Dignāga s Concept of Avasthā:
A Note on the Background of the Quyin jiashe lun
取因假設論OKAZAKI Yasuhiro
0. Introduction
In the Quyin jiashe lun 取因假設論 (*Upādāyaprajñaptiprakaraṇa), Dignāga categorized
the conceptually constructed things into three groups, namely aggregates (總聚：samūha),
continua (相續：santāna), and specific states (分位差別：avasthāviśeṣa). Examining the
structure of conceptually constructed things in the Quyin jiashe lun, I have formalized the relation between a conceptually constructed thing B and its material causes A in the fol-lowing schemata.1)
Aaccusative upādāya Bnominative prajñapyate. nānyaḥ Aablative Bnominative, nāpy ananyaḥ
The above schemata are common to all conceptually constructed things as I proved in my previous essay. In that same essay, I also proposed the hypothesis that the above struc-ture is modelled on Vātsīputrīya s theory of pudgala.2)
Among the three groups of conceptually constructed things, aggregates and continua are presumably associated with the concept of pudgala and other Buddhist basic doctrines, such as the four bases of mindfulness (catuḥsmṛtyupasthāna), as mentioned in the Quyin jiashe lun (Q, 886c21–22). On the contrary, the concept of specific states does not seem to
be. Although the concept of avasthā and avasthāviśeṣa are used in various contexts of Bud-dhists discussions, they seem to be used in an explanatory sense. The aim of this essay is to examine Dignāga s concept of avasthā and its background. I think in doing so will offer insight to his threefold categorization of conceptually constructed things.
1. The Concept of
Avasthā in the Quyin jiashe lun
First let us examine how Dignāga describes and defines the concept of avasthā. Judg-ing from the introduction of the Quyin jiashe lun, I think this treatise consists of four parts, namely the introduction (Q, 885a25–885c8), the denial of identity and difference between
conceptually constructed things and their material causes (Q, 885c8–886c17), the denial of absolute absence and real existence of conceptually constructed things (Q, 886c17–887c4), and the explanation of the relation between them and religious or worldly behaviors (Q, 887c4–20). The first and second parts contain the description of avasthā.
Q-1 言分位差別者, 謂於一事有其多性, 異不異時而爲建立．如色生・位(住)・異・無常性・有見・有對・業
具(果)性故等．(Q, 885b04–06: The characters in brackets are emendation of Ui3)) When one entity has many characteristics that are established at the same point or at different point in time, (such characteristics) are called specific state (avasthāviśeṣa). This is illustrated by the case of visible object (*rūpa), which has (four characteristics, namely) arising (*jāti), abiding (*sthiti), changing
(*jarā), and non-eternity/cessation (*anityatā) and it is also visible (*sanidarśana) and resistant
(*sapratigha) because it (viz. visible object) is an effect of action, and so on.
Q-2.1 於果性等分位之處，取彼事已，而興言説．異彼無體．謂於色等，説爲因・果，一・異性， 自・他性，有見・有對性等．(Q, 886c08–10) In the case of the states beginning with the being effect, we make a verbal expression (about its states), after having taken that thing (viz. material cause). If it (viz. states) were different from that (thing), it (viz. that thing) would have no essence. When we mention some visible objects and so on, they are described as cause, effect, identical, different, own, other, visible, resistant, and so on.
Q-2.2 若言彼事異於此者，此即便成非因果等，亦無自體．由無一事不待於徳於自體處可成言説． (Q, 886c10–12) If that thing were said to be different from this (state), such thing would immediately be neither cause nor effect nor so on, and it would also have no property (*svabhāva) because there is no entity whose property is mentioned without reference to its qualities (*guṇa).
Q-1 and Q-2.1 give us some concrete examples of avasthāviśeṣa, including four
characteris-tics of conditioned phenomena, visibility, and resistance. Although the term, 徳(*guṇa:
quality) remains ambiguous, Q-2.2 implies that the concept of avasthā is roughly coexten-sive with that of guṇa in their senses. This means that the concept of avasthā plays a signif-icant role in Dignāga s categorization of conceptual constructions. As Dignāga says in his introduction (Q, 885a25–28), conceptual constructions are a basis for the teachings of Buddha, which are a typical example of verbal behaviors. The category of avasthā is indis-pensable to verbal behavior as well as Dignāga s system of conceptual construction. We could also say that the concept of avasthā characterizes Dignāga s categorization of con-ceptual constructions. Did such a kind of categorization originate with Dignāga?
The mode of existence had been discussed by many scholars until Dignāga s catego-rizing. Some of those scholars discriminated real existence (dravyasat) from a provisional one (prajñaptisat), and others made a distinction between conventional (saṃvṛtti) and
ulti-mately true (paramārtha) existences. Some conceptually constructed things that Dignāga enumerated are conventionally or provisionally existent. Some categorizations of provi-sional matters are found in Yogācāra works which came before Dignāga.4) One of them is
in the last part of Vastusaṃgrahanī of YCBh, where the subjects of abhidharma-mātrikā are discussed. We can also find an item concerning states (avasthā) in this categorization.
2. The Categorization of Provisional Existence in Yogācārabhūmi
In that part of Vastusaṃgrahanī, which is available only in Xuanzang s translation, the things are classified as provisional (假有：*prajñaptisat), real (實有：*dravyasat) or
ulti-mate true existence (勝義有：*paramārthasat), and provisionally existent things are further
categorized into six groups, namely aggregates (聚集), causes (因), results (果), activities (所行), states (分位), and expectations (觀待). Their descriptions are as follows:
Y-1.1 聚集假有者，謂爲隨順世間言説易解了故，於五蘊等總相，建立我及有情・補特伽羅・衆生等 想．此想唯能顯了此聚，是故説名聚集假有．(YCBh(C) 878c29–879a03) The provisional existence of aggregate (*samūha) is said to be representations constructed from the general characters of five skandha and so on. These representations manifest as self (*ātma), sentient beings (*sattva), individual (*pudgala), and people (*jana), for the sake of easy understanding of verbal expressions in accordance with world convention. These representations alone can manifest these aggregates (viz. self and so on) entirely. Therefore, they are named provisional existence of aggregate.
Y - 1 . 2 因假有者，謂未來世可生法行．由未生故, 雖非實有, 而有其因當可生故, 名因假有． (YCBh(C) 879a03–05) The provisional existence of cause (*hetu) is said to be religious practices
(*dharma-carita) whose results must be obtained in the future. Although it is not really existent
because (its result) has not been obtained, such a cause must make (some results) occur. Therefore it is named provisional existence of cause.
Y-1.3 果假有者, 所謂擇滅．是道果故, 不可説無．然非實有, 唯約已斷一切煩惱, 於當來世畢竟不生 而假立故．(YCBh(C) 879a05–08) The provisional existence of result (*phala) is said to be suppression due to discernment (*pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha). It is a result of the teachings of Buddha, so it cannot be said to be absent. It, however, does not really exist because we provisionally construct such a concept only on the ground that all afflictions are ceased and never to occur in the future.
Y-1.4 所行假有者, 謂過去世已滅諸行．唯作現前念所行境, 是故説名所行假有．已謝滅故, 而非實 有．(YCBh(C) 879a09–10) The provisional existence of activities (*saṃskāra) is said to be the activities that have ceased in the past. They are named the provisional existence of activities only on the ground that they are objects of present activities of recollection. They do not really exist
because they have already ceased.
Y-1.5 分位假有者, 謂生等諸心不相應行, 如前意地已標辯釋．即於諸行由依前後有及非有．同類異 類相續分位假立生等．非此生等離諸行外有眞實體而別可得．(YCBh(C) 879a10–14) The provisional existence of states (*avasthā) is said to be factors not associated with mental functions (* citta-viprayukta-saṃskāra) beginning with the arising. Such factors have been previously discussed in Manobhūmi section (YCBh(Bh) p. 61, 7–15, YCBh(C) 291c21–29, YCBh(T) Tshi 31a.3–6). That is to say, in regards to every phenomena (*saṃskāra), (their factors) beginning with the arising are provisionally assumed on the ground of continuous states of preceding and succeeding, existent and non-existent, and similar and dissimilar things. Separating from any phenomena, these arising and so on do not have real existence and are not perceived independently.
Y-1.6 觀待假有者, 謂虚空・非擇滅等．虚空無爲待諸色趣而假建立．若於是處色趣非有, 假説虚空．
非離色無所顯法, 外別有虚空實體可得．非無所顯得名實有．觀待諸行不倶生起, 於未來世不生法中,
立非擇滅無生所顯, 假説爲有．非無生所顯可説爲實有．(YCBh(C) 879a14–20) The provisional existence of expectation (*apekṣā) is said to be space (*ākāśa), suppression not due to discernment
(*apratisaṃkhyānirodha) and so on. The unconditional entity named space is provisionally
constructed in expectation of the aspect of visible objects. If there is no aspect of visible objects in this (unconditional entity), space is metaphorically mentioned. Separating from the visible objects which have no element brought forth, there is independently no real entity named space that is perceived. What is not brought forth cannot be named real existence. In the expectation that every conditional phenomena do not arise simultaneously, taking up suppression not due to discernment from elements not arising in the future, we construct it (viz. suppression not due to discernment) as not arisen and brought forth, and provisionally explain that it is existent. What has not arisen and is brought forth cannot be explained as real existence.
In the above categorization, Y-1.1 and Y-1.5 seem to correspond with the concept of
samūha and avasthāviśeṣa in Q. On the contrary, there seems to be no item in YCBh that
corresponds with the category of santāna in Q. Examining Y-1.2, Y-1.3, and Y-1.4 in detail, however, we realize that these concepts presuppose the continuity from the past to the fu-ture. In this sense, we can say that they correspond to the category of santāna. On the other hand, the terms, 因 (*hetu) and 果 (*phala) appear in Q-1 and Q-2.1. In addition,
judg-ing from Y-1.6, we notice that the concept of 觀待 (*apekṣā) concerns a relativity. For
ex-ample, the concept of space cannot be constructed without any material thing. In this sense, it is similar to the relative concepts, which are exemplified in Q-2.1. I summarize the rela-tion between them in the following table5):
Comparing the categorized items in YCBh with those in Q, we realize that the catego-rization in YCBh has closer connection with the system of abhidharma or religious
prac-tice. On the contrary, we must notice that the semantic domain of avasthāviśeṣa in Q obvi-ously overlaps with that of provisional existence of states (分位假有) in YCBh. In this sense, both concepts are closely connected. We, however, cannot conclude that they are identical. Lastly, let us examine the difference between both concepts.
3. Yogācāra Background of Dignāga s Concept of
Avasthā
The provisional existence of state in YCBh is described to be factors not associated with mental function (cittaviprayuktasaṃskāra) including the arising. As a matter of fact, Yogācāra scholars describe every factor not associated with mental function by using the concept of avasthā in Viniścayasaṃgrahanī of YCBh (YCBh(C) 607a23–608a6; YCBh(T) Zhi 72b4–74b2). Dignāga, however, does not mention all of the factors not associated with
Q: Conceptual Construction (*upādāyaprajñapti)
YCBh: Provisional Existence (*prajñaptisat)
category example example category
總聚：samūha ⎧ ⎨ ⎩ 身 (*kāya) ⎧ ⎨ ⎩ 我 (*ātman) ⎫⎬ ⎭ 聚集假有 林 (*vana) 有情 (*sattva) 衣食等施物 (*āhāracīvarādidatta) 補特伽羅 (*pudgala) 毘訶羅・窣 波等 (*vihāra, *stūpa) 衆生 (*jana) 相續：santāna ⎧ ⎨ ⎩ 羯羅羅等位 (*kalalādyavasthā) ⎫ ⎬ ⎭ ⎧ ⎨ ⎩ 法行 (*dharmacarita) 因假有 芽等轉異 (*aṅkuravikāra) 擇滅 (*pratisaṃkhyānirodha) 果假有 風吹等用 (*vāyuvātādikriyā) 已滅諸行 (*niruddhasaṃskāra) 所行假有 分位差別： avasthāviśeṣa ⎧ ⎨ ⎩ 生・住・異・無常性 (*jāti, sthiti, jarā, anityatā) 生等諸心不相應行 (*jātyādicittaviprayuktasaṃskāra) 分位假有 有見・有對 (*sanidarśana, *sapratigha) ⎧ ⎨⎩ 虚空 (*ākāśa) ⎫⎬ ⎭ 觀待假有 因・果 (*hetu, *phala) 非擇滅 (*apratisaṃkhyānirodha)
一・異性 (*ananya-anyatva) ⎫⎬ ⎭ 自・他性 (*sva-paratva) 苦集二相 (*duḥ kha-samudaya-ākāra) definitive relationship possible relationship
mental function and only mentions four characteristics of conditioned phenomena included in them. On the other hand, visibility (有見：*sanidarśana) and resistance (有對：* sapra-tigha), which are mentioned in Q-1 and Q-2.1, and basic properties of material things are
not included in factors not associated with mental function. In Yogācāra-tradition, do the visibility and the resistance concern the concept of avasthā?
Considering this problem, we find an interesting description in Viniścayasaṃgrahanī of YCBh.6)
tatra rūpādīṇāṃ viṣayāṇāṃ pravibhāgas tad yathā Maulyāṃ bhūmau | tat punaḥ ślakṣṇatvādy
ūrjāvasānaṃ spraṣṭavyāyatanam uddiṣṭaṃ | upādāyarūpatas tasya mahābhūteṣv evāvasthāpanī teṣu prajñaptir veditavyā | tatra mahābhūtācchatām upādāya ślakṣṇatvaṃ.... tad etat sarvam abhisamasya mahābhūtānām eva ṣaḍavasthā bhavanti | (YCBh(P) 21a5–7: YCBh(C) 579a09–24; YCBh(T) Zhi 48a1–7) Among them (viz. sensible fields), a differentiation of perceptible objects, namely visible object and so on is made in the Maulī-stage section. The tangible objects beginning with smoothness and ending with strength have been also explained. Since it is dependent material matter, it is settled in the very primary material elements. In regards to them (viz. the primary material elements), the conceptual construction must be known. Among them (viz. conceptual constructions), depending on clearness of primary material elements, the smoothness (is conceptually constructed).... Summing all of these, the very primary material elements have six states.
From the above description, we can formulate the relation between the concept of
avasthā and tangible objects in the following schema.
mahābhūtānām avasthām upādāya spraṣṭavyāyatanasya/spraṣṭavyasya prajñaptiḥ.
Presupposing the above schema and regarding the similarities between visible and tangible objects, we could interpret the description of Q-1 easily. That is to say, visible objects are results of primary material elements, and their basic characteristics, visibility and resis-tance are conceptually constructed in dependence on the states of primary material ele-ments.
4. Conclusion
Throughout my observations, the similarity between Dignāga s concept of avasthā and that in YCBh is noticed. In YCBh, however, the concept of avasthā is closely connected with abhidharma-category, whereas Dignāga seems to use it more freely. Therefore, Dignāga s concept of avasthā is likely to have been derived from Yogācāra s analysis of abhidharma.
In that case, he did not use the concept of avasthā only in the original sense of Yogācāra but extended its sense in order to apply it to explanations of verbal behaviors in general. (A special thanks to Prof. Kazunobu Matsuda for providing me with invaluable research materials, and Ms. Lauren Alexander for her English language editing.)
Notes
1) See Okazaki 2019. 2) See Okazaki op. cit. 3) See Ui 1958, 204. His emendations are plausible. However 位 might not need to be emended, because Hirakawa shows the case where 位 is used for a translation of sthiti (Hirakawa 1997, 110). 4) Another example is found in the Xianyang
shengjiao lun 顯揚聖教論 T 1602. 31.505b13–16. Asaṅga classified specific conceptual construction of
conditioned phenomena (諸行施設差別) into three, that is conceptual construction of afflicted phenome-na (雜染施設), that of purified ones (清淨施設) and that of states (分位施設). He described last one in the same way as YCBh: 分位施設者, 謂生等心不相應行 (505b15–16). 5) The examples of each cat-egory in Q are found as follows: samūha:885b1–2, 886c27, 887a5–6; santāna:885b3–4, 887a1;
avasthāviśeṣa:885b5–6, 886c9–10, 887a3. 6) The cited Sanskrit text is offered by Prof. Kazunobu
Matsuda. Choi reports the manuscript from which Prof. Matsuda reconstructed this text (Choi 2015).
Abbreviations
Q The Quyin Jiashe lun 取因假設論. T no. 1622.
T Taisho Tripitaka. http://21dzk.l.u-tokyo.ac.jp/SAT/.
YCBh Yogācārabhūmi.
YCBh(Bh) The Yogācārabhūmi of Ācārya Asaṅga. Ed. V. Bhattacarya. Calcutta: University of Calcut-ta, 1957.
YCBh(C) 『瑜伽師地論』100巻．T no. 1579. YCBh(T) D no. 4035–4042.
YCBh(P) Matsuda s reconstruction from St. Petersburg fragment.
Bibliography
Choi Jinkyoung. 2015. A Brief Survey on the Sanskrit Fragments of the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī. Indo
ronrigaku kenkyū インド論理学研究 8: 305–318.
Hirakawa Akira. 1997. A Buddhist Chinese-Sanskrit Dictionary. Tokyo: Reiyūkai.
Okazaki Yasuhiro. 2019. The Realities and Verbal Behaviors in the Quyin jiashe lun. IBK 67（3）: 1164–1171.
Ui Hakuju 宇井伯寿．1958. Jinna chosaku no kenkyū 陳那著作の研究．Iwanami Shoten.
Key words 取因假設論，Dignāga, Yogācāra, prajñapti, avasthā
