Vol.64 , No.3(2016)186佐々木 亮「ニヤーヤ学派の＜主張命題の断念＞に関するダルマキールティの批判に対するジャヤンタの反論」

Joumal

oflndian and BuddhistStudiesVol,64,No.3,March 2016

(51)

Jayanta's

Objection

to

Dharmakirti's

Criticism

of

the

pratijnNahani

ofthe

Nyaya

School

SASAKI

Ry6

1.

Introduction

The "condition

of

defeat"

(nigrahctsthana)

is

the rule which

determines

the victory or

defeat

of

debaters.

Dharmakirti,

who criticized

the

definition

of

the

condition of

defeat

appearing

in

the

ACydyasatra

(N5),

Atydyabhali}ra

(NBh),

and

Atydyavarttika

(NV),

_provided

a

new

definition

of

the

condition of

defeat

in

the

Vadar!ydya

(VN);

Little

attention

has

been

_given

to

the

Naiyayikas' way ofaccepting or criticizing

the

theory

of

the

condition of

defeat

in

the

VN.

However,

this

research

theme

is

important

in

thinking

about

the

history

of

debatology

in

India.

In

_particulag

the

importance

of researching

the

acceptance or criticism of

Dharrnakirti

shown

in

Bhatta

Jayanta's

AIYdyamabjan-

(NM)

cannot

be

overemphasized.

I cornpared the

first

half

of the VN with the second

half

and

demonstrated

the

correspondences

between

Dharmakirti's and

the

Nyaya school's conditions of

defeat

in

Sasaki

[2014a];

furthermore,

I

clarified

how

Dharmakirti's

acceptance of the Nyaya

school's conditions of

defeat

was accepted

by

Jayanta

in

Sasaki

[2014b].

i)

In

this

article,

I

investigate

the

_part

of

the

NM

in

which explicit criticism of

Dharmakirti

is

unfblded.

Although

Dharmakirti

identified

seventeen of the Nyaya

school's

twenty-two

types

of conditions of

defeat

as

incorrect

in

the

latter

half

of the

VN,2)

due

to

space

limitations,

this

_paper

fbcuses

on the "abandonment

of

thesis"

(pratijhahani),

which

is

the

first

condition

listed

by

the

Nyaya

school, and

discusses

the

difference

between

Dharmakirti's

andJayanta's views.

To

sum up the explanation of the abandonment of thesis

by

the Nyaya _school,3) we can say

the

fbllowing:

First,

the

_proponent

makes an

inferential

statement, such as,

(52)

_Jayanta's

Objection

to

Dharmakirti's

Criticism

ofthe

_{pratijnNa-hani}

ofthe

NyEya

School

(SAsAKi)

"Sound

is

non-eternal

(Q)

because

it

is

_perceived

by

the sense,

like

a

_pot,"

Second,

in

order

to

oppose

this

_proponent's

statement,

the

opponent says, "Similarity

is

_perceived

by

the

sense and

is

eternal

(P);

therefore,

sound

_perceived

by

the

sense

is

also eternal

(P)."

Third,

the

_proponent

answers, '`It

is

true.Ifsimilarity

is

_perceived

by

the sense and

is

eternal

(P),

a

_pot

_perceived

by

the sense

is

also eternal

(P)."

When

he

admits that the

property

(P)

ofa counterexample

(i.e,,

eternality) exists

in

his

own example

(i.e.,

a

_pot),

he

abandons

his

original thesis

(i.e.,

"sound

is

non-eternal")

because

in

this

case,

he

admits

that

sound

is

also eternal, as

the

opponent states.

Inthisway, when a

_proponent

is

opposed through the

_property

(P),

which

is

contrary

to

the

_property

(Q)

as

_probandum,

the

_proponent

who admits

that

a

_property

(P)

ofa

counterexample exists

in

a

_proponent's

own example abandons

his

thesis, and therefore

is

defeated

due

tothe "abandonment

ofthesis."

2.

The

Controversy

between

Dharmakirti

andJayanta

In

the

latter

half

of

the

vN, Dharmakirti

does

not admit the abandonment of thesisto

be

a correct condition of

defeat;

he

_produces

three

important

_points

of criticism. In

contrast,

Jayanta

confirms

the

meaning of

the

_points

and

then

refutes

Dharmakirti's

three

_points

one

by

one.

Therefbre,

in

relation

to

the

three

_points,

we should consider

(1)

Dharmakirti's

criticism against

the

Nyaya

school,

(2)

Jayanta's

confirmation of

Dharmakirti's

criticism, and

(3)Jayanta's

criticism ofDharmakirti's view,

2.1.The First

Point

of the

Controversy

Dharmakirti criticized the NyAya school's "abandonment of thesis"as

fbllows:

VN 25,18-22:

(Dharmakirti's

criticism:)

[The

rule thatthe _proponent who

leaves

his

thesis

is

defeated

due

totheabandonment of thesis

does

not need toexist]

because

he

can

leave

his

own

position

and accept another

[opponent's]

position

in

different

ways

[from

that where the

proponent's

admission thata

_property

of a counterexample exists in a

_proponent's

own

example abandons

his

thesis].

[For

example, the opponent may]

indicate

the

[proponent's]

logical

reason's

fault

and so

forth,

and

[the

opponent may] state

[his]

counter-position's _proofl

Furthermore,thisisexactly the

_principal

cause ofthe abandonment ofthesis.

[The

_proponent]

to whom

[the

opponent] explains this

(i.e.,

the

fault

inthe

_proponent's

logtcal

reason and the

proof

of the opponent's counter-position)

has

to abandon

[his]

thesis,and when

[the

proponent]

abandons

[the

thesis],

he

is

defeated.

Jayanta's

Objection

to

Dharmakirti'sCriticismofthe

_{pratijn-ahani}

ofthe NyayaSchoo]

(SAsAKI)

(53)

an appropriate

instance

of the abandonment of

thesis

because

he

thought

that

the

principal

cause of

the

abandonment of

thesis

is

the

fault

in

the

proponent's

logical

reason and

the

opponent's statement ofproof of

his

counter-position.

Jayanta

confirmed and

interpreted

the above criticism

by

Dharmakirti in the

fo11owing

manner:

NM

2,682,7-8:

(Dharmakirti's

view as understood

by

Jayanta:)

Inthismatter, DharmakirtJisays

the

fbllowing:

First,

[stating]

a thesisis

just

"stating what isnot the element of the means of

proof"

(asadhanctfigavacana),

Therefore, stating it

(i.e.,

the thesis)

deserves

the condition of

defeat

[but]

abandoning

it

(i.e.,

thethesis)

does

not

[deserve

thecondition of

defeat],

Jayanta's

understanding of

Dharmakirti's

criticism

is

diffbrent

from

Dharmakirti's

original view. Indeed,

Dharmakirti

thought thatstating a

thesis

is

a condition of

defeat

as asadhanartgavacana

in

the

first

halfofthe

VN

(cf.

VN

17,9-15).

However,

he

does

not refer

to

this

_point

when criticizing

the

`Labandonment

ofthesis"

in

the

second

half.

Jayanta

understands

Dharmakirti's

criticism to mean thatabandoning a thesis

is

not a condition of

defeat;

ratheL stating a thesis

is

a condition of

defeat

because

the thesis

is

not a

_probans

(sdidhana).

NM 2.682,14-17:

Oayanta's

answer:) Inthismatter, Iwill answer as

fbllows:

First,it

has

been

[already]

settled in the

definition

of the component

_part

(avayava)`)

of the inferential

statement] that

[stating]

a thesisisnot `'stating what isnot the element of the means of

proof"

(asa-dhanangavacana).

Indeed,all

_proponents

are

[required]

effbrt to

_prove

the thesis

from.

Furthermore, stating it

(i.e.,

thethesis)

is

not "stating what isnot the element of the

means _of

_proof"

because

_a

[thesis]

which isnot _{shown can} never

be

_proven.

_{Among ordinary}

people,

inrelation toa

_point

of controversy such as recovery ofa

debt,

theabandonment of

thesisissaidto

be

exactly the

_principal

cause of

defeat.

Jayanta

contends

that

Dharmakirti's

view

that

the

thesis

is

not

_probans

is

wrong

because

the

thesis

is

established as

_probans

when

defining

the

component

_part

(avayava)

ofthe

inferential

statement.

2.2,

The

Second

Point ofTheir

Controversy

Dharmakirti

criticizes

the

Nyaya

school's "abandonment

of

thesis"

as shown

below.

VN 26,2-9:

(Dharmakirti's

criticism:) When itisonly said thateternal similarity is

_perceived

by

thesense,

does

[the

_proponent],

who

has

healthy

mind and says, `'Sound is

non-eternal

because

itis

perceived

by

thesense,

like

a

_pot,"

for

himseif

admit thatsound iseternal?

[No,

he

cannot

admit it...Without thestaternent thateternal similarity is_perceived

by

thesense, a

fool]

must

-(54)

Jayanta's

ObjectiontoDharrnakirti's

Criticism

ofthe

_{pratijfiaha'ni}

oftheNYhya

School

(SAsAKi)

say thus onlM thatis,thatsound iseternal,

because

there isno consideration inthe

fool's

thinking.

Dharmakirti

indicates

that

the

proponent

who abandons

his

thesis

in

the

manner thatthe Nayiyayikas show,

that

is,

by

accepting

the

eternality of a

_pot,

is

a stupid man

whose mind

is

not

healthy.

According

to

him,

the

_proponent's

action shown

by

the

Nayiyayikas

is

absurd, and a

_proponent

whose mind

is

healthy

cannot

do

such a

thing.

That is

to

saM

he

shows

that

the

Naiyayikas'

definitive

instance

is

inappropriate

fbr

the

content ofthe abandonment ofthesis.

NM 2.682,s-10:

(Dharmakirti's

view as understood

by

Jayanta:)

And

further,

[in

the

first

place,

the thesis]isnot even abandoned. Even ifeternality as the

_property

of the counterexample

[such

as similarity] isadmitted to

be

[the

_property

ofl a

_pot

which isregarded as an example, is the thesisthatsound isnon-eternal _abandoned

due

to

_only this

[admission]?

[No,

itisnot abandoned,]

Here,

Jayanta's

sumrnary of

Dharmakirti's

criticism

is

different

frorn

Dharmakirti's

original view.

Jayanta's

understanding

is

that

the

_proponent

does

not normally

abandon

the

thesis

that

sound

is

non-eternal only

due

to

the

acceptance of

the

property

of eternatity

in

a

_pot.

NM 2.683,3-6:

aayanta's

answer:)

[The

_proponent] who adrnits thata _propertyof a

exarnple

[which

an opponent shows exists]

in

the

[proponent's]

own example abandons

[his]

thesis.That

is

to saM

[ifl

he

agrees thata _pot also

has

[the

_property ofl eternality;

like

[the

eternality oflsimilarity

[and

then,]

because

of

[a

_property

such as eternality

in]

an example

[such

as a

_pot],

he

wishes to

_prove

thatsound also

[has

thesame

_property

as the

_property

of the

pot].

Therefbre,

just

then

[eternality

thatis,]the

prcperty

of the

_pot

[as

the example] must

establish thesame

[property

ofl eternality insound

[as

the subject]. Hence, why isnot the

thesisthat

it

(i.e.,

sound) isnon-eternal abandoned?

[No,

thethesismust

be

abandoned.]

Jayanta's

point

of objection

is

that

as

long

as

the

_proponent

uses a

_property

of an example

in

order toestablish the same

_property

in

a subject,

he

has

toadmit that sound

has

the

_property

ofeternality when

he

admits

that

a

_pot

has

the

_preperty

of eternality

Therefore,

he

fa11s

into

the

abandonment ofthe

thesis

that

sound

is

non-eternal.

2.3.The Third

Point

of

Their

Controversy

Jayanta's

ObjectiontoDharmakirti's

Criticism

ofthe_{pratijfiaha-ni}ofthe

Nyaya

School

(SAsAKI)

(55)

VN

26,14-16:

_{(Dharrnakirti's}

criticism:)Therefore,"being

perceived

by

thesense"

[as

the

logical

reason] _existsin

both

the

position

of non-eternality and the

_position

of eternalitM and therefore

deviates

_[from

non-eternality, which isthe

property

as

_probandum].

Hence,

[the

_proponent]

deserves

defeat

due

to"mentioning

what

is

not the

factor

of

_proof"

(asadhanfifigasyopadana)

but

dees

not

[deserve

defeat]

due

to abandoning the thesis

by

admitting a

_property

of a counterexample

[which

an opponent shows exists

in

the_proponent'sown exarnple].

In

the

Naiyiyikas'

definitive

example, "being

_perceived

by

the

sense"

is

the

logical

reason

(probans)

for

establishing the

_proven

_property

(probandum)

of non-eternality

According

to

Dharmakirti,

"being

perceived

by

the

sense"

in

thiscase

deviates

from

the

property

of non-eternality and

is

concomitant with

the

_property

of eternality;

therefbre,

it

is

the

logical

reason's

deviation

(vyabhicara),

that

is,

inconclusiveness

(anaikantika),

representing "fa11acious

logical

reasons"

(hetvabhdsa).

Therefore,

the

proponent

is

defeated

due

to

stating

the

"fa11acious

logical

reasons"

but

is

not

defeated

due

to

the

"abandonment

of

thesis"

by

admitting

the

_property

ofthe counterexarnple.

NM 2,682,11-13:

(Dharmakirti's

view as understood

by

_Jayanta:)

Moreoveg

the

"fa11acious

logical

reasons" are also

indeed

counted among the

_group

of "conditions

of

defeat."

And

further,

the

[proponent]

is

defeated

only

due

tousing incenclusiveness as "fa1]acious

logical

reason"

[but]

isnot

[defeated]

due

tothe "abandonrrient of thesis."Therefore, itshould

be

stated that

it

(i,e.,

the abandonment of thesis)

is

not

different

[from

the

fallacious

logical

reasons].

In

the above

text,

Jayanta

exhibits a solid understanding of

Dharrnakirti's

original

point.

Moreover,

he

criticizes

Dharmakirti

as shown

below.

NM 2.683,7-13:

Oayanta's

answer:) Incontrast,

[we

consider the case where] the _proponent,

who isrefuted through

[the

opponent's] indicationof

[the

logical

reason's]

deviation

based

on

what

has

been

established

by

theopponent,

_gives

up

[the

discussion]

only

due

tothis

(i.e.,

the

opponent's indicationof the

logical

reason's

deviation)

in the second statement

(i.e.,

the

opponent's objection to the _proponenVs thesis).If

[this

occurs, then] it rnust

be

correct that

what

is

called the "cause of

defeat"

(nigrahanimitta)

isnothing

but

usage of the '`fa11acious

logical

reason," not theL`abandonment

ofthesis."However, _the

[proponent]

who

is

engaged

in

the thirdstatement

(i.e.,

the

_proponent's

answer tothe opponent's objection)

based

on

[his]

intelligence,

which removes

it

(i.e.,

the

logical

reason's

deviation)

explains such

kind

[offaults].

[If

he

cannot explain this,]

he

will abandon

[his]

thesis.Therefore,

defeat

is

suitable

fbr

the

[proponent]

only

due

tothe "abandonment of thesis."

[At

thattime,the

_proponent]

aims to

[state]

and

is

dependent

on words which are stated

because

ofthe

desire

toabandon

[the

logical

-

₁₀₉₇

-(56)

Jayanta's

ObjectiontoDharmakirti'sCriticismofthe

_{pnitijfidhani}

ofthe Ny5yaSchool

(SAsAKi)

reason's]

deviation

[but

cannot

let

the _proponent abandon the

deviation]

and admits thata

property

of a counterexample

[exists

in

a

_proponent's

own example].

[In

thiscase,] the

"fa11acious

logical

reason" is_not used

[as

the"cause of

defeat"],

Thisisindeed the_principal

matter of the `Labandonment

ofthesis."

Jayanta's

point

of objection

is

that

in

the sequence ofthe

_proponent's

_proof

(the

first

statement),

the

opponent's objection

(the

second statement), and

the

_proponent's

answer

(the

third _statement),

if

the

_proponent

_gives up

the

discussion

when

the

opponent

_points

out

the

logical

reason's

deviation

in

the

second statement,

he

is

defeated

due

to

the

fa11acious

logical

reason asthe condition ofdefeat.

In

thatcase,

ifhe

does

not

_give

up

the

discussion,

intends

to

leave

the

logical

reason's

deviation,

and

fails

to

leave

it,

then

he

is

defeated

_due

to

the

abandonment of

thesis

as

the

condition of

defeat.

Inthismanner, the Nyaya school's

_position

_can

bejustified.

3.

Concluding

Remarks

In

terms

of

the

"abandonment

of

thesis"

(pratijnNa-hani),Jayanta

addresses

Dharmakirti's

points

of criticism one

by

one

in

the NM, although

he

misunderstands

the

_purport

of

Dharmakirti's view

in

rriattersofdetail.

The

difftirence

in

opinion about

the

abandonment ofthesis

between

Dharmakirti

and

Jayanta

derives

from

a

difference

in

the theory of

logic,

such as the

definition

of the

thesis

and

the

fallacious

logical

reason, as well as a

difference

in

debatology}

including

the order ofthe

debate.

This

is

evidence

that

understandings of

the

condition of

defeat

as one ofthe most

important

concepts inthe

field

of

debate

theory are

inseparable

not

only

from

their

debatology

but

from

their

theory

of

logic.

Netes

1)

_Jayanta

resolves asadhanantn'gavacana and adosodbhavana intoapratipatti and vipratipatti, thatis, the traditionalconcepts inthe

doctrine

of the Nyaya school. Furthermore,

he

welcomed and reintroduced Dharmakirti'sassertion inwhich some of the twenty-two conditions of

defeat

are admitted to

be

correct. SeeSasaki

[2014b]

for

details.

2) When criticizing the seventeen

types

of conditions of

defeat,

Dharmakirti adopts two methods-criticism of thecontent ofeach condition of

defeat

and criticism of classificationof conditions of

defeat.

As

for

thesetwo methods ofcriticism, see Sasaki

[2014a:

323-324]

for

details.

3)

CL

NBh

1163,3-1165,2ad

NS

5.2.2

(Ci'e

VN

25,4-5).

Uddyotakara

explained

the

abandonment ofthesis

in

a

different

way

from

Vatsyayana.Cf NV 1166,2-4.

Jayanta

’

s　Objection　to　Dharmakirti’s　Criticism　ofthe　

pr

口_壇勲

h

δηf　ofthe 　Nydya　Schoo1（SAsAKI）

　

　

（

57

） 4）　

Cf

．　

NS

　I．1．

32

−

33

． AbbreViations Ci’e NBhNM NSNV VN

cita亡ロm　fn　alio　u5に5　_secundarii川odσedendi ！citation　in　another 　text　used 　secondarily _，　that　is，

not 　marked 　

by

　an　author 　as　

being

　a　citation ，　with 　redactional 　changes ． NyayabhaSya （V5tSyayana ）．　See　NV ・

ハ_｛

_y

_垣

_y

αm _頃∫αrf （Bha鞐a　

Jayanta

）．　K．　s．　varad酉c亘

rya

，　ed・N頭

dyamafijarf

　of　

Jayan

亡abhatta 　wf亡

h

TipPa4i

：　Nya

’

yasaurabha，2vols ，　Mysore：Oriental　Research　Institute，1969，1983 ・

Ny

  α5α亡rα（Gautama ），　See　NV ．

理

y

ζ

y

αvδrt亡

ika

（Uddyotakara ）．亘n　T訌ran 百tha　Ny互_{ya−Tarkatirtha}　and 　Amarendramohan Tarkatirtha，　eds．_，ハ_｛

ydyadarsdnam

　wi亡

h

　V百_乾ソζ

_y

αη α冶Bh霞

y

α，【1dめ70亡α

k

αr〆5　vdrt亡ikα，　Vdca5pati

MiS’ra’∫ 丁瓧

p

α

ry

α_『蔽 and　

Vf

_‘vαη冱亡

h

爵

Vrtti

．2vols ．　Calcutta　Sanskrit　

Series

，　nos ．18， 29．

Calcutta：Metropolitan 　Printing ＆Publishing　House ，1936，1944．　Repr ．，　Kyoto ：Rinsen　Book ，

1982，

V飆α_η頭

y

α （

Dharmakirti

）。　Michael　Torsten　Much ，　ed，　

Dharnlakirtis

　

Vadanyayail

．　Teil　I，

5anskrit−T麒 ．

6sterreichische

　

Akademie

　

der

　Wissensch誼 en，　

philosophisch

−

historischen

Klasse，　Sitzumgsberichte，581．　Band，　Ver6ffentlichungen　

der

　Kommission　

fUr

　Sprachen 　und

Kulturen



S廿

dasiens

，　 Nr．25。　 Wien ： Verlag

　der　

6sterreichis

⊂

hen　

Akademie

　der

Wissenscha丘en_，1991。

Bibliography

Sasaki　Ry6 佐々 木亮 ，2014a，　“Darumakiruti　ni　

yoru

　t6ron　shis6　no 　taikeika：Vadanydya 　ni　okeru

　

　

NiyEya　

_gakuha

−setsu 　no 　

hihan

　t。　

juy6

” ダル マ キール テ ィによる討 論 思 想の 体 系 化：

　

　　

臓

d

α艇 yα における ニ ヤーヤ学派説の批判 と受容 ［

Systematization

　ofthe 　thought　ofdebate

　

　

by

　Dharmaklrti：

Criticism

　and 　acceptance 　of　the　Ny 巨_yaschoors theory inthev反

d

α_啌

y

_ζyα

1

．

　

　

Minami　Ajia　

kotengaku

南ア ジア 古典学 9：319−370．

Sasaki　Ry6 ．2014b ．　LLAcceptance 　and 　lnterpretation　of　Dharmakirti’s　Theory　of　nigrahasthana 　in　the

　

　　

Nydyamafijan−．”　Kuon∫　Kenkya　r。nbunshti 久遠：研究 論文集 5：40−62．

Key　wordsDharmaklrtl ，

Jayanta

，　vadanyaya，　Nydyamafijαri，　nigrahasth δna，　

pm

亡i

’ fiahani

　　

　　

　　

　　

　　

　　

　　

　　

　　

　　

　　

　

　　

　　

　　

　　

　　

　　

　

（Lecturer，　Waseda　University，　PhD ）