Hu Jintao’s Korea Policy: Slow Changes in the Making?

The nuclear weapons programs were the extreme ef- fort to express North Korea’s ultimate security concerns.

Although Pyongyang’s nuclear ambition is widely interpreted as a minimum security measure vis-à-vis Washington, it was at the same time the loudest voice it has been making against its traditional allies, most notably China.⁽²⁵⁾ In retrospect, however, Pyongyang’s voicing has not been very effective, at least vis-à-vis Beijing. To a considerable extent, it has instead made Beijing more drawn to Seoul and rethink about its long- term position on the Korean Peninsula.

Since the late 1990s, China quietly purged the styl- ized language of the “ally sealed in blood” (xiemeng) previously reserved only for describing its relationship with North Korea. The phrase has been quietly replaced by the significantly downgraded concept of “traditional friendly ties” (chuantong youhao guanxi). While, offi- cially, China continues to display concern for North Korea, the intensity of Beijing’s support for Pyongyang has gradually declined over the years, as discussed in detail in the earlier section. Although it may be a truism that China may not sacrifice Pyongyang just for the sake of Seoul, China’s modus operandi in dealing with the two Koreas has been increasingly shifting in favor of the South at the expense of the North.⁽²⁶⁾

Nowhere has the response to the “rise of China” been more receptive than in South Korea where China has managed to win the hearts of many, the elite and the public alike. ⁽²⁷⁾ Although some attribute this “China fever” mostly to economic incentives, it has been quietly closely monitored by the Korea watchers in the United States. In particular, Washington has paid attention to a possible connection between the “China fever” and the rise of anti-American sentiments in South Korea in recent years.⁽²⁸⁾ By 2002, the trade with China accounted

for over 13 percent of South Korea’s total trade, signify- ing a trend of Beijing’s non-allied “capture” of Seoul.⁽²⁹⁾

Is there a proven connection between the “China fe- ver” and the rise of anti-American sentiments in South Korea? Is such a connection—if there is any—one of Beijing’s long-term preferences? While both Washington and Beijing have reiterated the same tenet of “stability”

in their respective managing of Korean affairs, one cannot help but wonder if they really meant the same thing by it. In fact, stability may mean many different things: (1) the continued division of the Peninsula; (2) the maintenance of peace and no war; (3) the sustained dominance by the US and US-based alliance; or (4) the continuation of Beijing’s “creeping” influence over the Peninsula. If China is indeed keeping a low profile but seeking a right time to emerge in order to pursue its own preferences—taoguang yanghui—the Korean Peninsula may well be the perfect setting to do so given its histori- cal and geopolitical backgrounds.

With the foregoing discussion as the backdrop, we now return to the question posed in the beginning of this article: does Hu Jintao’s rise matter to Chinese foreign policy? No concrete evidence is available to support that Hu Jintao’s emergence as China’s new leader has intro- duced a crucial new variable in its policy toward the two Koreas.⁽³⁰⁾ In fact, the situation—specific variables—i.e., the non-proliferation and the “axis of evil” contingen- cies—have further pushed Beijing to opt for the afore- mentioned position that has surprised many of the seasoned observers of Sino-North Korean relations. It should be noted, however, that such a situation—specific position may not necessarily represent a fundamental change in Beijing’s relationship with Pyongyang.⁽³¹⁾

On the other hand, it is equally plausible that we may be witnessing only the first string of Beijing’s deter- mined moves to deal with Pyongyang on a more normal and rational basis. If this were really the case, then, the rise of Hu Jintao—and younger and more technocratic leaders—is likely to make China readjust its relationship with North Korea more in line with international norms and values of reciprocity. Just that these changes are bound to be slow and difficult to discern considering China’s “special” consideration for North Korea. In conclusion, some stealth changes may be in the making but whether they will become much more visible and even endure remains to be further explored in the years to come.

Notes

* Jae Ho Chung is Professor of International Rela- tions and Director of the Center for International Studies at Seoul National University, Korea. Profes- sor Chung is also a policy advisory member of the National Security Council, non-resident fellow at the Korean Institute for Defense Analysis (KIDA), and China consultant for the Federation of Korean Industries (FKI) and the POSCO Group. Dr. Chung is the author and editor of six books, including Cen- tral Control and Local Discretion in China (Oxford University Press, 2000), and currently working on two books entitled Between Dragon and Eagle:

South Korea-China Bilateralism and the United States and China’s Internal Governability: Chal- lenges from Local, Rural and Cyber Spaces.

1. While one other powerful position—the chairman- ship of the Central Military Commission—is still retained by Jiang Zemin, the extent of Jiang’s direct involvement in the making of China’s foreign and security policy remains uncertain at this juncture.

2. Whether the watershed year for China’s opening was either 1979 or 1982 is subject to different inter- pretations. Compare, for instance, Xie Yixian, Zhongguo dangdai waijiaoshi 1949-1995 (Contem- porary China’s Diplomatic History 1949-1995) (Beijing: Zhongguo qingnian chubanshe, 1997) and Wang Taiping, Xinzhongguo waijiao wushinian (The Fifty Years of New China’s Diplomacy) (Bei- jing: Beijing chubanshe, 1999), Vol. 1, pp. 33-37.

3. The argument is well made in Robert Suettinger, Beyond Tiananment: The Politics of US-China Re- lations 1989-2000 (Washington, D.C.: The Brook- ings Institution Press, 2003). Also see Zhu Tingchang, “Lun zhongguo mulin zhengce de lilun yu shijian” (Theory and Practice of China’s “Good Neighbor” Poilicy), Guoji zhengzhi yanjiu, No. 2 (2001), pp. 43-47.

4. For China’s assumption of more responsibilities on a par with its power, see Yongjin Zhang and Greg Austin, Power and Responsibility in Chinese For- eign Policy (Canberra: Asia Pacific Press, 2001);

and Ye Zicheng, “Zhongguo shixing daguo waijiao zhanlue shi zai bixing” (China’s “Great-Power Di- plomacy” Is Inevitable), Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi, No. 1, (2000), pp. 9-12.

5. See Li Yu and Lu Tingen (eds.), Zhongguo yu

zhoubian ji 9-11 hou de guoji jushi (China, Its Neighbors and the International Situation after the September 11^th) (Beijing: Zhongguo shehuikexue chubanshe, 2002).

6. China’s success in the ASEAN is attributed in part to the less conflict-ridden nature of the issues in Southeast Asia compared to those in Northeast Asia.

At the individual-state level, of course, significant variations are found as the island and continental parts of Southeast Asia have all different percep- tions of and relations with China.

7. See Mohan Malik, Dragon on Terrorism: Assessing China’s Tactical Gains and Strategic Losses (Carlile, P.A.; US Army War College, 2002).

8. For a good summary of this earlier episode, see Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary His- tory (Reading, M.A.: Addison-Wesley, 1997), pp.

320-321.

9. See North Korea’s Decline and China’s Strategic Dilemmas, United States Institute for Peace Special Report (Washington, D.C.: USIP, October 1997), p.

6.

10. See Renmin ribao (People’s Daily), October 25, 2002, and January 10 and 22, and February 19, 2003.

11. See “Hanguo wending zhong qiu gaige” (Korea Seeks Change in the Midst of Stability), Renmin ri- bao, January 8, 2003.

12. For Beijing’s snubbing of Seoul’s request that China send delegations to Pyongyang to express concerns, see John Pompret and Glenn Kessler, “China’s Re- luctance Irks US: Beijing Show No Inclination to Intervene in North Korea Crisis,” Washington Post, February 4, 2003.

13. A People’s Daily piece reported the following in January 2003: “[W]ithin a dozen days, five delegations came to seek China’s cooperation…The world is watching us.” See Renmin ribao, January 20, 2003 at http://www.peopledaily.com.cn/GB/junshi/20030120/9 10932.html (last accessed on February 13, 2004).

14. For the push by George Bush and Colin Powell that China should do more to defuse the crisis, see Elisabeth Rosenthal, “China Asserts It Has Worked to End Nuclear Crisis,” New York Times, February 13, 2003. Interviews in Washington in 2003. Also see Renmin ribao, February 8, 2003; and Joseph Kahn, “Turnaround by China: Center Stage as a Diplomatic Power,” New York Times, August 28,

2003.

15. See Renmin ribao, February 20, and March 11 and 13, 2003.

16. For these reports, see Gady A. Epstein, “China Seen Toughening Stance against North Korea Nuclear Developments,” Baltimore Sun, March 28, 2003;

and David M. Lampton, “China: Fed up with North Korea,” Washington Post, June 4, 2003.

17. On this leadership small group, see Willy Wo-Lap Lam, “China Looks ahead to Korea Crisis,” CNN (http://cnn.com/world - March 18, 2003); Morton Abramowitz and James T. Laney, Meeting the North Korean Nuclear Challenge (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, June 2003), p. 28; and Dong-A Ilbo (Dong-A Daily), September 8, 2003. Despite these reports, the actual existence and political im- portance of this group remains unspecified.

18. See, for instance, Shen Jiru, “Weihu dongbeiya anquan de dangwu zhi ji” (The Urgent Mission in Protecting the Security of Northeast Asia), Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi (World Economy and Politics), No. 9 (2003), p. 57.

19. See Charles Hutzler and Gordon Fairclough, “The Koreas: China Breaks with Its Wartime Past,” Far Eastern Economic Review, August 7, 2003.

20. See “China Seen Toughening Stance against North Korea Nuclear Developments,” Baltimore Sun, March 28, 2003.

21. When Hu Jintao met with General Cho Myung-rok in April—the highest-ranking military man second to Kim Jong Il—their “stylized language” was starkly different. Whereas Cho emphasized the

“blood and bullets” North Korea and China had gone through together in the past, Hu remained much sober by stressing the “traditional friendship”

(chuantong youyi) between the two. See Renmin ri- bao, April 23, 2003.

22. For Beijing’s self-praise about its “shuttle diplo- macy” (chuanjun waijiao), see Renmin ribao, Au- gust 7, 2003.

23. See Renmin ribao, April 23 and 28 and July 8, 2003.

24. The second six-party talk, initially scheduled for December, was also preceded by Wu Bangguo’s October visit although it was later put off to 2004.

25. The conspicuous decline in the high-level official exchanges between North Korea and China since 1994 might have also provided an impetus for such extreme efforts on the part of Pyongyang. For the

“voice” analogy, see Jae Ho Chung, “China and the Korean Peninsula: From Interest Re-evaluation to Strategic Realignment?” in David Shambaugh (ed.), Power Shift: China and Asia’s New Dynamics (Stanford: Stanford University Press, forthcoming).

26. For the case of Hwang Chang-Yop’s defection, Chae-Jin Lee and Stephanie Hsieh, “China’s Two- Korea Policy at Trial: The Hwang Chang Yop Cri- sis,” Pacific Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 3 (Fall 2001). For China’s favorable handling of North Korean “es- capees,” see Dong-A Ilbo (Dong-A Daily), Decem- ber 25, 2003.

27. See Jae Ho Chung, “South Korea between Eagle and Dragon: Perceptual Ambivalence and Strategic Dilemma,” Asian Survey, Vol. 41, No. 5 (Septem- ber-October 2001), pp. 777-796; and William Watts, Next Generation Leaders in the Republic of Korea:

Opinion Survey Report and Analysis (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Associates, 2002), p. 12.

28. For Washington’s concern with the Seoul-Beijing bilateralism, see Jae Ho Chung, “How America Views South Korea-China Bilateralism,” Brookings CNAPS Working Paper (September 2003) available at http://www.brookings.edu .

29. In 2003, South Korea’s trade with China amounted to US$ 55 billion. China (excluding Hong Kong) replaced the US as South Korea’s number one ex- port market.

30. While some attach importance to Hu’s meeting with Kim Jong Il in 2000, that does not necessarily mean Hu possesses personal amity toward Kim. See Richard Daniel Ewing, “Hu Jintao: The Making of a Chinese General Secretary,” The China Quarterly, No. 173 (March 2003), p. 32.

31. For this position, see Andrew Scobell, “China and North Korea: The Limits of Influence,” Current History, September 2003, pp. 274-278.

South East Asia had always been considered strategi- cally and economically important for China. Since the end of the Cold War, China had cultivated a close relationship with countries in South East Asia, complet- ing the formal diplomatic recognition to all South East Asian countries by the early 1990s and moving forward toward closer economic partnership. As the Chinese economy expanded in this period, the “rise of China” had been a cause for concern for many South East Asian countries. China, realizing this uneasiness, tried very hard to alleviate the fear and suspicion. The Asian financial crisis of 1997 provided the opportunity for China to demonstrate her sincerity that the rise of China would be a stabilizing force in Asia. Her announcement of not devaluing the Chinese currency—yuan was praised by all corners.

As China changed the leadership in the Fall of 2002 at the sixteenth Party Congress to the fourth generation, Hu Jintao emerged as the new Party Secretary and led eight new members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo. Later at the March 2003 National People’s Congress, Hu succeeded Jiang Zemin as the President and Wen Jiabao became the Prime Minister. The new Chinese leadership would face several challenges, domestic as well as international. Opportunities were also available , especially for China’s policy toward South East Asia.

This paper aims at analyzing new Chinese Leader- ship policy toward South East Asia. The paper is divided into two parts, the first one presents a brief overview of Chinese foreign policy toward South East Asia prior to the present leadership, the second part focuses on the New approaches and characteristics of Chinese policy toward South East Asia.

1. China and South East Asia Relations: Conti-