ThePossibilityofReligion inafro…scientificSociety The血nd‑bodyproblemchallenged byneuroscienceandrepliedbyreligion
KoichiMiyata
1.Myprivateconcernaboutthistheme.
Myuniversity,SokaUniversity,wasfoundedbyanewBuddhistmove‑
mentorganizationinJapan,SokaGakkai.Iteachcontemporaryphilosophy andphilosophyofreligionthere.Oneofthemostexcitingissuesincontem‑
poraryphilosophyis"neurophilosophy"{namedbyPatriciaChurchland}.
Thisphilosophyisinfluencedbyneuroscienceandinsistsakindofreductive physicalismthathumanmentalactivitiesarereducibletobrainactivities.
Thisargumentchallengesadualisticviewofhumanbeingintraditionalphi‑
losophyandreligion.InJapan,TakeshiYoroalsoinsists"brainism",akind ofneurophilosophy,buthisargumentisnotsoextremeasneurophilosophyin theUSA.Headmitssomeroleofreligion.ButneurophilosophersintheUSA areextremistsandtheycallthetraditionaldualisticview"folkpsychology"
andlookforwardtodaysinthefuturewhenneurophilosophyreplacesfolk psychology.WhenIteachneurophilosophyatmyuniversity,manystudents becomeperplexedabouthowtothinkabouttheirownmindorconsciousness, andeventuallyrejectneurophilosophy.Thingsarethesameatanothercollege forscientificdiscipline.Thestudentsadmitthatmentalphenomenahavetheir
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placeinbrainactivities,butwouldnotliketothinkthatmentalactivitiesare nothingbutphysicalactivitiesinthebrain.
Inmỳphilosophyofreligion'class,Isometimesaskmystudentshow theythinkaboutworldviewinsomeBuddhistscriptures,forexample,about therelationshipbetweentheweatherandfaith.Morethanhalfstudentsthink that,iftheworidviewcontradictsscientificworldviewacceptedbymanypeo‑
ple,theydon'tsticktothereligiousworldview.Butsomestudentsstillsup‑
portthereligiousworldviewbecauseitisinsistedinhistoricalreligiousdocu‑
ments.Myteachinghasthreecomponents.Firstly,IteachthatifBuddhaor Nichirenwereborninthemoderndays,theywouldteachBuddhismindiffer‑‑
entwaybecausetheywouldbewiseenoughtounderstandimportanceand limitsofscience.Secondly,IteachthatthefounderofSokaGakkai, TsunesaburoMakiguchithoughtthatBuddhismshouldbecompatiblewith science,sohelaunchedanewreligiousmovementwithrationalinterpreta‑
bonsaboutBuddhism.Thirdly,Yteachthatreligionshouldchangetobe
adaptabletopresentculturalsocietyorelseitwillextinct.Someofthestu‑
dentswhosupportedthereligiousworldviewbegintorethinkandchange theirminds.
Althoughneurosciencegivesusvaluableinformationaboutbrainmecha‑
nismsthatgenerateourmentalactivities,neurophilosophythatisinfluenced byneurosciencedoesnotgiveusahappyviewofmentalactivities(atleast formystudents).Inowseekanotherkindofphilosophythatisbasedonneu‑
roscienceandyetgivesusamoresoundviewofmentalactivitiesthatallows ustoholdmuchoftraditional̀folkpsychology'.4ntheotherhand,although Irecommendmystudentstoreceiveamoreliberalviewofreligionthatis compatiblewithscience,Iwondertowhatextentreligioncanacceptneuro‑
science.FortunatelyIcanfindrecentCatholictheologicaltrendthatseeks newtheologycompatiblewithneuroscience.Inmypresentation,Iwouldlike
toshowyousomefeaturesaboutit.
2.Neurophilosophersandtheirarguments
2‑1Neurophilosophers
"Neurophilosophers"meansakindofphilosopherwhoisinfluencedby
neuroscienceandsupportsreductivephysicalismthathumanmentalactivities arenothingmorethanphysicalactivitiesinthebrain.Itincludesphilosophers attheUniversityofCaliforniaatSanDiegoornearthere;forexample,
PatriciaChurchland(Neurophilosophy1.98b,7'heComputationalBrain 1994},PaulChurchland{MatterandConsciousness1993,TheEngineof
Reason,theSeatoftheSoul1996},DanielDennett(ConsciousnessExplained 1991)andotherneuroscientistswhoarguesimilarphilosophicalissues;for example,FrancisCrick(TheAstonishingHypothesis:TheScientificSearch foraSoul1994}.AntonioDamasio(Descartes'Error1994,TheFeelingof
WhatHappens2000)andRamachandran{PhantoynintheBrain1998}are alsomembersoftheirgroupbuthavedifferentopinion.
2‑2FrancisCrick'sargumentinTheAstonishingHypothesis(Nobel Laureate)
HequotesfromtheRomanCatholiccatechism,"Whatisthesoul?The soulisalivingbeingwithoutabody,havingreasonandfreewill."{Crick, p.3)Thisisatraditionaldualisticviewofmindandbody.Againstthisview Crickproposeshisastonishinghypothesis,arguing,"AstonishingHypothesis isthat̀you',yourjoysandyoursorrows,yourmemoriesandyourambitions, yoursenseofpersonalidentityandfreewill,areinfactnomorethanthe behaviorofavastassemblyofnervecellsandtheirassociatedmolecules...
You'renothingbutapackofneurons."(ibid}Thisisaphysicalisticmonistic
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viewofthemindandbody.Heinsiststhatreductivephysicalismistrue,say‑
ing,'"Thescientificbeliefisthatourminds,thebehaviorofourbrain,canbe explainedbytheinteractionsofnervecellsandthemoleculesassociatedwith them"(ibid,p.7)Crickdefendsreductionism,saying,"Whydoesthe
AstonishingHypothesisseemsosurprising?...Thefirstisthatmanypeople arereluctanttoacceptwhatisoftencalledthèreductionistapproach'that acomplexsystemcanbeexplainedbythebehaviorofitspartsandtheir
interactionswitheachother...Afterall,reductionismisthemaintheoretical methodthathasdriventhedevelopmentofphysics,chemistry,andmolecular biology....Generalphilosophicalargumentsagainstreductionismwillnot do."(ibid,P.7‑P.9)
Wecanfindakindofreductivephysicalism.Butwecanalsofindthatthis opinionis̀methodologicalreductionism'.Thisreductionismisaresearch strategyofanalyzingthethingtobestudiedintoitsparts.Crickalsobelieves iǹcausalreductionism',theviewthatthebehaviorofthepartsofasystemis determinativeofthebehaviorofallhigher‑levelentities.Healsoadmitsa dynamicinteractiveprocessofbothlevels,saying,"Reductionismisnotthe rigidprocessofexplainingonefixedsetofideasintermsofanotherfixedset ofideasatalowerlevel,butadynamicinteractiveprocessthatmodifiesthe conceptsatbothlevelsasknowledgedevelops."(ibid,p.8)AfterallCrick cannotproveyetthat‑causalreductionismorreductivephysicalismistrue.
Wealsoadmitthatmethodologicalreductionismisimportantresearchstrate‑
gy.But.itdoesnotentailthatreductivephysicalismistrue.
2・3Someneuroscien面candarti血cialintemgenceachievementsdescribed
inPaulChurchland,sTheEngineげtheReason,theSeat{〜 プtheSoul.
Inhisinformativebook,Churchlandemphasizestheimportanceofaneural networkmodelcomputerinsteadofaserialcomputerwithaninherentpro一
gram.Hethinksanimalandhumancognitionshavetheirbaseinthebrain
activities,especiallyinneurons'synapticconnections.Heusesmanyexam‑
Alesoftheachievementsoftheneuralnetworkcomputers.
Aneuralnetworkcomputer,Cottrell'sface‑recognizingnetwork,canrec‑
ognizehumanfacialpicturesfromnon‑facialpictures.Italsocandiscrimi‑
natemalefacesfromfemalefaces.Itcangeneratecategorieswithoutapro‑
gram.(P.Churchland1995,pp.45‑50)Aminorvariantoftheface‑recogniz‑
ingnetwork,EMPATH,canalsorecognizefamiliaremotionalstatesinthe face.Forexample,astonishment,delight,anger.(ibid,pp.125‑127)
Anotherneuralnetworkcomputercanalsofunctionsasanacousticdetec‑
tivedeviceforsubmarinesonartodiscriminateexplosivemineechoesfrom rockechoes.Itgeneratesthepartitionintotwoexclusivecategories:mine
echoesandrockechoes.Also,itgeneratesthetwoprototypicalhotspots wheretypicalanduncompromisedexamplesofeachcategoryareroutinely coded.{ibid,pp.79‑83}
Moreover,aneuralnetwork,NETtalk,canreadEnglishtextscoherently withoutaprogramthatcontainsacomplexsetofrules.NETtalkhasnocom‑
prehensionofthecontent;ithasnogaspofwordmeaning.NETtaikmanages todothejobofacomplexsetofexplicitpronunciationrules,whichneeded severalman‑yearsintheformationofDECtalk(aserialcomputerwithapro‑
gramofrules),withasinglepassthroughafewhundredneuronskittogether byapatternofconnectionweights.Itgeneratesacategoricaldivisioninto consonantsandvowels.(ibid,pp.84‑91)
Elmannet,oneofthesimplestpossibleformsofrecurrentnetworkscan abstractgrammaticalcategoriessuchasnoun,verb,anddirectobjectfrom variousEnglishsentences.Itgeneratesvariousgrammaticallyrelevantcate‑
gories.Itincludesthe.three‑waydistinctionbetweenverbsthatmustbefol‑
lowedbyadirectobject,verbsthatcannotbesofollowed,andthosefor
C6)
whichanobjectisoptional.Andnounsaredividedintoanimatesandinani‑
mates.Theformerissubdividedintoanimalsandhumans,andthelatterinto food,breakable,andothers.Thenetworkcandiscriminatewhetherornota complexsentencewithrelativeclausesiscorrect.(ibid,pp.137‑143}
Churchlandthinksthattheseachievementsofneuralnetworkcomputers revealhowanimalandhumanbrainswork.Ourbraindoesnotworkwithser‑
ialcomputationsandaprogramofrules.Hesays,"Inhumans,andinanimals generally,itisnowmodestlyplainthatthebasicunitofcognitionistheacti‑
vationvector.Itisnowfairlyclearthatthebasicunitofcomputationisthe vector‑to‑vectortransformation.Anditisnowevidentthatthebasicunitof memoryisthesynapticweightconfiguration.Noneofthesethingshaveany‑
thingessentialtodowithsentencesorpropositions,orwithinferentialrela‑
tionsbetweenthem.Ourtraditionallanguage‑centeredconceptionofcogni‑
tionisnowconfrontedwithaverydifferentbrain‑centeredconception,one thatassignslanguagenofundamentalroleatall."(ibid,pp.322‑323)
Healsoarguesagainstouractivitiesconcerningconsciousness,saying,
"Youcametothisbookassumingthatthebasicunitsofhumancognitionare
statessuchasthoughts,beliefs,perceptions,desires,andpreferences.That assumptionisnaturalenough:itisbuiltintothevocabularyofeverynatural language....Theseassumptionsarecentralelementsinourstandardconcep‑
tionofhumancognitiveactivity,aconceptionoftencalled̀folkpsychology' toacknowledgeitasthecommonpropertyoffolksgenerally.Theiruniver‑
salitynotwithstanding,thesebedrockassumptionsareprobablymistaken."
(ibid,p.322)Heinsiststhatalthoughweassumewethinkandbelievesome‑
thingmeaningful,ourbraindoesnotusemeaningfullanguage.Thereforethe braindoesnotthink,itonlyworkswithoutcomprehension.Thismeansthat ourmentalactivitiesdonotcorrectlyreflectourbrain'sactivities.
HereI,aswellasmystudents,havetowonderwhyourbraingeneratesour
consciousness;whyourbraindoesnotworkwithoutourconsciousness;what wearedoingreallywhilethinking;whetherornotourconsciousnessis unnecessaryforourbrain.
AlthoughChurchlandinsiststhatourbraingeneratesourconsciousness andthatourassumptionsaboutmentalactivitiesarenotcorrect,hedoesnot replytothesenaivequestions.Furthermore,inhisbook,MatteYand
Consciousness,Churchlandsays,"Ourcommon‑sensepsychologicalframe‑
workisafalseandradicallymisleadingconceptionofthecausesofhuman behaviorandthenatureofcognitiveactivity....Folkpsychologyisnotan
incompleterepresentationofourinnernatures;itisanoutrightmisrepresenta‑
lionofourinternalstatesandactivities....Accordingly,wemustexpectthat theolderframeworkwillsimplybeeliminated,ratherthanbereduced,bya maturedneuroscience."(P.Churchland1988,p.43)Sohearguesfor̀elimi‑
nativereductionism'.ButIwonderifIamalwaysmisguidedwheneverI think.ThisidearemindsmeofDescartes'maligndemonswhodeceiveme
wheneverIthink.Descartessecuredthementalentitybuthefailedtoexplain whatthementalentitywas.Churchlandinsiststhatconsciousnesscanbe reducedtoaphysicalentity,thebrain,butIthinkhefailstoexplainwhycon‑
sciousnessexistsratherthandoesnotexist.
2‑4Ramachandran'sneuroscientificargumentontheselfinPhantom intheBrain
Ramachandranshowsbraindamagecasesthatcausedpatientsvariousdis‑
ordersinthemselves.Hesays,"Philosophershavearguedforcenturiesthatif thereisanyonethingaboutourexistencethatiscompletelybeyondquestion,
itisthesimplefactthat̀1'existasasinglehumanbeingwhoenduresin spaceandtime.Buteventhisbasicaxiomaticfoundationofhumanexistence iscalledintoquestionbythesepatients."(Ramachandran,p.173)
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2‑4‑1Thedifferentfunctionsbetweenleftandrighthemispheres
Atfirst,heshowsthatboththeleftandrighthemispherescanhavetheir owndifferent"wills".Hestates,"Awoman'slefthandwouldflyuptoher throatandtrytostrangleher.Sheoftenhadtouseherrighthandtowrestle theIefthandundercontrol....KurtGoldsteinthoughtthatthiswomen'sright hemisphere(whichcontrolledherlefthand)seemedtohavesomelatentsui‑‑
cidetendencies.Initiallytheseurgesmayhavebeenheldincheckbybrakes inhibitorymessagessentacrossthecorpuscallosumfromthemoreratio‑
nallefthemisphere.Butifshehadsuffereddamagetothecorpuscallosumas theresultofstroke,thatinhibitionwouldberemoved.Therightsideofher brainanditsmurderouslefthandwerenowfreetoattempttostrangleher....
Infact,shehadsufferedamassivestrokeinhercorpuscallosum."(ibid,pp.
12‑13}
2‑4‑2Thephantomlimbanditsbrainmechanism
Ramachandranbecamefamousforhisstudiesonphantomlimbs.The phantomlimbwasknowntoDescartes,whouseditasevidencethatour knowledgeaboutourownbodywasuncertain.AfterLordNelsonlosthis rightarm,heexperiencedphantomlimbpain.Hethoughtthathisphantom painwasdirectevidencefortheexistenceofthesoul.Becauseanarmcould existafteritwasremoved,thewholepersonwouldbeabletosurviveafter physicalannihilationofthebody.(ibid,pp.22‑23}
AphantomIimbisacommonphenomenon,butscientistsdon'tknowits
physicalcauseoritstreatment.Ramachandranwasthefirstneuroscientist thatdiscoveredarelationshipbetweenaphantomlimbandbrainmechanism.
Wehavearepresentationofthebodysurfaceonthesurfaceofthebrain.Itis calledPenfield'ssomatosensoryhomunculus,ormap.Butthemapisnot entirelycontinuous,unlikehumanbody.Forexample,onthemapthefaceis
notneartheneck,butisbelowthehand.Sothehandisbetweentheshoulder andthefaceonthemap.
Ramachandranthoughtthatinaphantomlimbpatient'sbrain,otherbody
partswouldusethesomatosensorynervesthatcorrespondedtothelostlimb.
Whenhetouchedapatient'scheek,thepatientbegantofeelhischeek touchedandalsohisphantomfingertouched.Hefoundthatonthemapthere weretwoareas,faceandupperarm,whichco皿espondedtoaphantomhand.
Heshowedthataphantomlimbisnotanillusionofapatient,buthasits physicalcauseinthebrain.ApatientsaidtoRamachandran,̀IMyphantom handsometimesitcheslikecrazy,andIneverknowwhattodoaboutit.But nowIknowexactlywheretoscratch."{ibid,p.38)
2‑4‑3Phantomlimbpainorparalysisanditsrelationtovisualsystem Next,Ramachandrantriestoexplainandcurephantomlimbpain.There wasapatientwhocouldmovehisphantomhand.Withhisphantomhandhe couldfeelgrippingacupplacedtwofeetaway.WhenRamachandran
wrenchedtherealcupfromphantomfingers,thepatientyelled,"ouch!"The fingerswereillusionary,butthepainwasreal.(ibid,p.43)Ramachandran begantothinkabouttheroleofvisioninsustainingthephantomlimbexperi‑
ence.
Whenanactuallimbisparalyzed,thebrainsendsitsusualcommands
"movethatarm" .Thecommandismonitoredbytheparietallobe,butitdoes notreceivethepropervisualfeedback,Thevisualsystemrealizes,"Thearm isnotmoving".Eventually,thebrainlearnsthatthearmdoesnotmove,anda kindof"learnedparalysis"isstampedontothebrain'scircuitry.Afterthe amputationofaparalyzed,painfullimb,thepatientexperiencesavividphan‑
tomofthislimb.(ibid,pp.45‑4b)Learningbythevisualsystemcauseda phantomlimbparalysis.Rarnachandrandevisedamirrorboxwhereapatient
{lo)
couldseehisphantomarmmoving.Thiswasactuallyamirrorimageofhis
goodarm.Ifapatientsendsmotorcommandstobotharmstomakemi皿or symmetricmovements,hecanseehisphantomarmmovingaswellashis goodarm.Hisbrainreceivesconfirmingvisualfeedbackthathisphantom armismovingcorrectlyinresponsetohiscommand.Thepatientsaid,"My leftarmispluggedinagain."(ibid,p.47}Fourweekslater,hisphantomarm wasgoneandhispainvanished.Itwasthefirstexampleinmedicalhistoryof asuccessfulamputationofaphantomlimb.(ibid,p.49)
2‑4‑4Blindsight,abehaviorwithoutconsciousawareness
Ramachandranalsotriestoexplaintherelationshipseeinganddoingby analyzing"blindsight".Therewasapatientwhobecameblindbybraindam‑
age,butshecouldidentifyobjectsfromhearingandtouching.Surprisingly, shecouldalsotakealetterfromhisdoctorandmoveittowardtheslotofa postbox,eventhoughshecouldnottellhimwhetheritwasverticalorhori‑
zontal.Shecarriedoutthisbehaviorwithoutanyconsciousawareness.(lbld, pp.63‑65)Itseemedasthoughinsidehertherewereanotherbeing(azom‑
bie)whomovedherbodywhileshewasunaware.
Humanbeingshavetwodifferentvisualpathwaysinthebrain.Theolder pathwaygoesfromtheeyestraightdowntothesuperiorcolliculusinthe
brainstem,andfromthereiteventuallygetstohighercorticalarea,particu‑
larlytheparietallobes.Thenewerpathwaytravelsfromtheeyetothelateral geniculatenucleus,whichisarelaystationenroutetotheprimaryvisualcor‑
tex.Thepathwayfromtheprimaryvisualcortexleadstoboththe"how"
pathway(thedorsalpathway)intheparietallobeandthe"what"pathway {theventralpathway)inthetemporallobe.
Theolderpathwayhasbeenpreservedasasortofearlywarningsystemfor
"orientingbehavior"
,aprimitivereflex.Damagetothenewerpathwayleads
toblindnessintheconventionalsense.(ibid,p.73)Ramachandransupposes thattheblindsightpatientcanusetheolderpathwaytocarryoutherbehavior withouttheconsciousawarenessthatrequiresthenewerpathway.
2‑4‑5CharlesBonnetsyndrome,vividanduncontrollablehallucinations.
Therelationshipbetweenimaginationandsensation.
Next,heshowsCharlesBonnetsyndromethatcausesvividanduncontrol‑
lablehallucinations.Apatientbecameblindinthelowerhalfofhisfieldof vision,andvisualhallucinationsfilledthescotoma.Inavisuallynormalper‑
sonablindspotis"filledin"byirrevocableperceptualcompletion,whilethe patient'sscotomaisfilledinwithillusionaryimages.WiththeCharles Bonnetsyndrome,theimagesarebasedonasortof"conceptualcompletion"
ratherthan"perceptualcompletion";theimagesbeing"filledin"arecoming frommemory(top‑down}.Avisuallynormalpersonhasaninteraction betweentop‑downimaginaryandbottom‑‑upsensorysignalsinperception, andtheformercanbeco皿ectedbythelatter.(ibid,p.111)Ramachandran suggeststhatwearehallucinatingallthetimeandwhatwecallperceptionis arrivedatbysimplydeterminingwhichhallucinationbestconformstothe currentsensoryinput.(ibid,p.112)Butif,ashappenswiththeCharles Bonnetsyndrome,thebraindoesnotreceiveconfirmingvisualstimuli,itis freetosimplymakeupitsownreality.
2‑4‑bDenialsyndromeandthemechanismthatgeneratesanotherself
Next,Ramachandranexaminesanosognosia,thestateof .beingunawareof illness.Apatient,afterastrokethatdamagedtherighthemisphere,waspara‑
lyzedontheleftsideofherbody.Sheseemedblissfullyindifferenttoher predicamentapparentlyunawareofthefact.Notonlywassheunawarebut shealsodeniedthatherlefthandwasparalyzed.Shesaidshecouldclapwith
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bothhands.(Sheactuallymovedherrighthandonly.)Anotherpatientalso hadsomatoparaphrenia,thedenialofownershipofone'sownbodyparts.He notonlydeniedthathisarmwasparalyzedbutassertedthatthearm.lyingin thebednexttohimdidn'tbelongtohim.Hesaid,"it'smybrother'sarm."
(ibid,p.1.31)
WhenRamachandranirrigatedice‑coldwaterintoadenialpatient'sleftear canal,shebegantoadmitthatshehadhadnouseofherleftarmforafew
weeks.Thisaffirmationimpliesthateventhoughshehadbeendenyingher paralysis,thememoriesofherparalyzedlimbhadbeenregisteringsome‑
whereinherbrain,yetaccesstothemhadbeenblocked.Thecoldwateracted asatruthserumthatbroughtherrepressedmemoriesaboutherparalysisto thesurface.Buttwelvehourslater,shedenieditagain.Shedidn'tremember
whatshehadsaid,andrepliedthatshehadsaidthatherarmhadnotbeen paralyzed.Indeed,itwasalmostasifthereweretwoseparateconscious
humanbeingswhoweremutuallyamnesic.(ibid,pp.145‑146)
Ramachandranexplainsthisself‑defensebythedifferentfunctionsofthe lefthemisphereandtherighthemisphere.Thelefthemisphere'sjobistocre‑
ateabeliefsystemormodelandtofoldnewexperiencesintothatbeliefsys‑
tem.Ifconfrontedwithsomenewinformationthatdoesn'tfitthemodel,it reliesonFreudiandefensemechanismstodeny,repress,orconfabulate.The righthemisphere'sstrategyistoplayDevil'sAdvocate,toquestionthestatus quoandlookforglobalinconsistencies.Whenanomalousinformationreach‑
esacertainthreshold,therighthemispheredecidesthatitistimetoforcea completerevisionoftheentiremodelandstartfromscratch.Iftheright hemisphereisdamaged,thelefthemisphereisthengivenfreereintopursue itsdenial,confabulationsandotherstrategies.(ibid,p.136)Adenialpatient cannotrevisehermodelofrealitybecauseherrighthemisphere,withits mechanismsfordetectingdiscrepancies,isoutoforder.Torespondtoincom一
patibleanomalies,creatingmultiplepersonalitiesbalkanizationiseasi‑
ertodealwiththancivilwarforthelefthemisphere.Evennormalpeople havesuchexperiences.(ibid,p.147)
2‑4‑7Capgras'delusionthatduplicatestheself
NextRamachandranexaminesCapgras'delusion.Apatientsaidabouthis parents,"Theylookexactlylikemyparentsbuttheyreallyaren't.Theyare
imposters."(ibid,p.159)Ramachandransuggeststhathisstrangebehavior mighthaveresultedfromadisconnectionbetweenthetwoareasinthebrain
(oneconcernedwithrecognitionandtheotherwithemotions).Thepatient's facerecognitionpathwaywasstillcompletelynormal,buttheconnections betweenthisfaceregionandhisamygdalehadbeenselectivelydamaged.He couldnotexperienceanyemotions,familiaritywhenlookingatparents' faces,sohethoughttheywerenotrealparents.
Thepatientsometimesduplicatedhimself.Whenshownhispicture,he
replied,"ThisisanotherArthur(patient'sname).Helookslikemebutitisn't me."(ibid,p.172)Hemayhaveastrangebeliefthatthereasonhedoesn't
experiencewarmthuponseeingthepicturemustbebecauseheisnotthereal Arthur.HeaskedhismothernottoforsakehimiftherealArthurreturned.
(ibid)
Ramachandransays,"Philosophershavearguedforcenturiesthatifthere isanyonethingaboutourexistencethatiscompletelybeyondquestion,ItiS thesimplefactthat̀1'existasasinglehumanbeingwhoenduresinspace
andtime.Buteventhisbasicaxiomaticfoundationofhumanexistenceis calledintoquestionbyArthur."(ibid,p.173}
2‑4‑8Amoduleforreligiousexperienceinthebrain
NextRamachandranexamineswhetherthehumanbrainhasamodulefor
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religion.Withatranscarnialmagneticstimulator,aCanadianpsychologist, MichaelPersinger,stimulatedpartsofhistemporallobes.Heexperienced Godforthefirsttimeinhislife.Patientswithepilepticseizuresoriginatingin thelefttemporal .lobecanhaveintense,spiritualexperiencesduringthe seizuresandsometimesbecomepreoccupiedwithreligiousandmoralissues
evenduringtheseizure‑freeperiods.Rarnachandranquestions,"lfreligious beliefsaremerelythecombinedresultofwishfulthinkingandalongingfor immortality,howdoyouexplaintheflightofintensereligiousecstasyexperi‑
encedbypatientsortheirclaimthatGodspeaksdirectlytothem?"(ibid,p.
176)Afterexaminingsomepossibleinte叩retations,Ramachandransays,
"Therearecircuitsinthehumanbrainthatareinvolvedwithreligiousexperi ‑
enceandthesebecomehyperactiveinsomeepileptics.Westilldon'tknow whetherthesecircuitsevolvedspeciallyforreligionorwhethertheygenerate otheremotionsthataremerelyconductivetosuchbeliefs."(ibid,p.188)
2‑4‑90urconsciousnessthatmakesustobelieveinourself
Finally,heexaminestheconsciousnessandtheself.Consciousnessarises notfromtheentirebrain,butratherfromcertainspecializedbraincircuits thatcarryoutaparticularstyleofcomputation.Thecircuitrythatembodies thevividsubjectivequalityofconsciousnessresidesmainlyinareasofthe temporallobes(suchastheamygdala,septum,hypothalamus,andinsular cortex}andasingleprojectionzoneinthefrontallobesthecingulate gyrus.(ibid,p.228}
Ramachandranaskswhynaturalselectioncreatednotbrainsthatwork withoutconsciousness,butoneswithconsciousness.Philosopherscallthe vividsubjectivequalityofconsciousness"qualia."Ramachandranexamines thequalia‑ladenperception.First,thequalia‑ladenperceptionisirrevocable byhigherbraincenters.Second,qualia‑ladenperceptionaffordstheluxuryof
choiceorassociatesotherrelatedconceptsorimages.Thesetwofunctional featuresofqualia,irrevocabilityontheinputsideandflexibilityontheoutput
side,makeitpossibletomakedecisions.Buttomakedecisionsonthebasis ofaqualia‑ladenrepresentation,therepresentationneedstoexistlongenough forustoworkwithit.Sothird,qualia‑ladenperceptionhasshort‑termmemo‑
ry.Qualiaisirrevocableinordertoeliminatehesitationandtoconfer.certain‑
tytodecisions.{ibid,p.242)Thereforethequalia‑ladenperceptionisdiffer‑
entfromthinking,believing,andimagination.
Brainswithconsciousness血ghtbeadvantageoustotheanimals,togive themvariousoptionsandtoallowthemmakedecisionstocopewithdifferent
conditions.
Ramachandranstates,"Webelievethattheselfthe"1'insideusactu‑
allyexperiencesthesequalia.Qualiaandselfarereallytwosidesofthesame coin;obviouslytherearenosuchthingsasfree‑floatingqualianotexperi‑
encedbyanyone."(ibid,p.24b)
Thesepatientsshowthatourconsciousnessanditsdisordersarebasedin thebrain.AlthoughRamachandrandiscussesexplicitlyphilosophicalreduc‑
tivephysicalism,hesays,"lnthisrevolutionofbrainscience,wehavegiven uptheoldideathatthereisasoulseparatefromourmindsandbodies.Far frombeingterrifying,thenewideaisveryliberating.Ifyouthinkyouare somethingspecialinthisworld,engaginginaloftyinspectionofthecosmos fromauniquevantagepoint,yourannihilationbecomesunacceptable.Butif
youarereallypartofthegreatcosmicdanceofShiva,ratherthanamere spectator,thenyourinevitabledeathshouldbeseenasajoyousreunionwith natureratherthanasatragedy."(ibid,p.157}Hereheinsiststhatdeathisa reunionwithnature,butIwonderinwhataspectitisreunited.Hesuggests thatadeadbodyreturnstothesoilandbecomesdustandthatnothingelse remains.Healsosays,"AsIwasborninIndiaandraisedintheHindutradi一
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tion,Iwastaughtthattheconceptoftheself,thè1'withinmeisanillusion, aveilcalled̀maya'andIamreallyonewiththecosmos.Ironically,after extensivetraininginWesternmedicineandresearchonneurologicalpatients andvisualillusions,Ihavecometorealizethatthereismuchtruthinthis viewthatthenotionofasingleunifiedself"inhabiting"thebrainmay
indeedbeanillusion."(ibid,p.227}Heseemstoinsistthatthebraincreates bothconsciousnessandtheself,butitisactuallyanillusion.Thissoundslike anargumentforeliminativereductivephysicalism,butinRamachandran,itis harmonizedwithmetaphysicalHindutradition.
3.Aresponsewithinanewtheologicalmovement.in theCatholicChurch.
3‑1AnewtheologicalmovementintheRomanCatholicChurch
AccordingtoNanceyMurphy's"lntroduction"ofIVeuroscienceandthe
person.一 ・∫dε 班 撰cperspectivesondivineaction,PopeJohnPaul2called for"aninterdisciplinarycollaborationofscholarstoseekafruitfulconcord betweenscienceandreligionin1.979.Respondingtothiscall,theVatican Observatory,inItaly,...sponsoredanumberofevents,culminatingina majorinternationalconferenceinSeptember1987.GeorgeCoyne,Director oftheVaticanObservatory,thenproposedaseriesoffiveconferencesforthe decadeof1990sandinvitedtheCenterforTheologyandNaturalSciencesin Californiatobecomeacosponsor....Itbecameapparentthatonetheological
problemwasintegrallyrelatedtomanyofthemorespecifictopics;thisisthe problemofhowtounderstandtheroleofdivineactioninthenaturalworld.
Thus,theproblemofdivineactionbecametheorganizingtheologicaltheme fortheseries,tobeconsideredfromthepointofviewofavarietyofrecent
scientificadvances."(Murphy1999‑1,p.i)
ThistrendcontinuedatFullerTheoiogicaiSeminaryinCalifornia,known foritsconservativeevangelicalism.ItsGraduateSchoolofPsychologyhad severalconferencestodiscusstherelationshipbetweenscienceandfaith.The achievementswerepublishedinWhateverHappenedtotheSoul?in1998.
Thecontributorshadanewcommonopinionaboutthesoul‑bodyproblem.
1Vlurphystatesinthe"Preface"oftheBook,WhateverHappenedtotheSoul?
isanattempttoestablishaperspectiveonhumannaturethatwouldallowfor greaterresonancebetweenscienceandfaith....onecoretheme...isa
monistic,orholistic,viewofhumans.Inordertoavoidconfusionwithreduc‑
tionisticormaterialisticformsofmonism,...wehavechosenthelabel
̀nonreductivephysicalism'torepresentourcommonperspective .Thus,state‑
meatsaboutthephysicalnatureofhumanbeingsmadefromtheperspective ofbiologyorneuroscienceareaboutexactlythesameentityasstatements madeaboutthespiritualnatureofpersonsformthepointofviewoftheology orreligioustraditions.Wewoulddisavowtheopinionthathumanscience speaksaboutaphysicalbeing,whiletheologyandreligionspeakaboutaspir‑
itualessenceorsoul....Wehavewrittenfromtheperspectivethatviewssoul asafunctionalcapacityofacomplexphysicalorganism,ratherthanasepa‑
ratespiritualessencethatsomehowinhabitsabody."(Murphy1998‑1,p.
X111
1citedadualisticopinionfromtheRomanCatholiccatechismintheargu‑
mentonCrick,"Whatisthesoul?Thesoulisalivingbeingwithoutabody, havingreasonandfreewi11."ForalongtimethisisRomanCatholic'sofficial opinionthatneurophilosophersattack,butthecontributorshaveadifferent opinionaboutthemind‑bodyproblem.ThoughIadmiretheirbookWhatever happenedtotheSoul?,Idon'tknowwhatwillhappentotheirsouls.Now let'sconsidertheiropinionwritteninMurphy'spapers.
(ls)
3・2NanceyMurphy,snonreductivephysicalism
3‑2‑1Anaivequestionaboutcausalreductionism{reductivephysicalism) Murphythinksitimportanttorejectreductivephysicalisminordertosave ourordinaryunderstandingofourselves.Shestatesinherpaper
"NonreductivePhysicalism:PhilosophicalIssues"intheabovebook
,"The questionofcausalreductionseemstobethe,onethatmattersforretainingour
traditionalconceptionofpersonhood.First,ifmentaleventscanbereduced tobrainevents,andthebraineventsaregovernedbythelawsofneurology
(andbythelawsofphysics),theninwhatsensecanwesaythathumanshave freewill?...Second,ifmentaleventsaresimplytheproductofneurological causes,thenwhatsensecanwemakeofreasons?...Itseemsutternonsense tosaythatthesejudgmentsaremerelytheresultof̀theblindforcesof nature.'Iffreewillisanillusionandthehighestofhumanintellectualand culturalachievementscanbecountedasthemereoutworkingofthelawsof physics,thisisutterlydevastatingtoourordinaryunderstandingofour‑
selves."(Murphy1998‑3,p.131)
3‑2‑2Nonreductivephysicalism
Inherpaper"Humannature:historical,scientific,andreligiousissues"in thesamebook,Murphystates,"Todayscientistsandphilosopherssuppose
thatthepersonisbutonesubstanceaphysicalbody....Neurosciencehas completedtheDarwinianrevolution....Nearlyallofthehumancapacitiesor facultiesonceattributedtothesoularenowseentobefunctionsofthe
brain."(Murphy1998‑2,p.1)Language,emotion,anddecision‑makingare explainedbythebrainactivity.
Althoughneurophilosophersandneuroscientistsargueforreductivephysi‑
calism,ormaterialism,sherejectsitandarguesfornonreductivephysicalism.
Sheexplainsit,saying,"̀Physicalism'signalsouragreementwiththescien一
tistsandphilosopherswhoholdthatitisnotnecessarytopostulateasecond metaphysicalentity,thesoulormindtoaccountforhumancapacitiesand
distinctiveness.̀Nonreductive'indicatesourrejectionofcontemporaryphilo‑
sophicalviewsthatthepersonis̀nothingbutabody'."(ibid,p.2}Shethinks thatitiscrucialfornonreductivephysicalismto"explainhowwecanclaim thatweareourbodies,yetwithoutdenyingthehighercapacitiesthatwe
thinkofasbeingessentialforourhumanness;rationality,emotion,morality, freewi11,andmostimportant,thecapacitytobeinrelationshipwithGod."
{ibid}
3‑2‑3Thephilosophicaldifferencebetweentypeidentityandtokenidentity Toarguefornonreductivephysicalism,Murphyusesaphilosophical
debateonthemind‑brainidentity,saying,"Animportantdistinctioninphi‑
losophyofmindisthatbetweeǹtypeidentity'and̀tokenidentity.'Token
identityisthethesisthateveryparticularmentaleventorpropertyisidentical with̀some'physicaleventorother;typeidentityisastrongerthesistothe effectthateverytypeofmentaleventisidenticalwithatypeofphysical event.So,forinstance,atypeofsensation,suchaspain,isidenticalwitha particulartypeofneuronfiring.Typeidentityentailsthereducibilityofthe mentaldescriptionstophysicaldescriptions....Thisstrongidentitythesis maybeunobjectionableincasessuchaspainsensations,butitrunsintoprob‑
lemswithhigher‑ordermentalstatessuchasbelievingsomeproposition."
(ibid,p.10)
SheusesDonaldDavidson'sargumentfornonreducibility,saying,"This distinctionbetweentypeandtokenidentitytheoriesmakesitpossible,tostate thedifferencebetweenreductiveandnonreductivematerialismorphysical‑
ism....Becausetherearenotypeidentitiesbetweenthementalandthephys‑
ical{nopsychophysicallaws),thementalcannotbereducedtothephysical.
(20)
DonaldDavidson's"anomalousmonism"isthebest‑knowncurrentversion ofnonreductivephysicalism.Heclaimsthattherearenostrictlawsatthe
mentallevel,.beliefsarerelatedinsteadbyprincipleofrationality.Because therearecausallawsatthephysicallevel,beliefsmustbeonlytokenidenti‑
calwithbrainstates."(ibid,p.11)
3‑2‑4Theemergentpropertyofourconsciousness
Sheexplainsthisdifferencebyusinganargumentfortheemergentproper‑
tyofourconsciousnessinherpaper"Nonreductivephysicalism:philosophi‑
calissues".Sheinsists,"Higherhumancharacteristicssuchasmorality,ratio‑
nality,andtheabilitytoenterintopersonalrelationshipscannotbereducedto evolutionaryadvantage,orgeneticendowment,orneurobiology....These featuresaxeemergentproperties....Recognitionofgeneticfactorsinhuman behaviordoesnotentailgeneticdeterminism."(Murphy1995‑3,p.127)
Thepointisthedeterminism.Itistruethatneuroscientistscanshowthatif acertainpartofthebrainisdamaged,acertainfacultyofhumanmind
becomeslost.Buttheycannotshowthatanactivationofacertainpartofthe braincausesdeterminatelyacertaintypeofknowledge,belief,imagination,
will,orothersthatarementalstatesofhigherlevel.
But,evenifsuchdeterminismispossible,thereisanotherpossibleaccount formentalstate.Murphyexplainsitinacaseoffreewill.Shediscriminates differentviewsoffreewill,saying,"Anincompatibilistviewmaintainsthat freewillisincompatiblewithadeterministviewofthenaturalworld.Acom‑
patibilistviewmaintainsthathumanfreedommeansbeingabletoactasone chooses.Itisrelevantwhetherone'schoicesthemselvescanbeshowntobea
productofpriorcausesofcertainsorts.Theimportantissueiswhetherour choicesaredeterminedbythekindoffactorsthatwebelievetobeoperative, orwhetherweareself‑deceived....Themental‑leveldescription...iscom一
patiblewithcausaldeterminismattheneurobiologicallevel."(ibid,pp.138‐
139)AlthoughMurphybelievesthatphysicaldeterminismisunsuccessful, shewantstokeepmentalpropertyfromphysicalpropertyevenifphysical determinismturnsouttobetrue.
3‑2‑5Anotherargument,thedistinctionbetweenontologicalreductionism (nonreductivephysicalism}andcausalreductionism{reductivephysi‑
caiism}
Sheusesanotherargumentaboutthediffezentreductionisms,saying,
"Causalreductionismistheviewthatthebehaviorofthepartsofasystemis determinativeofthebehaviorofallhigher‑levelentities....Allcausationin thehierarchyis̀bottom‑up.'...Thelawpertainingtohighersciencesinthe hierarchyshouldbereducibletothelawsofphysics....4ne(ontological reductionism)istheviewthatasonegoesupthehierarchyoflevels;nonew kindsofmetaphysical̀ingredients'needtobeaddedtoproducehigher‑level entitiesfromlower.Nòvitalforce'or̀entelechy'mustbeaddedtogetliv‑
ingbeingsfromnonlivingmaterials,noimmaterialmindorsoulisneededto getconsciousness."(ibid,p.129)
Shecharacterizesreductivephysicalism,saying,"(Reductivephysicalism, ormaterialism,addstotheontologicalreductionism}thatonlytheentitiesat thelowestlevelarereallyreal,higher‑levelentitiesmolecules,cells, organismsareonlycompositesofatoms."(ibid}
Shearguesfornonreductivephysicalism,saying,"ltispossibletohold ontologicalreductionismwithoutsubscribingtothisthesis(ofreductive physicalism}.Thus,onemightwanttosaythathigher‑levelentities,suchas humanbeings,arerealasrealastheentitiesthatcomposethemandat
thesametimerejectallsortsofvitalismanddualism....(Nonreductivephys‑
icalismhas)theacceptanceofontologicalreductionism,buttherejectionof
(22)
causalreductionismandreductivematerialism.Itdeniestheexistenceofnon‑
materialentities,themind(orsoul)butdoesnotdenytheexistenceofcon‑
sciousnessorsignificanceofconsciousstatesorothermentalphenomena....
Thehumannervoussystem...istheseatofconsciousnessandalsoofhuman
spiritualorreligiouscapacities.Consciousnessandreligiousawarenessare emergentpropertiesandtheyhavetop‑downcausalinfluenceonthebody."
(ibid,pp.129‑131}
3‑2‑6Sometheologicalargumentsfornonreductivephysicalism
AsMurphyisProfessorofChristianPhilosophyatFullerTheological Seminary,shehastodefendhernonreductivephysicalismfrombothneu‑
rophilosophersandtraditionaldualisttheologicians.Shestates,"Aserious theologicalproblemawaitssolution.Philosophersseedualismasnolonger tenable;theneuroscientistshavecompletedtheDarwinianrevolution,bring‑
ingtheentirehumanbeingunderthepurviewofthenaturalsciences.
ScientistsandphilosophersalikeassociatedualisrriwithChristianity....If theonlyoptionsweredualismorthereductivematerialism,...Christians
wouldfaceamajorintellectualcrisis.Ourclaimisthatthesearenottheonly options;athirdpositionexiststhatisnotonlytheologicallyandbiblically soundbutconsistentwithcurrentphilosophyandscienceaswell."(Murphy
1998‑2,p.24)
Sheenumeratesfourpossibleoptionsaboutthemind‑bodyproblemasfol‑
bows.
"1.Radicaldualism:thesoul(ormind)isseparatablefrombody,andthe personisidentifiedwiththeformer,
2.Holisticdualism:thepersonisacompositeofseparablèparts'butisto beidentifiedwiththewhole,whosenormalfunctioningisasaunity.
3.Nonreductivephysicalism:thepersonisaphysicalorganismwhose
complexfunctioning,bothinsocietyandinrelationtoGod,givesrise tòhigher'humancapacitiessuchasmoralityandspirituality.
4.Eliminative/reductivematerialism:thepersonisaphysicalorganism, whoseemotional,moral,andreligiousexperienceswillallultimately beexplainedbythephysicalsciences.(ibid,pp.24‑25)
Outofthesefouroptions,sheselects3,saying,"While2isconsistentwith muchofChristianteaching,wehavejudgeditworthwhiletoconsiderthe
plausibilityof3,nonreductivephysicalism,inthatitisclearlymorecompati‑
blewithdevelopmentsinscienceandphilosophy."(ibid,p.25)
3‑2‑7Atheologicalargumentagainstdualism
Inanegativeviewtooption1,shepointsoutanewtheologicalmovement inherpaper"Neuroscienceandtheology."{Murphy,1999‑2}Accordingto her,criticalstudiesaboutthechurchhistoryinthemodernperiodhaverecog‑
nizedsignificantdoctrinaldevelopment.Oneimportantaspectofthishas beenrecognizationoftheHellenizationofChristianthoughtthètransla‑
Lion'ofdoctrinesintothethought‑formsandlanguageofGreekculture.This movementledtoquestionsbeingraisedwhetherbody‑souldualismwasin factbiblicalteaching.
ThereissomewhatTessagreementonNewTestamentconceptionsof humannature.MostscholarsnowagreethattheNewTestamentgenerally
supportsaholisticandphysicalistaccount.However,somearguethatitpre‑
supposesdualismsincethereareafewpassagesthatappeartosupportadoc‑
trineof̀theintermediatestate'afterdeath.Christiansareassumedthat betweendeathandthegeneralresurrectiontheysurvivetoawaitjudgment.
ButanotherpassagesaidthatJesusgaveuphisspirit.Thispassagecanmean
thereisnospiritafterdeath.Moreover,adifferentinterpretationoftheinter‑
mediatestateispossible.BecauseGodisnot̀intime',thosewhoarewith
X24)
Godafterdeatharethereforenotintime,either.ThereforeChristiansneed nothaveaspiritafterdeathtoawaitjudgment.(Murphy1999‑2}
3‑3Apossibleargumentagainstnonreductivephysicalism
AgainstMurphy'snonreductivephysicalism,therecanbesomearguments.
Aneurophilosopher,PatriciaChurchland,arguedagainstemergentproperty theoryinherNeurophilosophy.Thereshesummarizedpropertydualism,say‑
ing,"Evenifmindisthebrain,thequalitiesofsubjectiveexperienceare emergentwithrespecttothebrainanditsproperties.Subjectiveexperience, goestheargument,hasacharacterandaqualityuniquelyandirreducibly mental."(PatriciaChurchland,p.323)
Shestartedbyexaminingthemeaningof"emergence".Shesays,"Ithas oftenbeenclaimedthatthebluenessofwaterisapropertythatisemergent relativetothemicrophysicsofH20molecules,onthegroundsthatnoamount ofmicrophysicalinformationcouldallowustopredictortodeducethatliq‑
uidaggregatesofsuchmoleculeswouldhavethepeculiarqualitativecharac‑
terwecall̀blue'.Bluenessmaysystematicallyco‑occurwithaggregatesof H20molecules,...butisemergent....Butthisargumentisnotsufficientto explainemergentproperty.ItisthecomplexpropertyofHBOmoleculesthat provestohaveallofthecausalpowersofblueness.Thismicrophysicalprop‑
ertyaffectshumanobserversinallthesamewaysasdoesblueness.Sothe bluenessofwaterisnotcausallyanemergentproperty."(ibid,pp.325‑32b)
IthinkPatricia'sexampleisnotagoodonefortheargumentagainstemer‑
gentproperty.IfIimaginethatIhearGod'svoice,whatphysicalproperty affectsmeinallthesamewaysasanimaginaryvoice?Ifshefindsoutits causeisinthebrain,whyisthereaphysicalcauseinwatermoleculesinthe caseofsensation,whileoneinthebraininthecaseofimagination?So Patricia'sexampleisflawedintryingtoargueagainstemergentproperty.
4.Mybriefcomments
4‑11srealityaphilosophicalproblem?
AsRamachandranpointsout,Ifeelvividvisualrealityaboutthingsnear me.ButwhenIcallsomethingtomind,Icannotfeelvividreality,evenifI
believeinitsexistence.Vividrealitymaybelongtosensation,nottothink‑
ing,believing,orimagination.Thisisoneusageof"reality",andithasnoth‑
ingtodowiththeproblemofexistence.
However,inphilosophy"reality"hasontologicalmeaningrelatedtodual‑
ism,physicalismandspiritualism.Sotheycansay,"Whatyoufeelvividreal‑
ityaboutdoesnotreallyexist."ButIcannoteasilyunderstandwhatthissen‑
fencemeans.DoesthissentencemeanthatIfeelnothing?Maybenot.
AneuroscientistcanapplythissentencemeaningfullytoaCharlesBonnet patient.Inthiscaseitmeansassuch,"Yousayyounowreallyseearabbiton
thedoctor'slap,butwereallyseenorabbitonhislap.Youmustbehavinga
hallucination."Inthiscaseifthepatientunderstandhissyndrome,hewilltry tousereasoningtodisbelieveinhishallucination.
Inanothercase,aneuroscientistcanusethissentencetoaphantomlimb patient,meaning,"Yousayyoufeelrealpaininyourleftarm,butwecannot
seereallyyourarm.Youmustbehavingadelusion."Butinthiscasethepain feltbythepatientcanbeunendurable,andhemayrequestapainkiller.
Inanothercase,aneuroscientistcanusethissentencetoadenialpatient, meaning,"Yousayyoureallyhearyourhandsclapping,butwereallysee
onlyyourrighthandmoving.Youmustbesufferingself‑deception."Inthis caseitisdifficultforthepatienttoadmithisorherparalysis.Inanycase,the sentencecanhaveameaningfulusageintheaboveconcretesituations.
Inwhatsituationdoesaphilosopherusethissentence?Mainlyheusesitin hisjobofmakingaunifiedworldview.Ifheisareductivephysicalist,hemay
(26}
useit,meaning,"Yousayyoùreally'seeaboxonthetable,butit̀really' consistsofatomsthatbothyouandIcannotseereally.Ifyoucannotunder‑
standthetheoryofatoms,yourunderstandingabouttheboxisnotsufficient orwrong."Inthisusagethesecond"really"hasnothingtodowithseeing, sensation.Itmodifiesaverbphrase"consistof'.However,Iwonderifthere isameaningfuldifferencebetween"consistoff'and"reallyconsistoff'.Ican onlyunderstandthatbyusing"really"thephysicalistemphasizesthesen‑
fence.Ithinkthat"reality"notonlyhasnothingtodowithontologicalargu‑
mentinphilosophybutalsoismisleadingaboutmakingaunifiedworldview.
Makingaworldviewbelongstothinking,whilefeelingrealitybelongstosen‑
sationandhallucination.Itmaybeimpossibleforaphilosophertofeelreality inhisworldviewevenifhecanbelieveinit.Ifhefeelsreality,thenhemay behavinghallucinations.
4‑21semergentpropertyontologicalpropertyorpragmaticproperty?
Thedebatebetweenneurophilosophersandnonreductivephysicaiistsmay beinterestingforsomepersons.However,formanypeopleitmustbediffi‑
cultandboring.Fortheresultofthedebateleadstoallowtodenialor
approvalofreligiousthought.Accordingtoresearch(Anderson .1999),the percentageofpersonswhobelieveinreligiousthoughtsanddenyevolution‑
arytheoryismarginallyhigherthanthatofthosewhohaveacompatible view,andfarhigherthanthatofthosewhobelieveinevolutionarytheoryand denyreligion.Thoughmanypeopleenjoyproductscreatedbyscience,they seemtobeunwillingtoabandonreligiousthoughtsandbehaviors.Thereare manyreasonswhypeoplebelieveinreligionorspiritualthought.Somerea‑
sonsaresocialandothersarecultural.Ramachandransuggeststhattherecan beevolutionaryreasons,physicalmechanismsinthebrain.Comparedwith thesereasons,philosophicalontologicaldebatemaygiveonlyaminorinsight
onhumanthoughtsandbehaviors.Ithinkthatthoughphilosopherstreat
emergentpropertyofconsciousnessasontologicalproperty,ithasitsrootsin pragmaticproperty.Wecannotknowsubtlerelationsbetweenmindandbody (brain),butwethinkthatthebeliefsystemabouttheselforfolkpsychology hasbeenuseful.Incaseofbraindamageandpsychologicaldisorderswe questthescientificresearch,butusuallywegoonwithfolkpsychology.
Manypeoplecannotfindanycriticaldefectinfolkpsychology.Infolkpsy‑
chology,weassumethatwehaveaunifiedselfwithreasonandfreewi11.
Thisassumptionisusefulforsocialbehavior.Webelievethatwecancontrol ourbehaviorbycontrollingourreasonandwill.Sotheemergentproperty theoryhaspragmaticmeaning.However,wecannotfindanyusefulscientific devicethatcontrolsourbehaviorbycontrollingourbrain.Ifsciencecancre‑
atesomebrain‑manipulatingdevicewithwhichwecanmakeourbehavior
better,thenthereductivephysicalismwillgetpragmaticmeaning.Ifithap‑
pens,traditionalfolkpsychologyandreligionmaychangedramatically.If someonefeelsunhappy,sciencecanmakehimorherhappybychanging
his/herbrainstate.ItlooksliketheSFmovie"Matrix".However,Iwonderif peoplewishforsuchdevice.Moreover,wehadarecentdisastrousexample.
InAumShinri‑kyotheleadersinventeddeviceforcontrollingtheirandtheir followers'spiritualminds.Theyusedhallucinatorydrugsfortheirfollowers' initiationstomakethemsensitivetoreligioushallucinations.Theyinvented electricheadgearknownasthePSIperfectsalvationInitiation}thatwas believedtohavethepowertoenhancethespiritualstateandtoimplant Asahara'sthoughtpatternsintothefollowers.Neurophilosopherswantto destroyreligion,butironicallytheirachievementscanbeusedforthepros‑
perityofreligion.
(2g>
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