Beyond Separatist Conflict: Political Economy of
Violence in West Papua
分離独立紛争を超えて：西パプアにおける暴力の政治経済
Summary of Dissertation
Doctoral Program in International Relations Graduate School of International Relations Ritsumeikan University (ニノ ヴィアルタシウィ) (Nino VIARTASIWI)
MAP OF INDONESIA
MAP OF PAPUA REGION
(WEST PAPUA PROVINCE AND PAPUA PROVINCE)
ABSTRACT
This study examines the dynamics of local conflict in West Papua, Indonesia’s eastern most area that covers the western-half of the world’s second largest island, New Guinea. Since its annexation to Indonesia in 1969, the escalation of separatist conflict has attracted the eyes of international community. It is widely understood that, during the three decades of Suharto’s authoritarian rule (1966-1998), people in West Papua suffered from human rights atrocities and local economic exploitation both led by the state—so that the secessionist movement is a direct reflection of the long-term repression that could not be easily forgotten, and that is why the conflict never ends until today. This perception has constructed a strong and powerful interpretation of West Papua’s conflict both domestically and internationally. The idea that West Papua’s conflict should be understood in the context of separatist wish has been mainstreamed, and it has even become ‘hegemonic’ in explaining the nature of the conflict.
However, three decades of Suharto’s dictatorship and the subsequent wave of democratization have brought many changes in West Papua’s local politico-economic landscape, and they have generated many different types of conflicts in the region, which are not necessarily related to separatist issues. For the study of West Papua’s conflict, it is imperative to analyze these emerging conflicts in the region and elucidate the impact on the existing mainstream understanding of the conflict. It is only after Indonesia’s democratization in 1998 that academics are allowed to visit West Papua for political research. However, it is still difficult for ‘non-indigenous’ scholars to research sensitive issues like conflict and violence. Because of this limitation, the study of conflict in West Papua is underdeveloped, and the hegemonic interpretation is still prevailing.
My study—which aims to fill this gap—attempts to ‘deconstruct’ such a mainstream narrative of West Papuan conflict by analyzing and understanding different types of emerging conflicts in West Papua and elucidate the ways in which they are mutually linked. From our observations, it is safe to argue that the mainstream narrative has benefited a lot of people who are involved in the conflict. We conclude that West Papua’s conflict has been sustained not only due to the difficulty in finding the solution, but also due to the reality that predatory elites have taken advantage from the status quo. Conflict and violence are essentially needed by greedy actors who have built an invisible ‘conflict industry’ in West Papua.
要約 本研究は、インドネシアの最東端に位置する西パプアにおける紛争の力学を分析 するものである。1969 年にインドネシアに合併された西パプアは、以後、分離独立 闘争が絶えず、その武力紛争は国際社会の懸念にもなっている。分離主義が根強い 原因として、スハルト大統領時代(1966-98)の強権政治が指摘されてきた。すなわち、 西パプアの住民に対する国家暴力の横行であり、それは大規模で日常的な人権侵害 や地元経済資源の搾取を伴った。この背景があるからこそ、分離独立運動が続いて いると理解されてきた。その理解は、同時に、西パプアで起きている紛争は分離主 義の文脈で捉える視点を強化し、その視点が西パプアの紛争を見る際の「主流」と なり、今や「支配的」になっているともいえる。 しかし、長期のスハルト時代と、その後の民主化の時代を経て、西パプアの政治 経済は大きく変容し、それが新たなタイプの紛争を数多くもたらしている。なかに は分離主義とは無関係の紛争も増えている。このことは、西パプアの紛争研究にと って重要な意味を持つ。新たな紛争の台頭は、上記の「支配的な紛争理解」にどの ようなインパクトを与えるのか。今こそ、多様化する紛争の実態を分析し、それら が相互にどう関係しているのか、そして分離独立紛争にどう影響を与えているのか を明らかにする必要がある。それを行うのが本論文である。 1998 年の民主化以降、西パプア（現在の自治体でいえば西パプア州とパプア州） での政治調査はある程度自由になったものの、「地元民」でない研究者が、紛争や 暴力といったセンシティブな問題を調査することには依然として困難が伴う。その ため、西パプアの紛争研究はまだ発展途上であり、いまだ上記の「支配的な紛争理 解」が根強い。本研究は、そのギャップを埋める貢献をしたい。独立運動の内部対 立構造や、地方選挙政治にみる権力と利権をめぐる紛争、そして土地や伝統や移民 や部族アイデンティティなどの社会問題に係る紛争など、数々のケーススタディを 通じて、多様化する紛争の実態を示し、これまでの「支配的な紛争理解」の脱構築 を試みる。 その作業を通じて明らかにしたことは、紛争に関わる多くのアクターにとって 「支配的な紛争理解」は、実は都合がよく、利をもたらすものであったという政治 力学である。それが今でも存続する背景には、単に紛争解決が困難であるという理 由だけでなく、一部の影響力の大きいローカル・エリートたちが、「分離独立紛争」 というプロジェクトに利益を見出しているからである。略奪的なエリートは、不可 視的ではあるものの、ある種の「紛争産業」を築きあげており、紛争や暴力といっ た事象は、彼らにとって必要なツールとなっている。多様な紛争の実態を考察する ことで、分離独立紛争の相対化が可能になり、紛争利権の力学を浮き彫りにするこ とが出来た。これが本論文の重要性であり、インドネシア政治研究・西パプア紛争 研究における学術的貢献である。
Acknowledgement
Back in 2010, my role model, an Indonesian famous scholar on International Relations, Dr. Dewi Fortuna Anwar shared me her insight that in a lifetime of a scholar, the luxurious period is the PhD time. It is luxurious for the freedom of works and time and the drive of enthusiasm, for after that there will be no more 3-year span for just to research, contemplate and write. A luxurious time to create a great work. I took her view seriously. I departed my academic journey with determination to pour my best efforts and to produce my magnum opus. Looking back, now I think I was just partly right. I have dedicated my best efforts, but I don’t think I have made my magnum opus, far from it. This thesis is not my magnum opus. This is a humble study that I sincerely hope will benefit to the humanity. Humanity does not need a magnum opus. It needs dedicated people, and I’m humbled if I can be one of them.
First of all, I would like to extend my gratitude to my guru, Professor Jun Honna, for his guidance, valuable advice, and encouragement. It takes a great teaching skill to demand perfection while at the same time keeping the motivation alive because most students fall into depression when a yardstick is raised; and Honna Sensei is the best to embolden his students. I have seen myself grow as a junior researcher under his training and for that, I will always be indebted to Honna Sensei. He has been more than just an academic supervisor, and I am honored for his friendship to my family and me. Honna zemi, which we nicknamed as ‘Die Hard Zemi’, is a supportive group with a family-like atmosphere. We grow together through our weekly meeting, listen to each other’s struggle and learn from our members’ achievements (and also failures). Every PhD student needs a support group, and Honna Zemi is the best support group I could ask.
I am also thankful to Professor Naoki Ishihara, my second supervisor, for his support, guidance, and patience. Also for Professor Akihiko Kimijima for his guidance and encouragement in every meeting during my progress report presentations. I would also like to thank all faculty members and administrative staffs of Graduate School of International Relations, Ritsumeikan University.
Conducting research in a conflict area was challenging. Personally, it was more difficult given that I am a woman, a Javanese by ethnicity, an Indonesian by nationality, a practical Muslim, and the fact that I am wearing a hijab, because West Papua is predominantly Christian and rather suspicious with non-Melanesian Indonesian especially the Javanese. However, I am very fortunate that in my 5-year journey, I have met and helped by many people. Most of them I just met in my research, but we have been grown our friendship ever since. First, I deeply
indebted to Ms. Latifah Anum Siregar, a brave woman, Human Rights activist and lawyer from West Papua. She opened doors of many places and put me beside her so that people could trust me. I witnessed her unshakable spirit for standing for the poor, the oppressed, and the weak. I followed her to remote places in her work defending people who have been wronged by the powerful, in court and out court. On my recommendation, kak Anum rightfully received Gwangju Human Rights Awards 2015 from South Korea, and I hope it encourages her to do more for her people. I am proud to call her my friend, and she deserves my big loyalty. I would also like to thank friends from ALDP-Papua who have given me shelter and offered me friendship during the troubled and lonely times of fieldworks.
I am also grateful that I was being mentored by the late Dr. Muridan Widjojo, the leading scholar of West Papua studies, for a short period. I was just a nobody from nowhere when I first knocked on his office door in 2011, introduced myself and asked him to be my mentor in studying West Papua. He granted my request and coached me in the field during my first fieldwork in West Papua, even though the terminal cancer was raged in his body. He taught me by showing me an example of being a researcher who motivated by love to the humanity. Cancer could not deter him from going to the field and listen to the voice of the people. When Dr. Muridan passed away in 2014, West Papuan people mourned him and I was devastated. Indonesia had lost one of her best scholars. Dr. Muridan is irreplaceable, and I will always cherish what he had taught me.
I would like to recognize the contribution of many organizations and institutions such as ALDP Papua (Democratic Alliance for Papua), JDP (the Papuan Peace Network), Rumah Bina-Wamena, Titik Nol Merauke, Yasanto Merauke, Imparsial, Majelis Muslim Papua, STFT Fajar Timur (Sekolah Tinggi Filasafat dan Teologi), Muhammadiyah Papua, NU Papua, Kahmi Papua, ICMI Papua, Roman Catholic Diocese of Agats, and many others for the network and data that would not have been possible to collect without their supports.
I also would like to thank many of resourceful people, to whom I have engaged in fruitful discussions and have been broaden my view: my dearest mbak Poengky Indarti from Indonesian Police Commission; abah Thaha Al Hamid from Papua Presidium Council; Father John Djonga from Rumah Bina Wamena; Dr. Neles Tebay from STFT Fajar Timur; Gen. Tito Karnavian from Indonesian Police; Dr. Bernarda Meteray from Cendrawasih University Jayapura; Dr. Solahudin from ICG-IPAC; Dr. Ngurah Setiawan from Papua University Manokwari; Dr. Toni Wanggai from NU Papua; Bishop Aloysius Murwito from Roman Catholic Diocese of Agats; Prof. Ikrar Nusa Bakti, Prof. Hermawan Sulistyo, Dr. Adriana Elisabeth, and Dr. Cahyo Pamungkas from Indonesian Institute of Sciences; Dr. Rizal Sukma
from CSIS; Dr. Abubakar Eby Hara and Dr. Himawan Bayu Patriadi from Universitas Jember; Katrina Yampi from STIE Timika; Dr. Yulia Sugandi; Dr. Nancy Jouwe from KITLV Netherlands; Dr. Nanang Somantri from the Ministry of Village, Development of Disadvantaged Regions, and Transmigrations; Victor Mambor from Jubi; the late Octovianus Pogau from Suara Papua; Abdel Syah and Jery Omona in Merauke; Yusman Conoras and Dian Wasaraka in Jayapura; Asrida Elisabeth in Wamena; Rizky Amelia in Asmat; Fatmawati in Sorong.
I would also like to acknowledge my friends from my circle of network: Dr. Hatma Suryatmojo, Dr. Agus Trihartono, Dr. Nuki Agya Utama, Professor Ben McLelan, Professor Miquel Esteban, Dr. Roby Permata, Dr. Yulianto Prihatmaji, Dr. Suharman Hamzah, Dr. Titin Fatimah, Dr. Aretha Aprilia, and many more from Sustain Society; Risye Dwiyani, Nurul Rochayati, Endah Riyana, Rizky Fitrasha, Munadian, Niken Prilandita from Binar Indonesia; Una, Geeg, Renmu, Nan, Jord, Wendy, Riza-san, Haja-san, So-san, and Shin-san from the PhD research room; my fellow Honna Zemi members Kudo-senpai, Kwak-san, Haripin-san, Adhy-san, Mono-Adhy-san, Trissia-Adhy-san, and Shigemura-san; Indonesian Students Association Kyoto-Shiga, Indonesian Student Association at Ritsumeikan University, and Pengajian Annisa Shalihah.
I believe that my very fortunate life is because my parents have been guarded me with their endless prays and best wishes. I am eternally deeply grateful for my parents and my parent-in-law for their enormous supports in my life. This achievement is my heartfelt tribute for the Sukarno family and the Prawiro family. I hope I will never dishonor them in every possible way. I am also grateful for having Sugimoto family as my family in Japan. Their sincere acceptance has made our life in Kyoto much more beautiful.
Words fail me to express my gratitude for having the best people in my life. My husband Agus Trihartono and my daughter Azzahrah Philosophia Mandira Trihartono, to whom I will never thank enough. They have endured the ups and downs in my life when my failure made me bitter, and my enthusiasm drove me selfish. They never ceased to encourage me and provide me with the warmest support and the comforting love. Because of their unconditional love and trust, I could reach my dreams and bravely aim for the bigger one.
Lastly, I would like to thank others who were very important to my work, whom I could not mention personally one by one.
I am solely responsible for the content of the thesis. Alhamdulillahirobbil ‘alamiin.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Map of Indonesia i
Map of West Papua [region] ii
Abstract iii
Acknowledgement v
Table of Contents viii
List of Abbreviations ix
Chapter 1 Introduction 1
Background 1
Significance of the Study 4 Research Question 5 Research Methods 6 Chapter Organization 7
Chapter 2 The Politics of History: How West Papua’s Conflict is Originated 11
Chapter 3 West Papua as an Imagined Community: Assessing Its Diversity 13
Chapter 4 The West Papua Conflict: Mapping Different Perceptions 15
Chapter 5 West Papua’s Freedom Fighters 18
Chapter 6 The Local Political Dynamics: Elections, Identity Politics and Violence
20
Chapter 7 Dynamics of Social Cleavages: Tribe, Land, Migration, Adat, and God
23
Chapter 8 Conclusion 27
Contested Histories and a Divided Society 28 Separatism 29 Identity Politics and Culture as the Political Capital 31 Beneficiaries of Conflict 32 Revisiting Development and Security Approach in Peacebuilding 33
Bibliography 35
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ABRI Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (Indonesia armed forces) AFC Act of Free Choice
ALDP Aliansi Demokrasi untuk Papua (Democratic Alliance for Papua) AMP Aliansi Mahasiswa Papua (Papuan students alliance)
AMPTPI Asosiasi Mahasiswa Pegunungan Tengah Papua Se-Indonesia (Association of Papuan Central Highland students across Indonesia) APBD Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah (regional budget and
expenditure)
ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations
BIN Badan Intelejen Negara (national intelligent agency) BKO Bawah Kendali Operasi (police auxiliary forces) Brimob Brigade Mobil (police mobile brigade)
DAP Dewan Adat Papua (Papuan Customary Council) DOB Daerah Otonomi Baru (new autonomous region) DOM Daerah Operasi Militer (military operation area)
DPD Dewan Perwakilan Daerah (Regional Representative Council)
DPRD Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah (Local House of Representatives) DPRP Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Papua (Papuan House of Representatives) DPR RI Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Republik Indonesia (Indonesia National
House of Representatives)
Elsham Papua Lembaga Studi Hak-Hak Asasi Manusia dan Advokasi (the Institute of Human Rights Study and Advocacy)
Foker LSM Forum Kerjasama Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat
FUNDWI Fund of the United Nations for Development of West Irian GIDI Gereja Injili di Indonesia (Evangelical Church of Indonesia) GKIT Gereja Kristen Injili di Tanah Papua
GPK Gerakan Pengacau Keamanan (security agitator movements)
GSMIP Gerakan Solidaritas Masyarakat Indonesia Pendatang (Indonesian settlers’ solidarity movement)
HKJM Himpunan Keluarga Jawa Madura (Association of Javanese and Madurese Families)
HRW Human Rights Watch ICG International Crisis Group
IKT Ikatan Keluarga Toraja (Torajan community) ILWP International Lawyers for West Papua
JDP Jaringan Damai Papua (Papua Peace Network)
KKB Kelompok Kriminal Bersenjata (armed criminal group/ armed civilian group)
KKS Kerukunan Keluarga Sulawesi (Sulawesi community)
KKSK Kerukunan Keluarga Sulawesi Selatan (South Sulawesi Association) KNP Komite Nasional Papua (Papua National Committee)
KNPB Komite Nasional Papua Barat (National Committee of West Papua) KNPI Komite Nasional Pemuda Indonesia (Indonesian National Youth
Committee)
Kodam Komando Daerah Militer (regional military command) KODAP Komando Daerah Pertahanan (regional defense command) Kodim Komando Distrik Militer (district military command)
Komnas HAM Komisi Nasional Hak-Hak Asasi Manusia (Indonesia’s National Committee for Human Rights)
Kopassus Komando Pasukan Khusus (Indonesian Special Forces) Koramil Komando Rayon Militer (Sub-district military command) Korem Komando Resort Militer (resort military command)
Kostrad Komando Strategis Angkatan Darat (army strategic reserve command) KPK Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (Corruption Eradication Commission) KSAD Kepala Staf Angkatan Darat (the chief of army staff)
Lemasa Lembaga Masyarakat Adat Suku Amungme (Amungme Tribal Consultative Council)
LMA Lembaga Masyarakat Adat (Customary Community Institution)
LIPI Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia (Indonesian Institute of Science) MIFEE Merauke Integrated Food and Energy Estate
MPR Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (People’s Consultative Assembly) MRP Majelis Rakyat Papua (Papuan People’s Assembly)
MSG Melanesian Spearheads Group
OPM Organisasi Papua Merdeka (Free Papua Organization)
OSIBA Opleidingschool voor Inheemse Bestuurambtenaren (training school for administrators)
OTK Orang tak dikenal (Unknown person)
Papenal Pasukan Pembebasan Nasional (National Liberation Group) PDP Presidium Dewan Papua (Papuan Presidium Council) PD Partai Demokrat (Democrat Party)
PDIP Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (Indonesia Democratic Party of Struggle)
Pemka Pemulihan Kemananan (Security Restoration) Pepera Penentuan Pendapat Rakyat (referendum) Perda Peraturan Daerah (local law)
Perdasi Peraturan Daerah Istimewa (special local law) Perdasus Peraturan Daerah Khusus (specific local law) Petapa Penjaga Tanah Papua (guardian of Papua land) PIDF Pacific Islands Development Forum
PIF Pacific Islands Forum
PNWP Parlemen Nasional West Papua (West Papua national parliament) PPIB Pelopor Pembangunan Irian Barat (pioneer of West Irian’s development) PVK Papoea Vrijwilligers Korp (Papuan Volunteer Corps)
RPKAD Resimen Para Komando Angkatan Darat (Indonesian Paratroopers) RUSI Republic of the United States of Indonesia (RIS-Republik Indonesia
Serikat)
TNI Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian military/ Indonesian National Armed Forces)
TPNPB/Tepenal/ TPN
Tentara Pembebasan Nasional Papua Barat (West Papua National Liberation Army)
Trikora Tri komando rakyat (three people’s command)
TRWP Tentara Revolusi West Papua (the West Papua Revolutionary Army) ULMWP United Liberation Movement for West Papua
UNHRC United Nations Human Rights Council UNRWI United Nations Representative for West Irian UNTEA United Nations Temporary Executive Authority
UP4B Unit Percepatan Pembangunan Provinsi Papua dan Papua Barat (Unit for the Acceleration of Development in Papua and West Papua)
WNG West Nieuw Guinea
WNPCL West Papua Coalition for Liberation WPNA West Papua National Authority
Yahamak Yayasan Hak Asasi Manusia Anti Kekerasan (institute of human rights and anti violence)
Chapter 1 Introduction
This is a study about the conflict in West Papua. It is the ongoing conflict that Indonesian government is struggling to tame. Indonesian government acknowledges ‘West Papua’ as a name of one province, which is West Papua Province. It is located next to Papua Province. Academic discussions mostly use the term ‘Papua’ in referring to a region consists of these two provinces, namely Papua Province (Provinsi Papua) and West Papua Province (Provinsi Papua Barat). To avoid confusion in calling Papua (as region) and Papua (as a province), most Indonesian writers use the term Tanah Papua (Papua land) to describe the region. This study is exercising the term ‘West Papua’ in referring to a certain geographic area—i.e., western half—of New Guinea Island where current Indonesia’s Papua Province and West Papua Province are located; and where in the past the Dutch colonial government named as West New Guinea. As ‘West Papua’ is also the term that has been chosen by Papuan nationalists to name their motherland, this study wants to honor it. Finally, the West Papua conflict in this study is also referring to Tanah Papua in which people are involved in political disputes, violent clashes, and suffering grave human rights violations.
Background
West Papua became a conflict site ever since Indonesia’s proclamation of independence on August 17, 1945. Indonesia was Netherlands’ colony (named Dutch East Indies) before being occupied by Japanese in 1942, and it proclaimed independence after Japan was defeated in World War II. As the former colonizer of Indonesia, however, the Dutch tried to retain its power over Indonesia. Following a series of negotiations, the Netherlands finally agreed to transfer sovereignty to Indonesia in 1949; however, the status of a region named West New Guinea, or West Irian, was under dispute.
The dispute over West New Guinea was rooted on the status of the region as part of newly established Indonesia. The Dutch kept West Papua and changed its name from West New Guinea to Netherlands Nieuw Guinea in 1951. On August 21, 1956, the Netherlands amended the constitution to incorporate Netherlands Nieuw Guinea into the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Nevertheless, after long international disputes and political process under the
imminent threat of expanding communism in the global context, the Netherlands finally agreed to deliver West Papua to a UN institution, which in turn handed West Papua’s administration to Indonesian government. Indonesia formally entered West Papua on May 1, 1963, as the administrator of the region, with responsibility to conduct a plebiscite in 1969 as a mechanism to find out the political wish of West Papuan people. The plebiscite was finally conducted in 1969, under the supervision of UN Secretariat General’s representative. The result was in favor of Indonesia, and Indonesia eventually gained an acknowledgement of sovereignty over West Papua. Amid the dispute between Indonesia and the Netherlands over West Papua during 1945-1962, however, political condition in West Papua rapidly changed. When Indonesia entered, West Papua was almost ready to claim self-sovereignty. Understandably, Indonesia administration was not openly welcomed by Papuans. Armed and political resistance started right after Indonesia entered the region. Accordingly, due to this historical background, in the eye of the central government of Indonesia, the West Papua conflict has been generally understood as a separatist conflict.
During 1966-1998, Indonesia was ruled by the authoritarian regime of President Soeharto that highlighted political stability through militaristic approach. West Papua was then a region that received oppressive security treatment for three decades. With the end of Soeharto regime and the subsequent start of democratization in 1998, the West Papua struggle also found its new commencement. The end of Soeharto’s dictatorship had a significant impact in West Papua. After a long time of being silenced by the authoritarian state repression, Papuan nationalists were suddenly exposed to the freedom of speech and expression provided by the new environment of democratic Indonesia. The Papuan nationalist conscience revived. Not only demanding greater political rights, the appeal to be separated from Indonesia was also expressed by some local leaders.1 Consequently, separatist indignation toward West Papua was also reactivated.
Post-1998 Indonesian government has been taking more cautious approaches to tame the turmoil in comparison to the previous regime. Adapting the United Nations’ approach of peacebuilding, which was implemented in three sectors of UN works: namely security, development and human rights (Jenkins, 2013), Indonesian government’s policy to West Papua
1 In the post-Soeharto Indonesia, Papuan political movements have taken greater public attentions. Some of the
most acknowledged were: first, a dialog between 100 respected Papuan leaders with President Habibie in Jakarta, February 26, 1999, in which the wish for separation was delivered. The second was the Second Papuan People’s Congress (Kongres Rakyat Papua Ke II) in May-June, 2000. Around 5,000 people from all over the region with 501 delegates attended the Congress. The Congress produced a resolution to demand rectification of the history of West Papua.
started to change. At the national level, the government tried to show its commitment of human rights by providing a legal foundation for the National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM) in 1999. As its peacebuilding efforts in West Papua, Indonesia has adopted ‘development and security’ approaches. The development approach is conducted through granting the Special Autonomy status to West Papua and boosting infrastructure projects in the region. The security approach is executed through keeping the military and police presence in West Papua; though it has been significantly toned down in comparison with the military grip during the authoritarian regime. However, up until 2016, 53 years after Indonesia entered the region, the region has not been pacified yet. West Papua remains to be troubled and it continues being regarded as a secessionist hotspot. The region is still trapped in the cycle of violence and political turbulences. What have gone wrong with the government’s development and security approach in the West Papua?
The conflict in West Papua has concerned not only Indonesia’s general public but also international community at large—including academics, civil-society organizations, foreign governments, and international organizations. The mainstream view in understanding the West Papua problem is that it is a conflict between the separatists and the state. This view has been strengthened by the global media coverage on the enduring human rights violations and local economic exploitations by the state that are regarded as the roots of the separatist conflict. This mainstream (and perhaps hegemonic) view of synchronizing the West Papua conflict and the issue of separatism is promoted mainly by the state and the military that want to defeat separatism. This is understandable. However, such a view—intentionally or not—has a serious effect of ‘devaluing’ other types of conflict that have troubled West Papua’s everyday life. Regardless of separatist problem, West Papua has experienced rapid politico-economic changes in the past three decades and they have created various serious problems and conflicts. Neglecting these conflicts is problematic and it disturbs our scholarly interest of understanding the West Papua conflict more objectively and comprehensively. During the Soeharto period, it was very difficult to do a fieldwork in West Papua, especially if we were dealing with political issues. Now, the access is relatively open, but still it is difficult to conduct a research on sensitive issues like local conflicts. It is against this background that we still do not have enough research findings to effectively challenge the relevance of the hegemonic interpretation of the conflict in West Papua, but I am hoping that my study will be one breakthrough. In this thesis, we attempt to develop arguments that may lead to the ‘de-hegemonization’ of the mainstream (hegemonic) view above. At the same time, we will elucidate how this hegemonic interpretation of the conflict has been constructed not only by the state and the military but also
by various local civilian actors in the age of democracy. In the end, we will see that the hegemonic interpretation is ‘convenient’ and therefore it has become an instrumental for different actors with different interests. It is nothing but this dynamic that have made the view ‘hegemonic’ and ‘sustainable’ until today.
Significance of the Study
The West Papua conflict is one of the biggest and prolonged armed conflicts that Indonesia government has ever faced. West Papua is also a region that has suffered backwardness in comparison with other regions in Indonesia. However, West Papua, especially the conflict in West Papua, has been understudied due to the tight security pressure and its inaccessibility. Scholarly works on the topic of West Papua are mainly anthropological studies of traditional communities, and the majority of these studies date back to the pre-democratization era of Indonesia. On the other hand, previous studies on the West Papua conflict are mostly limited to the case studies of the conflict; for example, studies of Djopari (1993), al Rahab (2006, 2010), Anderson (2015), Araf et al, (2011), Banivanua-Mar (2008), Chauvel (2005, 2008a, 2008b), Chauvel & Bhakti (2004), Elisabeth (2006), Elisabeth et al. (2004), Elmslie (2010), Giay (2006), Giyai (2013), Heidbuchel (2007), King (2002, 2004, 2006), Kirksey (2012), Kirksey & Roemajauw (2002), Kossay (2011, 2012), McGibbon (2004), Osborne (1985), Rutherford (1999, 2003, 2012), Saltford (2008), Singh (2008), and van Den Broek & Szalay (2001). There are some important works made by political observers since the fall of Soeharto, but they are narrowly focusing on particular topics of the time (ALDP, 2002, 2003, 2008, 2011, 2012, 2015; ICG, 2002, 2003, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2010, 2011, 2012; ICP, 2013; ICJT and ELSHAM, 2012; IPAC, 2013a, 2013b). Therefore, they are not so helpful in assessing the comprehensive nature of the West Papua conflict. Clearly, there is a high demand for conducting research that covers wide-ranging problems of West Papua’s conflict in the age of democracy with historical perspectives. To meet the demand, my study aims to fill the gap of the study of West Papua’s conflict in the post-democratization Indonesia.
Second, the study will challenge the main narrative of ‘Papuan versus Indonesian’ dichotomy in understanding the West Papua conflict. Since political and social development in West Papua has been going rapidly in the post-Soeharto era, we can assume that rivalries in West Papua conflicts are more diverse and complicated than merely two parties with clear issues as seen in the dichotomy above. Many researches on the West Papua conflict have
suggested that an independence aspiration is the center of all security disturbances in the region (Osborne, 1985; Rutherford, 1999, 2003, 2012; Saltford 2008; Kirksey, 2012; van Den Broek & Szalay, 2001; King, 2002, 2004, 2006). As most studies on West Papuan conflicts are conducted before democratization of Indonesia, it is important to investigate other motivations and interests associated with conflicts in the contemporary West Papua. This study attempts to reveal actors, motivations, and beneficiaries of conflicts as well as the connections of other conflicts with separatist issue in West Papua. Thus, my study attempts to understand different types of conflicts in West Papua and elucidate the ways in which they are mutually linked.
Third, the study wishes to contribute to the scholarship of peace and conflict studies particularly on the peacebuilding concept. The UN peacebuilding concept is relatively a new one that still needs to be developed and sharpened to be an operational concept targeting various types of conflict (Jenkins, 2013, p.2-5). Studies on peacebuilding today mainly focus on post-conflict states and discuss the efforts of many concerned parties to help a post-conflict state from relapsing into another conflict (such as studies by Zarkov & Hitjens, 2015; Schwarz, 2015; Krause & Jutersonke, 2015; Brown, 2015; Lopes, 2014; Steinert & Grimm, 2014). Conditions in these countries are different from West Papua where the government recognizes the problem as a matter of counter-insurgency and local autonomy in politics and economy. Therefore, the government never invites international initiatives for peacebuilding in the region. However, West Papua’s case provides very unique lessons for us in assessing the nature of local conflicts. Without understanding the nature, there is a danger of any peace-initiative being ‘harm’ for the local community.
Research Questions
The study departs from the macro question of how the mainstream view of separatist conflict has been made, by whom, and how it has been consolidated until today. What are problems and conflicts that West Papua is struggling with? How separatist conflicts relate to other conflicts in West Papua? Are they totally unrelated to the separatism argument, or are they somehow related each other? Through the discussion, we also want to examine some important micro-questions: who are the main actors of West Papuan conflict? Who are the beneficiaries of the conflict? For them, what is the benefit of sustainable conflict in West Papua?
Research Methods
This study is a product of empirical/qualitative research. The method is effective to help finding the answer to the main question of the study, that is to reveal the reason behind phenomena (Flick, 2014). The qualitative research method is also more flexible as it provides space for subjective interpretation of the data, illustrating the complexity of relationship, allowing personal or group recollections, and it is open to variation of occurrences (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011). The so-called phenomenological approach is used in this study. The approach puts emphasis on case studies and takes into account perceptions of individuals and groups in order (Edmonds & Kennedy, 2013), which in this study helps understand the dynamic reality of conflict in West Papua. This study relies on data analysis and pattern identification through case studies. Data were collected through in-depth interviews, forum group discussions, direct conversations and emails correspondences, and field observations. Documents and numerous publications from relevant institutions, news reports, and scholarly articles were also compiled to compare, confirm, control, enhance, and clarify the data. A snowball sampling technique of finding interviewees was employed to find relevant resource persons.
In the span of 4 years of research from 2011 to 2015, interviews with 198 individuals, 14 forum group discussions, and field observations in 9 main districts/cities in West Papua were conducted. In addition, some individuals were interviewed for more than one session. Most of the interviews and forum group discussions were recorded under the consent of the subjects. In the following chapters, however, many individuals were anonymously mentioned for the inevitable reason of security concern and respect to confidentiality. The places of the fieldworks were regarded as the center of political movements and security unrests. These districts (kabupaten) and cities (kota) were: Kabupaten Jayapura, Kota Jayapura, Kabupaten Mimika, Kabupaten Merauke, Kabupaten Jayawijaya, Kabupaten Manokwari, Kabupaten Sorong, Kota Sorong, and Kabupaten Raja Ampat. Field observations to each place were conducted repeatedly. Additional trips to Jakarta, some cities in the Netherlands, and other cities in West Papua were also made as some target interviewees were residing in these respective places. Discussions with academics and researchers working on West Papua issues and conflict studies were also made in order to gain insights on the issues.
Chapter Organization
This study is essentially divided into two parts. The first part consists of Chapter 2, Chapter 3, and Chapter 4, and it is the departure of the study in which the background and foundation of West Papua’s conflict will be presented. The second part consists of Chapter 5, Chapter 6, and Chapter 7. This part is the main body of the study discussing theaters of conflicts in West Papua in which cases studies are employed to examine the reality of the conflict in West Papua. The concluding chapter (Chapter 8) summarizes our findings and highlights their significances. The major aim of each chapter is as follows.
Chapter 2 discusses the discourse of the history of West Papua. The chapter examines the interpretation of history as a root of disagreements over West Papua’s reason for being. History is commonly used as a source of legitimacy and a weapon in political contestations. In West Papuan realm, in accordance with the nature of history as an interpretation of occurrences, different parties have narrated different views and offered different judgments on the history of West Papua. Thus, history became a conflict itself due to the different interpretations and contesting ideas on the dichotomy of ‘West Papuan nationalists versus Indonesian government.’ The chapter will present points of debates in West Papua’s history that are pivoting in two issues. The first is the discourse over the nation of West Papua in relations with Indonesia and the Netherlands. The second is on the debate of the execution of 1969’s plebiscite namely The Act of Free Choice, or Penentuan Pendapat Rakyat. Papuan nationalist arguments will be presented, followed by Indonesian government’s counter arguments. In addition, studies of professional historians are also resumed to provide a balance of judgment of the issue.
Chapter 3 presents the socio-cultural diversity of West Papua. We will see how it has been influenced by recent democratization and local development. The chapter underlines that common assumption of West Papua society, as a relatively homogenous society with clear divisions in conflicts, is not only inaccurate, but also leads to failure in grasping essential problems Papuan people have been dealing with. Chapter 3 illustrates the complexity of the society and how it is connected to all levels of conflicts and troubles that have been going on. We will classify the society into four types to arrange the discussion. The first type is native inhabitants of West Papua and the dynamic of its identity formation. The second type is non-indigenous and mixed-race communities in the region, of which the existence has been unrecognized by most post-Soeharto studies of West Papua. The third type is religious societies. Religious communities have played pivotal role in the identity formation of West Papua. The
fourth type is ethnic societies. We will investigate the development of ethnic identities and the birth of ethnic politics in contemporary West Papua. Throughout the chapter, the study aims to present a clear picture of West Papua society that is crucially important for a comprehensive understanding of the West Papua conflict.
Chapter 4 analyzes discursive constellation of conflict in West Papua. The assessment that West Papua is being in conflict has been widely shared. However, discrepancies prevail on the level of perception of each actor and audience. In turn, different perception of the conflict has led to different analysis, conclusions, and policy recommendations. This chapter will clarify how conflict has been perceived and interpreted by actors and audience of the West Papua conflict. It will also serve as a literature survey of the West Papua conflict. We divide our discussions into four themes: academic discussions of the West Papua conflict, state perception of the West Papua conflict, Papuan elites’ perceptions of the conflict, and the ‘world’ perspectives of West Papua’s problems. First, academic works on the West Papua conflict since 1969 will be examined, and we highlight major conflict discourses employed by major literatures. Second, we will explore the Indonesian government perception of the conflict by investigating official publications and statements of the presidents and relevant governmental bodies. Third, we will discuss Papuan nationalists’ perception of the West Papua conflict based on interviews. Fourth, we will examine the ‘world view’ of West Papuan problems by analyzing publications of international bodies and other countries. Throughout the chapter, my study reveals that the mainstream paradigm in reading the West Papua conflict has long been a conflict between the central government of Indonesia versus people in West Papua, over the issue of human rights violations. The wish to separate is understood as an outcome of the failure to uphold democratic principles in governing the region as well as the consequence of inequality in economic development.
Following the assessment of mainstream paradigm in the conflict discourse of West Papua, we will move onto case studies in Chapters 5-7. How do we explain the sustainable nature of conflict in West Papua? The conflict has been benefiting certain actors; hence, it needs to be sustained. Conflicts have created opportunities for those who have the access to them. This chapter reveals the beneficiaries of West Papua’s conflict. We discuss the rationale to commit violence for those actors who are involved in the conflict projects. For them, violence is necessary both to affirm the importance of their causes and to eventually preserve the conflict. Conflict-ridden West Papua became a market of violence, as violence is a handy weapon to leverage interests. During the turbulence, local elites have consolidated their politico-economic power. The chaotic situation caused by the communal violence has
increased the vulnerability of the local civilian administrations and reduced accountability of the local governance. Such a condition has provided opportunities for certain political actors. We will analyze the dynamics in these chapters.
First, in Chapter 5, we will look at separatism and separatist-related violence in West Papua. As separatism is the main narrative in West Papuan conflict’s academic discussions, separatism has been seen as the core value of political movement in West Papua. I analyze the level of commitment of West Papuan pro-independence activists who launch armed-resistance and political moves in order to send the message to the broaden audience of their wish to secede. The state’s response is also analyzed. Throughout the analysis, we will reveal the rationale of separatism and how it has become the main paradigm in understanding the West Papua conflict for the Indonesian government. Then, actors of separatist-related conflict would be investigated. We will first examine West Papuan pro-independence activists, with main focuses on the development, power dynamics, and the mapping of armed resistance organization, namely Free Papua Organization (OPM: Organisasi Papua Merdeka). The existence of pseudo freedom-fighters known as OPM Binaan (phony OPM) is also discussed in order to understand a complex reality of armed resistance groups in the field. Non-OPM pro-independence political groups, which are not well highlighted by previous studies, are also discussed in this chapter as they have played important role in the making of the mainstream conflict discourse in the past.
Chapter 6 deals with the dynamics of local politics in West Papua. West Papua’s local political contestations have been affected deeply by Indonesia’s democratization since 1998. Power struggle in local politics born ever since the region was no longer governed by appointed bureaucrats from Jakarta. Local elites seized the opportunity to consolidate power in politics as well as in economics. In line with the nature of the heterogeneous community in West Papua, ethnicity became the departure of power consolidation among elites. Ethnic politics develops further into group politics and, along with the exploitation to West Papuan culture, it found its way to be the elites’ political capital. Unique to West Papua, ethnicity and culture have been exploited not only by the indigenous, but also by non-indigenous groups. In the conflict-ridden West Papua, ethnic mobilization with violent tendencies is articulated naturally. In some cases, local politicians cooperate with armed-groups to win the power struggle. It has created enigmatic local dynamics as well as sustained the image of separatist conflict in West Papua since the ‘outside world’ tends to see the actions of separatist groups without fully understand the background. Moreover, ‘democratized’ local political contestation, which is accelerated by direct elections for local leaders, is also escalating disturbances. Thus, our discussion in this
chapter will start from local elites’ power game in elections, followed by the development of ethnic politics to group politics and its contestations in the region. Exploitation of indigenous customary system (known as adat) in struggle for power is also one of the focus in this chapter. Finally, we will see how the everyday local politics has greatly contributed to the violence escalation in the post-1998 West Papua.
Chapter 7 will discuss social cleavages in the West Papua society. West Papua is a multiethnic society intertwined with complicated social stratification. This chapter aims to clarify that West Papua’s turbulence and violence are not always connected to separatism and to reveal that counter-insurgency policies of the government have added more fuel to the societal divisions in West Papua. My study will illustrate that antagonism is strong among communities; however, it is alive only in the collective conscience, and it is fading at the individual level. We will also see how state policies to tame West Papua’s turbulence in fact have enhanced antagonism among communities. Main sources of social tension in West Papua are migration, customary rights acknowledgment, and religious contestations and they will be discussed fully in this Chapter.
Chapter 8 concludes our discussions. Based on the various case studies in previous three chapters, we will then elucidate the unique nature of the political economy of enduring conflict in West Papua. Major findings of this study will be highlighted to answer our main questions.
Chapter 2
The Politics of History: How West Papua’s Conflict is Originated
The chapter discusses the variation of history of West Papua in relations with Indonesia and the Netherlands colonial. The chapter is important because history is also being used as a political instrument, as well as, the reason of a cause in West Papua conflict.
The questions to be examined are: how has history been narrated by each group? How do historians draw their conclusions of the history of Papua? The chapter argues that understanding West Papua’s conflict through understanding its history is also a ‘conflict’ itself due to many different versions of the interpretation of history. In the end, the point of departure of studying the West Papua conflict may rest on which side of the version of history to been taken. This chapter lay all points of the discourse of history of West Papua, that are advocated by both Indonesian government and pro-independence groups, as an attempt to present a fair point of view in presenting the history of West Papua conflict.
The study departed from a perspective that history is never a single story. In a conflict setting, history is contested and debated to gain a dominant narration that could meet the needs of the contesting party. The West Papua’s conflict setting has been pivoting on the historical debates since the beginning. Both parties in the West Papuan conflict have constructed and reconstructed the narration of histories motivated by their political interests respectively. Examining the academic works of historians is important to offer third views in the contestation between West Papua nationalists and Indonesian government.
After examines the narration of history by both West Papuan nationalists and Indonesian government, and also taking into account studies by historians, the study argues that West Papua has long been known as a part of Netherlands East Indies, as the fact was stated in most of historical accounts of scholars and observers. However, the distinction of West Papuans’ racial characteristics in comparison with the majority of Indonesians cannot be denied. Nevertheless, the argument of racial and cultural differences of the Papuans to justify the disconnecting history of the West Papua and Indonesia is also a misleading because Indonesia itself is a multi-racial country. Indonesia is fatefully a nation-state that is consisted of various racial groups and cultures. Moreover, racial homogeneity is not a convincing argument for a nationhood.
Indonesia, has been dominated by the question of validity of Papua as a part of Indonesia. The West Papua issue was officially politicized since the Malino conference and Denpasar conference in 1946, one year after Indonesia proclaimed her independence. Before that, West Papua—which was called West Nieuw Guinea and West Irian—was unchallenged to be seen as a part of Netherlands East Indies. Accordingly, the Indonesian reaction to the Dutch government’s political move to retain West Papua was understandable. However, West Papuan people, as the object of the disputes, were unable to consolidate and formulate their own political wish during the period of the dispute. As the result, power contestations between Netherlands and the Indonesian government left the object of the dispute out from the table. By perceiving the fate of West New Guinea as a bilateral matter between the two countries, the Netherlands and Indonesia consequently undermined the rights of the Papuans to define themselves and decide their fates.
West Papuans was the victim of dominant powers’ contestations in 1960s as the world politics greatly influenced the policies taken to settle the Netherlands-Indonesia dispute. As seen above, the New York Agreement in 1962 was the product of such geopolitical dynamics. The fact that Papuans, even if it was only very thin layer of elites, had taken initial phase of political development was ignored on the stake of the world politics. On the same reason, the dominant world powers turned a blind eye to Indonesia’s chicanery in conducting the Act of Free Choice to ensure its victory. The ‘one man one vote’ practice might not be suitable to be applied in West Papua society at the time of 1969, and the Consultative Assembly scheme was far more efficient as it was similar to the traditional decision-making system used by the Central Highlands’ tribes. However, the way Consultative Assembly members were elected was disputable, since the members were handpicked by the Indonesia government officials in a way that was essentially undemocratic. Moreover, the 100% votes in favor of Indonesia naturally invited further suspicions of the fraudulent practices. Therefore, the Papuan claim of the fraudulent process of the Act of Free Choice was not entirely groundless. The fact that the United Nations stipulated the result of the Act of Free Choice shows that the fate of the Papuans might have been sealed to become a part of Indonesia. From the realist perspective, therefore, the rectification of the history that has been wished by the Papuan nationalists need a stronger grounds and arguments to be able to reach the powerful international audience.
Chapter 3
West Papua as an Imagined Community: Assessing Its Diversity
This chapter discusses architecture of West Papuan society to illustrate a clear image of the society in which tensions and security disturbances are chronically taking place. Throughout the discussions, this chapter provides an overall mapping of current West Papua society and dynamic of West Papua’s inhabitant’s identity formation that is crucial for a comprehensive understanding of the setting of the West Papua conflict.
West Papua is essentially a plural society. Indigenous people versus migrants, as the main paradigm to read the West Papua society, might no longer be valid in the coming future. Intermarriages among ethnic groups become common and racial category becomes blurring in the society. While essentially the society becomes more plural, the pluralism is facing a new challenge due to the changing political dynamics. West Papua society is now leading to a divided society with ethnicity and sectarianism as the boundaries.
Indigenous West Papua society, in addition, has also experienced rapid transformation during the last century. The adaptation to modernity and new civilization in speedy phase has been putting the indigenous Papuans in the difficult position since they have never been settled in a new situation before entering another one. The continuous rapid change has forced indigenous communities to endlessly format and reformat their identity. As the result of the rapid transformation, many elements of the society have been enjoying the benefit of modernization such as education and economic power, but, on the other hand, majority people have been bound to be the sufferer of the excess of modernization for their lack of capacity to compete in a world with different rules of the game. Most indigenous communities regress back to their ethnic and group identity to organize power in facing the new challenge. What comes next is not an organized protective power institution but exploitation of ethnic sentiment as a road to power by local elites.
Identity is seemingly still the most relevant issue in West Papua’s ‘imagined community.’ Religious teachings have been providing new identity to indigenous people. Some communities even fully embrace religion as their new identities and leaving out their vernacular cultures. Most of the communities, however, have managed to adapt religious practices with vernacular traditions. In a society which embraces religions as identity, religious contestations are unavoidable. Contestation of religious identities in West Papua’s vernacular society is seemingly getting into a more serious phase in the coming decades.
Discourses over indigenous vs. migrant and religious identities prevail after the status of Special Autonomy was granted to Papua and West Papua Province in 2001. Ethnicity and religious affiliation have become new sources of legitimacy to gain access to economy, and more importantly, power politics becomes a marker in social-political relations. As identity formation is in process in West Papua, segregation in society is also expanding. Ethnic and sectarian categorization grows to be pertinent, and competition over resources goes into group sentiments. Political opportunities have invited a new test to the religious ethnic communities in the competition to secure resources. How ethnic and religious communities can escape from the trap of ethnic-sectarian politics becomes an important issue to address in West Papua society in the coming future.
Chapter 4
The West Papua Conflict: Mapping Different Perceptions
Perception is the basis of identifying the dynamic of a political phenomenon. Boulding (1956, pp.13-16) suggests that perception is a subjective knowledge of an individual to the world that can generate actions. Thus, different perceptions can also lead to different actions. As a tool of mobilization, political elites tend to articulate political expression based on their perceptions and it influences a collective thought of their supporters. Similarly, Schirch, (2013, p.39) opines that the parable of the ‘four blind people and an Elephant’ precisely depicts how perceptions of conflict can be developed among many observers; different actors can have different perceptions on a same object. Differences in perceptions can also lead to difference in directions for a conflict resolution path. Therefore, in the context of West Papua problems, understanding how different actors and spectators perceive West Papua conflict is important as it also determines the peacebuilding process. So far, the perception that West Papua is in conflict has been widely shared. The conflict perception in West Papua is based on the high statistical number of violent incidents and clashes among groups in the region. However, violence and conflict are connected but not synonymous to each other. Conflict can lead to violence, but violence does not always mean conflict. In comparison with other areas in Indonesia, West Papua is a violent-prone region based on the high number of violent incidents in the area.
The discussion in this Chapter consists of four parts. The first part is the academic discussion on the West Papua conflict. Scholarly discussion is important to be seen as it shapes the direction of major discussions on West Papua turbulence and the base of the stances of other concerned parties on West Papua problems. The second part analyzes the Indonesian government’s perception on the West Papua turmoil. It oversees how the presidents of the Republic of Indonesia have interpreted the West Papua affairs. The study also discusses the Indonesian military’s political stance on West Papua. The particular attention is the military perception as it has enjoyed autonomous political power in the country’s conflict areas for decades since the Soeharto era. The third part discusses the perception of West Papua’s indigenous leaders on problems in West Papua. By exploring opinions of the indigenous leaders, the study attempts to reveal the perception of conflict that is alive in West Papua’s indigenous communities. The last part discusses international perceptions of West Papua affairs. Foreign countries and international institutions’ opinions on West Papua, as well as
attitudes of international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), are examined in this section. Their perceptions on West Papua problems are also influential because the capacity of other countries, regional cooperation, and international non-governmental organizations to put pressure to Indonesia. Historically, self-determination movements and human rights violation closures are materialized after international public giving their pressure and attention to the country in discussion. Such case was also happened in the referendum of East Timor in 1999. Therefore, assessing international perception of West Papua conflict is also crucial.
The study concludes that the mainstream paradigm seems to be one that sees the West Papua problem as the problem between West Papuans and the government at local and national levels (i.e. domestic affairs). The perception of separatist conflict is mostly held by academics and the Indonesian government. It is important to note that, for many of West Papua’s indigenous leaders, separatism is not the immediate problem and concern. Social problems are more important for indigenous leaders and prominent people as the study found in interviews. However, since academic studies and government assessments tend to be the basis of policy recommendations, the perception that West Papua is in conflict with the government due to the enduring separatism is more pronounce than other sources of disturbances. Moreover, as an important actor in the government (i.e. the military) has different agenda concerning West Papua, the perception of West Papua conflict as a conflict that challenges Indonesian sovereignty is sustained. It should be highlighted that separatism does certainly exist in West Papua, but it is not the only color of the West Papua’s disturbances. To some extent, the government is correct in connecting the disturbances with dissatisfaction over development failures, but to link it further with separatism only muddies the water. Central government’s blanket conclusion that frames all disturbances as related to separatism has proven sustaining the separatist myth in West Papua’s political and social dynamics.
Another significant point to note is the perception of the audiences of West Papua’s turbulence. West Papua’s pro-independence activists have confidently claimed that international audience march behind their demand for independence. However, from the statements of organizations that working on the West Papua problem, we found that those organization’s utmost concern is human rights violations in West Papua; while independence wish is being seen as voicing the freedom of choice that essentially democratic. In terms of international relations, independence aspiration has become a sensitive issue being avoided to discuss at diplomatic occasions. Other countries’ governments’ positions are clearly recognized Indonesian sovereignty on West Papua. Thus, it can be concluded that separatism is not the main concern for many stake holders of the West Papua problem. The mainstream
paradigm in reading the West Papua conflict is a conflict between the central government of Indonesia and people in West Papua, over the issue of human rights violation. However, why does the perception of conflict in West Papua has been shadowed by perception of separatist conflict? This perception gap is very important because it is also raised question about who the party who has maintained the perception of separatist conflict in West Papua and what benefit does it get from sustaining the separatist issue as the West Papua conflict? In the next chapter, we will discuss the separatist conflict in West Papua and how it has become the main attention in West Papua problem.
Chapter 5
West Papua’s Freedom Fighters
In Chapter 3, it has been discussed that, in academic discussions, separatism is the main focus in understanding West Papua’s conflict. Separatism is regarded as the core value of political movement in West Papua. Separatism converges the idea of merdeka (independence)—a word that is sacred for indigenous Papuans and serves as a mantra, faith, and ligature for the people. Most West Papuans are on the same opinion with the notion of merdeka as their ideal future, dream, and expectations. Therefore, separatism, according to those studies, is the action to materialize the ideal dream.
The dynamics of West Papua’s freedom movements are still understudied. Studies on West Papuan conflict have mainly focused on the separatist conflict that could cause human rights violations. Studies of Rutherford (2003; 2012; 2015) and Kirksey (2012), for example, focus on the freedom movement in connection with the past and the culture. While studies of King (2002; 2004; 2006), Human Rights Watch (2001; 2001), Franciscan International (2011), Araf et al. (2011) and Tapol (2013) focus on human rights violations against Papuans. Osborne (1995), Djopari (1993), Elisabeth et al. (2004), and ICG (2002; 2010a; 2010b; 2011; 2012) capture the development of armed-resistance groups and actors in conflicts in a specific time span. However, the current development of these groups is still uncovered. This chapter analyzes the most recent independence activism in West Papuan homeland and in international arena. We observe how the pro-independence West Papuans launch armed-resistance and political moves in sending the message to the broad audience on their wish to secede.
It finds that even though the separatist movements both in armed-resistance and political struggle are alive and active, their internal power consolidation is frail and a parent organization that oversees all movements actually do not exist. Even though this is the reality, the threat of separatism is sustainably highlighted by Indonesia’s security sector players.
From the discussion in this Chapter, it is understood that factionalism is still the main feature of West Papua’s resistance movement. This factionalism could be found both in armed-resistance groups and political groups. It goes further to group rivalry as every armed-resistance group pursues its own agenda and goal for its struggle. Every group wishes to be acknowledged as the first representation of West Papua’s struggle. The acknowledgement may bring a prestige and leverage the power in the eyes of the central government. Struggle for power among West Papuan resistance groups, unfortunately, brings disadvantage for West Papua because it
weakens the consolidation of the movement. As the byproduct of unconsolidated movement, international support for West Papua’s independence is also dim. The world concerns only about human rights violations, not the wish of independence. Therefore, West Papuan movements are in serious need to rebuild their cooperation and unify their agendas if they want to be recognized further by the world.
The use of violence by West Papuan resistance groups has also justified the use of violence by Indonesian security forces. It is exacerbated by the tendency to commit violence by groups that claim for conducting civilian resistance and peaceful movements. In turn, Indonesian government’s counter-separatist security approach has enhanced the cycle of violence in West Papua since human rights violations are made by the government action. Violence became West Papuan conflict’s attribute and separatism became the most convenient argument to explain it. Further, the suspicion of government omission to stop violence and the military’s possible use of OPM Binaan both show that ‘separatism’ can be a political instrument to seek agendas different from the official purpose. Therefore, the presentiment that certain actors deliberately try to sustain separatist image of the West Papua conflict is also prevailed.
The study examined that the wish to secede from Indonesia, even though it is strong, is actually not equally shared by the general public in West Papua. West Papua’s public at large was against the idea of boycotting local elections, and it raises a question about the degree of influence of the resistance groups to the people. Trauma and fear of Indonesian security forces may explain it. However, study about the West Papua’s public opinion toward the claim of legitimacy and representation of the people is also important in the future to find the real answer of this.
Chapter 6
The Local Political Dynamics: Elections, Identity Politics and Violence
West Papua’s local political dynamic is marked with identity politics and exploitation of culture in a democratic electoral political setting. West Papua’s democracy is a product of Indonesia’s post-Soeharto democratization started in 1998. Since 2001, in line with the policy of decentralization, Indonesia’s central government has started to limit sending appointed bureaucrats from Jakarta and giving bigger opportunity to West Papuan local politicians to govern their own region. Moreover, in 2005, Indonesia introduced direct elections for local leaders (governors, district heads, and mayors) in an attempt to deepen democracy at the local level. This circumstance has escalated power struggle at the local level as local elites compete to fill leadership positions left by Jakarta’s representative officials. Further, since West Papua’s indigenous culture is recognized by the law, indigenous politicians manipulate cultural practices to advance their agendas. Thus, although Indonesia’s democracy introduced an instrument to channel people’ wishes to politics, electoral politics as the manifestation of democracy becomes the source of division in the West Papuan plural society.
Elites’ exploitation of ethnicity, group sentiment, and culture has corrupted democracy in West Papua. For the sake of politics, groups’ salience is enhanced, with the resulting conflict among communities. Moreover, since in the conflict-ridden West Papua local politicians do not hesitate to instigate the aggressive behaviors in winning a contestation, ethnic mobilization sparks violence that puts security in a peril. Among the indigenous communities, in line with tribal and group loyalty as the characteristic of the Melanesian culture, political violence is materialized in tribal wars. As the result, communal conflict becomes a form of power struggle in West Papua. Furthermore, local West Papuan indigenous culture has transformed democratic electoral politics into coerced electoral politics because obligations to groups and clans confine the freedom of choice in politics. Practically, indigenous people lose their freedom to vote in ‘democratic elections’ due to the cultural obligation to bestow loyalty to the elites.
This chapter deals with how democracy and electoral politics have contributed to the security tension in West Papua. How has the ethnic mobilization developed into ethnic politics that fractures further into group politics? How do non-indigenous groups adapt to the enhancement of ethnic and group politics? What is the catalyst of the raise of identity politics? Throughout the discussion, we will see that there is a unique dynamics of linking ‘democratic
