• 検索結果がありません。

FOR CONSTRAINED GENERALIZED GAMES

N/A
N/A
Protected

Academic year: 2022

シェア "FOR CONSTRAINED GENERALIZED GAMES"

Copied!
10
0
0

読み込み中.... (全文を見る)

全文

(1)

FOR CONSTRAINED GENERALIZED GAMES

P. S. SRINIVASAN AND P. VEERAMANI

Received 28 August 2003 and in revised form 11 November 2003

We obtain sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium pair for a particular constrained generalized game as an application of a best proximity pair theorem.

1. Introduction

Consider the following game involvingnplayers. For theith player a pair (Xi,Yi) of strat- egy sets is associated. Knowing the choice of strategiesxiXi=n

j=1,j=iXj of all other players, theith-player choice is restricted toAi(xi)Yi. Otherwise the choice will be made from Xi. According to these preferences, let fi:Yi×XiRbe the payofffunc- tion associated with theith player for eachi=1,. . .,n. In this situation, it is natural to expect an optimal approximate solution which will fulfill the requirement to some ex- tent. Therefore, it should be contemplated to find a pair (x,y) wherexX=n

i=1Xiand yY=n

i=1Yiwhich will behave like an equilibrium point of a generalized game, that is,yiAi(xi) and maxzAi(xi)fi(z,xi)= fi(yi,xi) for eachi=1,. . .,n, and satisfy the opti- mization constraint, namely, the distance betweenxandyis minimum with respect to XandY. In this case, the pair (x,y) is called anequilibrium pairand the game is termed asconstrained generalized game. Indeed, in this paper, sufficient conditions for the ex- istence of an equilibrium pair for this constrained generalized game are obtained as an application of a best proximity pair theorem.

The entire edifice of game theory expounds with a mathematical search to strike an optimal balance between persons generally having conflicting interests. Each player has to select one from his fixed range of strategies so as to bring the best outcome according to his own preferences.

Following the pioneering work of Debreu [1], the generalized game is one in which the choice of each player is restricted to a subset of strategies determined by the choice of other players. Mathematically, the situation is described as follows.

Let there benplayers. LetX1,. . .,Xnbe nonempty compact convex sets in a normed linear spaceF. LetXibe the strategy set and letfi:X=n

i=1XiRbe the payofffunction for theith player, for eachi=1,. . .,n. Given the strategiesxiof all other players, the choice

Copyright©2004 Hindawi Publishing Corporation Fixed Point Theory and Applications 2004:1 (2004) 21–29 2000 Mathematics Subject Classification: 47H10, 47H04, 54H25 URL:http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/S1687182004308132

(2)

of theith player is restricted to the setAi(xi)Xi. An equilibrium point in a generalized game is an elementxXsuch that for eachi=1,. . .,n,xiAi(xi) and

ymaxAi(xi)fiy,xi=fixi,xi=fi(x), (1.1) where the following convenient notations are used.

Notation 1.1. Denote

X= n i=1

Xi, Xi= n

j=1 j=i

Xj. (1.2)

A pointxofXwhoseith coordinate isxiandxiXiis written as (xi,xi).

The above definition of the equilibrium point is a natural extension of the Nash equi- librium point introduced by Nash in [6].

Since then a number of generalizations for the existence of an equilibrium point have been given in various directions. For instance, the existence results of equilibria of gen- eralized games were given by Ding and Tan [2], Tan and Yuan [13], Ionescu Tulcea [4], Lassonde [5], and so forth. For a unified treatment on the study of the existence of equi- libria of generalized games in various settings, we refer to Yuan [15].

On the other hand, consider the following economic situation. Suppose that goods are manufactured and sold in different locations. Each location can be both a manufacturing as well as a selling unit. It is agreed that the ultimate place where the goods get sold would be determining the payofffor the goods. Let there bensuch locations. For each location, two strategiesXiandYiare associated, one to that of manufacturing unit and other to that of selling unit. Knowing the manufacturing strategyxiof all other locations, the choice of selling strategy at theith location is restricted toAi(xi)Yi. Also, let fi:Yi×XiR be the payoffassociated with theith location. Moreover, the cost involved in the travel of goods to different places should also be taken into account. In this situation, one cannot expect an equilibrium point as the strategy setsXiandYimay be quite different. In view of this stand point, it is natural to expect a pair of points (x,y), wherexX=n

i=1Xiand yY=n

i=1Yi, which will fulfill the requirement as in the case of equilibrium point of a generalized game and also minimize the traveling cost where the traveling cost is denoted byxy. Therefore, it is contemplated to find a pair of points (x,y) wherexXand yYsuch that fori=1,. . .,n,yiAi(xi),

zmaxAi(xi)fiz,xi= fiyi,xi (1.3) andxy =d(X,Y), where

d(X,Y)=Infab:aX,bY. (1.4) In this case, the pair (x,y) is called anequilibrium pairfor this economic situation which is newly termed asconstrained generalized game.

(3)

If the setsYi coincide with Xi for i=1,. . .,n, thenY =X and it is easy to see that the equilibrium pair boils down to a single pointxwhich is an equilibrium point for a generalized game in the sense of Debreu [1].

In this paper, an existence of an equilibrium pair for this constrained generalized game is obtained. For this, a best proximity pair theorem exploring the sufficient conditions which ensure the existence of an elementxAsuch that

d(x,Tx)=d(A,B) (1.5)

is obtained inSection 3for the given nonempty subsetsAandBof a normed linear space Fand a Kakutani multifunctionT:A2B. This result is applied to obtain the existence of an equilibrium pair of the constrained game inSection 4. Indeed, an existence theorem for equilibrium point of a generalized game due to Debreu [1] is obtained as a corollary.

2. Preliminaries

This section covers the preliminaries and the results that are required in the sequel.

LetX andY be nonempty sets. Amultivalued mapormultifunctionT fromX toY denoted byT:X2Yis defined to be a function which assigns to each element ofxX a nonempty subsetTxof Y. Fixed points of the multifunctionT:X2X will be the pointsxXsuch thatxTx.

Let X andY be any two topological spaces. LetT :X2Y be a multivalued map.

The mapT is said to beupper semicontinuous(resp.,lower semicontinuous) ifT1(A) := {xX:T(x)A= ∅}is closed (resp., open) inXwheneverAis a closed (resp., open) subset ofY. AlsoTis said to be continuous if it is both lower semicontinuous and upper semicontinuous.

A multifunctionT:XY is said to have compact values if for eachxX,T(x) is compact subset ofY. Also,Tis said to be acompact multifunctionifT(X) is a compact subset ofY.

It is known that ifTis an upper semicontinuous multifunction with compact values, thenT(K) is compact wheneverKis a compact subset ofXifXis Hausdorff.

A multifunctionT:X2Yis said to be aKakutani multifunction[5] if the following conditions are satisfied:

(1)Tis upper semicontinuous;

(2) eitherTxis a singleton for eachxX(in which caseY is required to be a Haus- dorfftopological vector space) or for eachxX,Txis a nonempty, compact, and convex subset ofY (in which caseY is required to be a convex subset of a Hausdorfftopological vector space).

The collection of all Kakutani multifunctions fromXtoYis denoted by᏷(X,Y).

A multifunctionT:X2Yfrom a topological spaceXto another topological spaceY is said to be aKakutani factorizable multifunctionif it can be expressed as a composition of finitely many Kakutani multifunctions.

The collection of all Kakutani factorizable multifunctions fromXtoY is denoted by

C(X,Y).

(4)

IfT=T1T2···Tn is a Kakutani factorizable multifunction, then the functionsT1, T2,. . .,Tnare known as thefactorsofT. It is a noteworthy fact thatTneed not be convex valued even though its factors are convex valued.

LetAbe any nonempty subset of a normed linear spaceX. ThenPA:X2Adefined by

PA(x)=

aA:ax =d(x,A) (2.1)

is the set of all best approximations inAto any elementxX.

It is known that ifAis compact and convex subset ofX,PA(x) is a nonempty compact convex subset ofAand the multivalued mapPAis upper semicontinuous onX.

A single-valued function f :XRis said to be quasiconcave if the set

xX:f(x)t (2.2)

is convex for eachtR. 3. Best proximity pair theorem

Consider the fixed point equationTx=x whereT is a nonself operator. If this opera- tor equation does not have a solution, then the next attempt is to find an elementxin a suitable space such thatxis close toTxin some sense. In fact, a classical best approxima- tion theorem, due to Fan [3], states that ifKis a nonempty compact convex subset of a Hausdorfflocally convex topological vector spaceEwith a continuous seminormpand T:KEis a single-valued continuous map, then there exists an elementx0K such that

px0Tx0

=dTx0,K. (3.1)

Later, this result has been generalized by Sehgal and Singh [10,11] to the one for continuous multifunctions. It is remarked that they have also proved the following gen- eralization of the result due to Prolla [7].

IfKis a nonempty approximately compact convex subset of a normed linear spaceX, T:KXa multivalued continuous map withT(K) relatively compact, andg:KKan affine, continuous, and surjective single-valued map such thatg1sends compact subsets ofKonto compact sets, then there exists an elementx0inKsuch that

dgx0,Tx0

=dTx0,K. (3.2)

In the setting of Hausdorff locally convex topological vector spaces, Vetrivel et al.

[14] have established existential theorems that guarantee the existence of a best approx- imant for continuous Kakutani factorizable multifunctions which unify and generalize the known results on best approximations.

The known example [11] shows that the requirement of continuity assumption of the involved multifunction in Sehgal and Singh’s result [11] cannot be relaxed.

(5)

Example 3.1. LetX=R2,K=[0, 1]× {0}, andg=I, the identity map. LetT:K2Xbe defined by

T(a, 0)=

(0, 1) ifa=0,

the line segment joining (0, 1) and (1, 0) ifa=0. (3.3) ThenTis upper semicontinuous but not lower semicontinuous. Also it is clear that there is noxKsuch that

d(x,Tx)=d(Tx,K). (3.4)

Remark 3.2. In [12], the above known example has not been quoted correctly. Example 1.1 of [12] should be replaced by the above example.

On the other hand, even though a best approximation theorem guarantees the ex- istence of an approximate solution, it is contemplated to find an approximate solution which is optimal. The best proximity pair theorem (see [9]) sheds light in this direction.

Indeed a best proximity pair theorem due to Sadiq Basha and Veeramani [8] provides sufficient conditions that ensure the existence of elementx0Asuch thatd(x0,Tx0)= d(A,B) where the givenT:A2B is a Kakutani factorizable multifunction defined on the suitable subsetsAandBof a topological vector spaceE. The pair (x0,Tx0) is called a best proximity pairofT. The best proximity pair theorem seeks an approximate solution which is optimal.

The following fixed point theorem, due to Lassonde [5], for Kakutani factorizable mul- tifunctions will be invoked to establish the main result of this section.

Theorem3.3 (Lassonde [5]). IfSis a nonempty convex subset of a Hausdorfflocally convex topological vector space, then any compact Kakutani factorizable multifunctionT:S2S (i.e., any compact multifunction in the familyC(S,S)) has a fixed point.

LetAandBbe any two nonempty subsets of a normed linear space. Before stating the principal result of this section, the following notions are recalled:

d(A,B) :=Infd(a,b) :aA,bB, Prox(A,B) :=

(a,b)A×B:d(a,b)=d(A,B), A0:=

aA:d(a,b)=d(A,B) for somebB, B0:=

bB:d(a,b)=d(A,B) for someaA.

(3.5)

IfA= {x}, thend(A,B) is written asd(x,B). Also, ifA= {x}andB= {y}, thend(x,y) denotesd(A,B) which is preciselyxy.

The following best proximity pair theorem [8] which will be used to prove the exis- tence of an equilibrium pair is included for the sake of completeness.

Theorem3.4. LetAandBbe nonempty compact convex subsets of a normed linear spaceX and letT:A2Bbe an upper semicontinuous multifunction. Further assume that for each xinA,Txis a nonempty closed convex subset ofBandT(A0)B0.

(6)

Then there exists an elementxAsuch that

d(x,Tx)=d(A,B). (3.6)

Proof. Consider the metric projection mapPA:X2Adefined as PA(x)=

aA:ax =d(x,A). (3.7) AsAis a nonempty compact convex set,PA(x) is a nonempty closed, convex subset of A, for eachxinA. Also it is well known thatPAis an upper semicontinuous multivalued map.

Now, it is claimed thatPA(Tx)A0, for eachxinA0.

LetyPA(Tx). ThenyPA(z), for somezTx. This implies thatxy =d(z,A).

But it is given thatT(A0)B0. HencezB0. ButzB0implies that there existsaA such thataz =d(z,A). Now

zy =d(z,A)za =d(A,B). (3.8) This implies thatzy =d(A,B). HenceyA0. Consequently,PA(Tx)A0, for each xinA0.

SinceAandBare compact sets,A0= ∅. Also it is easy to prove thatA0is compact and convex. Now, forxinA0,PA(Tx) need not be a convex set. Here, the fixed point theorem of Lassonde [5] is invoked. ThoughPATis not a convex-valued multifunction,PAT: A02A0is a Kakutani factorizable multifunction. Hence, by the fixed point theorem of Lassonde, there existsxA0such thatxPA(Tx).

Now,xPA(Tx) implies thatxy =d(y,A), for someyTx. ThenTxB0im- plies that there existsaAsuch thatay =d(A,B). Hence

xy =d(y,A)ya =d(A,B). (3.9) Thereforexy =d(A,B). Asd(x,Tx)xy =d(A,B), henced(x,Tx)=d(A,B).

This proves the theorem.

Remark 3.5. In [8], the above theorem is proved in more general setup where the setAis approximately compact andTis a Kakutani factorizable multifunction.

4. Constrained generalized game

This section is devoted to principal results on game theory.

The following lemma is an important tool in the proof ofTheorem 4.4. For the proof, we refer to [12].

Lemma4.1. LetAandBbe nonempty compact subsets in a normed linear spaceFand let f :A×BRbe a continuous function. Given a continuous multifunctionT:A2Bwith compact values, the functiong:ARdefined byg(x)=δ(Tx,x) :=maxzT(x)f(z,x)is a continuous function.

The proof of the principal theorem of this section invokes the best proximity pair theorem (Theorem 3.4). Before that, the following definitions are introduced.

(7)

Let X1,. . .,Xn and Y1,. . .,Yn be nonempty compact convex sets in a normed linear spaceF. Also, letX=n

i=1Xi,Y=n

i=1Yi, and X0=

xX:xy =d(X,Y) for someyY. (4.1) Definition 4.2. Let fi:Yi×XiR, fori=1,. . .,n, bensingle-valued functions. These nfunctions are said to satisfy a condition (A) with respect to the given multifunctions Ai:Xi2Yiif for eachxX0and for allyYsuch that

yiAi xi, δiAixi,xi:= max

zAi(xi)fiz,xi=fiyi,xi for eachi=1,. . .,n, (4.2) there existsaXsuch thatayd(X,Y).

Definition 4.3. Let the single-valued functionsfi:Yi×XiRand the multifunctionsAi: Xi2Yi, fori=1,. . .,n, be given. LetxXandyY be such that, for eachi=1,. . .,n,

(a) yiAi(xi),

(b)δi(Ai(xi),xi) :=maxzAi(xi)fi(z,xi)=fi(yi,xi), (c)xy =d(X,Y).

Then the pair (x,y) is called anequilibrium pairfor the game which is termed ascon- strained generalized game.

Theorem4.4. LetX1,. . .,XnandY1,. . .,Ynbe nonempty compact convex sets in a normed linear space F. Fori=1,. . .,n, let fi:Yi×XiR be continuous functions satisfying a condition (A) with respect to the given lower semicontinuous multifunctionsAi:Xi2Yi, i=1,. . .,n, in᏷(Xi,Yi), and are such that for any fixedxiXi, the functionyi fi(yi,xi) is quasiconcave onXifor eachi=1,. . .,n. Then there exist an equilibrium pair for the con- strained generalized game.

Proof. For eachi=1,. . .,n, let the multifunctionEi:Xi2Yibe defined as follows:

Eixi=

yiAixi:fiyi,xi=δiAixi,xi (4.3) andE:X2Yas

E(x)= n i=1

Ei

xi. (4.4)

It is shown thatEsatisfies all the conditions ofTheorem 3.4. For this, it is claimed that Ei᏷(Xi,Yi), fori=1,. . .,n.

Leti∈ {1,. . .,n}be fixed. For any fixedxiXi,Ei(xi) is nonempty and compact be- cause the functionyi fi(yi,xi) is continuous on the compact setAi(xi). Now, it is shown thatEi(xi) is convex.

Letz1,z2Ei(xi). This implies fi

z1,xiδi

Ai

xi,xi, fi

z2,xiδi

Ai

xi,xi. (4.5)

(8)

Sinceyi fi(yi,xi) is quasi concave onXi,

fiλz1+ (1λ)z2,xiδiAixi,xi. (4.6) But,Ai(xi) is a convex set. So,

fiλz1+ (1λ)z2,xiδiAixi,xi. (4.7) Therefore,

fiλz1+ (1λ)z2,xi=δiAixi,xi. (4.8) Henceλz1+ (1λ)z2Ei(xi). Therefore,Ei(xi) is convex for eachi=1,. . .,n.

Next, it is shown thatEi:Xi2Yi is upper semicontinuous multifunction onXi, for everyi=1,. . .,n.

LetznXiwithznzandwnEi(zn) withwnw.

The factwnEi(zn) implies the fact that fi(wn,zn)=δi(Ai(zn),zn). ByLemma 4.1, xiδi(Ai(xi),xi) is a continuous function. Therefore,δi(Ai(zn),zn)δi(Ai(z),z). More- over, since fi is a continuous function, fi(wn,zn) fi(w,z). This implies that fi(w,z)= δi(Ai(z),z). HencewEi(z). ThereforeEiis upper semicontinuous onXifor everyi= 1,. . .,n. Hence this establishes the claim thatEi᏷(Xi,Yi), fori=1,. . .,n. Further from the above claim, it follows thatE᏷(X,Y).

Now, letxX0 and yE(x). This implies that fi(yi,xi)=δ(Ai(xi),xi), i=1,. . .,n.

Since fifori=1,. . .,nsatisfy condition (A) with respect to the multifunctionsAi, there existsaXsuch thatay =d(X,Y). This illustrates the factyY0. ThereforeE(X0)

Y0. HenceEsatisfies all the conditions ofTheorem 3.4. Therefore, there existsxX such that

d(x,Ex)=d(X,Y). (4.9)

SinceExis compact, there existsyExsuch that

d(x,y)=d(X,Y). (4.10)

This establishes the theorem.

If the setsYi’s coincides withXi’s fori=1,. . .,n, thenY=Xand the following corollary is immediate.

Corollary4.5. LetX1,. . .,Xnbe nonempty compact convex sets in a normed linear spaceF.

LetAi:Xi2Xi,i=1,. . .,n, be lower semicontinuous multifunctions in᏷(Xi,Xi). Fori= 1,. . .,n, let fi:XRbe continuous functions such that, for any fixedxiXi, the function yi fi(yi,xi)is quasiconcave onXifor eachi=1,. . .,n. Then there exists an equilibrium point for the game in the sense of Debreu[1].

Remark 4.6. It is remarked thatTheorem 4.4does not strictly generalize Debreu’s theo- rem [1] or [5, Theorem 6]. In [5] the setsXi’s are convex sets with all the multifunctions Ai’s compact except possibly one in addition to the conditions forAi’s given in the above corollary.

(9)

References

[1] G. Debreu,A social equilibrium existence theorem, Proc. Nat. Acad. Sci. USA38(1952), 886–

893.

[2] X. P. Ding and K.-K. Tan,On equilibria of noncompact generalized games, J. Math. Anal. Appl.

177(1993), no. 1, 226–238.

[3] K. Fan,Extensions of two fixed point theorems of F. E. Browder, Math. Z.112(1969), 234–240.

[4] C. Ionescu Tulcea,On the approximation of upper semi-continuous correspondences and the equi- libriums of generalized games, J. Math. Anal. Appl.136(1988), no. 1, 267–289.

[5] M. Lassonde,Fixed points for Kakutani factorizable multifunctions, J. Math. Anal. Appl.152 (1990), no. 1, 46–60.

[6] J. F. Nash Jr.,Equilibrium points inn-person games, Proc. Nat. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.36(1950), 48–

49.

[7] J. B. Prolla,Fixed-point theorems for set-valued mappings and existence of best approximants, Numer. Funct. Anal. Optim.5(1982/1983), no. 4, 449–455.

[8] S. Sadiq Basha and P. Veeramani,Best proximity pairs and best approximations, Acta Sci. Math.

(Szeged)63(1997), no. 1-2, 289–300.

[9] ,Best proximity pair theorems for multifunctions with open fibres, J. Approx. Theory103 (2000), no. 1, 119–129.

[10] V. M. Sehgal and S. P. Singh,On random approximations and a random fixed point theorem for set valued mappings, Proc. Amer. Math. Soc.95(1985), no. 1, 91–94.

[11] ,A generalization to multifunctions of Fan’s best approximation theorem, Proc. Amer.

Math. Soc.102(1988), no. 3, 534–537.

[12] P. S. Srinivasan and P. Veeramani,On best proximity pair theorems and fixed-point theorems, Abstr. Appl. Anal.2003(2003), no. 1, 33–47.

[13] K.-K. Tan and X.-Z. Yuan,Approximation method and equilibria of abstract economies, Proc.

Amer. Math. Soc.122(1994), no. 2, 503–510.

[14] V. Vetrivel, P. Veeramani, and P. Bhattacharyya,Some extensions of Fan’s best approximation theorem, Numer. Funct. Anal. Optim.13(1992), no. 3-4, 397–402.

[15] G. X.-Z. Yuan,The study of minimax inequalities and applications to economies and variational inequalities, Mem. Amer. Math. Soc.132(1998), no. 625, x+140.

P. S. Srinivasan: Department of Mathematics, Indian Institute of Technology, Madras, Chennai 600 036, India

Current address: Department of Mathematics and Statistics, University of Hyderabad, Hyderabad 500 046, India

E-mail address:[email protected]

P. Veeramani: Department of Mathematics, Indian Institute of Technology, Madras, Chennai 600 036, India

E-mail address:[email protected]

(10)

Special Issue on Space Dynamics

Call for Papers

Space dynamics is a very general title that can accommodate a long list of activities. This kind of research started with the study of the motion of the stars and the planets back to the origin of astronomy, and nowadays it has a large list of topics. It is possible to make a division in two main categories: astronomy and astrodynamics. By astronomy, we can relate topics that deal with the motion of the planets, natural satellites, comets, and so forth. Many important topics of research nowadays are related to those subjects.

By astrodynamics, we mean topics related to spaceflight dynamics.

It means topics where a satellite, a rocket, or any kind of man-made object is travelling in space governed by the grav- itational forces of celestial bodies and/or forces generated by propulsion systems that are available in those objects. Many topics are related to orbit determination, propagation, and orbital maneuvers related to those spacecrafts. Several other topics that are related to this subject are numerical methods, nonlinear dynamics, chaos, and control.

The main objective of this Special Issue is to publish topics that are under study in one of those lines. The idea is to get the most recent researches and published them in a very short time, so we can give a step in order to help scientists and engineers that work in this field to be aware of actual research. All the published papers have to be peer reviewed, but in a fast and accurate way so that the topics are not outdated by the large speed that the information flows nowadays.

Before submission authors should carefully read over the journal’s Author Guidelines, which are located athttp://www .hindawi.com/journals/mpe/guidelines.html. Prospective au- thors should submit an electronic copy of their complete manuscript through the journal Manuscript Tracking Sy- stem athttp://mts.hindawi.com/according to the following timetable:

Manuscript Due July 1, 2009 First Round of Reviews October 1, 2009 Publication Date January 1, 2010

Lead Guest Editor

Antonio F. Bertachini A. Prado,Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais (INPE), São José dos Campos, 12227-010 São Paulo, Brazil;[email protected]

Guest Editors

Maria Cecilia Zanardi,São Paulo State University (UNESP), Guaratinguetá, 12516-410 São Paulo, Brazil;

[email protected]

Tadashi Yokoyama,Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP), Rio Claro, 13506-900 São Paulo, Brazil;

[email protected]

Silvia Maria Giuliatti Winter,São Paulo State University (UNESP), Guaratinguetá, 12516-410 São Paulo, Brazil;

[email protected]

Hindawi Publishing Corporation http://www.hindawi.com

参照

関連したドキュメント

This follows directly from [3], on using inequality (3.7). Let be any constant in the range 2.. AFUWAPE, A.U., On the Convergence of Solutions of Certain Fourth-order Different-

[5] D.A.Romano: On construction of maximal coequality relation and its applica- tions; In: Proceedings of 8th international conference on Logic and Computers Sciences ”LIRA ’97”,

For the call , which gives the holder the right to buy the underlying stock , it is possible to use straightforward asymptotic analysis (Alobaidi [3] and Wilmott [8]) to find a

In this paper we discuss a method to develop treat- ment protocols in chemotherapy basing on results stemming from application of optimal control theory to

We prove a theorem on the existence of an optimal process in the classes of absolutely continuous trajectories of two variables and measurable controls with values in a fixed compact

Optimal control problems for PDEs are most completely studied for the case in which the control functions occur either on the right-hand sides of the state equations, or the boundary

We present the optimal grouping method as a model reduction approach for a priori compression in the form of a method for calculating an appropriate reconstruction layer profile for

In this paper we consider an optimal control problem for a system of parabolic partial differential equations (PDEs) modelling the competition between an invasive and a native