生物数理の理論とその応用
ミニシンポジウム
「進化動態の数理」
進化動態の数理的記述について一概説
Fugo
Takasu
Dept. Information and Computer Sciences, Nara Women’s University
Kita-Uoya
Nishimachi,
Nara 630-8506, Japan
[email protected]
March
31
2008
1
Evolution
Evolutionis
a
dynamicalprocess
that inheritedphenotypeofa
population changes throughgeneration. Genotypes underlies phenotype and genetic constitution of
a
population alsochanges by evolution. Evolution is driven by natural selection and genetic drift. Natural
selection includes sexual selection, kin selection, etc. and is accompanied by adaptation.
Individuals with
some
phenotype reproducemore
offspringthan othersandif the phenotypeis genetically inherited, the fraction of such individuals with the phenotype will finaly
dominate the population. This is “adaptation“. Individuals with higherfitness increase in
frequency and finally dominate the population.
Evolution is also driven by statistical effect ofrandom events
even
if the trait in focusis neutral. This is called genetic drift and neutral
genes
which conferno
advantage to thebearer
can
befixed
or
lost simply bychance.
In this paper I deal only with adaptation
as a
major force ofevolution. But the effectofstochasticity of
neutral
traits could berelevatit as
I mentioned inthe last section.2
Models
to deal
with
evolution
by adaptation
Adaptation is
a
process that maximizes individual’s fitness. But this is not simply“opti-mization“
as
is often used in engineering because individual’s fitness is likely affected byhow other individuaJs behave. This is a
game
theoretic situation andwe
have to definein-dividual fitness
as
dependenton
the target individualas
well as other individuals infocus.To
model
evolutionby adaptation,we
define 1)fitness of
a
population along hypothetical phenotypic traitsor
genetic constitution. This is called “adaptive landscape”. Throughevolution thepopulation will climb
on
the adaptive landscape toreacha
local fitnessmaxi-mum.
But the adaptive landscape oftenchangesits shapeas
the populationevolves becausethe change of the population status usually results in the change of individual’s fitness.
The most major
case
is frequency dependency.If the population reaches
a
state where no other traits can invade, the population issaid to be at evolutionarily stable strategy, ESS [1].
3
Adaptive dynamics
Although the concept of ESS has greatly contributed to understand evolution of
many
$traits/behaviors$ of animaJs and plants, ESS itself does not indicate that
a
population willconverge tothe state. In this
sense
ESS is basedon
a
“static”view.
To betterunderstand
the dynamic process ofevolution, adaptivedynamics has been proposed in the last decade
and is
now
widely used in various theoretical study ofevolution [2] [3].Adaptive dynamics isaframework of phenotypic evolutionary dynamics. It just focuses
on
phenotype. In adaptive dynamics,we
firstdefine
“invasion exponent”as
the fitness ofmutant $m$ in
a
resident population$r,$ $S_{r}(m)$.
Once the invasion exponent $S_{r}(m)$ is defined, the dynamics of trait $r$
can
betraced as
follow.
$\bullet$ Selection gradient defined
as
$\frac{\partial S_{r}(m)}{\partial m}|_{m=r}$
determines the direction of evolutionary change.
$\bullet$ Evolutionarily singular strategy $r*satisfies$
$\frac{\partial S_{r}(m)}{\partial m}|_{m=r=r*}=0$
$\bullet$ An evolutionarily singular strategy $r*is$ ESS iff
$\frac{\partial^{2}S_{r}(m)}{\partial m^{2}}|_{m=r}<0$
,
i.e., atESS
$r*is$ fitness maximum.$\bullet$ An evolutionarily singular strategy $r*is$
convergence
stable strategyCSS
iff$\frac{\partial^{2}S_{r}(m)}{\partial r^{2}}|_{m=r=r*}>\frac{\partial^{2}S_{r}(m)}{\partial m^{2}}|_{m=r=r*}$
Topology of the invasion exponent $S_{r}(m)$ determines the trajectory of evolution. We should note thatESS and
CSS
are
mutuallyindependent concept and evolutionarilysingular strategy,
a
candidate
ofan
end point ofevolution,can
be either ESSor
non-ESS,either
CSS or non-CSS. IntriguIng
trajectorylike evolutionary branching and evolutionarysuicide has been reported [4].
4
Evolutionary
dynamics
build up
from individual level
Adaptivedynamicsstarts with defining theinvasion exponent $S_{r}(m)$for eachtarget system.
And it isdefined
as
an
expression underacertainbiological assumptions. Recently, thanksto the advance of colnputer technology, quite arealistic
model called individual-based
model, IBM, is widely used to explore
biological
phenomena.In
$\mathbb{B}M$,
individual
is theunit and all birth and death eveuts ofindividuals
are
iherently stochastic.InIBM, aset ofstrategiae (traits, genetic structure, etc.) is assignedto
Individuak
andall individuakreproduce
or
survive according toa
$cert\dot{u}n$rules. IBM has been recognizedas
apowerfultool tosimulateand explorethe consequenoe ofcomplicated set of birth- alld death-rul\’eon
the population-level phenomena.Figure 1show asnapshotof$\bm{t}$IBM where hosts andparasites interact. Both hosts td
parasites
are
located in two-dimellsional torus space $\bm{t}d$ aparasite parasitized any hostswithin acertain radius R. If ahost is parasitIzed, aparasiteoffspring
emerges
and disperseacertain distance to land in the space. If ahost
escapes
parasitism, acertain number ofhost offspring
emerges
$\bm{t}d$ disperse acertain distance to land in the space. AU hosts andparavites dies after reproduction. This corresponds to the Niiokon-Baily model of host
parasite population dynamics.
By extending the IBM to include the evolution of host resistance to parasitism and
parasite virulence to
overcome
the host resistance,we
have very interesting simulationresults (Takasu in prep.).
Untilnow, most theoreticalstudy
on
evolutionary dynamics has beenbasedon
adeter-ministic descriptionofthe invasion exponent. As Ishowed IBM simulationshows avariety
ofinteresting phenomena worth to be mathematicafy’ explored.
Most
mathematical
modelshavebeen “talytical models”which describesthe population-levelphenolnena, i.e., population density,etc. However, IBM is basedon
“algorithm” thatrules birth and death ofeai individual. Exploring mathematicallink between the
analyt-ical models and algorithmic modek is worth to challenge.
References
[1] John Maynard Smith.
1982.
Evolution and the Theory ofGames.ISBN 0-521-28884-3.
[2] Dieckmann U.
and
R. Law.1996.
The dynamical theory of coevolution:A
derivation fromstochastic
ecologicalprocesses. J.
Math. Biol.34:579-612.
Figure 1: Snapshots of the host-parasite IBM in two dimensional space. Hosts
are
shown[3] Geritz, S. A. H.,
\’E.
Kisdi, G. Mesz\’ena, and J. A. J. Metz.1998.
Evolutionarily singularstrategies and the adaptive growth and branching ofthe evolutionary tree. Evol. Ecol.
12:35-57.
[4] Gyllenberg M. and K. Parvinen.