Introduction
Any good historical research involves a range of material. Historical sources encompass every kind of evidence which human beings have left of their past activities - the written word and the spoken word, the shape of the landscape and the material artefact, the fine arts as well as photography and film. Among the humanities and social sciences, history is unique in the variety of its source materials, each calling for specialist expertise.
However, historians who specialize in one branch of history do risk attributing too much to one kind of factor in their explanations of historical change, and these approaches have been termed ”tunnel vision”.1)Survey works of history or general syntheses which seek to draw together the research findings of a large number of specialists into a coherent whole, have in general been unsuccessful, because the conventional division between politics, economics, society, and ideas is often rigidly adhered to in the structure of these books.
Historians who approach their own research with “tunnel vision” are conditioned to think in this way when they attempt a “bird’s eye” view. However,
1) Tosh, J.,The Pursuit of History, London, 1992, p 107.
New Zealand’s Origins in International Aviation
Alastair J. Shephard
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the interdisciplinary approach to history of mentalité has certainly helped historians avoid the thematic specialization, and the influence of the Annales historians has been particularly salutary. The interdisciplinary approach by its very nature also allows us to perceive and appreciate the sources, whether utilized or discarded, in a much wider sense. And in utilizing the sources, it is the historian’s responsibility to be always sceptical, scrupulous, and self - critical, thereby making us think more carefully about evidence.2)
In terms of any study into New Zealand’s aviation policy, the sources are numerous and varied. Primary material includes government papers, both unpublished and published, as well as newspapers, with the bulk drawn from government records in New Zealand’s National Archives. These include the files of the Air Department, Prime Ministers’ papers, and that of the Department of Island Territories. Additional primary sources concerning TEAL, the forerunner of today’s Air New Zealand, are from the company’s own archives and includes besides in-house publications and press material, a range of documents on air policy matters. As a business enterprise ultimately answerable to government owners, the TEAL documentation provides useful insights into the development of both national and international air policy at a time when the company’s efforts to interpret and survive under government directive often deprived it of self‐
determination.
2) Such is the case with the study of diplomatic history which has been largely built on the analysis of the ambiguities of diplomatic documents-not all of them intentional-and has taken much of its analytical power from its awareness of the possibility, even likelihood, that a treaty, or a protocol, could, and often would, be interpreted by different states in different ways. (See for example, Richard Evans’In Defence of History, London, 1997, pp 103-128).
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Background
During the first decade of the twentieth century Western governments had largely ignored the potential that the fledgling adventurers in their balloons and flying machines had been continually demonstrating. Only a very few were perceptive or progressive enough to see the significance of these demonstrations.
However, after Bleriot had flown from France to England in 1909, the nations of Europe, with their intricate border alignments, were forced to recognize, perhaps somewhat reluctantly, that this new activity needed some sort of government involvement and called for legislative controls, if their borders were to be made secure. Whitehall began at once to consider the need for some level of control over this new development.
Controlled and sustained flight had introduced a new threat to the sovereignty of all borders and it was from these embryonic thoughts that there grew the first international conference on the subject of air navigation regulation. This gathering, known as the Paris Conference of 1911, was followed later the same year by the enactment at Westminster of the first Air Navigation Act, to be followed two years later by the more developed 1913 Act. Britain, perhaps more than any other state, saw the integrity of her island kingdom threatened by the aeroplane and thus has ever since been at the forefront in the matter of developing flying rules and procedures and air navigation regulations.
New Zealand’s interest in aviation was early. New Zealanders were amongst the first to take to the air,3) and their early and continuing airmindedness reflects the significance of its development for New Zealand’s growth as a nation.
3) Richard Pearse, a South Canterbury farmer, began building his own aircraft and engines about the time the Wright brothers made their historic flight at Kittyhawk.
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However, despite all the efforts of private enthusiasts, the New Zealand government in the early years expressed little or no official interest in flight developments. Privately, the Prime Minister, Sir Joseph Ward, was at one with Henry Wigram in holding a wider view on the potential of these achievements. As early as 1908 Henry Wigram had visited England and had become enthused with the potential of the air arm in military actions and found a ready ear in Joseph Ward. Ward agreed that the government should seek more information on the subject, and he did this while attending the 1909 Imperial Conference. Two New Zealand Army officers were sent to Britain in 1912 to attend a demonstration of the use of the aeroplane in manouevres, and in the same year two New Zealand Army lieutenants were enrolled in training courses in Britain.
The first practical example of a growing interest amongst New Zealand politicians occurred early in 1913 when Joseph Ward, the Prime Minister, visiting London, accepted the role of Vice-President of the Imperial Air Fleet Committee, the President of which was Lord Desborough and its Chairman William Coward, head of the British firm William Coward and Co., a company engaged in business activities throughout Australasia as agents for Colonial Corporations.
The idea behind this committee was two-fold. Firstly, it aimed to draw the attention of the Empire to the need for aerial defence, and secondly, it aimed to provide a unit of the Imperial Air Fleet, “for the defense of Overseas Dominions”.
On February 25, 1913, a letter was sent to the New Zealand High Commissioner in London offering as a gift a tested and proven model of the latest type of aeroplane to the New Zealand government, and in quick time a cable of acceptance was received from Wellington.
When in December 1918 Sir Francis Bell introduced New Zealand’s first aviation bill, it in effect marked the New Zealand government’s official intention
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to participate and stand behind the international standards that were then being formulated in Britain and Europe, in anticipation of the up-coming aviation conference in Paris. Bell expressed the view that the bill would be “the first of many such items of legislation to be dealt with in years to come.” He suggested that it was really something of a “catch-up” bill to match the British bill that had been passed back in 1913. The bill provided for the issue of certificates to men for efficiency in the control and management of hydroplanes and aeroplanes, and also licensed flying schools and prescribed areas for navigation of aeroplanes.
New Zealand had been an eager signatory of the Paris Convention, but because there was little in the way of significant civil aviation activity in the country, there was little political urgency to translate the promises contained within that convention into more detailed regulations. Local flying operations were, for the most part, military in nature and during the 1920s such civil ventures as there were could not really be considered “commercial” or “international”. However, despite this early lack of interest by the government in matters of aviation, through the efforts of the early enthusiasts, the foundations were being laid for the future development of local aviation.
In Britain, the formation of Imperial Airways, the government’s “chosen instrument” for the operation of airline services throughout the Empire, was one of the main driving forces behind the establishment of TEAL, the trans-Tasman service representing the final link in the chain of routes Imperial had begun in 1924. Its formation also represented the growing competition and rivalry with other national carriers attempting to expand internationally.
The Early Pacific Theatre
By the beginning of the twentieth century all Pacific islands had come at least New Zealand’s Origins in International Aviation（Shephard） −１６９−
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nominally under the rule of Western powers. This experience linked the history of the Pacific islands with the history of Asia, Africa and the Americas, and there may therefore seem to be an inevitability of design about the outcome.
Contemporaries certainly thought so ; by the second half of the nineteenth century, Europeans at home and overseas, and those in the derivative states of America and Australasia, were intoxicated with sentiments of racial supremacy, and had devised crude philosophies to justify the political and material ascendancy to which they had risen. In the resulting atmosphere of imperialism, and particularly during the 1870s and 1880s, the major powers of Europe had assumed sovereignty over most of the peoples inhabiting the tropical parts of the world.
In the Pacific, this apparent ‘rush’ for colonies was slightly delayed, occurring for the most part in the 1880s and 1890s, giving the appearance of being the final stages in a grand design ; but in fact the Pacific islands did not become incorporated in the European empires as part of any grand design to partition the world, nor simply to give expression to an irrational European fantasy of racial superiority. There was a multiplicity of motives and a diversity of circumstances and the process extended fitfully not over two decades, but over six. In most cases it resulted from actual or threatened chaos occasioned by the un-controlled, self-interested contact between foreigners and islanders.4)
Broadly speaking, colonial policy throughout the Pacific was a continuation of pre-colonial policy ; the objectives which had been pursued before annexation did not suddenly disappear, and so colonial administration reflects the circumstances and intentions manifest in preceding events. Thus France, which acquired part of its empire in indifference, governed it the same way ; Germany,
4) I.C. Campbell,A History of the Pacific Islands, Christchurch, 1989, p 136.
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which was frankly concerned with exploiting and developing resources, got on with the job expeditiously ; Britain, having lacked a positive policy previously, continued to be guided by ad hoc principles ; the United States of America created an environment for business ; and Dutch neglect of Western New Guinea was almost total.
Of the five colonial powers in the Pacific up to the time of the First World War, the Americans were distinguished by their un-selfconscious style.
Unhampered either by scruples of humanitarianism, or by an obsession with imperialist imagery, the Americans adopted a pragmatic approach. American Samoa was under a naval administration which interfered little in Samoan life directly ; Hawaii was technically not a colony but a territory, which implied an interim condition pending statehood. Under American law, Hawaii was a part of the metropolitan power in a sense which was quite different from the status of the British, German or French colonies. It was quite unashamedly a colony of settlement, and indeed, American settlement was well advanced long before annexation in 1898.5)
The United States interest in the Pacific increased dramatically after the acquisition of Hawaii and also with the procurement of the Philippines from the Spanish. The Philippines provided America with a strategic base from where commercial ventures could be launched into Asia, in particular to China. However, to the detriment of the US the supply lines to the Philippines passed through the Mariana, Caroline, and Marshall island groups which had been confiscated from Germany at the end of the First World War and which were now being administered by Japan as a Class ‘C’ mandate. Although America made no
5) Ibid, p 167.
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moves to acquire the new mandate, at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 she had strongly objected to Japan’s acquisition of it.
In the early 1920s the US navy prepared a report on the value of south central Pacific islands as strategic possessions.6)And in an effort to limit Japanese power in the Pacific, Great Britain and the US concluded an agreement with Japan at the Washington Naval Conference of 1921-22. The agreement in effect restricted Great Britain from building bases closer to Japan than Singapore, and the US from doing so closer than Hawaii. In return it prevented the build-up of defences or advance bases in Japan’s possessions.7) Japan officially repudiated the treaty in 1936.
Up to and during the First World War it was easily understood by America that the vast expanse of ocean lying between her Pacific possessions through to the Asian continent provided little opportunity for effective communications.
Suitable landing places for aircraft were few and far between, and the safety of her shipping would be tenable in the event of any international threat. In the North Pacific there were no American naval bases other than Pearl Harbour. Thus, in the mid 1930s mindful of a potential threat from Japan, America established air bases on the North Pacific islands of Wake, Guam, and Midway. This move also provided a stepping stone for establishing an eventual air route to the Philippines and China.
The perceived threat from Japan led directly to the consideration of an alternative route to Asia through the southern Pacific, and as aviation became a factor in its own right in strategic concerns, the need for air routes became just as
6) W.R. Braisted, The United States Navy in the Pacific 1909-1922, Texas, 1971, pp 525-528.
7) The mandated islands were not referred to in the agreement.
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important and significant as the traditional maritime routes.8) There were two possible alternatives : one route dropped south from Hawaii down through the Pacific to Fiji and New Caledonia and then on to the Asian continent, and the other, a more defensive route, originating in Panama stretched through to the Galapagos islands and on to French Polynesia before going further to Fiji and New Caledonia. The latter route remained suitable for only shipping until well after the Second World War due to the long distances involved. The American concern over the safety of a northern Pacific route was justified in light of the unstable political climate in mainland China and the growing militarism of the Japanese regime both in Asia and in her sphere of Pacific interests.
The physical and geographical challenge of commercially navigating the Pacific ocean by plane was achieved by American technology in the form of Sikorsky S-42 and Martin 130 flying boats. The United States put emphasis on its interest in achieving long-distance flight and its capability had been facilitated by the technical requirements of desired long distance routes. However, the nature of Britain’s objectives were a little different where its ‘red route’ could be flown with relatively shorter hauls between stops. And by 1934 Imperial Airways was flying as far as Australia. Britain saw this ‘red route’ as linking her Empire, an airline route from London, via the Middle East, Africa, and India, to Sydney, and eventually on to Auckland.
Under the Presidency of Juan Trippe, Pan American Airways, the international airline of the United States, had developed into the world’s largest airline in less
8) For an historical examination of these air routes, particularly with regard to Japan-New Zealand relations, see Alastair Shephard’s journal article, The Significance of Sea and Airfreight in the Development of New Zealand’s Foreign Trade with Japan : An Historical Perspective, Fukuoka University Review of Commercial Sciences, Vol XXXXI, No.1 (No 143), June 1996, pp 143-164.
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than ten years. Juan Trippe was one of the pioneers of modern air travel with his company Pan Am being one of the first to offer relatively inexpensive air travel around the world.9) American government support for the new company came in the form of mail subsidies granted by the Kelly Air Mail Act of 1925. The American government had yet to formulate an international air policy, but by 1934 could see the financial security that Pan Am provided in developing air routes for both mail and passengers to the Caribbean, South America, and to China.
Trippe could see the potential of developing a mail service to Australasia, whose trade in terms of volume was already comparable to that of China.
The envisioned New Zealand-Canada-Britain air route relied not only upon mid-Pacific bases, but also crucially on the goodwill of the United States to deliver both mail and passengers to Europe.10) The existing Empire route from Australia concerned aircraft landing and departing from Crown possessions, but also passed through an Asia and Europe becoming increasingly politically unstable.
Thus it was seen that the acquisition of an alternative route was not only sensible politically, but also offered an exciting challenge and potential to circumnavigate the globe by air on Commonwealth transport, thereby resolving many of the communication problems associated with a somewhat fragmented but established Empire.
Air travel promised to revolutionize communications by drastically reducing
9) At first, Pan Am offered flights across the Caribbean and South America. This was so successful that Trippe started to offer flights to Asia eight years later in 1935. At the end of the thirties he introduced the first transatlantic flights, and immediately after the Second World War he decided to offer cheap transatlantic flights. Other airlines objected- they wanted to keep prices high, and earn maximum profits. For several years, many airports in Europe refused to accept Pan Am flights. The other airlines only finally agreed to offer economy flights in 1952.
10) Apart from the controversy over Canton and Enderbury, there remained the issue of landing rights in Honolulu.
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the time between great distances. And from New Zealand’s view, her pathways to the rest of the world (especially to Britain) lay across two relatively vast expanses of ocean - the Tasman to Australia, and the Pacific to North America and beyond. At the outbreak of the First World War New Zealand had become the first Allied nation to set troops on German territory when she occupied German Samoa, a territory to which she was later granted a League of Nations class ‘C’
mandate. This immediately gave New Zealand a vast area of Pacific Ocean to administer, an area which also included Niue, the Cook Islands, and the remote Tokelau group. Economically these islands were of little benefit to New Zealand : their exports commanded low prices and shipping operations proved costly. However, the advent of aviation in the Pacific created a more strategic use of many islands which had previously been deemed of no importance.
The barren and largely deserted Line and Phoenix groups had received brief attention in the late nineteenth century when Britain sought an island link in the Canada - Australia ‘red route’ telegraph line. However the advent of aviation caused this island group to become strategically significant. Between 1889 and 1892 Britain annexed the Phoenix group. Charles Kingsford Smith, who pioneered a flight from San Francisco to Sydney in 1928 via Hawaii, Fiji, and Brisbane, upon arriving in Honolulu on June the first, made a public appeal for information on possible emergency landing sites in the central Pacific. And E. H.
Bryan, a scientific officer on an earlier naval expedition, had suggested the significance of the Line and Phoenix groups.11)As aviation as a means of travel became more established and regular, international interest in stopovers on the
11) Bryan had been on board theS. S.Whippoorwill which conducted scientific surveys of Wake, Midway, Howland, Baker, Jarvis, Pitcairn and other islands in 1924. According to theNew York Times(2/3/1924 and 29/7/1924), no territorial acquisitions were made.
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North America - Australasia route increased. At the time technology was not that advanced to allow aviators to fly easily between Hawaii and Fiji non-stop : the distance was almost the maximum of any aircraft of the day, and commercial interests in this route by plane was not yet developed.
The rapid development of aviation technology not only created an interest in previously non-strategically important islands but was responsible for starting a bizarre display of international competition between Britain and her empire and the United States. The rivalry was characterized by the employment of age-old principles regarding sovereignty. Both sides found it difficult to make legitimate claims on some islands and had been, until the advent of Pacific aviation, trying to limit their responsibilities in the region.12)
The incentive for this assertion of national ownership was the central tenets of the laws governing international aviation, first formalised in Paris in 1919 and re- affirmed in Havana in 1928. Under international law all nations had absolute sovereignty over the air space above their territory which in effect gave every country the omnipotent right to decide who could land on, refuel at, or fly over, its domain. Thus sovereignty over islands that were potential stopovers for aircraft helped to legitimise aviation interests. National ownership would permit sovereign nations to exclude others from operating rival transpacific services if they possessed no territory of their own along the route.
In a bold move on August 13 1877 a British order in council declared that all Pacific islands not claimed by any other nation to be British. And at the time the US had made no moves to challenge this. However soon after America did start to survey islands to the south of Hawaii in an effort to establish a route to
12) From 1909 until 1925 Britain and the US had informed the other that they considered Swains Island to be under the jurisdiction of the other nation ; neither wanted possession.
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Australia.
American claims on unoccupied islands in the central Pacific were based upon their discovery by American whalers and also by the establishing of the Guano Act of 1856 which stipulated that all unoccupied islands containing guano were American territories. By 1884 the Guano Act applied to fifty seven Pacific islands. The initial purpose of the act had been to protect the American fertiliser trade which previously had been threatened by Venezuelan interests in the Caribbean. This act was not a guarantee of permanent sovereignty of remote offshore islands, the possession of which being contrary to the expressed ideals of US policy. It was clearly stipulated by this act that islands possessing guano were not necessarily possessions of America, but were rather ‘appertained’ to the USA. In fact many of the islands involved were not worked, and some which were, were done so by British companies. Finally, the abandonment of diggings when Chilean nitrates became inexpensive and more accessible led to the islands reverting to the status of ‘terra nullius’. With the renewed importance of the Phoenix and Line groups being potential island stopovers for transpacific aircraft, a secretive race essentially between Great Britain and the US in the name of sovereignty ensued.
In early 1935 the United States Department of Air Commerce called upon the assistance of the Treasury and the Navy to help implement its plan of colonization of Howland, Baker, and Jarvis Islands. Indigenous Hawaiiians from the Kamehameha Boys School formed into small groups led by American army officers were placed on the atolls by coast guard cutters. These “colonists” spent several months living on the islands gathering both scientific and meteorological data before being replaced, and represented an American government plan of settlement, one that was supported by the President who favoured an occupancy New Zealand’s Origins in International Aviation（Shephard） −１７７−
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for at least twelve months.13)One objective of American occupancy was to survey the feasibility of building air bases in anticipation of establishing an air route from North America to Australasia.
Jarvis Island lay in almost a direct line from Hawaii to Samoa and was a possible stepping stone to New Zealand, while Howland and Baker were potential stops en route to Australia. In the mid 1930s these islands were seen as of little use with no suitable landing areas even for seaplanes : there were no lagoons and the surrounding seas were too rough and dangerous. Thus the US Bureau of Commerce foresaw the future of commercial aviation in the Pacific as lying in the development of the potentially more versatile land plane which had proved more useful on continental North America. It was then envisaged that these islands would be suitable for the building of airstrips and until then could be invaluable as weather stations on anticipated sea plane routes and also as outposts for military aircraft.14)
In a letter of May 4 1936 to Harold Ickes, the then Secretary for the Interior, Roosevelt identified that the most important uses of these occupied islands were for naval defence and commercial aviation. He also believed that the potential for mineral extraction should be explored as he saw that an implementation of mineral rites would enhance any claims for sovereignty.15)And so on May 13 1936 President Roosevelt officially announced that these three islands were now under the control and jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Interior.16)Territorial acquisition was a new experience for the then State Department’s Bureau of Commerce, with 13) Roosevelt to C. A. Swanson, Secretary for the Navy, 30 May 1935. E. B. Nixon, ed.,
Franklin D.Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs, Vol 2, p 523.
14) R. B. Black, American Equatorial Islands,American Yearbook 1937, New York, 1938, pp 217-218.
15) Roosevelt to Ickes in E. B. Nixon,Franklin D.Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs, vol 2, p 294.
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their approving the early construction of an air strip on Howland Island that was completed by the end of 1936. Although this construction was in the guise of a civil venture, concurrently the government held considerable naval and air exercises in this region maintaining that these exercises were not of a military nature.17)
The American occupation of these islands created a great deal of apprehension for certain members of the British Commonwealth who interpreted the move as not only a provocation to British sovereignty and dominance in the region but also was seen as a possible threat to British interests in developing her aviation ‘red route’. The New Zealand government was particularly concerned as the American move was relatively close to her Tokelau and Cook Island territories, the Americans having already claimed sovereignty over the otherwise insignificant Nukunono Island in 1935.
Initial surprise over the American move was quickly followed by a Commonwealth reaction. Expeditions were now carried out by various Commonwealth vessels, sometimes covertly and sometimes thinly disguised as commercial ventures. In consultation with the British Colonial Office, the New Zealand government prepared her navy for a series of top secret surveys employing her ships Dunedin, Leith, Wellington, Leander, and Achilles.18) The New Zealand navy, being in effect a division of the Royal Navy, represented British interests in the area, the plan being to assert sovereignty over all British islands ranging from the Gilbert and Ellice colony to the Pitcairn group. When
16) J. S. Reeves, ‘Sovereignty of Equatorial Islands’, American Journal of International Law, Washington Supplement to Vol 33. Executive order No.7368, May 13, 1936.
17) A. F. Peachey, ‘Air Power and Problems of Sovereignty 1935-1941’, Thesis, University of Canterbury, 1972, p 23.
18) CA 1 103/2/2. Report on Wellington Survey.
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the New Zealand plan to launch survey expeditions emerged in June 1936, America began a hurried reoccupation of Jarvis, Howland, and Baker Islands.
Trippe advised Roosevelt that Pan American would be willing to assist in consolidating sovereignty through its dummy company, Oceanic Nitrates Corporation, which by means of the Guano Act of 1856 had exclusive control of the islands thereby preventing any outside competition entering the islands.19)
In early 1936 theDunedinstarted survey work in Western Samoa while a few months later theLeander carried out surveys in Fiji. And then on August 6 1936 the patrol sloop H. M. S.Leith landed officials on Canton Island to post a sign declaring sovereignty in the name of King Edward VIII. It now appeared that Commonwealth concerns of asserting sovereignty were justified with the US now more determined to annex any island it thought desirable for aviation needs regardless of British concerns. And in a communication of October 1936 from the Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics to the Chief of Naval Operations it was stated that both Christmas and Canton Islands were most desirable for US defence and civil aviation purposes and should be procured.20)And so on April 8 1937 the Phoenix Islands were placed under the charge of the Administrator of the Gilbert and Ellice colony with signs proclaiming sovereignty erected six months later in the island group.
Pan American Airways and Political Developments
In May 1935 after being rejected by the Australian government, Pan American Airways approached the New Zealand government regarding a proposal
19) P. X. Holbrook, ‘Aeronautical Reciprocity and the Anglo-American Island Race 1936- 1937’,Journal of the Royal Australian Historical Society, Vol 57, December 1971, p 324.
20) Ibid, p 328.
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to establish a flying boat service from North America to Auckland. Australia’s rejection was based on the fact that an Imperial service from England had already been established and she felt no need for another service which in effect would be foreign competition. Pan American’s proposal to New Zealand outlined that the route to New Zealand would commence from San Francisco to Hawaii and then proceed on to Kingman Reef and Pago Pago covering a distance of 6350 miles and taking forty five hours (excluding stoppages).21) It was pointed out that the longest leg would be from San Francisco to Honolulu which at 2,400 miles was twice the length of the Tasman crossing between New Zealand and Australia and requiring a seventeen hour non-stop flight. Harold Gatty, a Tasmanian by birth, representing Pan American, found the ensuing negotiations protracted and bogged down by imperialistic concerns. However in the end the proposal proved attractive to the New Zealand government : she saw that such a service would, besides helping to reduce her traditional isolation from the markets of the world, prove a faster line of communication to Britain than the route through Australia and Asia.
Although the New Zealand government was aware of British plans to extend the existing Imperial service between London and Sydney on to New Zealand, the plans to cross the Tasman were not imminent. In this light the American proposal proved attractive and the New Zealand government offered encouragement and various incentives to the American airline including the promise of no discriminatory taxation and exemption of aviation gasoline from import duties. Also, the airline would be allowed to establish both wireless and base facilities in Auckland, altogether a range of incentives and concessions
21) Civil Aviation Department (CA 1), File 98/1/9, Vol 1, Memo 14/3/1937, Trans-Pacific Air Service.
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previously unheard of granted to any foreign company with interests in New Zealand. Such a move by the New Zealand government was surprising in light of the country being traditionally conservative in any overseas dealings. Allowing an overseas company to establish and operate a major line of international communication into and out of the country would have certainly been a major concession for a country that had previously exercised strong control of its lines of communication.
During his negotiations with the New Zealand government, Gatty pointed out that in his opinion it would be ten years before New Zealand could run a trans- Pacific service and that in the interim Pan American would be able to help build up such a service by establishing and operating a route that would bring both passengers and mail to New Zealand.22) And on 25 July in New York the Vice President of Pan American announced to the press that the company did not wish to fly any of Imperial’s routes. Instead he emphasized that the airline wanted to fly to Auckland because the city was seen as an apex where the two airlines met.23) Delays had been caused by the issue of reciprocity with Pan American, on behalf of the American government, who were unable to grant landing rights to New Zealand. Gatty firmly believed that the Americans would not consent to reciprocal rights and that the New Zealand government’s insistence upon such rights would jeopardize any chance of a establishing a trans-Pacific service.
During discussions the American airline had been quite frank with the New Zealand representatives in stating that its main objective in establishing such a service via American Samoa was to gain a mail subsidy from the American
22) Prime Minister’s Department (PM) 26 pt 1 Record of Discussions held 17/7/1935 between Gatty, Acting PM A. Ransom and Minister of Defence J. G. Cobbe.
23) PM 26 pt 1, Clipping fromNew York Timeswith comment note.
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government, and that communications in general would be of some benefit to New Zealand.24) However it ensued that the New Zealand government would be unwilling to make any decision or sign any agreement without first consulting London.25)
The New Zealand government eventually did grant landing rights to Pan American but on the condition that when a British service was established thus requiring reciprocal landing rights in American territory, the contract would terminate if these rights were not granted. Soon after signing, the New Zealand government strove to renegotiate the terms, particularly the duration of the contract, believing it needed more time to establish its own service. Thus, following advice from London, New Zealand sought to strengthen its position in this matter, in anticipation of eventually establishing a service of its own.
In London the British government was well aware it had no aircraft to match the range of the American Sikorsky flying boats and feared that Pan American could easily establish a monopoly with its new Pacific service.26)Therefore Britain urged New Zealand to try to secure at the earliest reciprocal rights on the American service. Aware that the service would require landing rights in Hawaii, she saw New Zealand’s advantage in being an attractive destination for Pan American. Pointing out that a British service would require only refuelling rights in Hawaii on its way to Canada, the British government stressed that New Zealand was of great importance to air traffic in both directions and strongly urged the New Zealand government not to concede her position for reciprocal rights in Hawaii.
24) PM 26 pt 1, Memo from J. G. Coates, Minister of Finance, to Cabinet 20/9/1935.
25) Ibid.
26) See R. Higham’sBritain’s Imperial Air Routes 1919-1939, London, 1960, Chapter 5- 12.
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Britain feared that if New Zealand did concede, the Americans would then have a stronger position in comparing the Hawaii - continental US leg with the Tasman leg, thereby using this comparison as a means of blocking landing and fuelling rights if the Americans were declined reciprocal rights to fly the Tasman.27)
In short, Britain did not object to granting landing rights as long as the Americans re-ciprocated in return. Wary of dealings with a private company, the British government urged the New Zealand government to make representation direct with the American government in Washington DC, thereby putting any relationship on a more stable and firmer ground.28)
For New Zealand the whole process of consultation was slow and protracted involving not only various departments within its own government, but also a range of ministries and departments overseas in the respective British, Australian, and Canadian governments. Due to lengthy delays in its dealings with other Commonwealth members, New Zealand eventually decided to go ahead with the agreement, with the then New Zealand Prime Minister describing the new service as :
a valuable addition to the Dominion’s limited means of communication and might well further good relations with the United States...the Government regards the whole issue of very first importance to this Dominion and don’t feel given the fail safes that UK difficulties elsewhere should inhibit the New Zealand Government.29)
27) PM 26 pt 1, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to Governor-General, 16/6/1936.
28) Ibid, 29/7/1936.
29) Ibid, Memo from Forbes to Governor-General, 26/9/1935.
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Between May 1935 and March 1937, a period of nearly two years, there were in all seventy six letters of correspondence between New Zealand, Great Britain, Australia, and Pan American Airlines. The New Zealand government to no avail continually urged Pan American to involve the American government, the whole issue being complicated and compounded by the two governments squabbling for sovereignty rights on various Pacific islands.
However, after lengthy discussions, an agreement was finally reached and signed by the two parties on 25 November 1935. It was only a few days later that there was a new government in New Zealand with the Labour Party winning a convincing General Election, a government that wholeheartedly disapproved of the recently signed aviation agreement.
On July 8 1936 the Acting Prime Minister of New Zealand, Peter Fraser, declared that the government had relayed their concerns of American activities in various Pacific islands to British authorities, especially regarding earlier representations involving the possibility of a trans-Pacific airline service. However, both British and American governments did anticipate an early and amicable resolution of this matter and were keen to minimize any controversy by presenting some sense of unity, particularly in light of the growing menace of Fascism on the world stage.
New Zealand did fail to gain full reciprocy in her initial agreement with Pan American Airways. However when Gatty made an approach to the New Zealand government to alter the original agreement, Britain urged New Zealand to initiate further terms of her own : Pan American found it unacceptable that the New Zealand Minister of Transport had the authority to approve minimum payloads and compel the company to land at Suva. The company argued that changes were necessary as the American government regulated payloads and routes on a mileage New Zealand’s Origins in International Aviation（Shephard） −１８５−
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basis in order to grant its mail subsidy.30) With this fresh opportunity to gain reciprocal rights, Britain now advised the New Zealand government to strengthen its position by calling for an amendment to a key clause of the agreement : it called for the period of notification for the termination of services to be changed from one year to three months, thereby minimizing Pan American’s ability to delay the granting of appropriate landing and fuelling rights.
The 1936 Civil Aviation Conference
During negotiations leading up to the agreement Gatty, on behalf of Pan American, had become incensed with the New Zealand government’s delays on important points initially discussed with Britain. The delays became increasingly embarrassing for him to explain to an already agitated Trippe, and he duly wrote to the New Zealand government expressing his displeasure :
I consider that I have shown every courtesy in my reasonable request on behalf of the company and ask that I be shown similar courtesy by a decision.31)
For the 1936 Civil Aviation Conference in Wellington, the New Zealand government had extended an invitation to both the Australian and British governments, the British sending F. G. L. Bertram, a former Deputy Director of Civil Aviation and then in charge of the Empire Mail scheme. Fraser, the New Zealand Prime Minister, made it clear that his Labour government disapproved of the original agreement and feared that if Pan American did not get its way, the
30) Ibid, Governor-General to Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, 6/5/1936.
31) Ibid, Gatty to Semple, 31/8/1936.
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airline would attempt to extend on its own a service to Australia. He suggested that, in the event of a collapse of the existing agreement, a conference should set up between the respective nations involved to resolve the problem of South Pacific aviation.32)
Bertram’s involvement in this conference was instrumental. Describing the existing agreement as an obstruction to the expansion of the Empire mail scheme, he stated that ideally it should be scrapped and fresh dealings should be undertaken direct with the American government, the appropriate American body that could grant reciprocal landing rights for Commonwealth aircraft in American territory.33) He believed that now was the time for the establishing of the trans- Pacific link in the mail chain, one that had been a long‐running and overdue objective of the British government.
Aware that American government interests were being advanced through Pan American’s initiatives as a means to dominate the world’s air routes, Bertram cited the successful talks between British, Canadian, and Irish Free State representatives with the American government on transatlantic services, as a good example of mutual benefit accruing through cooperation rather than rivalry. He therefore proposed that in the first instance an agreement should be reached between Britain and Commonwealth members before any approach be made to the American government.
Bertram believed that the basis for a mutually beneficial agreement lay in a service that minimized the respective country’s territorial sovereignties over Pacific islands along the route. Aware that the Commonwealth’s main objective centred on securing refuelling rights in Hawaii, he also saw the difficulty of the American
32) CA 1 123/11/1. Also in PM 26 pt 1. Summary of conference and statement by Bertram.
33) Ibid.
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position : with Hawaii being home to her Pacific fleet, any granting of rights within her defensive zone may lead to Japan, a growing menace in the Pacific, asking for both landing and refuelling rights, clearly a situation that the American government would try to avoid at all costs.
Bertram stressed to the conference that New Zealand’s strength lay in its position as a terminus, downplaying Hawaii as merely a through point. He anticipated that if the American government argued it was conceding more than it was gaining, it could be countered by pointing out the American advantage in the establishment of the Atlantic service.34) Australia agreed wholeheartedly with Britain’s proposals and stated that in the event of the collapse of any agreement, it would not enter into any agreement with Pan American without prior consultation with both New Zealand and Britain.
New Zealand was now keen to be in a position to operate a trans-Pacific service before claiming reciprocal rights, an attitude that contrasted with the British view that rights could be obtained several years later when a British airline was formed to service the route, a view possibly showing that Britain’s aviation technology was still not that advanced to immediately establish a Pacific service.
They certainly thought that an American service was at least that far off.35)Walter Nash, the Minister of Finance, was aware that while landing rights were of significant importance there also existed another major obstacle facing a British service when he stated :
We still want to go across the Pacific to Canada even if we cannot land in America ; so it depends to some extent on the power of the machine to get
34) PM 26 pt I, Conference summary and Bertram statement.
35) Ibid, Statement by Bertram to the 1936 conference.
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us across to some point owned by Britain.36)
This New Zealand view demonstrated a belief that the establishing of an airline may place greater pressure on both Pan American Airways and the American government to grant rights, contrasting with the British view that reciprocal rights were more likely to be granted if Pan American faced no tangible rival thereby having the relative freedom to establish a Pacific service.
New Zealand’s apprehension came from the belief that profits were unlikely to be made on the route for several years due to Pan American, supported by American subsidies, becoming well enough established to make New Zealand’s later entry uneconomic.
In turn, this move would allow for American domination of civil aviation in the Pacific and the enhancement of both American prestige and commerce at the expense of the British.37) At the beginning of negotiations with Pan American Airways, a New Zealand government-appointed meteorological committee was established to define facility requirements for the proposed trans-Pacific route.
This committee expressing some reservations with the proposal, also saw benefits in the granting of rights to Pan American before any British or Commonwealth airline could work the route. On the positive side, it saw that the USA were never likely to become an enemy and that civil aviation was likely to enhance her regional military prowess in the Pacific, important for New Zealand’s strategic security. Apart from the protection afforded by Britain’s base in Singapore, New Zealand’s regions stretched as far North as Fanning Island which New Zealand saw as vulnerable.38) Thus, in the event of Japanese aggression, it was seen as
36) Ibid, 1936 Conference summary, p 27.
37) Ibid, Report of 1936 Civil Aviation Conference, p 4.
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desirable that the facilities along the route were uniformly British and co-ordinated with the best of both air and sea forces. In the event of the USA remaining neutral in any war with the Japanese, Britain also saw a major, if not complete, dislocation of the service.39)
A major concern for the Commonwealth members attending the conference was the apparent greater amount of funds the American government was prepared to invest in the service, a detriment to any British investment. However, the one factor that was still advantageous to British air interests in the South Pacific was the relatively limited American sovereignty possessions, namely then Hawaii and Samoa. Britain thus felt it was imperative that there were no further American Pacific acquisitions. As far as the Australians were concerned, like the New Zealand representatives, they expressed a desire to have “an all red route of communications circling the world” and were anxious that another nation outside the Commonwealth bridging this communication might in effect damage both British and Commonwealth prestige.
In the end there was a general consensus agreeing with Bertram’s views : New Zealand was not to renegotiate direct with Pan American, and the host government was to first initiate plans for discussions amongst Commonwealth nations to be followed by discussions with the American government. Preliminary discussions were also launched for the creation of a joint venture to fly the Tasman leg of the existing Empire Mail Scheme.
Both New Zealand and Australia were keen on a joint board to administer the proposed company, Tasman Empire Airways Limited (TEAL), along similar lines
38) Ibid, Report of the Meteorological Committee for Trans-Pacific Aviation. Annex to 1936 CA Conference Report.
39) Report of the Meteorological Committee for Trans-Pacific Aviation. Annex to 1936 CA Conference report. PM 26 pt 1.
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to that of the Pacific Cable Board and the Nauru Phosphates Commission, but the British delegation preferred the proposed company should be more commercial and business-oriented in structure. A more conservative input by the New Zealand Prime Minister, Peter Fraser, proved instrumental when he pointed out the necessity of various parties being able to cooperate and compromise in order that the proposal should succeed.40) Recommendations were also made for New Zealand to initiate at the earliest possible date Commonwealth talks which would provide an opportunity for further discussion of the trans-Pacific red route. It was also suggested that the Canadian government be invited to participate in further discussions.41)
While being no more than a set of recommendations, the resolutions drawn up at the conclusion of the conference suggested a victory for Britain’s unified approach to the establishing of a trans-Pacific service, one that in effect was detrimental to any New Zealand expansionist effort in her own right. Also, New Zealand had felt threatened by Australian desires to modify Resolution Two of the conference which stated that in the event of the collapse of the Pan American agreement, Australia would not grant Pan American landing rights. The Australians ,feeling it unfair that the American airline wished to approach their country with an already established route from Asia, called for an amendment stating that landing rights would not be granted “without full consultation with the United Kingdom and New Zealand”.42) Finally after due consultation with the British government, New Zealand decided not to object in order not to jeopardize the link bypassing New Zealand altogether.
40) Report of 1936 Civil Aviation conference, PM 26 pt 1, p 46.
41) For a summary of the resolutions of the conference, see Appendix 3.
42) EA 110/3/3 pt 1 a, Savage to Nash, 10 February 1937.
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After hearing the outcome of the conference, Harold Gatty sought a twelve month extension under the terms of the initial agreement placing the commencement flights in late December 1937. In its proposal the airline pointed out two unforeseen difficulties, namely the delays in the New Zealand government’s response to modifications of the initial agreement and also a maritime strike on the Western seaboard of North America. And so in the spirit of the initial agreement the New Zealand government felt morally obliged to grant an extension.
The New Zealand government, pressured by Britain to continue to seek reciprocal rights from Pan American during the recently granted time extension, now felt embarrassed in carrying out Britain’s requests, particularly as there still was no British airline capable of utilising such a service. However New Zealand’s desire to see a Commonwealth service, led to the government delaying its reply to Pan American while it awaited assurances from Britain that such an airline would soon exist.43)
On 9 March 1937 the new Prime Minister of New Zealand, Michael Savage, informed Gatty that the New Zealand government were no longer willing to accept responsibility for agreements regarding civil aviation made by the previous government, unless they were in the interests of the Commonwealth.44)And just two days later an extension was granted. These comments were a strong indication to the American airline that the Commonwealth were closing ranks and that previous freedom of that airline to initiate and operate a sole Pacific service at will was drawing to a close. In any event the first route proving flight landed in Auckland on 29 April 1937 and was met by an enthusiastic crowd of 30,000
43) CA 1 110/3/3, Governor-General to Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, 21/2/37.
44) The Press, 10/3/1937.
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people. This was followed by the first commercial flight arriving in Auckland almost eight months later on 26 December 1937, one day before an Imperial Airways Empire flying boat from England via Australia landed on the Waitemata Harbour.
Pan American Airways was counting on the popularity of its service as a safeguard of continuity once it faced competition from Britain and its Commonwealth. However, long distance travel by air was still very much a risky and dangerous experience : Pan American services were temporarily halted when one of its Sikorsky 42 B aircraft,The Samoan Clipper, exploded in mid-air on its second flight to Auckland. One of the only other aircraft types suitable for the service, the Martin 130, suffered a similar fate on the Hawaii - Manila route in July 1937. And so it was planned that a scheduled trans-Pacific service would not commence until the new Boeing 314 became available in mid 1940, the route being altered to New Zealand taking in Hawaii, Canton, and Noumea, and avoiding the British colony of Fiji.
The Continuing Sovereignty Dispute
Throughout Pan American’s negotiations with Commonwealth members, the scramble to assert sovereignty over various Pacific islands continued with the New Zealand navy continuing to survey in the South Pacific until the early stages of the Second World War. New Zealand naval actions were by and large directed at preventing the Americans from gaining any further foothold in securing sovereignty rights of Pacific islands, a move that was particularly important given the reluctance of the government-subsidized American airline company to convince the State Department to grant reciprocal rights. With what appeared to be direct collusion between the two parties in sovereignty matters, Commonwealth members New Zealand’s Origins in International Aviation（Shephard） −１９３−
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were quite aware that the American government was continually determined to assume a dominance in Pacific aviation. Behind this belief the British government and Commonwealth members also continued to assert some form of sovereignty over certain islands that showed some potential in aiding British development of aviation in the Pacific with New Zealand being one end of the service.
In both time and distance the lengthy surveys of the vessel Leander throughout the Pacific demonstrated the British objective of furthering and maintaining sovereignty rights of various islands. In 1937 she spent time in the Line and Phoenix islands before visiting the more distant and remote Henderson, Ducie, and Oeno islands in the southern Pitcairn group, which the previous year had been visited by the Wellington. There was at this time a belief that within five years the Pacific would be criss-crossed by air routes making previously insignificant and remote islands important in operating an air service.45) The inclusion of the Pitcairn group as a stop-over in the new service represented the extent of the impetus in the development of such a service. In 1937 the group was considered too remote to be reached safely by air but its strategic location between New Zealand and South America made sovereignty , and thus ownership, directly pertinent to the development of Pacific aviation. Pan American did have a base in Valparaiso, Chile, and the American assertion of sovereignty over the Pitcairn group was seen as a means of guaranteeing that the Americans would be able to dominate a southern Pacific route to New Zealand. The route was first flown in 1951 but only became commercially viable with the advent of jet aircraft in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
45) PIM, April 1936, p 3.
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As far as covert operations in sovereignty matters were concerned, the most transparent action took place in early June 1937 directly involving both British and American naval vessels : with a total eclipse of the sun predicted on June 8 and the Phoenix group being deemed the best place for observation, an American seaplane tender, the Avocet, called at Canton arriving just before the Wellington.
According to reports from the Wellington, the captain of the Avocet refused to shift position in the Canton roadstead to allow the British vessel to anchor, in effect denying the British any sovereignty rights. This move obviously irked the British, particularly as one objective of the Wellington’s mission was to assert authority over this island in honour of the new British monarch, King Edward VIII having abdicated the previous year. However, the Wellington did actually proclaim sovereignty over the island on June 3 in the name of George VI, followed by an American move to erect steel flags to commemorate the eclipse.
The island of Canton was fast becoming a centre of sovereignty attempts by both the British and American governments. Its suitability for both sea and airplanes and its ideal location lying on a path between Fiji and Hawaii made it highly desirable as a trans- Pacific base. On August 11 1937 the Leith returned to Canton placing two New Zealand radio operators on the island to bolster British claims of possession. And nine months later, on March 3 1938, Roosevelt placed Canton and Enderbury islands under the control of the Secretary of the Interior.
This was followed three days later with a group comprising seven American
“colonists” (including five native Hawaiians) landing from a coast guard cutter, and promptly setting up camp not far from the New Zealanders. Once again, directly defying any British claim, the American flag was raised.
The Achilles, delayed from joining these surveys by deteriorating conditions in the Mediterranean where she was based, eventually returned to New Zealand New Zealand’s Origins in International Aviation（Shephard） −１９５−
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where it had been decided she should conduct a survey in the Pacific.46)Thus, the vessel was dispatched in June 1937 on a goodwill mission to Hawaii, on the way dropping off a wireless operator on Christmas island before conducting its own survey assessing island suitability for both sea and airplanes. Although missions did continue into the Second World War, the last major expedition surveyed Fiji in March 1939, its findings being combined with others to determine the best possible route to North America.47)
Several possible trans-Pacific routes passing through Fiji were now formulated. As well, because both Tonga and Samoa had potential as alternative routes, it was recommended that that facilities be established on these islands. The strong influence of weather conditions and the risk of mechanical failure on the long journeys meant that alternative alighting areas needed to be maintained. And these same considerations also called for a suitable route having equi-distant legs.
And so the New Zealand Pacific Aviation Survey eventually concluded that the best route would run through Fiji, Nukunono, and Fanning islands, the time required for preparation of facilities being nine months from initial date of authorization to the commencement of works.48)In his report the man in charge of the Fiji-based expedition, Squadron Leader E. A. Gibson, importantly suggested that for the purposes of establishing an air route the “British Pacific” should be considered as one separate political entity in which the development of facilities should be entrusted to either Britain or New Zealand.
After the tragic loss of theSamoan Clipper, Pan American Airways, realizing the inadequacy of the Kingman Reef - Pago Pago - Auckland route, contacted the
46) PM 26 pt 1, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, 8/7/1936.
47) EA 110/3/7 and EA 110/3/1. Gibson Report of Survey, November 1938 to March 1939.
48) Gibson Report of Survey, November 1938 to March 1939.
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New Zealand government on the necessity of facilities on several New Zealand administered islands : namely certain islands in the Union (Tokelau) and northern Cook Island groups. More specifically these included the islands of Nukunono, Manahiki, and Puka Puka islands which lay between the Line islands and American Samoa. And the New Zealand government, having no objections to the American airline surveying these island groups, was then under the impression that should any of these islands prove suitable for aviation, New Zealand herself would build the facilities and then grant Pan American the appropriate landing rights. At that time the New Zealand government believed that traffic volumes would not justify for some years the maintenance of two sets of trans-Pacific facilities, and that for defence purposes it was desirable to establish the route along British or Commonwealth-held territory.49)
At this time of aviation development in the Pacific, although technology was progressing rapidly, the aeroplane was still seen as having its limitations : for example, a tropical storm or cyclone was a major problem and difficulty in any long distance flight in the Pacific often forcing aircraft to fly to its limitations in seeking alternative landing sites. Alternative landing fields were seen by New Zealand as an essential part of any trans-Pacific route and would be required in the Union, northern Cook, and Line groups.50) In this respect the government realised that to achieve any progress in development, co-operation would be necessary.
Both mistrust and suspicions between Britain and her Commonwealth on the one side and Pan American and the American government on the other continued
49) Deputy Governor-General to Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, 3/2/1938. IT 1 1/40.
50) Ibid.
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with both parties often disputing the other’s claims to Pacific island sovereignty.
After the airline had asked the State Department to investigate the historical basis for British ownership of twenty three islands, the resulting American claims to certain New Zealand administered islands helped to intensify the relationship between the respective governments. Thus, following its investigations, the State Department disputed New Zealand ownership of Tongareva, Manahiki, Rakahanga, Suvarov, and Puka Puka islands in the Cook Islands, despite these islands having been placed under New Zealand control in 1901 by the Colonial Boundaries Act of 1895.51)The American government also disputed the sovereignty of the Tokelau islands of Atafu, Nukunono, and Fakaufu, despite the Tokelaus being ceded to Great Britain by the inhabitants in 1916 and later being handed over to New Zealand to administer in 1925.52) Significantly all these islands did have good lagoons for the landing of sealanes and were also suitable for the building of airstrips. It was considered that even if any of these islands were unsuitable for development, they could at least be used as radio and weather stations. In due course the American government also disputed the ownership of seventeen British islands, ranging from the Gilbert group to the Line group.
Central to British concerns in developing a trans-Pacific service was the American insistence on developing a service separate from any sovereignty issue.
While Britain wished to consider any aviation development in terms of the sovereignty issues at hand, the American government was more occupied in keeping the two separate, and in this way continually vexed British and Commonwealth parties. By this time the American government was becoming increasingly anxious over Japanese intentions in the Pacific with Japan having
51) AJHR A3G, 1901.
52) Ibid, A4D, 1925.
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