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Volume 2012, Article ID 373462,9pages doi:10.1155/2012/373462

Research Article

Noncompact Equilibrium Points and Applications

Zahra Al-Rumaih,

1

Souhail Chebbi,

1

and Hong Kun Xu

2

1Research Chair on Applied and Actuarial Mathematics, Department of Mathematics, College of Science, King Saud University, P.O. Box 2455, Riyadh 11451, Saudi Arabia

2Department of Applied Mathematics, National Sun Yat-sen University, Kaohsiung 80424, Taiwan

Correspondence should be addressed to Souhail Chebbi,[email protected] Received 16 February 2012; Accepted 28 March 2012

Academic Editor: Yonghong Yao

Copyrightq2012 Zahra Al-Rumaih et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

We prove an equilibrium existence result for vector functions defined on noncompact domain and we give some applications in optimization and Nash equilibrium in noncooperative game.

1. Introduction

LetXbe a subset of a vector spaceEandf:X×X → R, withfx, x 0. It is well known in the literature that a pointxsatisfying the property:

f x, y

≥0, ∀y∈X, 1.1

is called an equilibrium point. This notion of equilibrium plays an important role in various areas such as optimization, variational inequalities, and Nash equilibrium problems.

We recall that an equilibrium point in this formulation was first introduced and studied by Blum and Oettli1, who, inspired by the very known work of Allen2and of Fan3, proved the existence of an equilibrium point by using some hypothesis concerning continuity, convexity, compactness, and monotonicity.

Recently, many authors have investigated the existence of such equilibrium points in different context. In some references, different generalizations of monotonicity condition are used to prove the existence of equilibriumsee, e.g.,4–6; while some other references studied this equilibrium problem under generalized convexity conditionsee, e.g.,5. The main objective of our work is to study this equilibrium problem by using a generalized coercivity-type condition.

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InSection 3of this paper, we prove the existence of equilibrium points when X is a noncompact subset of a Hausdorffreal-topological vector space andf is a vector function that takes its values in another Hausdorffreal topological vector space. The order onY will be defined by a coneC. Formally, we obtain the existence of a pointxX, which will be called a weak equilibrium point, that satisfies the following condition:

f x, y

/∈ −intC, ∀y∈X, 1.2

where intC denotes the interior of the cone Cin Y. The existence of what we refer to as equilibrium point,xXsatisfying the following condition:

f x, y

∈ −C/ \0, ∀y∈X, 1.3

is then deduced. The results that we obtain in this section generalize the corresponding results obtained in the classical formulation by Fan in3,7, Blum and Oettli in1as well as the corresponding results obtained in noncompact case by Tan and Tinh in8.

InSection 4and as applications, we prove the existence of saddle points for vector functions defined on noncompact domain. We also prove the existence of Nash equilibrium for an infinite set of players game in which every player has a noncompact strategy set and vector loss function.

2. Preliminaries

In this section, we will recall some notions, definitions, and some properties from the literature that will be used in the paper. LetEand Y be real Hausdorfftopological vector spaces. LetXEbe a nonempty closed convex subset andCY a pointed convex closed cone. The coneCcan define a partial order onY, denoted by, as follows:xyif and only ifyxC. We will writexyif and only ifyx∈intC, in the case intC /∅.

We say that the coneCsatisfies conditionif there is a pointed convex closed cone Csuch thatC\ {0} ⊆intC.

Letf:XY be a mapping.fis said to be convexresp., concavewith respect toCif for allx, yXandα∈0,1, the following condition is satisfied:

f

αx 1−αy

αfx 1−αf y

, 2.1

resp.:αfx 1−αfy fαx 1−αy. It is clear that ifC1andC2 are two convex closed cones inY withC1C2andfis convexresp., concavewith respect toC1, thenfis also convexresp., concavewith respect toC2.

The mapping f is said to be lower semicontinuous, in brief l.s.c.resp., upper semi- continuous, in brief u.s.c., atx0 with respect toCif for any neighborhoodV offx0inY, there exists a neighborhoodUofx0inXsuch that

fUXVC, 2.2

resp.fUXVC.

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Note that following Lemma 2.11 in 8, if f is l.s.c. with respect to C, then the set F{x∈X:fx∈/C}is closed. The mappingfis said to be continuous with respect toCat a pointx0inXif it is l.s.c. and u.s.c. with respect toCat this point.

The mappingfis said to be monotone with respect toCif for allx, yX, the following condition is satisfied:

f x, y

f y, x

0. 2.3

In this paper, we will use the definition of coercing family borrowed from9.

Definition 2.1. Consider a subsetXof a topological vector space and a topological spaceY. A family{Ci, Ki}i∈Iof pair of sets is said to be coercing for a set-valued mapF:XY if and only if the following hold.

iFor eachiI,Ciis contained in a compact convex subset ofXandKiis a compact subset ofY.

iiFor eachi, jI, there existskIsuch thatCi

CjCk. iiiFor eachiI, there existskIwith

x∈CkFxKi.

Remark 2.2. Definition 2.1can be reformulated by using the “dual” set-valued mapF:YXdefined for allyY byFy X\F−1y. Indeed, a family{Ci, Ki}i∈I is coercing forF if and only if it satisfies conditionsi,iiofDefinition 2.1and the following one:

∀i∈I, ∃k∈I, ∀y∈Y\Ki, F y

Ck/∅. 2.4

Note that in case where the family is reduced to one element, condition iii of Definition 2.1and in the sense ofRemark 2.2appeared first in this generalitywith two sets K and C in10and generalizes condition of Karamardian11and Allen2. Condition iiiis also an extension of the coercivity condition given by Fan7. For other examples of set-valued maps admitting a coercing family that is not necessarily reduced to one element, see9.

The following generalization of KKM principle obtained in9will be used in the proof of the main result of this paper.

Proposition 2.3. LetEbe a Hausdorfftopological vector space,Ya convex subset ofE,Xa nonempty subset ofY, and F : XY a KKM map with compactly closed values inY (i.e., for allxX, FxCis closed for every compact setCofY). IfFadmits a coercing family, then

x∈XFx/φ.

3. The Main Result

The main result of this paper is the following equilibrium theorem for vector valued maps.

Theorem 3.1. LetXbe a nonempty closed convex subset of a Hausdorfftopological vector spaceE,Y a Hausdorfftopological vector space, andf, g:X×XY be two functions satisfying the following conditions.

1fis monotone function.

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2For any fixedxX, the functionfx,·:XYis convex, l.s.c. with respect toConX.

3gx, x 0 for allxX.

4For any fixedyX, the functiong·, y:XYis u.s.c. with respect toConX.

5For any fixedxX, the functiongx,·:XY is convex.

6There exists a family{Ci, Ki}i∈Isatisfying conditions (i) and (ii) ofDefinition 2.1and the following one: For eachiI, there existskIsuch that

xX:f y, x

g x, y

/intC, ∀y∈Ck

Ki. 3.1

Then, there exists a pointxXsuch that:

f y, x

g x, y

/intC, ∀y∈X. 3.2

Proof. For anyyX, we consider the set-valued map:

F y

xX:f y, x

g x, y

/intC

. 3.3

We have the following.

iFor allyX,Fyis closed inX, thenFhas compactly closed values.

iiLet{yi :iI}be a finite subset ofXandz ∈conv{yi :iI}. We want to show that

conv

yi:iI

i∈I

F yi

. 3.4

By absurdity, suppose thatz

i∈Iλiyiwithλi ≥0,

i∈Iλi1 andz /

i∈IFyi, it means that for alliI,fyi, zgz, yi∈intC,

i∈I

λi f

yi, z

g z, yi

∈intC, ∀i∈I. 3.5

By assumption1and2, we obtain

i∈I

λif yi, z

i,j∈I

λiλjf yi, yj

1 2

i,j∈I

λiλj f

yi, yj f

yj, yi

0. 3.6

Further, it implies from assumptions3and5that 0gz, z

i∈I

λig z, yi

. 3.7

It follows that

i∈I

λif yi, z

i∈I

λig z, yi

. 3.8

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Or

i∈I

λi f

yi, z

g z, yi

∈−C. 3.9

We deduce that

i∈I

λi f

yi, z

g z, yi

∈intC∩−C ∅, 3.10

so we have a contradiction.

iii Hypothesis6 implies that the family {Ci, Ki}i∈I satisfies the following con- dition: for alliI, there existskIwith

y∈Ck

F y

Ki, 3.11

and hence it is a coercing family forF.

Fsatisfies all hypothesis ofProposition 2.3, so

y∈X

F y

/∅. 3.12

Takexin this intersection, thenfy, xgx, y/intC, for allyX.

Corollary 3.2. LetX,C,{Ci, Ki}i∈I,fandgsatisfy all assumptions ofTheorem 3.1and the addi- tional following conditions.

afx, x 0 for allxX.

bFor any fixedx, yX, the functionk : t ∈0,1 → fty 1−tx, yis u.s.c. with respect toCatt0.

Then, there exists a pointxXsuch that f

x, y g

x, y

∈ −/ intC, ∀y∈X. 3.13

In addition, ifCsatisfies condition (), then f

x, y g

x, y

/∈ −C\ {0}, ∀y∈X. 3.14

Proof. ByTheorem 3.1, there existsxXwith f

y, x

g x, y

/intC, ∀y∈X. 3.15 SincexK, by applying Lemma 3.3 in8, we obtain

f x, y

g x, y

∈ −/ intC, ∀y∈X. 3.16

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This proves the first assertion ofCorollary 3.2. Now, letCsatisfy conditionand letCbe a pointed convex closed cone in Y such that C\ {0} ⊂ intC. It is easy to see that X,C, {Ci, Ki}i∈I,f, andgsatisfy all assumptions ofTheorem 3.1, by the first assertion, we have

f x, y

g x, y

∈ −/ intC, ∀y∈X. 3.17

Since−C\ {0}⊂ −intC, it follows that f

x, y g

x, y

/∈ −C\ {0}, ∀y∈X. 3.18

LetKbe a convex subset ofX. The core ofKrelative toX, denoted by coreXK, is the set defined bya ∈ coreXKif and only ifaKand K∩a, y/∅for allyX\K, where a, y {x∈E:xλa 1−λyforλ∈0,1}.

The following result can be deduced fromTheorem 3.1.

Corollary 3.3. Let X, C, {Ci, Ki}i∈I,f and g satisfy hypothesis (1–5) of Theorem 3.1 and the following condition

6There exists a nonempty convex compact subsetKofXsuch that, for anyxK\coreXK, one can find a pointycoreXKsuch that

f x, y

g x, y

0. 3.19

Then, there exists a pointxXsuch that

f x, y

g x, y

∈ −/ intC, ∀y∈X. 3.20

In addition, ifCsatisfies condition (), then

f x, y

g x, y

/∈ −C\ {0}, ∀y∈X. 3.21

Proof. We just prove the first assertion. By taking for alliI,CiKiK, which is a convex compact set we can see that by using hypothesis6thatF admits a coercing family in the sense ofRemark 2.2.

Remark 3.4. Note that ifXis a compact convex subset ofE, then condition6ofTheorem 3.1 is automatically satisfied. Hence, Theorem 3.1 extends Theorem 1 in 1. Corollary 3.2 extends also Lemma 3.2 in 8 obtained in the noncompact case and Corollary 3.3 corresponds to Theorem 3.1 in1. In case of real-valued functionf, those results coincide with the corresponding results obtained in3,7.

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4. Applications

Let I be apossibly infinite set of players. If each player iI has a nonempty strategy subsetXi of a Hausdorfftopological vector space and a loss function,fi : X

i∈IXi

Y depending on the strategies of n players. For x xii∈IX, we denote x−i x1, x2, . . . , xi−1, xi1, . . .andx−i, yi x1, x2, . . . , xi−1, yi, xi1, . . ..

A pointx xiXis said to be a weak Nash equilibrium if and only if for alliI, fi

x−i, yi

fix∈/intC 4.1

holds for ally yii∈IX.

A pointx xiXis said to be a Nash equilibrium if and only if for alliI, fi

x−i, yi

fix∈ −C/ \ {0} 4.2

holds for ally yii∈IX.

Proposition 4.1. LetXi,fi,X be as above. Assume that, for alliI, the following conditions are satisfied.

1fiis continuous with respect toC.

2For any fixedx−i, the functionfix−i,·is convex.

3There exists a family{Ci, Ki}satisfying condition (a) and (b) ofDefinition 2.1and the following one:

x xii∈IX:

i∈I

fi x−i, yi

fix

∈ −/ intC, ∀y∈Ck

Ki. 4.3

Then, there exists a weak Nash equilibrium. In addition, ifCsatisfies condition (), then there exists a Nash equilibrium.

Proof. Defineg:X×XX, for allx xii∈I,y yii∈IX, by g

x, y

i∈I

fi

x−i, yi

fix

. 4.4

We can easily verify that X,{Ci, Ki}i∈I,f 0, andg as above satisfy all assumptions of Corollary 3.2. Applying the first part of this corollary, we conclude that there exists a point xxi∈IXwith

g x, y

∈ −/ intC ∀y∈X, 4.5

or

i∈I

fi

x−i, yi

fix

∈ −/ intC ∀y∈X. 4.6

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If foriI, we chooseyXin such a way thatx−iy−i, then g

x, y fi

x−i, yi

fix∈ −/ intC, ∀yiXi. 4.7

This completes the proof of the first assertion of the proposition. The second assertion ofCorollary 3.2implies that

fi

x−i, yi

fix∈ −C/ \ {0} ∀yiXi, 4.8

and this gives us the second assertion.

LetE1andE2be two Hausdorfftopological vector spaces,X1andX2be two nonempty convex closed subsets ofE1andE2, respectively. LetYandCbe as above andT :X1×X2Y.

A pointx1, x2X1×X2is called a weak saddle point ofTwith respect toCif T

y1, x2

T x1, y2

∈ −/ intC 4.9

holds for ally1, y2X1×X2.

A pointx1, x2X1×X2is called a saddle point offwith respect toCif f

y1, x2

f x1, y2

/∈ −C\ {0} 4.10

holds for ally1, y2X1×X2.

Proposition 4.2. LetX1,X2,YandCbe as above andf :X1×X2Y. Assume that the following hold.

1For any fixedyX2,f·, yis a convex l.s.c. function with respect toC.

2For any fixedxX1,fx,·is a concave u.s.c. function with respect toC.

3There exists a family{Ci, Ki}satisfying condition (a) and (b) ofDefinition 2.1and the following one. For eachiI, there existskIsuch that

x x1, x2X1×X2:f y1, x2

f x1, y2

∈ −/ intC,∀y y1, y2

Ck

Ki. 4.11

Then, there exists a weak saddle point off. In addition, ifCsatisfies condition (), then there exists a saddle point off.

Proof. Consider the functiong:X×X → Y, whereXX1×X2, defined for allx x1, x2, y y1, y2X1×X2by

g x, y

f y1, x2

f x1, y2

. 4.12

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Apply the first part ofCorollary 3.2forgand the null function 0, we conclude that there exists a pointx x1, x2Xwithgx, y∈ −/ intC, for allyX. This follows:

f y1, x2

f x1, y2

∈ −/ intC, ∀y y1, y2

X. 4.13

The second assertion ofCorollary 3.2implies that f

y1, x2

f x1, y2

∈ −C/ \ {0}, ∀y y1, y2

X, 4.14

and this completes the proof.

Acknowledgments

The third author extends his appreciation to the Deanship of Scientific Research at King Saud University for funding the work through the visiting professor programVPP.

References

1 E. Blum and W. Oettli, “From optimization and variational inequalities to equilibrium problems,” The Mathematics Student, vol. 63, no. 1–4, pp. 123–145, 1994.

2 G. Allen, “Variational inequalities, complementarity problems, and duality theorems,” Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications, vol. 58, no. 1, pp. 1–10, 1977.

3 K. Fan, “A minimax inequality and applications,” in Inequalities, O. Shisha, Ed., vol. 3, pp. 103–113, Academic Press, New York, NY, USA, 1972.

4 M. Bianchi, N. Hadjisavvas, and S. Schaible, “Vector equilibrium problems with generalized mon- otone bifunctions,” Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, vol. 92, no. 3, pp. 527–542, 1997.

5 M. Bianchi and S. Schaible, “Equilibrium problems under generalized convexity and generalized monotonicity,” Journal of Global Optimization, vol. 30, no. 2-3, pp. 121–134, 2004.

6 Y. P. Fang and N. J. Huang, “Variational-like inequalities with generalized monotone mappings in Banach spaces,” Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, vol. 118, no. 2, pp. 327–338, 2003.

7 K. Fan, “Some properties of convex sets related to fixed point theorems,” Mathematische Annalen, vol.

266, no. 4, pp. 519–537, 1984.

8 N. X. Tan and P. N. Tinh, “On the existence of equilibrium points of vector functions,” Numerical Functional Analysis and Optimization, vol. 19, no. 1-2, pp. 141–156, 1998.

9 H. Ben-El-Mechaiekh, S. Chebbi, and M. Florenzano, “A generalized KKMF principle,” Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications, vol. 309, no. 2, pp. 583–590, 2005.

10 H. Ben-El-Mechaiekh, P. Deguire, and A. Granas, “oints fixed et coincidences pour les applications multivoqueapplication de Ky fan,” Comptes Rendus des S´eances de l’Acad´emie des Sciences. S´erie I, vol.

295, no. 3, pp. 257–259, 1982.

11 S. Karamardian, “Generalized complementarity problem,” Journal of Optimization Theory and Applica- tions, vol. 8, pp. 161–168, 1971.

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