立命館学術成果リポジトリ

Abstract

This article discusses the changing relationship between the military and civil society in Indonesia s Reformasi period. It argues that Indonesian national armed forces (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI) has employed different approaches in dealing with civil society groups. We identify three approaches that reflect TNI views on democratization and military reform, i.e. conflictual, moderation, and cooperation. On the one hand, the military has problematic interactions with NGOs working on human rights and security sector reform issues. These organisations were heavily criticized due to their public advocacy and media campaign, and linkages with international donors. Nonetheless, within this camp, there are particular groups consist of scholars and researchers who can initiate communication with military establishment, and propose policy recommendations on defence and security affairs. High ranking officers particularly appreciate their salient inputs on the design of military transformation and defence posture. On the other hand, the military seems to have mutualistic relations with illiberal civil society groups, notably those aligning with ultra-nationalist ideology and religion or ethnic-based agenda. Ideological affinity plays a role in influencing these dynamics.

In the Making of Democracy:

The Military and Civil Society in Post-Authoritarian

Indonesia

H

, Muhamad

RITSUMEIKAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS Vol.16, pp.57-78 (2019).

* Researcher at the Centre for Political Studies–Indonesian Institute of Sciences (P2P– LIPI), Indonesia. He holds Ph.D. from Graduate School of International Relations, Ritsumeikan University, Japan. Correspondence: [email protected].

Keywords:

civil society, democratization, civil-military relations, military reform, Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI)

I

This piece attempts to discuss the state of military and civil society interactions in post-authoritarian Indonesia. Understanding the relations of these strategic actors in Indonesian politics is important, both in academic and political senses.

Academic wise, civil-military relations in the country have too often been discussed in elitist way. This has resulted in partial depiction of TNI reform and Indonesian democracy. Inquiries upon power struggle between president and military high-ranking officers are indeed crucial, but it leaves us with wrong impression that little is going on outside the state s formal institutions. Either pressure for reform or support towards TNI from civil society organisations through informal mechanism has been equally instrumental in shaping the course of democratization. In political context, this article also attempts to inquire innovative way to accelerate military reform. Situation in Indonesia has been portrayed as puzzling, though not unusual. TNI has lost most its formal decision-making authority yet it remains to be politically influential. Military elites have managed to halt further reform initiatives that, in return, re-empowered them to retain political status and privileges.

Here, civil society is defined broadly as collective of citizens that outlines certain political and social agenda through public advocacy and media campaign. Among various different types of civil society organizations (CSOs), we focus on those CSOs that concern about the role of the military in the country. Here we classify them into two main camps. The first is human rights and security sector reform NGOs mostly established in the late 1990s. Many of the members are veteran activists and students who staged mass rallies against Suharto in 1997-1998. Secondly, the nationalist and conservative organisations that have been around as early as 1950s, acting as strong supporter of Indonesian military. Their leaders have maintained strong ties with military elites.

forging relations with post–Suharto civil society. On the one hand, the military remains anxious with NGOs working on human rights and security sector reform issues. These groups become target of criticism due to their liberal political aspirations and linkages with international donor organisations. Nevertheless, within this segment, there are particular groups consist of academics and researchers who can maintain good relationship with the military. High level officers listen to their suggestions on military transformation plan and personnel management. On the other hand, the military seems to be open and accommodative upon less critical civil society groups, notably those aligning with right– wing ideology and religion or ethnic–based agenda.

How could we explain these different attitudes? What are the factors that influence TNI to take certain position against issues raised by civil society? Those are questions that will guide our discussion. This piece consists of five interrelated segments. First, we begin with politico– historical background. Second, we examine conceptual discussion on the relationships of military and civil society. In sections three and four, empirical evidence of the interactions is presented and analysed within the context of post-authoritarian political setting. We will conclude our discussion in section five.

B

Latest studies reassert that the military s ties with right-wing and militia groups have been strong throughout Indonesian history. In the event of 1965-66 violence, for instance, mass killings, incarceration, tortures, and rapes against Indonesian Communist Party s members and its sympathizers were a result of joint operation between the military and militia groups (Robinson, 2018; Kammen & McGregor, 2012). This partnership apparently endured throughout Suharto s New Order era. The military kept relations with urban thugs, armed gangs, and right–wing militants, and occasionally deployed them to commit heinous crimes. The victims were usually oppositions, students, and –as predicted- NGO activists.

Democratic wave swept the country abruptly during 1997-1998. Fatal combination of economic crisis and political protests had damaged the legitimacy of Suharto to rule. Resignation of the president was expected to

take place soon. Nevertheless, Suharto and his military supporter attempted to neutralize such pressure through coercion and mass shooting. The protest went uncontrollably once victims fell: four of Trisakti University s students were killed and dozens more injured. Riots erupted across Jakarta and the mobs began to take control of the city. It is widely reported that Let. Gen. Prabowo Subianto, Suharto s son in law, was the mastermind behind this atrocity. In a cut–throat competition against Gen. Wiranto, Commander in Chief of TNI and Minister for Security and Defence, Prabowo sought to tarnish the credentials of his superior and made himself up to the centre of military leadership. Suspicious group of strong–looking men were apparent in the city, provoking masses and bystanders to looting. Department stores, cars showroom, houses –among others- were burned down in numerous places. Fact–finding team established by the government later reported that sexual violence, including rapes, also occurred. The end game, nevertheless, just came days later: President Suharto announced his resignation on 21 May 1998.

Suharto s fall has been marked as the beginning of Reformasi period. Vice President B.J. Habibie was handed the presidential position. He introduced a quite progressive reform agenda, for instances press freedom a n d t h e r e l e a s e o f p o l i t i c a l p r i s o n e r s. C i v i l s o c i e t i e s b e g a n t o institutionalize their public presence as non-governmental organisations (NGOs). This development was accompanied with the massive influx of international donors and think tanks. These foreign organisations provided funding, technical assistance, and training to build up indigenous NGOs managerial capability and advocacy strategy. During this moment, human rights and security sector reform NGOs were established by activists and intellectuals to accommodate their concern upon the future of military in post–authoritarian Indonesia. They came with quite provocative demands: to hold accountable of those who responsible and commit violence against society during Suharto period, notably 1965-66 killings, murders of labour activists and journalists such as Marsinah and Udin, as well as arbitrary violence against certain segment of society, for instances villagers in Kedung Ombo and Moslem group in Tanjung Priok incidents.1） _{To prevent reoccurrence of such atrocities, these NGOs} 1） These are instances of state violence committed by the authoritarian regime of New Order (1966-1998). The events occurred in different times throughout 32-year rule of President Suharto. National Commission on Human Rights has investigated some of the incidents,

straightforwardly urged the post–Suharto government to implement security sector reform. This initiative means the armed forces should be put under scrutiny of civilian authority. Furthermore, they also took quite bold action by proposing immediate human rights tribunal as part of transitional justice reform in the country. These series of actions inevitably produced uneasiness among military elites.

On another hand, the rise of different stream of civil society was also apparent in post–Suharto s Indonesia. The groups have been around for years prior to Reformasi but their political significance and violent tendencies just began to be recognized recently. There are at least two types of organisations. First, ultra–nationalist groups closely affiliated with formal security actors, either military or police. Their members mostly came from urban thugs organised by street leaders. Second, ethnic- and religion–based associations that –in contrast with other social organisations working on similar social cause- pursue their agenda mostly through intimidation and mass rally. Military and police denied any relations with these groups. At minimum, the officials admitted to give them training to protect local community from rampant criminality following the breakdown of public order in some cities, for instances Jakarta during 1998-99. This act apparently had repercussion; they perceived it as social approval upon their existence and expanded their activities into illegal one, such as protection racketeering.

C

F

Present literatures mostly agree that civil society is one of major political actors in democratic transition countries. Civil society in the forms of epistemic community, NGOs, media, social or ethnic-based organisation, student groups, and labour unions, can either support or impede the transition. These groups might have ideological differences and competing interests that influence as well as shape the way they interpret and participate in post–authoritarian power struggle. The fall of authoritarian regime provides opportunity for them to coming out from underground and openly express their political aspirations. Previously, e.g. 1965-66 killings that happened after the abortive coup on 30 September 1965, and submitted the report to the Attorney General. Unfortunately, we have yet seen any meaningful progress.

opposition and dissent did not have freedom to undertake political activities freely. NGOs were working under strong scrutiny of state apparatus. Their advocacy was limited to only developmental and community building issues. Other groups initiated limited programme in education and health sector, for instance providing medical assistance for villages in rural area.

In parallel with this development, the illiberal and conservative groups also began to emerge and promote their perspectives and values. Part of their mission has been somehow intersecting with the status quo elites who attempt to preserve authoritarian system. This is indeed an ironic situation; democratization apparently helps the births of anti-democratic movement.

On the other side, the military shares equally important roles in democratization. They could become either a supporter or spoiler. Lee (2015) argues that facing democratic pressure against authoritarian government the military has been identified to undertake either one of defending or defecting the regime strategy. Course of actions depend on the nature of relationships between the autocrat leader and his/her military. President Suharto in Indonesia, for instance, to great extent had personalized his mode of interaction with the national armed forces. During crisis times, i.e. mass demonstrations, and political and economic crisis threatening the regime s survivability, such behaviour is highly potential derailing his relations with the armed forces. The fall of president could jeopardize the military position after the crisis ends. Therefore, it seems to be logical for armed forces to make a distance with the failing autocrats. Military would have flexibility to adapt with political change rather than dictated by or under control of democratic proponents.

Political transition from authoritarian rule to democracy is hardly a linear journey (Huntington, 1991). Military responses have deep impacts on the way democratization will take place. This does not suggest that military is primary player who hold veto power over future political constellation. There are two scenarios we could identify regarding the military behaviours in post-authoritarian setting: the military as supporter or spoiler of democratization. First, the military could possibly support democratic transition if its institutional and elite interests obtained during authoritarian period are left undisturbed. Otherwise, the military could take stern action against pro–democracy camps and spoil

the transition. Some compromises are possible as long as they do not impose radical transformation on internal military structure and its access to political economy gains.

Our discussion here highlights variation of military relationships with civil society. On one side, we already identify two major types of non– state actors emerging from political dynamics in post-authoritarian country. There are liberal and illiberal groups –or one might say (un)civil society- compete for public legitimacy and pursue different agenda. This does not suggest both are monolithic actors. Internal frictions and differences are possible and indeed apparent during democratic transition. On the other side, we have the military that holds pivotal role in influencing either the success or failure of democratization. The military elites might be anxious handling political change unfolded before their eyes. However, it does not mean they have lost political ground to the emerging anti-status quo power. They could employ supportive or spoiler approaches in responding to democratization. Based on this, we could infer some basic features that guiding the military and civil society relations. The military is likely to resist democratic pressure advocated by liberal NGOs. In contrast, illiberal or (un)civil society interests will have greater opportunity to be appreciated and accommodated by the military. This article will look upon the situation in post–New Order Indonesia using conceptual framework discussed above.

M

NGO

: C

M

A

Since early days of Reformasi, the army establishment has been hostile towards human rights and security sector reform NGOs. Munir Said Thalib, a prominent human rights defender and founder of KontraS (the Commission for the Disappeared and Victims of Violence), was actively exposing the army s abuse of power through his speeches and writings. Media provided open venue for NGOs to voice their democratic aspirations and criticism against the military. Some groups also initiated the publication of reports and books, mostly written by in–house researchers or staffs, on military in democratic setting and security sector reform in general. Indeed, military reform has been crucial element of Reformasi movement –if not the main topic- echoed by the student. The military, nevertheless, was quite outraged by this political development.

Such criticism was perceived as civilian intervention into army s internal affairs. This explains steps taken by the military commander Gen. Wiranto following Suharto s resignation in introducing organisational reform without much public consultation. The proposal was only discussed among handful of military elites and civilian scholars (Said, 2013, pp. 512-516). Under the big theme of New Paradigm (Paradigma Baru), Wiranto laid out some basic tenets underlying the status of military in democratic period. For instances, the TNI would no longer lead (meaning: at the forefront) the course of political dynamics in the country. Instead, they would provide indirect support. On another hand, NGOs had rather radical idea, for instance the military should be completely out of politics and business. Discrepancy between these views was apparently difficult to be reconciled.

Here, we could lay out two central themes of military reform advanced by NGOs in post–Suharto era. First, how to depoliticize the military? Under New Order regime, TNI had become the backbone of Suharto administration. Active personnel were assigned in civilian post in numerous ministries and local administrations. It was common to appoint military generals as provincial governors, for instance. This practice, thus, had blurred the distinction between military and civilian realm, resulting a militarization of public life. New Order s repressive nature was believed to be greatly sustained for more than thirty years by this power arrangement. Military practically dominated civilian life. On top of that, state violence during the same period was also common. Based on reports compiled by former high ranking officer, the military was indeed involved in arbitrary violence, extrajudicial killings, and tortures (Kadi, 2000, pp. 16-18). Against this backdrop, a comprehensive reform agenda was highly on demand so that the military could adapt with democratic norms. What are the norms underlying democracy? Here, NGOs proposed security sector reform (SSR) framework to provide the public and government with information on the supposed position of military under democratic government (Haripin, 2013). Along with that, SSR has also been advocated along with transitional justice campaign. The latter deals with advocacy on the investigation of past human rights violations committed by state security apparatus. Associations of victims and families were working together with relevant civil society organisations to raise public awareness and seek support for their struggle. Furthermore, NGOs also held public

discussion, published books and reports, as well as staged mass rally, along with direct communication with state actors, to expose the military wrongdoing.

NGOs had been exceptionally critical of the military operation in Aceh province. This most western province of Indonesia witnessed a prolonged conflict between Indonesian military and rebel fighters of the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM). Conflict initially erupted in 1970s but soon dismissed by strong force from Jakarta. Nevertheless, the fall of Suharto in 1998 and referendum of East Timor in 1999 prompted the Acehnese people to declare independence against the government of Indonesia. Due to high escalation of violence between the belligerent parties, martial law was eventually implemented in Aceh. Major influx of army personnel from Java and other regions showed up in the province, further marginalizing the locals who had deep antipathy towards them. Indiscriminate killings against civilians were commonplace. Numbers of casualties reached thousands and many others flee their homes to neighbouring province, notably North Sumatera. The military stated that they only killed the rebels or combatants. Reports from media outlet and civil society organisations, nevertheless, revealed the contrary. NGOs criticized the military s excessive use of violence as the culprit of major civilian casualties. Public campaign and mass rallies demanding the end of military law in Aceh and urging Megawati administration to pursue dialogue approach instead of coercive measures against GAM, were held in Jakarta and other major cities in the archipelago.

Coincidentally, the conflict in Aceh occurred in parallel with legal drafting of several regulations on security sector, notably Laws on State Defence (Pertahanan Negara), TNI (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, National Armed Forces), State Intelligence (Intelijen Negara), and State Secrecy (Rahasia Negara). Of particular importance is the debate among multiple parties, including civil society organisations, on Drafts on State Defence and TNI. These laws were regarded as consequential. For the first time in post–authoritarian period, Defence Minister Mahfud MD under Abdurrahman Wahid presidency (1999-2001), then Chief Justice of Constitutional Court, invited researchers, professionals, and member of NGOs –collectively organised as Working Group on Security Sector Reform- to involve in the drafting of laws on State Defence and TNI (Sukma, 2013, pp. 155-156). This group was initially established under the

coordination of Propatria Institute, a NGO working on various topics such as democratization and SSR. There were high hopes that TNI would e v e n t u a l l y b e r e g u l a t e d u n d e r d e m o c r a t i c p r i n c i p l e s, n o t a b l y accountability and transparency upon military operation, deployment, budget, as well as personnel management. Sense of urgency to locate armed forces under civilian control accelerated throughout this period. Nevertheless, dual development of conflict in Aceh and debate on State Defence and TNI Drafts have detrimental effect on civic pursuit of military reform. From the outset, President Megawati showed tacit support for military manoeuvre in Aceh. Megawati did not want to alienate the military from its core business: war against separatist/ rebellion groups. Consensus that internal military affairs should not be interfered by civilian administration seems to be in place. Otherwise, TNI would resist reform initiatives or, in worst–case scenario, disrupt and take over civilian leadership. In this regard, the military had no equal contender that could balance its political and security influences on Aceh issue. The Coordinating Minister of Political, Legal, and Security Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, a retired TNI s Chief of Territorial Affairs, preferred non–violence approach in dealing with GAM but he apparently held little influence in the cabinet.

Another episode that illustrates problematic relationships between Indonesian military and human rights NGOs occurred in 2006. Head of TNI s Strategic Intelligence Agency (Badan Intelijen Strategis, BAIS TNI) was reported to issue a statement that NGOs working on human rights issues and sector reform in Indonesia, i.e. Imparsial, KontraS, and Elsam, were among radical groups (kelompok radikal). These organisations were argued to disseminate foreign values that were incompatible with national culture and ideology, Pancasila. The statement coming from military intelligence institution surely hard to be overlooked. Its impact on the accused is equally significant as well. Being evaluated as radical group, individuals and organisations could become subject of investigation and be categorized as an enemy of the state. Realizing the political fallout resulting from such accusation, members of NGOs then filed a lawsuit, demanding public clarification and financial compensation from BAIS TNI. They stressed that the military should focus on external threats rather than domestic one.

opposition and critical groups in the country. During authoritarian New Order, the government was arbitrarily categorizing student activists and certain religion groups as radical and extremist. Common peasants and villagers who refused to give up their land for the government s developmental project were often becoming victim of such smear campaign. Following the end of New Order, suspicions against civil society have become greater than before. Political circumstances have been relatively constructive for national as well as local NGOs to establish relations with foreign organisations. Considerable funding for building and strengthening democracy projects in Indonesia had been available and distributed throughout multiple channels. This development, in the eyes of military establishment, was a worrying trend. It has threatened the sovereignty of the country. Local and national actors that obtained foreign assistances were called with derogatory remarks, for example the lackeys of foreign interests (antek asing). In this context, judicial approach taken by the NGOs was basically a political challenge against the military: whether domestic-oriented threats assessment could be justified under democratic political setting. The end result is quite predictable. After five years of legal process, the Supreme Court decided that BAIS TNI did nothing wrong. In other words, it is justified for the military to assess political orientations of social organisations and its potential damaging effects.

Second, it is interesting to see that despite growing public antagonism toward the army, there are civilian groups interested in the development of military hardware. Thirty-two–year rule of New Order had left the armed forces with outdated and obsolete weaponries. As a result, Indonesia has yet obtained proper defence capability that could protect the country from foreign infringements on national territory. The problem is argued to be equally apparent in army, navy, and air force. It seems that Suharto administration had minor interests in modernizing the Indonesian military. This issue has been pursued by small segment of academia and activists who hold interests in technicality aspects of the military. It is argued that military reform should also include the modernization of all branches of armed forces. In proper democracies, the role of military is adjusted so that the personnel could conduct their functions professionally, and their actions could be monitored in transparent and accountable way.

Most of these experts have similar academic background, either Political Science (International Relations) or Law. They hold position as senior lecturer or researcher in universities and research institutes, namely Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI), University of Indonesia (UI), and Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Meanwhile, some of them are activists, journalists, and enthusiasts of military studies. Initially, Propatria Institute was holding crucial role in coordinating this epistemic community (Sukma, 2013, pp. 151-154). Series of public seminar and focus group discussion were held in Jakarta, Bogor and other cities. Without discounting the importance of investigation upon military s past abuses, they offered policy advice and recommendation on military governance in post–authoritarian setting. Given Indonesia s vast ocean territory, the armed forces should be arranged differently. Land-based defence, as prevalently today, is already obsolete. Moreover, the cost to sustain such arrangement has been relatively high as well, burdening the already limited national budget. At some extent, they attempted to propose the abolition of territorial command (komando teritorial or koter), the army s vertical structure from provincial to rural level, to solve such problem, but unfortunately without success.2） _{The acquisition of modern} defence hardware has also been promoted to help TNI catching up with the latest technological advancement. Most of Indonesian weaponries are no longer reliable –lack of combat readiness. One of the plausible solutions, they argued, is to discard the old unreliable military equipment. This disposal management could be applied to most of armed forces armament acquired twenty to thirty years ago. Its deterrence level has been lagging behind much latest technology. Furthermore, it could harm personnel on duty as well.

How has the military dealt with this group of civilian experts? In early days of Reformasi, several high-ranking officers, notably Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Agus Widjojo, maintained good relationship with 2） Komando teritorial (koter) is the army s vertically organized structure, arranged as follows: military area command at provincial level (komando daerah militer or kodam); military regency command (komando resor militer or korem); military district command (komando

distrik militer or kodim); and military sub-district command (komando rayon militer or koramil). It begins as pocket of resistance against the colonial forces during revolutionary

war in the late 1940s. The structure then apparently evolved as income-generating and political repression machines. Territorial command remains intact despite strong criticism from pro-democracy and anti-status quo groups in Reformasi era.

students, academics, and journalists. Either Yudhoyono or Widjojo had b e e n i n v i t e d t o s p e a k a b o u t m i l i t a r y s i n t e r n a l t h i n k i n g o n democratization and political change in various public forums. Meanwhile, civilian experts were also given opportunity to share their research projects in education institution under military and police establishments. Some of them even became regular instructor for particular subjects, for instances strategic studies, defence management, and foreign policy. Mutual recognition between the two sides appeared to grow both on institutional and personal level. Nevertheless, it does mean that TNI was fully open and willing to seriously consider policy recommendations formulated by civilian experts. In this sort of moderation approach, the military selected particular reform agenda that suits its own interests. Advocacy on defence procurement and soldier welfare, e.g. higher salary and better working condition, get appreciation: the government should be responsible to fulfil such needs, otherwise national security is at risk. Meanwhile, much tougher issues, i.e. the abolition of army s territorial command and military business activities, such as holding concession r i g h t s a n d p r o v i d i n g s e c u r i t y s e r v i c e i n m i n i n g, l o g g i n g, a n d transportation sectors, are met with strong resistance. Those are considered sensitive topics.

In sum, we have seen the dynamics of military and NGOs relation in post–authoritarian Indonesia. In contrast with previous authoritarian period, civil society groups now having more say in policy deliberation. Liberal political climate provides perfect venue for diverging opinions collide and being discussed among members of community. In the post-Suharto era, the introduction of a new political law by President Habibie – which allowed political parties and mass organisations to nurture their own ideologies- had granted Indonesian NGOs the political freedom much needed to facilitate the democratic transition (Hadiwinata, 2003, p. 96). Nevertheless, through our discussion above, such flexibility seems to be operational in limited scope. The case of military relations with human rights and security sector reform NGOs can be our counterpoint. Reform initiative can be disseminated publicly, nevertheless there is no assurance that the target institution will take action. Occasionally the military rests on traditional approach of intimidation to undermine reform pressure. On the other side, TNI will be relatively open and accommodative on technical and managerial affairs that have little political significance.

M

U

S

: B

A

?

The fall of Suharto did not change the mutualistic nature of military and militia relationship. The latter remains to be a fierce supporter of army establishment. Why is that? This article offers ideological affinity as an important factor that explains the partnership. Furthermore, it also explains the military s dual approach in anticipating the development of civil society during post–authoritarian period. The absence of ideological baseline between TNI and human rights NGOs is, therefore, a salient element that explains the conflictual nature of their relationship. Before proceed to discussion, we need to clarify the classification of the nationalist and conservatives. As mentioned previously, it would be wrong to assume those groups are sharing identical background and interests. Some of them are inclined toward the (distorted version of) Pancasila, the Indonesia s national ideology, while others prefer to choose Islamic identity.3） _{There are groups with direct link with military establishment.} Meanwhile, others prefer to conceal their relationship. Despite this difference, they are falling into same category of militia due to their course of action that often times involving violence and discrimination. One study defines them as uncivil society (Beittinger-Lee, 2009, p. 159).

The beginning of mutual relationship between military and militia groups today could be traced back to early years of Reformasi. Political clash between state apparatus and student groups were escalating uncontrollably during 1998-99. Security and Defence Minister and Commander in Chief of ABRI Gen. Wiranto issued a decision to recruit 40,000 personnel of tenaga keamanan rakyat (kamra), people s security force, to support military and police anticipating student demonstration in Jakarta (Bertrand, 2004, p. 336). Protests mounted as the 1999 General Election –the first election in democratic period- was being prepared by Habibie administration. Meanwhile, students questioned the legitimacy of Habibie administration and its unwillingness to hold Suharto and his

3） Pancasila is the national ideology of Indonesia. It calls for believe in the one and only God, civilized humanity, national unity, deliberative democracy, and social justice. Pancasila has always been a contested political discourse. In its conservative form, the ideology is being exploited by right-wing youth groups affiliated with the military to suppress the opposition and liberal civil society.

family accountable. These militias were armed and trained by one of the army s prestigious divisions, Strategic Reserve Command (Komando Cadangan Strategis TNI Angkatan Darat, Kostrad). They were mostly men from 18 to 45 years old. Due to public pressure, kamra was eventually dissolved by the government. Police force was urged to take initiative and decisive policy in restoring public order in Jakarta and elsewhere. Nevertheless, the forming elements of people s security force continued to exist. One of them is Islam Defender Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI) led by charismatic leader Rizieq Shihab.

FPI has been consistently under the spotlight due to their activities in recent years. Members of this organisation attacked restaurant and café opened during the daylight in Ramadan, a holy month in Islamic calendar. Moreover, their act of violence has also been demonstrated against harmless minority groups. Unfortunate events of FPI members intimidated and assaulted the minority Ahmadiyya occurred several times, such as in West Java, Banten, and West Sumatera (Pearson, 2011). FPI continues to expand their political influence and followers throughout the country. Recent event of the 212 Movement (Gerakan 212) in December 2016 demonstrated the extent of organisation s capability in shaping public discourse and playing mass politics. It is a protest against the incumbent Governor of Jakarta Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (or Ahok), a Chinese descent and Christian, whose opinion on particular verse in Koran sparked controversy. The 212 Movement generated supporters in Jakarta, Bogor, Bekasi, and other places to organize a mass demand for imposing blasphemy charge to Ahok. Rizieq Shihab, among others, has played crucial role in this process as unifier of different Islamic–based organisations.

The emerging movement of Islamist groups was apparently accompanied with military s partial return to politics. Joko Widodo administration had tried its best to relegate the cause of 212 Movement as the police already arrested Ahok –as fiercely requested by the supporters of 212. Nevertheless, TNI Commander Gen. Gatot Nurmantyo instead perceived the movement as public exercise of freedom. Gatot then made such a symbolic move that could easily interpreted as token of appreciation for the movement; during the 2 December 2016 rally where Jakarta s main streets were filled with thousands of Moslems from all around the capital, he wore a white fez that matched with the outfits had

by most of 212 participants. President Joko Widodo and several high officials accompanying him in 212 parade, including Coordinating Minister of Political, Legal, and Security Gen. (Ret.) Wiranto and Vice President Jusuf Kalla, had black fez –that could be associated with more traditionalist Islamic stream in Indonesia -showing a stark contrast with the crowds. What we learn from that moment is Nurmantyo seemed to nurture his relationships with the 212 proponents and occasionally echoed their critiques toward Joko Widodo administration. For instance, Gatot shared with them a concern over the so-called the rise of communism (kebangkitan komunisme) in the country. Gatot even made it compulsory for army structure all over archipelago to organize the screening of anti-communist movie on 30 September every year –the date refers to tragic episode in Indonesian history when members of Presidential Guard Force sympathizing with communist movement killed several army high ranking officers in Jakarta. Whereas, the government deemed such order unnecessary. Instead, Joko Widodo stated that the public should be encouraged to learn the event from as many sources as possible.

The relationship of Gatot and 212 movement-related groups persisted even after his tour of duty as TNI Commander ended in December 2017. He has been supported by many ulama (Islamic scholars) associated with the movement to compete in the upcoming 2019 Presidential Election (Rikang, 2018, pp. 36-37). was considered to have excellent qualification and statesmanship. On the other side, there were also suggestions to nominate him as running mate for Prabowo Subianto, a former commander of Army s Special Forces who lost from Joko Widodo in the 2014 Presidential Election. Gatot s ascending popularity among Islamist groups, however, did not translate well into his electability prospects. According to surveys of some polling agencies, Gatot fell behind under other famous figures already known by the public, notably the incumbent President Joko Widodo and the chief leader of Gerindra (Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya, Great Indonesia Movement party) Prabowo Subianto (Purnomo, 2018, pp. 38-39). He made attempts to boost his popularity – and obtained supports from Islamic–based volunteers groups, but he failed to attract political parties, for instance Gerindra and Democrat (Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono s party), nominating him in the upcoming presidential election. This case illustrated the relationship between the military and conservative social groups in recent times; the former utilized

network sustained by Islamist in advancing its political interests. We have witnessed how political dynamics unfolded following the rise of 212 Movement created momentum for military actor, notably Gatot Nurmantyo, to pursue his political career.

Turning our eyes to non-Islamic social groups, it is important to note what happened in East Timor in late 1990s as it illustrates the mode of relationship between TNI and militia groups. Robinson (2002) argues that TNI played a pivotal role in providing arms and logistics for pro– integration militias following the 1999 referendum. Some of the recipients were infamous violent groups such as Mahidi, Aitarak, and Barisan Merah Putih (BMP). Violence and intimidation against local populations and foreign citizens, either working as observers, the United Nations staffs or journalists, inflicted by militias had been part of massive campaign to undermine pro–independence movements. Despite massive deployment of army personnel, which were coming various units, e.g. Special Forces Command (Komando Pasukan Khusus, K opassus) and K ostrad, Indonesian government and particularly the military central command under Gen. Wiranto were ostensibly unable to prevent the atrocities in East Timor. Furthermore, leaders of militia groups admitted that they obtained reinforcement from Indonesian military (Robinson, 2002, p. 256). Strikingly, Indonesian officials confirmed that military supplied weaponry to militia groups. This invites suspicion that Jakarta was involved and had let situation deteriorated rapidly in East Timor.

Despite strong pressure of democratization in security sector, the Indonesian military has maintained its role in domestic security at large. Army personnel remain to be deployed for territorial duty. Territorial management (pembinaan teritorial or koter) allows the local command to provide training and class session for non–military personnel. The objective seems to be normatively acceptable. Indonesia has been for years holding on total warfare or all people s defence and security doctrine (pertahanan keamanan rakyat semesta or hankamrata) that obliges the civilian population to actively involve in defending the country against foreign enemies. Thus, non–combatants should be prepared to confront national threats. Nonetheless, this is the same doctrine that, according to Cribb (2002, p. 235), underlying massive violence committed by Indonesian in East Timor during early years of occupation (1975-1980). Combined with sub-culture of impunity (Cribb, 2002, p. 238), the

doctrine has empowered the Indonesian military to conduct domestic operation without public consultation whatsoever. Hankamrata doctrine in normative sense asserts the mutualistic nature of military and ordinary people in their struggle defending the archipelago from foreign threats and domestic instability. However, this brainchild of Gen. A.H. Nasution – considered to be one of great names in the history of Indonesian military- is apparently having rather troubling trait. Rather than a strategy of the direct engagement of the mass of the population in military struggles alongside the armed forces, it was a political claim by the army to act in the name of the people and to draw on all the resources of the people as it saw fit (Cribb, 2002, p. 237).

The doctrine evolves as security landscape and political situation dramatically change following the beginning of democratic transition in late 1990s. Post–New Order administrations initiate bela negara (defend the state) agenda to be coordinated by Ministry of Defence. The objective for this programme is to prepare the reserve forces (komponen cadangan or komcad) as required by all people s defence and security doctrine. The notion of reserve forces itself, however, has been criticized by advocates on human rights and security sector reform NGOs (Tim Imparsial, 2008). It is considered as a cover–up for military conscription policy (wajib militer or wamil) that has little relevance in democratizing Indonesia. Bela negara is basically a civic education programme designed to train civilian from various walks of life about national ideology of Pancasila and to understand their roles in crisis times. Given the all–inclusive characteristics of the training, members of conservative groups and militias are among those who get the opportunity to become participant.

Among youth organisations that regularly dispatch their members to join bela negara training are Pemuda Pancasila, Pemuda Panca Marga, and FKPPI. Leaders of these groups emphasized the importance of civic education for general public so that misconception about it could be avoided. These groups have gained reputations as militant paramilitary that have direct link with the army. Most of the organisations elite members have relatives working in military institutions, nevertheless the field soldiers are among the under privileged who join street gangs.

Another instance could be seen in FPI. Members of FPI were given training by the personnel from military district command in Lebak, Banten (Kodim 06/03 Lebak, Banten). Responding to public outrage, the

military headquarter conveyed their regrets upon this incident. Defence Minister Ryamizard Ryacudu, a former army chief, and Commander in C h i e f o f T N I G e n . G a t o t N u r m a n t y o, h o w e v e r, s t a t e d t h a t t h e participation of FPI s members were justified. Both of them agreed that the only problem is the lack of coordination from military district command to higher command at the provincial level. Therefore, serious violation is considered to be non-existent and in principle the military should welcome members of conservative organization to participate in the bela negara training.

We have discussed the development of military relations with illiberal/uncivil society. Both parties gain advantages from one another. This troubling situation resonates with democratic regression in Indonesia lately. The failure of armed forces to take distance from paramilitary groups does tell something about the dim prospect of military reform acceleration in Indonesia.

C

The presence of civil society, a voluntary self–organized group of citizens, has been regarded as fundamental feature of democracy. People should have the rights and opportunity to assemble and form association without state intervention whatsoever. Furthermore, they should also be able to articulate their opinions and criticism through independent channels, non–state–sanctioned platform. Regulation, let alone national constitution, must protect such individual and collective rights from state infringement and intimidation or obstruction from other non–state groups. This freedom of assembly and expression is what makes democracy supposedly functions.

Indonesian experience has partially demonstrated the triumphalism of democracy. NGOs at national and local levels flourished astonishingly. They are coming from various backgrounds and different platforms. For instances, women and children rights have been represented by particular groups working on social development; meanwhile environmental issues are being studied extensively by green movement-based in university and research centre. Prominently, this article discusses two different types of civil society organisations and their relations with the military. They are human rights and security sector reform NGOs, and nationalist–

conservative groups. Both have showed distinct course of relations with TNI. Ideological affinity seems to play a role in influencing such dynamics.

Human rights and security sector reform NGOs have been promoting and advocating military reform since early days of Reformasi. Prominent figure, such as Munir Said Thalib, was at the forefront exposing military wrongdoing in the past and proposed reform agenda that should be undertaken by TNI. Security sector reform, a conceptual tool that provides sort of general guidance and best practices on how to conduct military reform –based on experiences in Eastern Europe and Latin American countries, brought to the table and being presented before military establishment to open communication channel between NGOs and TNI. Series of discussion were held, for instances those arranged by the Propatria Institute, and involved not only academia and activists but also uniformed personnel from different branch of armed forces. They occasionally agreed on particular issues, notably the need for the military to move away from practical and formal politics. Nevertheless, the military elites were wary of sudden transformation brought by democratization and its impact on military realm. Top officers, such as former military commander Gen. Wiranto, and political leaders, namely Presidents Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-2014, two–period in office) and Joko Widodo (2014-present), have declined on numerous occasions to dissolve territorial command structure across the archipelago. Vague promises have also become standard response for vital question on investigation of past human rights violations. We have mentioned the case of three NGOs being accused as radical groups and unpatriotic by the TNI s strategic intelligence unit. It illustrates the problematic nature of the relationship between NGOs and the military throughout two decades of Reformasi.

On another side, nationalist and conservative groups seem to have better relationship with military. TNI trained and deployed 40,000 civilian militias in Jakarta to restrict the movement of student protests in 1998-99. More recently, the local army command opened an opportunity for members of radical organisation to participate in civic education and training (bela negara). Defence minister and national military commander reasserted their commitment to provide such training to all citizens inclusively, regardless their political and social affiliations with radical or vigilante groups. This is a worrying trend for democracy in Indonesia.

applies dual –and diverging- approaches in establishing relations with civil society. What could be seen as key determinant that influences such mode of communication? We argue that ideological affinity holds pivotal role. Liberal values and democratic principles advocated by human rights and security sector reform NGOs are in detrimental position with the military s corporate interests. Formal and legal resolution of past human rights violation and the abolition of territorial commands are yet to be on TNI s working plan. Meanwhile, nationalistic stance of conservative groups, either based on national ideology or certain politicized religious values, has been resonating with the military identity. Both share deep criticism on democratization and political liberalization in the post–New Order Indonesia as well.

A

The author would like to thank Professor Jun Honna, Adhi Priamarizki, and all participants of 20 Years after Reformasi: Reflecting Indonesia s Military Reform workshop held at the Centre for Political Studies– Indonesian Institute of Sciences (P2P–LIPI), Jakarta, on 2 November 2018.

B

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