition failure in Japan at the

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Final Thoughts

• A Vicious Circle in Japan

– Parties cannot gain strength at national level without gaining at local.

– Cannot gain strength at local level without holding power at national.

• Hope for Japan’s Opposition?

– National party developments (new LDP defection?) – Decentralization movement

– Growing anti-clientelist sentiments

• Implications for New Democracies

– New democracies likely to be clientelistic

– Important to create institutions that decentralize fiscal power

¾Decentralization can raise the quality of democracy

LDP As A Party Is Not More Popular

LDP Success Is Due To Its Candidate Advantage

Chart 3: Probit Model of New Candidate Success in 2000 (LDP and DPJ) Aggregated Model Disaggregated Model

Variables Coef. (SE) Coef. (SE)

Quality 1.077 (0.282)***

Former Local Politician 0.702 (0.333)**

HC 1.506 (0.708)**

Bureaucrat 1.549 (0.468)***

TV 1.729 (0.860)**

Inherit a

LDP -0.457 (0.297) -0.476 (0.313) Campaign Expenditures 0.851 (0.851) 0.405 (1.187)

Opponent Inherits b b

Weak Inherit 1.023 (0.822) 1.109 (0.824)

Ran in 96 0.525 (0.288)* 0.527 (0.295)*

Urban 0.293 (0.155)* 0.338 (0.162)**

Incumbent Opponent -0.441 (0.360) -0.294 (0.442) Major Incumbent Opponent -0.839 (0.296)** -0.784 (0.301)**

Constant -1.189 (0.582)** -1.294 (0.667)*

N 191 184

Percent Correctly Predicted 79.0 88.2

Goodman-Kruskal λ (PRE) .244 .244

Chi-sq 55.52 42.77

Prob>chi-sq 0.0000 0.0000

Pseudo R-sq .2662 .2282

Log Likelihood -76.520 -72.329

Opposition Wins More Assembly Seats In Autonomous Prefectures: Statistical Evidence

Opposition Party Success in Prefectural Assembly Elections (1971-1991): Panel Data Estimation

D ependent V ariable=Proportion of Seats W on by O pposition in Prefecture i in Election t (w ith logit transform ation)

V ariab les C oef. (S td . E rror)

C onstant -0.543 (0.129)***

A u to n o m y 0 .1 8 2 (0.05 5 )* * * G D P G row th -0.033 (0.008)***

Lag of D ependent V ariable (Pref. i, E lection t-1) 0.718 (0.051)***

1971 (dum m y variable) 0.254 (0.055)***

Proportion of Seats W on by O pposition at H R

Level in Prefecture i in last H R election before t 0.588 (0.187)***

N 280

F (5, 46) 463.95

Prob > F 0.0000

R -Sq 0.755 N um ber of clusters (prefectures): 47

*p<.05 (one-tail), **p<.05 (tw o-tail), ***p<.01 (tw o-tail)

•Autonomy is statistically significant and positive

Greater Autonomy Leads to a Larger Proportion of Local Executives Who Are Progressive

Chart A: Mean Levels of Autonomy and Proportion of Local Executives Who Are Opposition

0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1 1.05

Standardized Values

Mean Autonomy Score

for All Prefectures

Proportion of All Mayors W ho Are Opposition

30

Chart B: Rise in Proportion of LDP-Affiliated Mayors, While Decline in Opposition-only Mayors

Once Greater Dependence on Central Government

0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55

1976 1979 1983 1987

Year

Proportion

Opposition-only Mayors LDP-Opposition Jointly

Endorsed Mayors

Chart C: Fewer Progressive Mayors When Fewer Cities Operate at a Deficit

0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25

1975 197

6

1977

1978

1979

1980 198

1

1982

1983

1984

1985 198

6

1987

Proportion

Proportion of Localities Operating at a Deficit

Proportion of Localities with Opposition Mayor

32

Chart D: Correlates of Opposition Party Success or Failure

T Y P E O F S Y S T E M

C L I E N T E L I S T ? N o G e r m a n y S w e d e n

U K

Y e s

C E N T R A L I Z E D ? N o C a n a d a U S

Y e s

P A R L I A M E N T A R Y ? N o M e x ic o T a iw a n

Y e s

C A N D I D A T E - C E N T E R E D E L E C T O R A L

S Y S T E M ?

N o A u s tr ia I s r a e l

Y e s

I N S T I T U T I O N A L P R O T E C T I O N O F

C L I E N T E L E ?

N o ^{I ta l y}

Y e s

J a p a n O P P O S I T I O N

F A I L U R E

C O M P E T I T I V E O P P O S I T I O N