The Collapse of Soviet-Type Socialism in Europe and the Lessons for China

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The Collapse of Soviet‑Type Socialism in Europe and the Lessons for China

著者 SAITO Minoru

出版者 Institute of Comparative Economic Studies, Hosei University

journal or

publication title

Journal of International Economic Studies

volume 5

page range 1‑19

year 1991‑03

URL http://doi.org/10.15002/00002085

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Joumaloflntemationa1EcoUDomicStudies(1991)No.5,1-l9

o1901ThelnstituteofComparativcEconomicStudies,HosciUniversity

ＴＨＥＣＯＬＬＡＰＳＥＯＦＳＯＶＩＥＴ－ＴＹＰＥＳＯＣＩＡＬＩＳＭｍＩＥＵＲＯＰＥＡＮＤＴＨＥ

ＬＥＳＳＯＮＳＦＯＲＣＨＩＮＡ＊．

MinoruSAITO

Prq/臼ssor,ＦｔＪｍｋｙｑｆＥｍ"omjcs,ＨｍｅｊＵ"jvelTj(ｙ

FollowingtheexampIesoftheSovietUnionandEast-Europeancountries,Chinatriedtointroducc economicrefbrmsafterthcdisastersoftheCuIturalRevolutionItseemsthatChinaintendsto

continueexpenmentingwitheconomicrefbrmsevemaftertheTian-An-MentragedyWhich

suppressedmemiIesslytheappealfOrpolitical「eform・

However,therecentsituationinEasternEuropeshowedthatattemptingeconomicrefOrmswithout politicaldemocratizationcannotsucceedandcalmleadtothecollapseofsociaIistregimes，IfChina wishestoleamthelessonsfmmthatexperlence,itwiI1benecessaryfOrChinatocombineeconimic refOrmwithpoliticalrefOrm,oratleasttoallowaconsiderabledegreeofpoliticalreIaxationButafter theTian-An-MentragedyithasbecomemoredifficultfbrtheregimetoobtainapopulaTconsensus

fOrrefbrmme2sq1res．

LTheCollapseofSoviet-TypeSOcialism l･TheRecemtSituationinEasternEumpｅ

Soviet-typesocialism,characterizedbyone-partyruleinpoliticsandcentralized planningintheeconomy，wasprimarilyshapedintheSovietUnioninthel930s

underJosephStalinThisSoviet-typesocialism-infactfardifferentfromthe

notionsofsocialisminMarxiantheory,whichpresupposedtheadventofsocialism astheresultofhighlydevelopedcapitalism-wasintroducedintoEastemEurope

andAsiancountries，includingChina，aftertheSecondWorldWar・

InEastemEurope，Soviet-typesocialismasdefinedabovestarted，almost simultaneously，aroundl948whenthecommunistpartiesabsorbedthesocial- democratｉｃｐａｒｔｉｅｓａｎｄｔｈｕｓｉｎａｄｅｆａｃｔｏｆａｓｈionestablishedone-partyrule・

Immediatelyafterthis，allEastemEuropeancountiesbegantheirfirstFive-Year PlanssimilartothatoftheSovietUnioninthel930s,Asaresult,IcalISoviet-type socialisminEastemEuropetheRegimeofl948、Thedrasticpoliticalchangesin EastemEuropefroml989onarenothingbutthecollapseofthisRegimeofl948．

IwillventuretosaythattheintrodｕｃｔｉｏｎｏｆｔｈｉｓＲｅｇｉｍｅｏｆｌ９４８ｉｎＥａｓｔem EuropewasinsomesensenecessaryandusefUl，atleastintheinitialstageofits introductionAlmostallEastemEurOpeancountries(tosaynothingofChina）

塾)TIDjSjSa唾visedve届ionofthoarticlewritにninJapanesowhichw…riginalIypubIishcdinK・YamanouchiandK・Kikq1chicds．

（19”).。､蛭oku雄izai〃oSllin｡｡“”"－８。"ｏKHFどkim7mboIJ,HoseiDaigakuShuppanKyoku(NewAspectsofthe ChineseEcouBomy:ｍｅＰｍｃ芯$びげRご/bmwmdjHsP'ＵＳＰ"fF・TOkyqHoseiUnivcrsityP唾ss).Thisbookisoneoftheresultsof reseaTchomModelnChincscEconomybyastudygrouporgamizedatHoseiUnive応ityWslmstituteofCOmparativeEconomic

StlUdi聖

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wereeconomicaIlylessdevelopedthantbeWest,andtheywereeagertoovercome thiscomparativebackwardnessbytheshortestroute・Undertheconditionsofthe ColdWar，ｔｈｅｙｈａｄｎｏｃｈｏｉｃｅｂｕｔｔｏａｄｏｐｔＳｏｖｉｅt-typesocialism，whichwas supposedtobethebestwaytoattaintheabove-mentionedaimOskarLange,the famousPolisheconomistwhopIayedaIeadingrolempost-wareconomicpolicy- makinginhiscountry，ａｄｍｉｔｔｅｄｉｎｌ９５７ｔｈａｔｔｈｅＣｏｌｄＷａｒｈａdbroughtfOrththe situationwhichmadealIEastemEuropeancountrics（thencallcdPeoplc，s

Democracies)imitatetheSovietmodelofsocialistconstructionl)ThismodeLas pointedbyLange，ｗａｓｉｎｆａｃｔｔｈｅｍｅｔｈｏｄｏｆａ“wareconomy"・Emphasizingthe

historicalnecessityofthismodel，Langealsoadmittedthatawareconomycould notbeapermanentwaytomanagetbenationaleconomy,althoughinsomeperiods

oftimeithadbeennecessaryandusefULz）

SilviuBrucan,diplomatandpoliticianinRomaniaundertheCeausescuregime，

confessedthathewasshockedtoseethattheeconomicandtechnicaldisparity betweentheWestandtheEasｔｗａｓｍｕｃｈｗｉｄｅｒｉｎｌ９８５ａｎｄｌ９８６ｗｈｅｎｈｅrevisited theUnitedStatesandWesternEurope,tban30yearsbefOrewhemhehadbeenthe RomanianambassadortoWashingtonAshestated：

bythewell-knownhistoricaIconditionsthatthesocialistrevolutionstartedinless developedcountries,post-revolutionarygovernmentswereforcedtoindustrial‐

izetheircountriesinordertocatchupwithcapitalistcountrieseconomicallyand technologically・Asfarasthecompetitionconcemedthedegreesofindustrializa‐

tion,thingswentwellaccordingtotheplans;namely,thosecountriescouldcatch

upslowIybutsteadilywiththeWestattainingrelativelyhighergrowthrates・

However,thefailuresinscientificandtechnoIogicaIrevolutionoffSeteverything JustatthetimewhenintheWestnewtechnologieswereappliedonalargescale andthusresultedinenormousexpansionofproductivefOrces,intheEastthere

happenedadrasticslowdownofgrowthrates、Thisshowednothingbutthe inadaptabilityofdirectiveplanningsysteminauguratedbyStalintoscientificand technologicalrevolution3）

ThismeansthatSoviet-typeSocialism,ｗｈｉｃｈｈａｄｂｅｅｎ“necessaryandusefUl，，in

theearlystagesofindustrializationcouldnotsurviveanylonger、Justafterthe

SecondWorldWar,intheshortperiodbefOretheestablishmentoftheRegimeof l948,therewereseveralattemptstocreateamoredemocraticandrationalregime，

calledthe“ThirdWay”（differingbothfromSoviet-typeandfromtheWestem- type)ItisdoubtfUlwhethertheThirdWaywaspossibleundertheconditionsof theColdWar，butafterStalin，sdeathinl953，whentheColdWarwaSgradually

beginningtomeltawayandtheinitialstageofindustrializationinEasternEurope wascomｉｎｇｔｏａｎｅｎｄ,therewererenewedattemptstoimprovethecxistingsystem

toadapttothechangedsituation

Especiallyinthemid-sixties，ｗｈｅｎｅｖｅｎｉｎｔｈｅＳｏｖｉｅｔＵｎｉｏｎｔｈｅｒｅａppeared Kosygineconomicreform，variouseffortsweremadetoimprovetheexisting

socialistsystem・TheseexperimentaIreformswerebasedontherecognitionthat thereweredifferentinterestsi、society・IntheSoviet-typeofsocialism，itwas

supposedthatthestatecouldrepTesenttheinterestofthesocieｔｙａｓａｗｈｏｌｅ・

Enterprises(almostallofthemownedbythestate)asthefUndamentalunitsof

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ＴＨＥＣＯＬＬＡＰＳＥＯＦＳＯⅥＥＴｘＴＹＰＥＳＯＣＩＡＬＩＳＭｌＮＥＵＲＯＰＥＡＮＤＴＨＥＬＥＳＳＯＮＳＦＯＲＣＨＩＮＡ

reproductionweresupposedtobemeｒｅｐａｒｔｓｏｆ“onesinglefactory,，、Thusthe interestsofindividualsasproducersaswellasconsumersweresupposedtobe

perfectlyrepresentedbythestatcUnderthesesuppositionsitwouldberational thatthestatedictateeverythingthroughcentralizedplanni､９，ａｎｄｔｈｅｒｅｗｏｕｌｄｂｅ

ｎｏｎｅｅｄｆＯｒｐａｒｌｉａmentarydemocracyastherewouldbenoconflictofinterests

However,itwasevidenteveninthel960sthattheexistingsocialiststatecould notpelfectlyrepresenttheinterestofsocietyasawhole，becauseitcouldneither

managethesocietyas“onesinglefactory，，,norsatisfytheneedsofeveryone throughcentralizedplanningAsWlodzimierzBrusemphasizedinhisdecentral‐

izedmodelofeconomicmanagement("amodelofaplannedeconomywithabuilt‐

inmarketmodel，，)4),atIeastthreedifferentkindsofinterestsshouldbedefined andcoordinated：namely，theinterestsofstate，enterprisesandindividuals，

Betweenthestateandvaliousenterprises,insteadofstrictlycentralizedplanning thereshouldbeguaranteedautonomyofmanagementfOrenterprises，thus recognizing(evenstate-owned)enterprisesasindependenteconomicunits,while thestateshouldlimititsroletomaintainingalong-termmacro-economicbalance fOrthesocietyasawhole，Roughlyspeakmg，ｔｈｉｓｉｓｔｈｅｍａｉｎｔａｓｋｏｆｅｃｏｎｏｍｉｃ

ｒｅｆOrm(refOrmofeconomicmanagemcntandplanning)Betweeneachenterprise anditsworkingcollective（individualsorganizedasproducers)，thedifference betweeninterestsshouldbecoordinatedthroughworkers,participation，collective

managementorworkers,self-management・ＴｈｉｓｍｃａｎｓｔｈｅｒｅｉｓａｎｅｅｄｆＯｒ

ｄｅｍｏｃｒatizationintheworkplacewhichhasbeenabsentinSoviet-typesocialism Andlastbutnotleast,betweenthestatcandindividuals(ascitizens)civicrights

shouldbefUllyguaranteedThismeansthereisaneedfOrdemocratizationofthe

societyasawhole・

TherefOrmofeconomicmanagementandplanningshouldbecoincidentwith politicalrefOrm（democratization),ｔｏｏvercomeresistancefromthesideofthe

existingplanningbureaucracy;andthepursuitfOrrationalcconomicmanagement shouldbecompIementedbyelementsofworkers,selfLmanagementtoguarantee cooperationfromthesideoftheworkingforce・TherefOre，ｉｎｍｙｖｉｅｗ，ifthe radicalrefbmoftheexistingSoviet-typesocialismispossible，thereshouldbea comprehensiverefOrmintegratingthosethreeaspccts（economicreform，self managementanddemocratization),whichmightleadtoanoptimalcombinationof economicrationalityandpoliticaldemocracy・However,untilthedrasticeventsof

l989，exceptintheuniqueandunsuccesfUleffOrtsofworkers，seIf-managementin Yugoslaviasincel950andintheunfOrtunatelyshort-livedPragueSpringfOr democratization，allothereffortstorefOrmtheexistingSoviet-typesocialismin EastemEurope(includingl965KosyginrefolmintheSovietUnion)concentrated solelyonthepartialmodificationoftheexistingsystemofeconomicmanagement andplanning，withoutanyseriousstepfbrworkers，selfLmanagementorthe

democratizationofpoliticalsystem、

ThosepartialrefbrmscouldonlybejustifiedtemporarilyAsfarastheywere

successfUlinimprovingpeople,seconomicconditions，thepoliticaldissatisfaction withtheexistingsystemwaseconomicallycompensatedOncethiseconomic compensationceasestowork，thedeficiencyofthesepartialrefonnswillbe seriouslyfelttothepointofrealdangerfOrtheexistingsystemMoreover，even thosepartialrefOrmsimpliedalotoftheoreticaIproblemshithertounresolved；

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suchasthenecessityofmarketinstitutionsinasocialisteconomy(notonlythe

existenceofthemixedeconomyduringtheshortperiodoftransitionbutalsoa

considerablelong-timecoexistenceofplanandmarket),mixed(state,cooperative，

individualandprivate）ownershipofthemeansofproductio､，ａｓｗｅｌｌａｓａｎａｃｃｅｐｔａｂｌｅｌｉｍｉｔｆＯｒｓｏcialinequality

Thoseproblemsalsoimpliedpracticalquestions；howcanasocialistmixed economyworkeffectively，withoutdamagingtheaccustomedsocialbenefitsand thequalityoflifehithertoenjoyed;howcanthedemocratizationofthework-place beintroducedinhannonywitheconomicefficiency，withoutleadingtoeconomic

chaosasinthecaseofworkers，selfmanagementinYugoslavia；ａｎｄwhatkindof

politicalreformcanbeintroducedpeacefullyintotheexistingsystem？Inaddition，

themostimportantquestionis，iftheexistingsystem，alreadysufferingfrom ecnomicinefficiencyandpoliticaldissatisfaction,cannotsuccessfUllyreformitself，

ｗｈｅｒｅｉｓｔｈｅｒａｉｓｏｎｄ，etreoftheexistingsystem？

AsisweII-knowntoday，Soviet-typesocialisminEasternEuropecouldnot refOrmitselfquicklyenough(theeffOrtsandfailuresofindividualrefOrmswillbe analyzedlater）WillthisalsobcthecasefOrChina？

2．IsThereaChineseTypeofSociaIism？

Duringthel960s，ChinesecommunistleadersunderMaoZe-donginafierce

debatecriticizedSovietleaderNikitaKhrushchev，accusingthathewastryingto

tumsocialismintocapitalismFroml966o､，theChineseleadershipinitiatedthe

so-called“CulturalRevolution,，、Ｃａｎｗｅｓａｙｎｏｗｔｈａｔｔｈｉｓｃｒｅatedaunique

ChinesetypeofsocialismclearlydistinguishablefromtheSoviet-type,orshouIdwe saythattheyonlytriedtomaintainandreproducetheoldSoviet-typcsocialism？

WhenthePeople，sRepublicofChinastarteditsFirstFive-YearPlaninl953,it wasundertheslogan“StudyexclusivelytheexpenencesoftheSovietUnion，,、At thattimetheChineseleadershiptriedwithalltheirmighttocreatethesameSoviet‐

typeeconomicandpoliticalsysteminChinathroughcentralizedadministrative- directiveplanning・TheGreatLeapForward（1958-1960）andtheCultural Revolution(froml966),bothinitiatedandpromotedbyMao,were,inmyview，

theeffortstoovercometheinherentcontradictionsoftheSovict-typesocialism

throughanon-Soviet，uniquelyChinesestyle，emphasizingselfconsciousactivity

ofChinesepeoplethemselves・

AfterMao，sdeathinl976andtheofficialdenouncementoftheCultural

Revolution,itseemedthatChinawasonceagainfollowingthepathofSoviet-type Socialism，addingtothisprototypetheexperiencesofthemorerecentpartial

reformsoftheSovietUnionandEasternEurope､AfterlvisitedChinafOrthefirst tｉｍｅｉｎｌ９７９，IwrotemyimpressionsofChinaasfOlIows：

AfterthedeathofMaoZe-dong,andafterthearrestoftheGangofFour,China

atlastreachedthestagewherｅｉｔｃｏｕｌｄｂｅｇｉｎｔｏｃｒｉｔｉｃｉｚｅＭａｏａｓｔｈｅＳｔａｌｉｎｏｆ

ＣｈｉｎａＢｕｔｉｎｔｈｏｓｅｔｗｅｎｔyyearssinceMaoblamedLiuShao-qiasthe KhrushchevofChina,therehavebeenconsiderableexperimentationwithpartial

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ＴＨＥＣＯＬＬＡＰＳＥＯＦＳＯＶＩＥＴ－ＴＹＰＥＳＯＣＩＡＬＩＳＭＩＮＥＵＲＯＰＥＡＮＤＴＨＥＬＥＳＳＯＮＳＦＯＲＣＨIＮＡ

ｒｅｆＯｒｍｉｎｔｈｅＳｏｖｉｅｔＵｎｉｏｎａｎｄｉｎＥａｓternEurope・ThenecessityfOrrefOrm objectiveIyexistedalsoinChina,butitsstartwashamperedbytheCultural RevolutionTherefOre,present-day(1979)chinaisexperiencingsimultaneously therevisionofeconomicpolicies,thecriticismofStalin(Mao),thedebateson economicrefOrm，thereappraisaloftheYugoslavWorkers，selfman- agement,``PragueSpring，，anditsreversal，allinahighlycompressedfOrm5）

ＬｏｏｋｉｎｇｂａｃｋｏｎｔｈｅｔｉｍｅｏｆｔｈｅＦｉｒｓｔFive-YearPlan，wasthereinChinathe urgentnecessitytoimitatethefOrcedindustriaIizationadoptedintheSovietUnion inthel930s？Thisquestionwasindeedraisedatthattime，askingwhetheritwas necessaryfOrChinatospeedupindustrialization.AfteralLChinawasthen enjoyingaidfromtheSovietUnionandEast-Europeancountries,andthusina morefavourableinternationalsituationthantheSovietUnionwasafterthe OctoberRevolutionTothisquestionrepliedLiFu-chun(thenthechiefofthe ChineseStatePlanningCommission)，sayingthatChinainheritedbackward economicconditionsandwassurroundedbyviciousimperalism・Underthese conditions，ｉｔｗａｓｎｅｃｅｓｓａｒｙｆＯｒＣｈｉｎａｔｏｓｐｅｅｄｕpindustrializationIfnot，there wouldberealdangernotonIytotheconstructionofasocialistsocietyinChinabut alsooflosingeconomicandpoliticalindenpendenceasaresultofagressionby

imperialiStcOuntrieS6）

Ａｓｉｓｗｅｌｌ－ｋｎｏｗｎｊｕｓｔａｔｔｈｅｅｎｄｏｆｔｈeFirstFive-YearPlan，amongthe leadershipoftheChineseCommunistParty，therearoseastmggleconcemingthe courseoffurthereconomicconstructionAttheEighthNationalCongressofthe

PartyheldinSeptemberl956,afactionledbyLiuShao-qitemporarilywonby criticizingthe“rushedadvance，，promotedbyMao・Liuatthattimeproposedthat theprimarytaskshouldbetowidendemocracyandtostruggleagainst

bureaucratism,appealingtonon-communistintellectualstocriticizethedefectsand enorsofthecommunists・Forthatpurpose,fromMayl957thePartyinitiatedthe so-calledperiodofa“HundredFlowers”（whenitwassaidthatonehundred Howerswouldflourishtogetherandonehundredthoughtswouldbedebated together)．However，thisrevealedthefactthattheantipathyagainstthe CommunistPartyamongthoseintellectualswasmuchstrongerthanexpected，

pointingthattherewasneitherrealsocialistdemocracynorquasi-democracyasin

capitalistcountries・

Facingthis，anotherfactionledbyMaodemandedａｃｏｕnter-attackonthose criticisms，blamingtheintellectualsas“rightwingelements，,、Ｔｈｉｓｔｉｍｅ，the majorityofthecommunistleadershipincludingLiu，sfactionfOllowedMaoin changingthecoursefromtheHundredFlowerspolicytothe“StruggleAgainstthe

Rights"・AtthispointaseliseofcrisisfOrthecommunists，ruleunitedtheParty・

ThiswasafavourablewindfbrMaowhousedittocounter-attacktheopposition groupwithintheParty・AnextraordinarysecondsessionoftheEighthParty CongressconfirmeｄＭａｏ,svictoryagainstLiu，whichledlatertotheGreatLeap

ForwardandtheCulturaIRevoIution・

TheCulturalRevolutionwasfinallｙｂｒｏｕｇｈｔｔｏａｎｅｎｄｉｎｌ９７６，afterthefirst Tian-An-MenIncidentinAprilandMao，sdeathinOctober,fOllowedbythearrest ofthcGangofＦｂｕｒ・TheCulturalRevolutionwasthencalledinChina“the DisasterofTenYears，，,indicatingtheperiodfromitsstartinl966､Butlaterthere

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ＭｉｎｏｒｕＳＡ１ＴＯ

wasanotherexpression,"theDisasterofTwentyYears"，whichimpliesthatthe disasterhadstartedhPomMao，svictoryoverLiu

However,ｉｔｗｏｕｌｄｂｅａｍｉｓｔａｋｅｉｆＬｉｕ，scourseisover-estimated・BetweenLiu andMaotherewasnodifferenceconcerningthenecessityoftheruleoftheParty，

therefOretheyunitedinthestruggIeagainsttheRight・Thedifferencebetween

themwas，thatLiuintendedtoadoptKhrushchev-typemini-revisionofeconomic

policyinordertomaintaintheexistingregimc,whileMaoinsistedonidealizingthe

war-timeYunanexperiences、

HadtheexperiencesoftheCulturalRcvolutionleftChinaanythmgdifferent fromtheoriginalSoviet-typeSocialism？Undoubtedly，ithadbroughttothe Chineseeconomyextremelydestructiveresults・Iftherewerenofavourablenon‐

economicoutcomesfromtheexperiencesoftheCulturalRevolution，thenitwas

clearlynothingbutagra､diosewasteoftimeandonecouldsaytherereallyareno originalelementsinChinesesocialismThiswouldsuggestthatChinahasno prospectotｈｅｒｔｈａｎｔｏｆＯｌｌｏｗｔｈｅｅｘａｍｐｌｅｏｆＳｏｖietsocialismbeingseveralsteps

behindHowever，ｉｔｗｏｕｌｄｂｅｗｏｒｔｈｗｈｉｌｅｔｏｐｏｉｎｔｏｕｔｔｈｅfactthatsomany

commonChinesepeoplejoinedtheCulturalRevolutio､,whichwecannotexplain solelyfromthepersonalauthorityofMao､ManyChinesepeopleshowedthentheir dissatisfactionwithprotestagainstthegrowingsocialimbalancesandbureaucrat‐

ismundertheleadershipofLiuShao-qi・IfsocialismshouldbebasedontheselfL

consiciousnessofthemiIlionsofpeopIe，theexpcriencesofthattimemightadd somethingtoChinesesocialism．

ILTheFailuresofIntra-RegimeRefDrmsinEasternEurope

AslstatedbefOre，ifradicalrefOrmsoftheexistingSoviet-typesocialismwere

possible,itshouldbeacomprehensiverefOrmintegratingthreeaspects(thereform ofeconomicmanagementandplanning，Workers，selfLmanagement，andthe

democratizationofthepoliticalsystem)，whichmightleadtoanoptimal combinationofeconomicrationalityandpoliticaldemocracy・However,therehave

beenonlypartialrefOrmｓｓｕｃｈａｓ：（１）theuniqueandunsuccessfuleffortsof workers,self-managementinYugoslaviasincel950;(2)theunfortunatelyshort‐

livedPragueSpringfordemocratizationofCzechoslovaksocictyinl968;(3)the

NewEconomicMechanisminHungaryasafOrerunnerofeconomicreformswhich

wasnotabletopreventthecollapscofSoviet-typeSocialism;and(4)therccurrcnt

faiIureofrefOrmsinPoland(itseemsthattheSovietUnionunderGorbaChevis

fOllowingthePolishpattern).ThemaincbaracteTisticsofeachoftheseintra-regime refOrmexperimentsareshownbrieHybclow．

１．SdfManagementinYugOslavia

Ａｓｉｓｗｅｌｌ－ｋｎｏｗｎ，YugoslaviaunderTito，whichhadactuallybeenthefirstto

introduceSoviet-typesocialismintoEasternEuropc，wasexpelledbyStalinfrom

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ＴＨＥＣＯＬＬＡＰＳＥＯＦＳＯＶＩＥＴ－ＴＹＰＥＳＯＣＩＡＬｌＳＭＩＮＥＵＲＯＰＥＡＮＤＴＨＥＬＥＳＳＯＮＳＦＯＲＣＨIＮＡ

theEastemblocinl949,AfterthattheYugoslavIeadershipearnestlytriedtofind theirownidentityasasocialistcountry,criticizingSoviet-typesocialismasStalinist bureaucraticstatesocialismTheyclaimedthattheyrediscoveredMarxwhohad insistedthatpost-revolutinarystateshouldgraduallydieawayandthattheworkers shouldbethegenuinemastersofthefuturesocietyinsteadofthebureaucratsOn

２７Junel950theFundamentaILawonWorkers，SelfManagementwasadoptedby theYugoslavparliament，andsincethenworkingcollectivesｏｆ“socially-owned，，

(notstate-owned)enterprisescouldelcctworkers，councils,whichhadtherightto managealltheaffairsoftheirenterprisesthroughmanagingcommitteeselectedby

theworkers，councils・

Decision-makingwasthusdcccntraIizedtotheenterpriseleveLsocentral planningwastobeabandonedLater，sincethebeginningofthel960s，various refOrmmeasuresmthesphereofcconomicpolicywereintroducedtoconfOrmto thesystemofworkers,councils､ThisprocessIedtothedevelopmentｏｆａｆｏｒｍｏｆ

“marketsocialism，，、

However，Workers，selfmanagemcntinYugoslaviawasintroducedunderthe one-partyruleoftheYugoslavLeagueofCommunistｓａｎｄ,inthisrespect,wasnot farfromthepoliticalsystemunderStalin,Itistruethatthereexistedanidealofthe transitionfｒｏｍｏｎｅ－ｐａｒｔｙｒｕｌｅｔｏｓｏｍｅｋｉｎｄｏｆｄｉrectdemocracy，buttheactual politicalprocessinYugoslaviawasalwaysincIinedtocentralizepoliticalpower，

wheneverpoliticalandeconomicdifficultiesaroscDr・ＩｖａｎＴ・Berend（then RectorofBudapestUniversityofEconomics，laterPresidentoftheHungarian AcademyofSciences)oncetoldmethathehadthoughtinl956thattheworkers，

councilssystemshouldbeintroducedalsoinHungary，butaftertwentyyearshe fOundthatbehindtheYugoslavsystemtherewasastrongtendencyfOrpolitical

centralization

lnthel960s,whenfurthermeasurestoenhance“marketsocialism,，wcretaken，

suchastheabolitionofthecontrolofwagesandtheliberalizationoffbreigntrade，

Yugoslaveconomicconditionsworsenedduetothelackofmacro-economic balance，resultinginagallopinginHation・Therewerethreepossiblecounter‐

measuresatthattime,namely:（１）revivingthecentralizedcontrolofeconomy，

considerablyrestrictingnotonly“marketsocialism,，butalsoworkers，self

managementinordertorestoremacro-cconomicbalance;（２）onthecontarry，

enhancing“marketsocilism，，，ｏｎｔｈｅｇｒｏｕｎｄｔｈａｔｔｈｅｒｅａｓｏｎｆＯｒｅｃｏnomic difficultieswasnotthelackofcentralcontrolbutthemalfUnctioningofthemarket mechanism;(3)stickingtotheprincipleoftheWorkers,selfmanagement,whatever

theeconomicresultswouldbc

Thefirstcountermeasurewasrejectedinprinciple,andTitoadoptedthesecond andthethirdcountermeasurescombined，ＢｕｔａｆｔｃｒＴｉｔｏｄｉｅｄ,thingsgotworseand worsewithanastronomicrateofinHation，leadingYugoslaviaintoeconomic

chaos・AsMilovanDjilas(oncevice-presidentunderTito)said,"theonlythingthat fUnctionedunderTitowasTito''７)TheYugoslavselfLmanagementsystem，which

Iackedasufficientlyrationalsystemofeconomicmanagementthatcouldcombine workers,selfLmanagementwithmacro-economicefficiency，andlackeda democraticpoliticalsystemwhichcouldhavereplacedone-partyrule,wasdestined tofailure・However,thisfailureispreciousfromtheviewpointoflearninghowto combineeconomicrationalitywithworkers，fundamentalrightsattheworkshop

－７－

(9)

ＭｊｎｏｍＳＡＩＴＯ

leveL

2．‘`PragueSpring，，inCzechoslowhkia

Atthebeginningofthel960s,inrelativeIyhighlyindustrializedCzechoslovakia theadministrative-directivesystemofeconomicplanningresultedinanabrupt

worseningofeconomicperfOrmance､Thisdemandedaradicalre-examinationof thepasteconomicpoliciessincetheintroductionofSoviet-typesocialismaround

l948Thisre-examinationbroughtafairlymarket-orientedeconomicrefOrmi、

1965,whichinturnclarifiedtheurgentneedtoeliminatethepoliticalobstaclesto

thesuccessofthereform

JustafterthefirsttentativerefOrmmeasureswereinterruptedbypoliticaI

oppositioninl961，theCzechoslovakeconomyexperiencedashalpdeteriolation，

andmarkedinl963aclearrecessionｆｏｒｔｈｅｆｉｒｓｔｔｉｍｅｕｎｄｅｒｔｈｅｓｙｓｔｅｍｏfa

plannedeconomy､ManyCzechoslovakeconomists(includingOtaSik,whowasat

thattimetheheadoftheInstituteofEconomicsoftheCzechoslovakAcademyof

Sciences)arguedthatthescnegativephcnomenawerctheinevitableresultofthe administrative-directiveplanni､9．TheThirdFive-YearPlan（1961-1965）in progresswasabandoned,andaradicaleconomicrefOrmwasintroducedwhichwas

intendedtocreate‘`normalmarketconditions,，inthesphereofexternaltrade，

domestictradeandinvestment・ThcrefOrmaffectedfavourablyoveralleconomic

growth,buttheintroductionofaflexiblepricesystemasakeypartoftherefOrm enabledthemonopolizedlargestateenterprisestoraisepriceseasily・Thisresulted

inaninUationarypncespiralinl967-1968

Meanwhile，theadvanceofeconomicrefOrmmeasuressharplyconfrontedthe traditionaladministrativeinstitutionsandbureaucrats，andaradicalpolitical

changeswereclearlyneeded､ThustheActionProgrammeoftheCommunistParty

ofCzechoslovakia，adoptedinAprill968，pointedthatthepreviouseconomic

policiesbasedonthedirective-administrativemethodhadresultedineconomic

imbalances，inefficiency，ａｎｄｓｔagnationanddeteriolationofpeople，sliving standardltfUrthersuggestedthatthedeeperreasonwhytheout-datedeconomic

managementsystcmhadsurvivedwasduetoadistortionofthepoliticalsystem,a

lackofatimelywideningofsocialistdemocracy，andadegenerationof

revolutionarydictatorshipintobureaucratism，whichhamperedprogressinevery sphereofCzechoslovaklife・TherefOre,thedemocratizationofpoliticallife,above

allthedenialofone-partyrulewasthenecessaryandinevitablepre-conditionfOr

thesuccessofeconomicrefOrm

Thedemocratizationofpoliticallifebeganwiththeabolitionofcensorship，

whichenabledopencriticismoftheＣｏｍｍｕｎｉｓｔＰａｒｔｙＯｎｔｈｅｏｔｈｅｒｈａｎｄ，the

SovietUnionunderBrezhnevaccusedthis“PragueSpring，，democratizationasa movemcntofcounter-revolutionlikethatinHungaryinl956、Ｏｎｔｈｅｎｉｇｈｔｏｆ

Ａｕｇｕｓｔ２０,1968,sixhundredthousandarmedfOrcesoffiveWarsawPactcountries ledbySovietmiUtarycommandersinvadedCzechoslovakia・Afterthat,asearlyas

thenextmonthcensorshipwasrevivedandtheCommunistPartyofCzechoslova‐

kiaunderGustavHusakexpelIedfromitsrankabouthalfamillionrefonn-minded

－８－

(10)

ＴＨＥＣＯＬＬＡＰＳＥＯＦＳＯＶＩＥＴ－ＴＹＰＥＳＯＣＩＡＬＩＳＭＩＮＥＵＲＯＰＥＡＮＤＴＨＥＬＥＳＳＯＮＳＦＯＲＣＨIＮＡ

communists，includingtheex-FirstSecretaryAlexanderDubcek・

ThesuppressionofPragueSpringwasaseriousmistakenotonlyfOr CzechoslovakiabutfOrallcountrieswithSoviet-typesocialismlnthemidstof PragueSpringthefamous“Manifestoof2000Words，，ｗａｍｅｄｔｈｅＣｏｍｍｕｎｉｓｔＰａｒｔｙｔｈａｔｉｔｗａｓｔｈｅｌａｓｔｃｈａｎｃｅｆＯｒｔｈｅＰａｒｔｙｔｏｒｅｈabilitateitself，whichlater provedcorrect・TheaccumulateddissatisfactionoftheCzechoslovakpeople discreditedtheCommunistPartywhichcouIdnotmaintainvoicesoftherefOrm underitsownleadership、AlloverEastemEurope，thedemocratizationofthe politicalsystemwasstrictlybannedandanyrefOrmoftheeconomicsystemwhich mightextendintothepoliticalsystemwasblocked・ＴｈｉｓｉｎｔｕｒｎｍａｄｅｅｖｅｎｔｈｅｅｃｏｎｏｍｉｃｒefOrmmeasuresinadequate

TimehadbeentooshortfOrtheCzechosIovakrefOrmexperimentstoshowtheir feasibility・Inparticular，duringPragueSpringtherefOrmersintentionally postponedmeasurestoguaranteetheactiveparticipationofworkersinthe managmemoftheirenterprises,toavoidover-burdeningthenewly-fOrmedwokers，

councils・Duetothat,theCzechoslovakrefOrmsinl968areoftencharacterizedas

"technocratic,，reforms,whichmighthavecontributedtothepassiveattitudeofthe Czechoslovakworkersincontrasttothatoftheintellectualswithrespecttoboth

therefOrmsandtheSovietinvasion

However，ａｓＪｉｒｉＫｏｓｔａｗｈｏａｓｓｉｓｔｅｄＯｔａＳｉｋｉｎPragueSpringwrote，

CzechoslovakiawasthefirstamongthosecountriesundertheSovietinHuence thattriedtointegratetheelementsofself-managmentintothedecentralized systemofeconomicpIaming，atarelativeIyhighdegreeofindustrial developmentinadditiontoattemptingtomaintainnon-capitalisｔｆｏｒｍｓof

ownershiplncompansontoYugosIavia,therewereconsiderablesufficientpre‐

conditionsfOrsuccess・ButCzechoslovakiacouldnotfinishitsexperimemtsThat wasbecausetheSovietleadershipfearedthattheCzechoslovakexpenments wouldspreadtoothercountriessuchasEastGermany，Hungary，Polandand eventheSovietUnionitselfThelongexpenenceinYugoslaviaofselfL managementandtheshort-livedgermofdemocratizationinCzechoslovakiain l968showedboththeproblemsandthepossibilitiesfOrthesolutiontothe integrationofplanningandselfmanagementundersocialisln8）

JiriKostawrotethisinl974,hopingthatCzechoslovak“socialismwithahuman face,，wouldrevivesomeday・However,todayitseemstoolatenotonlyfOrSoviet- typesocialismbutalsofOranytypeofsocialismtosurviveinCzechoslovakiaafter twentyyearsofresistancetoreaIrefOrms．

3．EcomomicRehrminHungary

TheoriginalconceptionofHungarianeconomicrcfOrmwasbomduringthefirst lmreNagygovernmentofl953-1955,butafterl956thedebateoneconomic mechanismwouldnotregainmomentumuntill963・Thedebateresultedinthe actualintroductionoftheso-called“NewEconomicMechanism，，ｉｎ1968．Ａｔｔｈａｔ

－９－

(11)

timeHungarywasverycautiousconcentratingthedebateoneconomicpolicy，

avoidinganyreferencesonpoliticａｌｒｅｆＯｒｍＴｈｅｒｅｍｉｇｈｔｂｅｔｗｏｍａｉｎｒｅａsonsof thiscautiousness：first，HungaryhadaIreadyexpcriencedSovietmilitary interventioninl956，andsotheHungarianleadershad，afterthat，ｔakenthe greatestcarenottoirritatetheSovietleadcrs・Moreover,itwasmcreasinglyclear thattheCzeshoslovakpoliticalrefOrmsatthattimewereundermountingpressures

fromtheoutsides、

Second，after1956,especiallysincetheendofl961whentheHungarianparty leaderJdnosKddardeclare。that"ｔｈｏｓｅｗｈｏａｒｅｎｏｔａｇａｉｎｓｔｕｓａｒｅｗｉｔｈｕｓ,,，there wereaconsiderabledegreeofpoliticalrelaxationandamoodofreconciliationin Hungary､Thiswassupposedtoguaranteeafavourablepoliticalclimatewithwhich itwouldbepossibletointroducearadicalcconomicrefOrmwithoutaccompanying furtherpoliticalrefbrmmeasures・

Withrespecttotheissueofworkers，participation，aYugoslavtypeofworkers，

councilshadbeenspontaneouslyorganizedinBudapestduringl956butsuppressed thereafter・Inl977whenlvisitedBudapest,RezsONyers(whowascalledthe

"FatherofHungarianEconomicReform"，forhewasresponsiblefOrthe introductionofl968economicrefOrmasSecretaryofthePartyinchargeof economicpolicy)answeredclearlytomyquestionthatitwasimpossibleinHungary tointroducethesystemofworkers，councilsbecauseofobjectionsfromtheSoviet

Union・

ＴｈｕｓＨｕngaryinitiateditseconomicreforminl968withnoradical democratizationofpoliticallife，retainingone-partyrulewithoutanypromiscof politicalpluralism，ｎｏｒａｎｙｋｉｎｄｏｆｗｏｒｋｅ｢s,sclfmanagement、Thiswaspossible becauseatthattimethereexistedinHungaryacertaindegreeofsocialconsensus，

neithertoretreattothepre-1956ｓｔａｔｅｏｆａｆｆａｉｒｓｎｏｒｔｏｒｅｐｅａｔｔｈｅｂｌoodshedof l956，ThisconsensuswasinawayrefIectedintheeditorialarticleoftheofficial

"NewHungarianQuarterly”ｉｎ1986,whichpointedthat“ｉｎｔｈｅｓｅｔｈｉｒｔｙｙｅａｒｓｍａｎｙｏｆｔｈｅｄｅｍａｎｄｓｏｆｔｈｅａｕｔｕｍｎｏｆｌ９５６ｈａｖｅｎｏｔｏｎｌｙｂｅｅｎfUIfilledbut

overfUlfilledbyfar",)

However，aftertheremarkablesuccessofitsinitialstage，Hungananeconomic refOrmconfrontedmanydifficulties,especiallywhentherefOrmentereditssecond decadeThosedifficultiｅｓｍｉｇｈｔｂｅｐａｒｔｌｙｄｕｅｔｏｔｈｅｆａｃｔｔｈａtthel968Hungarian reformwasahalfwayreformwithrespccttotheutilizationofmarketmechanism，

andpartlyduetothefactthatintemationalcompetitionintheworldmarketwas tooseverefOrtheover-protectedHungarianindustry・Rezs6Nyerswamedinl984 thattheslow-downofthereformprocessonthepleaofthosedifficultiesmightmelt downthe“capital,,ofpoliticaItrust,butforfUrtherrefOrmhithertoacceptedsocial policyachievements(suchasjobsecurityandpriccstability)wouldhavetobe questionedAsNyerswrote，

ThesolutionofthetopicaleconomicpoIicytasksinvolvesthreeproblems：first，

managementpracticeunderchangingcircumstancesrequiresbroadpolitical backing；second，transitionalsocialtensionsaretobeexpectedinfactoriesand

enterprises；third，ｔｈｅｔａｓｋｃａｎｏｎｌｙｂｅｓｏｌｖｅｄｗｉｔｈａｗｉｄesocialsupport.､'０）

HerearoseagaintheneedfOrpoliticalreforminHungary、Ｔｈｅｒｅｓｅｅｍｅｄｔｏｂｅ

－ｌＯ－

(12)

ＴＨＥＣＯＬＬＡＰＳＥＯＦＳＯⅥＥＰＴＹＰＥＳＯＣＩＡＬＩＳＭｌＮＥＵＲＯＰＥＡＮＤＴＨＥＬEＳＳＯＮＳＦＯＲＣＨＩＮＡ

severalreasonsfOrthat・First,politicaltrustfOrthePost-l968regimeunderJanos KddarwhichhadexistedattheinitialstageofeconomicrefOrmwasgradually meltingawayduringthosetwodecades,anditwasnecessaryfOranyfUrtherrefOrm toregainpopularsupportbyaradicalpoliticalchange、Second,asNyerspointed，

fUrtherpursuitfOrimprovingeconomicefficiencywouldendangersocial achievementspreviouslyconsideredasguaranteedJdnosKomaioncestatedthat therewerecontradictionsbetweentheefficiencyconditｉｏｎｓｏｎｔｈｅｏｎｅｓｉｄｅ，and theethicalprinciplesofSocialismsuchassolidarityandsecurityontheother,ａｎｄ

"oneofthebestqualitiesofHungana、practiceinrecentyearsmightbethatithas notsoughtatalltocreatetheillusionofhavingfOundafinalsolution,butassumes

thetaskofexperimentingandexploringwaysandmeans，，､'1）

Third,asfarasHungarianeconomicperformancchadbcenfavourable(asinthc firstfiveyearssincetheintroductionofthereform)，ａｋｉｎｄｏｆ“economic compensation，，worked,inasensethatpopulardissatisfactioncausedbythelackof widerdemocraticrightsmightbecompensatedpartlybyrelativelyavailable consumergoods、Butundertheconditionsofeconomicdifficulties，ｔｈｅｎｅｅｄｆｂｒ

"politicalcompensation,，ｍｕｓｔｅｍｅｒge、Inordertopersuadepeopletocooperate withtheregimeevenatthesacrificeoftheirownIivingstandard,theregimeneeds togainlegitimacyasthegenuinerepresentativeofpeople，sintereststhrough democratizingthepoliticallifc

Fourth，anyeconomicrefOrminasociaIistsyｓｔｅｍｈａｓｔｏｂｅａccompaniedbya radicalpoliticalchange，becausethesysteminitselfintegrateseconomywith politics､Amarket-orientcdsocialisteconoｍｙ(ifpossiblc)cannotbecompatiblc withaStalinist-typepoliticalsystem，whichwascompatibleonIywithan administrative-directivemethodofeconomiｃmanagement・Inthatsense，the inherentdeficiencyoftheHungarianl968refOrmshouldhavebecomeobviousin duetime，whatevertheeconomicperformancemighthavebeen・

ＩｔｗａｓｔｏｏｌａｔｅａｌｓｏｆＯｒＨｕｎｇａｒｙｔｏｉｎitiatepoliticalrefOrmfromabove・Since l988undermountingcriticismagainsttherulingSocialistWorkers,Partybythe mushroomingindependentpoliticalpartiesandorganizations,thePartyrapidlylost itsinUuence､Finally,afterthefirstfreeelectionsincel948heldinMarch，1990,a conservativecoaUtiongovernmentemergedinHungarywhichrejectedanysortof

socialism

4．RecurremFaUureofRefbrmTrialsofPoland

ＩｎＰｏｌａｎｄ,ｗｉｔｈmuchdebateandseveralattemptstointroduceeconomicrefOrm sincel956,noeffectivereformmeasureshadbeenfOundtoworkwithintheframe‐

workofthesocialistsystem・AccordingtoJanuszZielinski，inthel950sandl960s therewerefourbasicperiodstoconsider：1956-1959ｗａｓｔｈeperiodofemerging conceptionsofreform；1959-1965sawinterimdebateandpartialattemptatrefOrm；

andafterl965refOnnmeasuresweregraduallyintroduced・ButtheMarcheventat WarsawUniversityinl968andthefirstGdanskuprisinginl970forcedtheregime underGomulka(since1956)tocollapsetogetherwiththerefOrmmeasuuresThe periodafterl971(whichendedwiththeemergingof“Solidarity，，movementin

－１１－

(13)

1980)wasdefinedbyZielinskiasthepcriodofpromiseofrcfOrmoftheregime

underEdwardGierek12）

AfterthecoHapseofGomulkaregime，thePoIishgovemmentrenewedthe attemptfOrrefOrmbyintroducinganeweconomicandfinancialsysteminl973．

ButthiswasalsodestinedtofailfacingwithnationwidewavesofprotestinJune l976P.Ｇ・ＨａｒｅａｎｄＰ.Ｔ・Wanlescomparedthesuccessfulintroductionofthel968 reforminHungarywiththefailureofPolishl973-1975refOrmsasfOllows、First，

PolandintendedtointroduceeconomicrefOrmwithoutreducingthestrainofhigh economicgrowth，ｗｈｉｃｈｌｅｄｔｏlargerdomesticandexternalimbalances，causing populardissatisfaction・MeanwhileinHungary,theThirdFive-YearPlan(1966‐

1970)intendedonlytosustainsteadyeconomicgrowth,maintainingdomesticand extemalbalances，andsogravesocialtensionwasavoidedinHungaryatthe introductiｏｎｏｆｔｈｅｌ９６８ｒｅｆｏｒｍ、Second，ｔｈｅ“guided-marketmodel,，was introducedatthebeginningofl968,completelyabandoningthetraditional administrative-directiveplanninglncontrast，inPolandthel973-1975refOrmwas amixtureoftraditionalandnewsystems,andPolishpolicy-markerseasiIylosttheir selfconfidenceoncefacedwithdifficulties・ThisledeventuaIlytosweepingretreat fromthereformmeasures13）

Therecurrentfailureofreformsbroughtacriticalsituationinl9801ｎｔｈｅｓｕｍｍｅｒｏｆｌ９８０ｔｈｅｎｅｗｌｙ－ｆｏｒｍｅdindependenttrade-unionmoveｍｅｎｔ“Solid- arity，,sharplycriticizedthePolishgovemmentledbythePolishUnitedWorkers，

PartyfOrthefailureofrefOrms，anddemandedthatthegovemmentresolvethe accumulatedgraveproblemｓｉｍｍｅｄｉａｔｅｌｙｉｎｏｎｅｌｕｍｐ・ＡｔｔｈａｔｔｉｍｅｔｈｅＰｏｌｉｓｈｒｅｇｉｍｅｈａｄｔｏcopewithinsurmountabletasks:tointroducedemocratizationofthe politｉｃａｌｓｙｓｔｅｍｓｉｍｉｌａｒｔｏｔｈａｔｏｆｔｈｅＰｒagueSpring，toduplicatetheHunganan modelofeconomicreform,andtointroducetheYugoslavmodelofworkers，selfL management、Finally，alloftheseweretobeaccomplishedduringtheexisting

economiccrisis・

ThePolishregime,sincel981underGeneralWojciechJaruzelski,inwhichthe majoritywasrelucta､ttointroduceradicalpoliticalreｆｏｒｍ，gavepriorityto overcomingtheimpendingeconomiccrisisatanycost，anddecidedtodeclare martiallawThiswas，ｏｆcourse，alsopartlytoavoidthepossibleSovietmilitary intervention、However，ｉｎｏｒｄｃｒｔoovercomeeconomiccrisistheregimeneeded widerpopularsupportfOrtheinevitableausteritymeasures，whichcouldnotbe obtainedbyfOrce・

Afterthecancellationofmartialｌａｗ，ｉｎ1987,thePolishregimeproposeda plebisciteforthesecondstageofeconomicrefOrm(thefirststagewassaidtohave beenintroducedpreviouslyduringtheperiodofmartiallaw）andfOrpolitical democratization，butcouldnotgettheneededsupportfromthevoters・Fromthe beginningofl989，thePolishregimewasfOrcedtore-openthedialoguewith Solidarity,andpromisedtocarryoutpartial（onIyforthePoIishSenate）free electionThe「ｅｓｕｌｔｏｆｔｈｅｆｒｅｅｅｌｅｃｔｉｏｎｗａｓｔｈｅｓｗcepingvictoryofSolidarity candidates(theygained99scatsoutoflOO),whichlcdtothcformingofthe TadeuszMazowiecki(oneoftheadvisersofSolidarity)governmentinSeptember

l989・

TheoldPolishUnitedWorkers,Partywasseriouslyweakenedandsplitintotwo factionsbothclaimingsocial-democratictendencies,whiIetheSolidaritymovement

－１２－

(14)

ＴＨＥＣＯＬＬＡＰＳＥＯＦＳＯⅥＥＴ－ＴＹＰＥＳＯＣＩＡＬＩＳＭＩＮＥＵＲＯＰＥＡＮＤＴＨＥＬＥＳＳＯＮＳＦＯＲＣＨＩＮＡ

alsosplitintotwo、Aworker-basedpopuIisttendencybroughtLechWalesa (chairmanandsymbolofSolidarity）fOrwardasaPresidentialcandidate，thc intellectualsrecommendingMazowieckiforthesamepost，ThePresidential electionshowedthevictoryofWalesa，buttheresultalsoindicatedthegrowmg politicalinstabilityi、Poland．

ln．LessonsfmEconOmicandPOliticaｌＲｅｆｍｍｉｎＣｈｉｍａ 1．EconomicRehrmandNeedfmDemocratizationinChiuD2

AtthetimeofthePlenumoftheCentralCommitteeoftheCommunistPartyof ChinaheldinDecemberl978,whichimplicitlydenouncedtheGreatLeapForward andtheCulturalRevolution，theeditorialarticleofChinesemagazine“Jingli Yanjiu，，（"EconomicStudies,，）diScusSedthesituation：

WecannotsimplysubstitutephilosophyfOreconomicscience…

TbdiffUseandadvanceeconomicSciencewemustcarrythroughthecourseof

"HundredFIowers，，andencouragepeople,sdemocracy…

BefOretheCulturalRevolutionwehadexperiencedlivelydebatesarou､dmany

theoreticalproblemsconcemedwithsocialistconstructioninChina…

However,inthepastLinBiaoandtheGangofFourenfOrcedusanobscurantist policyonthepretextofmaintainingsecrecyagainsttheenemyandinfOrmedour peopleofnothingaboutthcrealintemalandextemalstateofaffairs…Wemust

infOrmpeopleoftherealstateofaffairsofournationaleconoｍｙ・Thisisnotonly

necessarytodevelopeconomicscience,butaIso，moreimportantly,itwouldbe

profitablefOrourpeopletoexcercisetheirfUndamentalrightsasthegenuine mastersofsocieｔｙｔｏｇｏｖｅｒｎｔｈｅｓｔａｔｅａｎｄｔｏｍａｎａｇｅｔheeconomy・'4）

lnthefOUowingrefOrmdebates，ｓｏｍｅｔｒｉｅｄｔｏｄｅｆｍｅｔｈｒｅｅｋｉｎｄｓｏｆｒｅform；

namely,``small，，，‘`medium，,，ａｎｄ“big”reforms．‘`Small，,refOrmwasmeantto

indicatepartialrevisionofpreviouspoliciesandinstitutions，maintainingthecore

ofSoviet-typesocialism，ｓｕｃｈａｓｈａｄｂｅｅｎｄｏｎｅｉｎＲｏｍａｎｉaunderNicolae

Ceausescu.“Medium，，wastheHungariantypeofrefOrm,whichradicallychanged theeconomicmanagementsystem，whilemaintainingaone-partyruleinpolitics．

"Big，,reformwastheYugoslavtypeofrefOrm，combinigworkers，self

managementwitharadicaleconomicrefOrm・

Ｓｕｃｈａｄｅｆinitionimpliedthat“small，，reformwasinsufficientandChinahadto

startfromtheHungariantypeofeconomicrefOrm，ｔｈｅｎtotrytoadoptthe Yugoslavtype，intoducingworkers，selfmanagementofenterprisesPossiblyin

thatsense，“JingjiYanjiu”initsFbbruaryl984issue（eightmonthbefOrethe

adoptionoftheResolutionontheRefOrmofEconomicSystem)publishedtwo

articlesonHungananrefOrm；“ReportofInspectionoftheHungarianEconomic RefOnn,，byaChinesedelegationofeconomistsoftheAcademyofSocialSciences

ofChina，ａｎｄ“ExperiencesofHungarianEconomicRefOrm，，writtenbyRezs6 Nyers・Againinthenextmonth“JingjiYanjiu”includedareport“Inspectionon

－１３－

(15)

MinonlSAITO

theFinancialSysteminHungary”byaChinesefinancialinspectionteam Comparingwiththeintra-regimerefOrmexperimentsinEasternEuropewhichI

mentionedearlier,itisevidentthatinChinaatthattimetherewaslittlereference tothenecessityofpoliticaldemocratization(especially,theneedtoabolishone- partyrule)similartothatproposedinthePragueSpringlnreality,especiallyin

thelatterhalfofthe1970s,alsoinChinavariousdemandsfOrdemocratizationwere boilingoutthroughthetemporarilyguaranteedfreedomofexpression,symbolized，

fOrexampIe，bytheso-calle。“DemocracyWall，，inPeking・WhenIfirstvisited ChinainAprill979,wallpostersinPekingandShanghaiwererichincontentswith criticismagainstMao,debateoncconomicpolicy,reproachesagainsttheprivileges ofPartyofficialsandmilitarypersonnel，ａｓwellasdissatisfactionfromtheyouth whohadbeensenttothefrontierduringtheCulturalRevolution、However,soon afterthisbriefperiod，wallposterswererestrictedandDemocracyWallwasshut

down・

Theabove-mentionedResolutionontheRefOrmofEconomicSystem(adopted inOctoberl984bytheCentralCommittecoftheCommunistPartyofChina）

State｡，concerningurbanreform，thefOllowing：

InthemainweshouldfinelyresoIvetwokindsofrelations;nameIy,toestablish rightrelationsbetweenthestateandthenationalizedenterprisesinorderto enlargetheautonomousdecision-makingoftheenterprises，andtoestablish rightrelationsbetweentheworkersandenterprisesinordertoguaranteeforthe workerstheirstatusasmasters15）

AslstatedbefOre,intheexistingsocialiststatesthereareatleastthreekindsof differentintereststobecoordinated;namely,theinterestsofstate,enterpnsesand individuals・Theabove-mentionedResolutio、proposed，bearinginmindsimilar needs，theintroductionofeconomicrefOrｍｃｅｎteringontheguaranteeof autonomousdecision-makingfOrthestate-ownedenterprisesinrelationtothe state，andtheintroductionofworkers，self-management・However,therewasstill nomentionoftheneedfOrpoliticaIdemocratizationinrelationtotheparty-state、

ＴｈｉｓｉｓｎｏｔｔｈｅｐｌａｃｅｔｏｅｘamineminutelytheprocessofChineseeconomic refOnnsincel984HereIquotethcanalysisofProfessorKazuyoshiUeharaof KyotoUniversity､HecomparedtheChineserefOrmwiththatoftheSovietUnion andsummarizedthat“thecharacteristicsoftheChinesereformare,audaciousbut inconsistenteconomicrefOrmononeside，andlaggedpoliticalrefOrmonthe other,，、ChineseeconomicrefOrmstartedfromonIyapartialsphereofthe econoｍｙ，whichsoonbecameincompatiblewithotherbranches，andtherefOrm processgraduallydevelopedinotherbranchesandspheresthroughtrialsand elTors・sｏｔｏsay，Chinesereformbeganasanemergencyevacuationfromthe economicandpoliticaldisastersbroughtfromthenotoriousCulturalRevolution，

andsoChinawasfOrcedtonavigatewithoutacorrectcompass,searchinggradually onthewayfortherightdirectionAsaresult，ｉｎＣｈｉｎａｔｏｄａｙｏｌｄａｎｄｎｅｗ mechanismsexisttogether・Astopolitics,ChineserefOrmhasarigidlimitof``Four BasicPrinciples，，，andsopoliticalreformisseverelyrestrictedandpostponedin practice・TheFourBasicPrincipleswerefirstmentionedbyDengXiao-pingin Marchl979，andtheyincludedthe“RoadtoSocialism，,，“People,sDemocratic

－１４－

(16)

ＴＨＥＣＯＬＬＡＰＳＥＯＦＳＯＶｌＥＴ－ＴＹＰＥＳＯＣｌＡＬＩＳＭＩＮＥＵＲＯＰＥＡＮＤＴＨＥＬＥＳＳＯＮＳＦＯＲＣＨ１ＮＡ

Dictatorship，，,"LeadershipoftheCommunistParty,，ａｎｄ“Marxism-Leninismand

MaoZe-dong，sThought，，、Thoseareambiguousphrases，ｂｕｔｏｎｅｔｈｉｎｇｉｓｃｌｅａｒ：

leadershipoftheCommunistPartyisunshakabIe､'6）

ThusChineserefOrmsincel984undertheleadershipofDengXiao-pingbeｃａｍｅｍｏｒｅａｎｄｍoreinclinedtoaone-sidedemphasisonthedevelopmentofeconomic

forcesandtoasevererestrictionofdemandsfordemocratizationProfessor

SusumuYabukiofYokohamaMunicipalUniversity,whohadbeenasupporterof

theideasoftheCulturalRevoIution，criticizedthissituationasa“Socialism limitlesslycIosetocapitalism"・Ｈｅｗｒｏｔｅｉｎｌ９８６，that；

DengXiao-pingisadvocatingtheconstructionofasocialismwithChinese

characteristics，butitsmeaningisexcessivelyinclinedtothetheorycenteringon productivefOrces…Ｉｔｓｅｅｍｓｔｈａｔｈｅｉｎｔｅｎｄｓｔｏｃｒｅａｔｅａｓystemwhichmight

manageitseconomywithcapitalism，andgovernwithsocialism・Heresocialism

meansnothingbuttheleadershipofthcCommunistParty・Asaresult,Chinais pursuingcapitalisminitseconomicmanagementbutcannotbecomecapitalismat

all…17）

SinceDecemberl986,Chinesestudentsissueddemandstodemocratizepolitical

life・Thisisintensifiedtheinner-PartyconflictandresultedinthedismissalofHu

Yao-balugfromthepostofGeneralSecretaryoftheCommunistPartyinl987・

Afterthat,newly-appointedGcneralSecretaryZhaoZhi-yangreaffirmedthelimit

ofpoliticalreform．

Withthedevelopmentandthcdcepeningofthereformoftheeconomicsystem therefOrmofthepoliticalsystemisneededmoreandmorekeenly・Theprocess ofthedevelopmentofasocialistcommodity-economymustbeatthesametime theprocessoftheconstructionofasocialistdemocraticpoliticalsystemWithout thereformofthepoIiticalsystcm，therefOrmoftheeconomicsystemcannotbe

successfulintheend…

Theconstructionofasocialistdemocraticpoliticalsystemis，justlikethe developmentofasocialistcommodity-economy,agradualprocesspilingupstep

bystepOurconstructionofamodernsocietyneedsastabilizedsocialand

politicalenvironment,facingcomplicatedsocialcontradictions､Soweabsolutely

deny“bigdemocracy，,whichwilldestroylawandorderanddestabilizeour

society、

ＩｔｉｓｏｕｒｍｅｒｉｔａｎｄｓｔｒｅｎｇｔｈｔｈａｔｗｅｈavetheCongressofPeople，s Representatives，multi-partypoliticalconsultationsystemundertheIeadership oftheCommunistPartyandthcadministrationontheprincipleofdemocratic centrismltwillbeabsoIutelyprohibitedtoabandonthismeritandstrengtband tocopytheWestern-styleseparationofthethreepowersandtherotationof

politicalpowersbetweenpluralparties､18）

Twoyearslater，attheoccasionofGorbachev，ｓｖｉｓｉｔｔｏＣｈｉｎａ，Chinesestudents onceagainorganizedmassdemonstrationdemandingthedemocratizationof politicallifewhichresultedinthcTian-An-McntragedyinJunel989Asiswell- known，immediatelyafterthatZhaoZhi-yangwasalsodismissedfｒｏｍｔｈｅｐｏｓｔｏｆ

－１５－

(17)

GeneraISecretary・ＨｅｗａｓａｃｃｕｓｅｄｏｆｐｕｔｔｉｎｇｔｈｅＰａｒｔｙｉnthedangerofsplitby hesitatingtosupressthesmdents，demonstrationUndoubtedlythePartyhada senseofcrisisthatifthemonolithicruleofthePartydisappearedtherewouldbea chaosinChina，andsocriticismagainstthePartywａｓ“absolutelyprohibited"・

However，theabsenceofdemocratizationalsｏｓｕｇｇｅｓｔｓｔｈｅｄａｎｇｅｒｏｆａｃｈａｏｓｔｏ

ｃｏｍｅ．

2.``S⑪meLessonsoftheHungarialHExperiencefbrChineseRefOrmers，,ｂｙＪａｎｏｓ

Ｋ⑪rmai

Asmentionedabove，itisclearthatChineserefOrmersboreinmindthe

HungananrefOrmmodelwhentheypromotedtheResolutionontheRefOrmofthe

EconomicSystemｉｎｌ９８４，becausetheHungarianmodelseemedtopursue economicefficiencysuccessfUlly,maintainingtheprevioUspoliticalsystemofone- partyrule・ProfessorKeijildeofRitsumeikanUniversitypointedoutthe

characteristicsofthel984Resolutionasfollows：

First，ChineserefOrmmodelintendedtochangegovemmentmanagementon stateenterpnsesgraduallyfromdirectcontroltoindirectcontrolasin

Hungarian-typereform・ＩｎｔｈａｔｓｅｎｓｅｉｔｗａｓｔｈｅｆｏｕｒｔｈｔｒｉａｌofrefOrminthe

socialiststatesnexttoYugoslavia，HungaryandPoland

Second,intheChineserefOrmmodcl,thebasicdirectionofreform(reductinof

directiveplanningandexpansionofguidedplanning)wasclear,butambiguous withrespecttotheactualrelativeweightsbetweendirectiveplanning，guided

planningandmarketregulation…

InthatsensenorealconsensusexistedfortherefOrmmodeLSo,theResolution

couldimplyboththeHungarian-typeandareformwhichsubstantially

maintaineddirectiveplannin9..13）

OnSeptemberl985，theChineseAcademyofSocialSciencestogetherwiththe

WorldBankinvitedJanosKomaitoChinatoparticipateinaconferenceonthe refOrmoftheeconomicsystemThenKomaipreparedatypedreportof56pages withatitle“SomeLessonsoftheHungarianExperiencefOrtheChinese

RefOrmers，，､Defininghimselfasa“convincedsupporterof(Hungarian)refOrm

ideasandatthesametimearathercriticalobserverofthepresent(Hungarian）

situation,，,andadmittingtheexistenceofverygreatdifferencesbetweenChinaand

Hungary，Komaicmphasizedthc“meaningfulness，，ｏｆｃｏｍｐａrativeanalysis､20）

ThoughKornaimadenodirectcomparativeanalysis，wemustpayattentionto

thepointshemadeconcerningtheHungarianexperience，Mentioningthe

cxistenceof“mixed-combincdfOrmsofnon-privateandprivateownershipand activity，，，Kornaihimselfraisedthequestion：

Doestheapplicationofthewaysandformsdescribedaboveleadtoabandoning socialismandadoptingcapitalism？Ｍｙａｎｓｗｃｒｉｓｎｏ．…

Ownershipisnotthemaincriterionwhendeterminingwhetherasystemdeserves

thenametobecalled“Socialism"・Inthenormativesensesocialismshoｕｌｄｂｅａ

－１６－

(18)

ＴＨＥＣＯＬＬＡＰＳＥＯＦＳＯⅥＥＴ－ＴＹＰＥＳＯＣＩＡＬＩＳＭＩＮＥＵＲＯＰＥＡＮＤＴＨＥＩＦ５ＢＳＯＮＳＦＯＲＣＨＩＮＡ

systemwhereproductionisefficientandthestandardofliving,thequaIityoflife isimproving・Justiceprevails,equalchancesaregiventoeveryone・Societyhelps thediasbled,thesick・Economicplanningplaysanimportantroleintherational aUocationofresources・AllthesedesiderataarefUllycompatiblewithsome domainofprivateactivityandprivateownership,２１）

AslstatedbefOre，theabsenceofdemocratizationmeansthedangerofachaos tocome,especiaUywhentheeconomicrefOrmdoesnotbringtheexpectedresults・

ThiswasalsotheHungariancase，Kornaiexplains：

Whatistherelationshipbetweenthepresent（Hungarian）troublesandthe

refOnn？Opinionsdiffer.Ｉ（Komai）agreewiththosewhobelievethatthe

troublesarenotbecauseoftherefＯｒｍｂｕｔｉｎｓｐｉｔｅｏｆｉｔ…

Totheregretoftheadherentsofthe(Hungarian)reform,thereisawrong-but veryconvincing-thoughtathand:sincetroublesandrefOrmcoincidedintime，

reformｍｕｓｔｂｅｔｈｅｃａｕｓｅｏｆｔｈｅｔｒｏｕｂｌｅ…

ＴｈｅｐresenteconomicdifficultiesinHungarydonothelpthcrefOrmprocess・

ThereisanimportantlessonfOrothercountries・Bettertobecautiousingoal‐

setting，strivingonlyfOrmodestgrowthofoutputandstandardofliving-and keepthispacepersistently、Anunsustainablyfastincreaseatthebeginning fOUowedbyaslowdownordeclineunderminesthepopularityoftherefOnnThe

"moraIcapitaI，，ｂｕｉｌｔｕｐｉｎｔｈｅｇｏｏｄｙｅａｒｓｃａｎｂｅｅａｓＵyerodedinthebad yearS､22）

InthelastparagraphofhisreportKornaiconcludedasfollows：

Itishighlydesirabletohavealong-tennplanfOrtheinstitutionalchanges,i､e,an all-embracingstrategyofthemoreimportantmeasuresandablueprintofthe

systemwhichshouldbecreaｔｅｄａｔｔｈｅｅｎｄ…

TheHungarianrefOrmdidnothaveandstilldoesnothavesuchastrategyand blueprint;thevariousindividualsandgroupshaveratherdifferingvisionsofthe

future…

Thispartlyamatterofconstructivediscussionswhichcouldexplorethe altemativesolutionsandeventuallyleadtocommonunderstanding､Thisauthor (Komai）ishowevernotasnaiveastobelieve，thataUdifferencescanbe elimi､atedbyargumentationappeaIingatnothingbutrationalconsiderations、

Thereareconnictingsocialforces，differentinterestgroups，thereispolitical

powcrstruggle・

StilltheoutsideobscrverwhodoesnotknowtheChinesecircumstanceswell

cannotexcludetheoptimisticscenarioofawidenationalconsensussupportmga

commonplanofreform23）

Thisoptimisticscenanocouldnotberealized，neitherinHungaryafterl988nor inChinaparticularIyaftertheTian-An-MentragedyofJunel989・EvenbefOrethc Tian-An-Mentragedy，ProfessorUeharacooIyanalyzedthesituationasfOllows：

TheprogressofChineserefOnnwouldresultinmanyconflictsandcotradictions、

－１７－

(19)

Forexample，theenlargementofcnterpnseautonomyandtheemphasisonthe responsibilityofthemanagersarcincompatiblewiththeacquiredprivilegesof cadresofthePartyandthegovemment・Moreover,thereisaquestionwhether theworkerswouldbearthehardshipsofthenegativeincentivessuchas bankruptcyandunemployment・Ｏｎｔｈｅｏｔｈｅｒｈａｎｄ,therearethoseinteUectuals andstudentswhointendtodeveIopthereformfromtheeconomytothepolitics andideology．Ｎodoubttheywerehatedbythecadres・Withthisfora background,thedismissalofHuYao-bang(Januaryl987）occurred…

Ｉｔｍａｙｂｅｐossibletosayatleasttwopointsfromthisprocess：first，Chinese refOrmhasadefinitelimitinthesensethatthereformisclearlycenteringonthe economicefficiency，andthepoliticalrefonnisadmitteｄａｓｆａｒａｓｉｔｉｓｎｅｅｄｅｔｏｓｔｉｍｕｌａｔｅｅｆficiency…

Second，ｉｔｉｓｒｅａｆｆｉｒｍｅｄｔｈａｔｔｈｅｅｃｏｎｏｍｉｃｒeformthusdefinedshouldbe

continuedasbefore…

TodayChinahastopursueeconomicefficiencywithverydifficulttasksto

harmonizeeconomicefficiencywiththeethicsofsocialism24）

ＡｓｗｅｓａｗｉｎｔｈｅｃａｓｅｓｏｆＥａｓｔｅｍＥｕｒｏｐｅ，economicrefOnnsneededwider

popularsupportsinorderthattheregimecouldpersuadepeopletobeareven temporaryhardships､ThereisaseriousdangeralsoinChinathateconomicreforms

whichmaintainthepreviouspohticalsystemofarigidone-partyrulecannotattain

theexpectedsuccess・WithoutanysenouseffOrtsofdemocartization，butwith

recurrentsuppressionofdemocratizationmovement，therewouldbeaccumulated

thepoliticaldissatisfaction・Thispoliticaldissatisfactioncouldbeenhancedby

disiIlusionedeconomicdissatisfactionofcommonpeoplebccauseofthefailureof theeconomicrefOrms・ThustheneedsfOrpoliticalrefonn，theneedsfOr democratization，ｆｉｒｓｔｏｆａｌｌｔｈｅｎｅｅｄｓｆｏｒｒａｄｉｃａＩｃｈangeoftheexistingpolitical

system(theone-partyruleoftheCommunistPartyofChina)areclearalsoin

China．

N0tes

Lange（1974),ｐ,105.

1bid.，ｐ・l08

Brucan（1989),p3-4 Brus（1972)，Chaptera Saito（1979)，p9q

citedinUehara（1972)，ｐ５Ｌ

ｈＴに｢"α"o"ロノＨｅｍﾉ。刀jbH"e，Januaryl8，1988．

Kosta（1974)、concludingpartofChaptera Saito（1989)，ｐ・Z59

Nyels-Tardos（1984)，ppl7-18 Komai（1986)，ｐ136．

Zielinski（1973),ppl4-15・

HalcandWanles（1981)，ｐｐ491-517.

Ｊi"g/ｉＹｍ/〃（EconomicStudies)，December1978，pp6-7．

ｊｊｊｊｊｊｊｊｊｊｊｊｊｊ１２３４５６７８９０１２３４１１１１１

－１８－

(20)

ＴＨＥＣＯＬＬＡＰＳＥＯＦＳＯＶＩＥＴＬＴＹＰＥＳＯＣＩＡＬＩＳＭＩＮＥＵＲＯＰＥＡＮＤＴＨＥＬＥＳＳＯＮＳＦＯＲＣＨIＮＡ

ｊｊｊｊｊｊｊｊｊｊ西沁刀岨沮加皿塑坦型

鹿kj"８Ｗどek(ｙ（JapaneseEdition),３００ctobcrl984,Appendixp､5．

Uehara（1989)，pp54-57、

Yabuki（1986)，Ｐ20．

PEkjlzgWeek(y，１０Novemberl987・

Ide（1988)，ｐ218．

SeeKornai（1985)，ｐp2-3.

1bid.，ｐ37.

1bid.，ｐｐ４３-44.

1bid.，ｐ５６．

Uehara（1987)，pp222-223．

Ｒｅ従rences

Brucan，Silviu（1989)，ＷＯｒﾉｄＳｏｃｊａﾉな'，ｚα／仇ｅＣＤｓｓｗｄｓ（translatedinto

Japanese),MinervaShobo，Kyoto

Brus,Wlodzimierz(1972),T1heMZzrAaj"αSocjaﾉﾑslEco"omy,Routledge＆Kegan

PauLLondonandBonston

Hare,Ｐ・GandWanles,Ｐ.T・(1981),"PolishandHungarianEconomicRefOrms- aComparison",SoyjelSmdjm,ＶＯＬ33,No.４（Octoberl981)．

Ide,Keiji(1988),Ｃ/lzJgoAc"ＳﾉmkaMuJgjmKejzajKmkaAzJ(Chj"eseSocjaﾉjSmα"ｄｔｈｅＥｃｏ"ｏｍｊｃＲｅ/blm),HoritsuBunkaSha，KyotO

Komai,Jdnos（1985)，SollTeL"so"ｓｑｆＺｈｅＬｍ'０９arm〃Ｅ】pe旅"Ｃｅ/ｂｒＣ/lj"aFe

Re/brme瓶，typedmanuscript．

－（1988),ＣＯ"tmdic"０１１sα'ｚｄＤｊﾉemlms,Ｓ'皿`jeso〃ｔｈｅＳｏｃｊα/lmEco"ｏｌ７ｚｙｑ'zd

SocjeZy，TheMITPress，CambridgeandLondon

Kosta,Jiri(1974),Sozjqﾉﾑ、ScﾉｶｅＰﾉ､"wﾉｱ灯cﾉｶ域,７１/ieolje""dPmxjs,Westdeutscher

VerlagGmbH，Opladen

Lange，ＯＦｋａｒ（19利，ＯＳDC/(z/jzmjejGospoda姪（translatedintoJapanese)，

NipponHyoronsha，Tokyo・

Nyers,Rezs6andTardos,Marton（1984),“TheNecessityfOrConsolidationof EconomyandthePossibilityofDevelopmentinHungary,，,AcmOeco"omjcq，

VoL23（1984),No.1-2．

Saito,Minoru（1979)，“IsThereaChineseTypeofSocialism?”（inJapanesc)，

雄jzajSﾉijrj〃（T1helWseiU)zjvelFj〃ＥＣＯ"ｏｍｊｃＲｅ〃ew)，VoLXLVII,No.3．

－（1989),"EconomicRefOrmandPoliticalChangeinHungary"，KCjzajShjrj〃

（T1heHosej［/､l'Cl、)ﾉＥｂｏ"omjcRev舵w)，Vol・LVII,No.1．

Uehara,Kazuyoshi(1972),Ｃｈ"gok〃ＳﾉiakajSﾉ､８ｔ"ｏＫｅ"ハル(StudiesonChinese

Socialism)，NicchuShuppan,Tokyo．

－（1987),Ｃ７ｉ皿goAc“〃okejzajKajkak型ＺｏＫｔＪｉｈｏＳｅなαAC“(ECO"olmcRQ/bmTα"ｄＯｐｅｎＥｃｏ"omyj〃αj"α)，AokiShoten,Tokyo．

－（1989),"ChugokuniokeruKaikakuKaihoSeisakutoTen-An-MonJiken”

（EconomicRefbrm,OpenEconomyinChinaandtheTian-An-MenEvent)，

Ｊｏ”"ロノｏ〃Regjo"αﾉ鋤djas（MatsuyamaUniversity)，ＶＯＬ１，No.l

Yabuki，Susumu（1986)，Ｃﾉｾj"ｑＳｙ"｡、me：Ｋ(Zgjrj"αkHShjholTsﾉmgj〃ｊｃｈｊｋａｊＳ/iaAcaなん"gj(ASocmﾉｉｓｍＬｊ'､Zﾉｾss/ｙＣﾙseloQZpimﾉな''2),So-So-Sha,Tokyo，

Zielinski，JanuszG.，（1973)，ＥＣＯ"omjcR巾"〃ｊ〃ＰＯﾉなﾉnｍ`、Ｗ，Oxford

－１９－

The Collapse of Soviet-Type Socialism in Europe and the Lessons for China