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(1)Interdependence, Institutions and Smart Power. Interdependence, Institutions and Smart Power: Obama s Neoliberal Foreign Policy in a Neoliberal World In the age of liberal order, revisionist struggles are a fool s errand. ― G.J. Ikenberry, The Illusion of Geopolitics Carlos Ramirez1. 総合依存、国際機構とスマートパワー :ネオリベラル世界におけるオバマのネオリベラル外交 ラミレズ カルロス Abstract  The fall of the Berlin Wall has ushered in a neoliberal world order characterized by the rise of a number of powerful state and non-state actors. The fundamental liberal principles of the old Post World War II order remain the same including open trade, support for the rule of law and a commitment to human rights. However, financial and technology revolutions have transformed the global order in that multiple actors now have numerous channels to interact with each other. This paper argues, given this new global order, that the neoliberal theoretical framework and its respective policies tools adopted by the Obama administration are appropriate. The main tenets of the neoliberal framework and its policy instruments as outlined here are interdependence, institutions and smart power. Neoliberal theory contends that the agenda of analysis for international relations has expanded far beyond the narrow confines of security policy to fields such as economics, environment, health and sociocultural interchange. In fact, the impact of these areas on security policy, particularly in a context of high interdependence, has substantially diminished the value of hard power as a foreign policy tool. Obama has recognized the changing nature of the global order and adopted the use of economic interdependence, institutions and smart power to modify the behavior of other states. The main challenge confronting the United States is to retain its central role within the neoliberal order while managing the peaceful rise of other states. Keywords: neoliberal foreign policy, Obama, interdependence, institutions and smart power.. 1. 近畿大学総合社会学部 基礎教育部門・講師(異文化コミュニケーション・国際関係). −59−.

(2) 総合社会学部紀要 第 4 巻 第 1 号. affairs particularly given the nature of the. Introduction. changing global environment over the past As declared by Paul Saunders (2014),. 20 years.. President Barak Obama is not a realist. Indeed, been. Obama s. given. many. foreign. policy. monikers. Theory helps us simplify the world.. has. Without it, the world would be too complex. including. to understand. Theories, as pointed out. realist by some (Kaplan, 2014; Yglesias,. by. 2014), isolationist or weak (Kagan, 2014). makers with guidelines that help them. Mearsheimer (2001), proffer. policy. and confusing or mystifying by others. understand the world and justify their. (Remnick, 2014). In fact, Obama himself. actions. The key is if the theory offers real. refused to associate his own policy with. explanatory power. This is measured by. any school of thought or philosophy. He. whether actual events can be adequately. described his national security strategies as. explained by the theory. But, since theory. neither realist nor idealist. In his words, I just don t think that describes what a smart. simplifies the real world, it cannot be. foreign policy should be (Obama, 2015, para. 1). While the actual foreign policy of. There will be anomalies; however, the. any leader will be far more complex and. (Mearsheimer, 2001). In the case of Obama s. intricate to fit neatly within any academic. foreign policy, there are no doubt a number. theory, the ideas and actions a leader takes. of anomalies. That is, his actions do not. will broadly conform to some philosophy. fit a particular theory because no theory. or school of thought whether he or she. adequately defines the real life context.. is aware of it or not. This paper places. Foreign policy is the product of a certain. Obama s foreign policy within the neoliberal. vision of how world politics function. A. school of thought. The next part of this. good foreign policy will be dependent on. paper discusses the roots and main tenets. whether this vision is applicable or not. A. of this philosophy. In the third section, I. good foreign policy will also be judged on. will outline the causes to a changed world. whether it is indeed following the chosen. order and describe the end product that. theory. This paper will argue Obama s. makes the application of neoliberalism. policies have been impressively consistent. appropriate. Finally, I will discuss and. with a theory and the theory with reality.. expected to explain experience perfectly. fewer the anomalies, the better the theory. review Obama s foreign policy to support. Obama s policies can best be described as. situating his policies within this school of. neoliberal especially that associated with. thought.. This section will also furnish a. Nye, Ikenberry and Keohane.2 The ideas. robust defense of Obama s actions in foreign. central to neoliberalism will be discussed in. 2. Neoliberalism as used in this paper should be distinguished from economic neoliberalism. Economic neoliberalism is associated with free markets, deregulation and privatization as espoused by the socalled Washington Consensus: the Global financial institutions, e.g., IMF/World Bank, and their supporters. Neoliberalism as used in international affairs and foreign policy concerns itself less with these issues and relates more to the co-operative relations among different actors on the global stage and the creation of stability in world politics via these relationships. Indeed, recent neoliberal research in international affairs is emphasizing the need to address questions of environmental sustainability, human rights and economic development. See Lamy (2008) for an explanation regarding the different types of neoliberalism.. −60−.

(3) Interdependence, Institutions and Smart Power. the second part of this paper. Neoliberalism. to these actors. Second, the economic rise. has its roots in its precursor liberalism, but. of developing states has resulted in these. lacks its utopian component. Neoliberalism,. states demanding their share of power. as espoused by Nye, also includes the. and influence. States that were globally. concept of smart power. Nye(2011)defines. dominant until now, mainly the West, will. smart power as the combination of hard. need to share power and allow these newly. power and soft power. Smart power is the. rising states to participate in shaping the. cornerstone. policy. new global order. International institutions. and is routinely used by administration. of. Obama s. foreign. will play an important role in this new. officials to describe their actions. Obama. division of power. Furthermore, the rise of. has formulated and implemented policy. a diversity of actors has spawned complex. combining smart power with the other main. relationships among them. Many of these. tenets of neoliberalism, interdependence. linkages take place outside the sphere of. and institutionalism, which will also be. security in fields such as economics, health. discussed at length. The second section of. and the environment. Yet, their impact on. this paper will also contrast neoliberalism. international security is of fundamental. with realism, the other major theory in the. importance.. field of International Relations, in order to. In section four of the paper, Obama s. differentiate Obama s policies and to argue. policy choices will be examined and used to. later that they are indeed well grounded in. support the claim that neoliberalism guides. neoliberal thought.. much of his foreign policy. This section will. In the third section of the paper, the. review his policy actions in the Middle East,. changes in the global environment over. China and East Asia, and finally, Ukraine. the past 20 years will be examined. These. and Russia. In these three regions, it is easy. changes are consistent with the explanatory. to discern the consistency between policy. powers of neoliberal theory and therefore. output and the underlying philosophy.. make the application of neoliberal policies. Obama s policies have demonstrated that. the most appropriate for the moment and. he understands the challenges confronting. the immediate future. Globalization has. the U.S. in the new global order. The. brought about enormous change in the. number one priority for Obama has been the. global community and two phenomena. managing of the peaceful rise of powerful. are. there. states. Until now, Obama s actions have. has been a diffusion of power from state. generally served both the U.S. s and the. particularly. relevant.. First,. actors to non-state actors. The advance of. world s. interests. well.. Like. Goldsmith. technology and the information revolution. (2014), this paper will make the case that. has meant corporations, non-governmental. Obama s foreign policy is both thoroughly. organizations,. and. grounded in neoliberal theory and an. individuals have access to information. enlightened policy given the changing. that was previously the monopoly of. international context.. insurgent. groups. governments. Direct contact among nonstate actors is now common and this reflects the power shift away from governments. −61−.

(4) 総合社会学部紀要 第 4 巻 第 1 号. International institutions and organizations. The Roots of Obama s Foreign Policy. would. oversee. adjudication. Liberalism in Historical Perspective. and. the. implementation,. enforcement. of. the. Obama s foreign policy is the outgrowth. rules using force, if necessary, through. of the tenets of twentieth century liberalism.. collective security. Finally, liberals believed. Liberal theory, in turn, has its roots in the. that, akin to individuals, states could be good or bad and that their actions in. philosophies of John Locke, John Stuart Mill and others thinkers of the Enlightenment Age. These thinkers emphasized individual. the international arena would reflect this innate disposition.4 To protect against. freedoms particularly freedom from the. potential bad behavior, rules safeguarded. constraints of government. Property rights,. by institutions would deter states from. free markets and free trade were among the. pursuing belligerent policies. It was also. most prominent ideas advocated by these. believed that free markets and free trade. early thinkers. Liberal doctrine emphasized. would. the primacy of the individual stressing that. countries which would lead to peace and. all citizens should enjoy these freedoms. prosperity. The potential loss of economic. and rights. The principal role of a limited. wealth resulting from such a system of open. government was to remain a neutral arbiter. commerce would be the most important. in disputes among individuals in order to. deterrent to states wishing to destabilize it. ensure maximum freedom for individuals.. through bellicose behavior.. foster. friendly. relations. among. Governments would also be responsible. It was thought the best way to ensure. for maintaining an environment in which. compliance to global rules and an allegiance. individuals could thrive.. to free markets was to encourage the. In the early twentieth century, foreign. development of democratic government.. policy makers adopted and modified these. Liberals believed democracies were more. ideas to the international arena. Like their. likely to adhere to the concepts of freedom. earlier. policy. and mutual respect. Indeed, history has. makers of the period focused on three. brethren,. borne out that democracies, for the most. concepts as outlined by Dunne (2008).. part, do not wage war with each other.. First, similar to individuals, states had. In sum, liberals from both the earlier and. a. natural right. liberal. foreign. to freedom of action. later era share the same view of human. regarding their domestic politics. States. nature and the nature of states. States, like. had, that is, the right to sovereignty and to. individuals, have inborn character flaws. non-intervention in their internal affairs.3. that liberals believe corrigible through. Second, liberals emphasized the importance. positive incentives. According to liberals,. of. humans and states are governed by reason. international. norms. and. rules.. 3. This belief was also the outgrowth of Westphalian principles. These principles are based on the terms of the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648 that ended the 30 year war. The terms of the Treaty referred to the sovereignty of the nation state and the respect for the territorial integrity of each state. 4 According to liberal theory, the innate disposition of states is dependent on domestic factors particularly state-society relations and the type of governing regime: democratic, totalitarian, etc. For further discussion see Moravcsik(1997).. −62−.

(5) Interdependence, Institutions and Smart Power. and rationality. In sum, foreign policy. and navigates the anarchical international. liberals of the twentieth century thought. system on behalf of its citizenry. Co-. the path to peace was to create a global. operation with other countries is only. environment or system that motivated. worthy under two conditions: when it. states. contributes to the nation s security and does. to. become. active. rule-abiding. participants.. so in such a manner as to provide relative. These liberal theories, however, were. gains, i.e., cooperation leads to a superior. overtaken and discredited by events in. position for one s country at the expense of. their time (Keohane and Nye, 2012). The. other states.. hope that commercial profits and social prosperity would render war too expensive. For realists, the one instance in which negotiations. are deemed useful is for. was unhinged by the First World War.. balance of power purposes. Balance of. Then, the Wilsonian belief that institutions. power is a situation where a group of states. and organizations, through international. form an alliance to check the power of. law and collective security, could eliminate. another larger state or group of states. The. conflict was discarded at the outbreak. Cold War is a typical example of balance. of the Second World War. In the place. of power politics when the NATO alliance. of liberalism, realism rose and came to. squared off against the Warsaw pact. A. dominate both academia and public policy. balance of power system is an attempt to. for the next 45 years, beginning with the. generate parity among nations and thereby. Cold War and ending with the fall of the. stability ‒ meaning the absence of war - in. Soviet Union.. international affairs. For realists such as Morgenthau (1973), the balance of power established during the Cold War offered. Realism and Neorealism The most distinctive trait of international. a modicum of peace and was the only. relations according to realism is anarchy in. sound alternative to a permanent state of. the state-dominated international system.. international instability. To summarizes,. In the system, states deem self-help and. the main principles of realism are statism,. survival as the primary objectives of foreign. survival and self-help.. policy. Realists see war as the natural. In the 1970 s, realism was updated by Waltz (1979). He. state of international affairs since, unlike. Kenneth. in individual countries, there is no central. that anarchy was not much a factor of. authority to resolve disputes. When there. human nature, but was more the result of. is no war, states should be preparing for. the system: the lack of a central authority. one. The assumption is that human nature. engendered. is neither compassionate nor magnanimous. among. nations.. and thus life is, as described by Hobbes,. realism. was. short, nasty and brutish. Military might. or neorealism. Like traditional realists,. alone determines the strength or weakness. structural realists agree that a balance. and, therefore, the survival of a state. The. of power is the central mechanism to. state is at the center of realist analysis as. maintain order in global affairs (Lamy,. it is the guardian of the national interest. 2008). However, structuralists believe that a. −63−. suspicion. and. Waltz s. termed. emphasized. competition version. structural. of. realism.

(6) 総合社会学部紀要 第 4 巻 第 1 号. military build-up among opponents would. Neoliberals believe, as opposed to liberals,. naturally peak to create a balance of power. that a harmony of interests is insufficient. situation. Traditional realists, on the other. to engender peace. Co-operation and mutual. hand, are more circumspect. They point out. trust are the result of active negotiation and. the important role leaders and diplomats. planning that leads to an interdependent. play in establishing a balance of power. relationship in which the cost of rupture is. system.. clear to all parties involved(Dunne, 2008).. In another strand of neorealism, also. Finally, in contrast to realist, neoliberals are. called offensive realism, represented by. more sanguine about the usage and impact. Mearsheimer (2001), the military build-. of hard power in foreign affairs. There are. up among competing nations, or what. three concepts that define neoliberalism. is termed the security dilemma, is never. and thus make it clearly different from. ending. The quest of one state to improve its. neorealism:. military situation necessitates other states. and smart power.. interdependence,. institutions. to match and go beyond its competitor. The ultimate goal of this race is to become. Interdependence,. Interdependence.. a. the global hegemon and achieve absolute. concept developed by Keohane and Nye. security. Offensive realism believes that the. (2012), underscores the recent expanding. perennially quest to up the ante inevitably. number and deepening of linkages among. leads to the tragedy of war and hence leaves. state and non-state actors. Interdependence. states no choice but to be in a permanent. is the interaction of multiple actors through. state of war preparation when not engaged. various. in war itself.. of. channels. mutual. include NGO s,. and Smart Power. individuals. accepts. the. core. dependence.. relationships These. multinational. Neoliberalism: Interdependence, Institutions Neoliberalism. creating. international The. interdependence. organizations. level can. actors. corporations, and. help. degree explain. and of the. assumptions of neorealism of international. actions of a particular actor in any given. anarchy and the centrality of states in the. situation as well as the outcome of the. international system(Dunne, 2008). Indeed,. situation in question. Interdependence can. some neoliberals argue that the two theories. create costs and benefits. Within a context. are overlapping and complementary rather. of high interdependence, the foreign policy. than in opposition to each other(Keohane. of a state could be constrained if relations. and Nye, 2012).5 However, neoliberalism. become. parts sharply away from neorealism in. other hand, the benefits of high economic. a number of issues, and uses concepts. interdependence between two (or more). and principles that are more akin to. countries can be enormous as a result of the. traditional liberalism. Yet, neoliberals are. commerce taking place among them.. more pragmatic than traditional liberals. 5. stressed. Greater. or. fractured.. interdependence. has. On. the. resulted. The sharp difference in emphasis on many issues would make them in my view competitive theories especially given the potential for vastly different results in the application (i.e., policy choices on offer) of the two different theories in the policy arena.. −64−.

(7) Interdependence, Institutions and Smart Power. in the bounding of disparate interests of. phenomenon. states and their citizens. This in turn has. the globe after the fall of the Berlin Wall.. led to more intense co-operation in many. Keohane and Nye(2012)use the financial. issues areas including security and politics.. crisis of 2007 as one example of increased. The by-product of interdependence and. interdependence after the end of the Cold. co-operation is twofold. First, the benefits. War. Financial deregulation spawned a. of. exchange,. complex network of global finance and. particularly the economic ones, raise the. investment. However, this web of financial. costs of disputes. Interdependence acts as. interconnections created by international. a bulwark against war and thus narrows. banking and insurance companies almost. the options for the use of force as a tool for. resulted in the complete destruction of the. resolving conflict. Second, interdependence. modern global economic architecture. Yet,. recognizes the growing importance of non-. the interdependence of China and the US. state actors and, conversely, the relative. led to the creation of the G20 as China s. declining influence of the state. To be sure,. importance in the international economic. neoliberals point out that the state is still. arena was duly recognized by the United. the most important actor in global affairs. States. The fact that China was the main. but it is now less so.. holder of American debt in the form of. increased. linkages. and. and. commonplace. around. Neoliberals note that the arrival of non-. treasury bills meant it would have great. state actors on the world stage is a new. influence on the resolution of the financial. facet of global affairs that cannot be ignored. crisis. However, China was limited to some. as is done by neorealists. The impact of non-. degree in its actions given that any extreme. state actors on the international system. measure on its part such as a panic sell off. is a significant development in areas such. of treasury bills would jeopardize not only. as economics, environment, health and. American good will but also China s own. many. neoliberals. economy. As the main import market of. do recognize that interdependence has. Chinese goods, closure of US markets or the. limited applicability in issues and areas. complete collapse of American purchasing. where linkages are few or superficial. For. power would spell job losses, economic. example, Keohane and Nye(2012)note that. dislocation. interdependence would have a little to offer. China. Policy coordination at the G20. in the analysis of US-North Korea relations.. helped in offsetting some of the economic. The implications for foreign policy is that,. losses created by the financial crisis. In. as Goldsmith explains,. others.. Nevertheless,. and. political. instability. in. judgement must. this example, it is possible to glean both. be exercised first and foremost with an. positive and negative benefits of the recent. understanding of the conditions under. deepening of interdependence.. which raw power must be driving the considerations and those under which co-. Institutions. The deepening of global. operation generated by interdependence. interdependence is managed and enhanced. can lead to greater benefits, or avoid serious. by institutions. Institutions and regimes. cost (2014, para. 30).. play a fundamental role in increasing. Interdependence is now a well-established. opportunities. −65−. for. co-operation. among.

(8) 総合社会学部紀要 第 4 巻 第 1 号. states and between states and non-state. among states. Whether direct or indirect,. actors. Indeed, neoliberal theorists believe. the influence of institutions on the security. that. dilemma. without. institutions,. the. world. is. considerable.. In. general,. would be a much more troubled place.. institutions act as a forum of information. Transnational issues such as trade, health-. exchange in which participants can gain. related pandemics, climate change and. a better understanding of intentions and,. terrorism have all been subject to some. as a result, can alleviate both the security. form of agreement by a plurality of actors. dilemma and the relative gains conundrum.. either in larger multilateral forums or. According. smaller regional organizations. As Keohane. survival in an anarchical world requires. and Nye note, We viewed international organizations not as a source of definitive. one to always be ahead of the competition.. law but as institutionalized policy networks. leaves one s country better-off than others.. within which transgovernmental policy. For. coordination and coalition building take. this concern for relative gains and allow. place (2012, p. 271). These institutions are. states to concentrate on absolute gains. especially useful when states believe that. as institutions improve the quality and. mutual benefits can be achieved through. transparency of information. As a result, it. negotiation and these benefits lead to the. is easier to focus on one s own gain without. securing of their own national interests.. worry about the gains accrued by others.. NATO, the WTO and numerous other. Mutual trust and understanding are the. institutions are examples of states willing. antidote to an arms races among competing. to submit to binding rules that regulate. to. neorealists,. a. country s. Co-operation is possible, but only if it neoliberals,. institutions. alleviate. states. From a neoliberal perspective, Jervis. national. (1999) eloquently explains the negative. interests. In a world of multiple issues with. significance of the absence of institutions. multiple actors institutions play a role in. in international political negotiations: it is. bringing diverse parties to a negotiating. a situation of market failure in producing suboptimal outcomes for all concerned”. national. actions. yet. enhance. table. They assist in determining priority by. (1999, p. 47). For neoliberals, institutions. providing pertinent information. Successful. are vital to ameliorate these situations of. negotiations can lead to formal agreements. imperfect(or insufficient)information.. issues. and. facilitate. transparency. or codes of conduct that restrain nations to. Finally, the non-security realm is where. act within rules or norms recognized by the. institutions have their greatest impact.. wider international community.. They enhance and develop the web of. Institutions can have both a direct. relations that occurs in such fields like. and indirect affect on security. In some. finance, health and the environment. It is. multilateral forums such as the United. in these areas where transnational actors. Nations Security Council the impact is. such as multinational corporations and. direct. However, other non-security related. nongovernmental. institutions can also have an indirect. be taken into account. As Dunne (2008). impact on security through the promotion. notes,. of economic, social, or cultural co-operation. the autonomy and power of the state.. −66−. organization. transnational. actors. have. to. challenge.

(9) Interdependence, Institutions and Smart Power. Their economic strength, in the case of. and increasing numbers of situations than. corporations (MNC s), or. hard power. That does not mean, however,. their ability to garner public support, in. hard power is discounted in neoliberal. the case of NGO s, make them formidable players in world affairs including inside. theory. Indeed,“military power dominates economic power in the sense that economic. international institutions. Thus the weight. means alone are likely to be ineffective. multinational. they. carry. inside. government. often. translates into influencing the direction. against the serious use of military force” (Keohane and Nye, 2012, p. 14). Yet, power. and content of policies formulated at. cannot. international. this. military might alone. For Nye (2011), in. growing interconnectedness among non-. contrast to Mearsheimer, the dictionary. state actors(i.e., MNC s, NGO s)intensifies. provides a more appropriate definition of. the. international institutional level as they also. power:“a common sense place to start is the dictionary, which tells us that power is the. have a large stake in a world without strife.6. capacity to do things and in social situations. potential. organizations.. for. Also,. co-operation. at. an. simply. be. exercised. through. to affect others to get the outcome we Smart Power. The concept of smart power. want” (p. 6). Power, in effect, is behavioral. is a relatively new idea within neoliberal. and dependent on outcomes. Thus, there. thought. Although its main author, Joseph. are multiple ways to achieve an intended. Nye, believes it can be incorporated into. outcome.. either realist or neoliberal frameworks,. In international relations, states can. it is generally acknowledged to be more. accomplish goals either through force,. closely. neoliberalism. the first face of power ‒ hard power ‒ as. especially the soft power component of. explained by Mearsheimer, or through. it (Gallarotti, 2011). Realists, particularly. soft power. For Nye, soft power represents. offensive realists, dismiss the element of soft. the second and third faces of power.7 The. power in smart power. Mearsheimer(2001). second face relates to controlling the agenda. defines power solely within the dimensions. of ideas while the third face manifests itself. of hard power: a state s effective power is ultimately a function of its military forces. (Nye, 2011). According to Nye, the soft. and how they compare with the military. power of a state is derived from three. forces of rival states (p. 55).. sources: its culture, its political values and. For. associated. neoliberals,. with. smart. power. is. through the establishment of preferences. an. its foreign policies. Non-state actors can also. increasingly important tool for defending. wield soft power through branding as well. the national interest. Smart power is a. as acting in a socially responsible manner.. conceptual extension of Nye s(2004)earlier. Soft power does not necessarily need to be. work on soft power. As Nye(2011)argues,. good or bad. It is not a“normative”concept but rather a descriptive one(Nye, 2011). As. soft power is more important in certain 6. For a more formal treatment on international organizations and regime change see chapter 3 of Keohane and Nye (2012). 7 Gallarotti (2011) and others argue that there is a fourth face to power based on Foucault s definition of power as a broad indoctrination of society so embedded within the citizenry that resistance is almost inconceivable (p. 18). Nye acknowledges this type of power but believes it to be conceptually too complex and lacking clarity to be incorporated into his framework (2011, p. 242/f.n.37).. −67−.

(10) 総合社会学部紀要 第 4 巻 第 1 号. stated by Keohane and Nye(2012), power. of economic progress for its own survival.. does not only result from the barrel of a gun. Much of this progress is dependent upon. but also from“comparative attractiveness of competing narratives ‒ some which, it. economic and commercial relationships with. turns out, favor certain non-state actors. of cooperation that can deliver economic. more than most observers anticipated” (p.. growth and works against the use of force.. xxxii).. Finally, the proliferation and strengthening. Gallarotti(2011)outlines the consequences. other states. This has created a bias in favor. of recent changes to the new emerging world. of international institutions has“embedded nations more firmly in networks of. order that have made the concept of soft. cooperation: themselves being fundamental. power more relevant in understanding state. components of power”(Gallarotti, 2011, p.. actions. First, globalization has rendered the. 36) . Together with the rising numbers of. use of military power, or the threat of it, less. institutional arrangements and their relevant. useful as a means of coercion. Military action. norms and regulations, there has been a. is tantamount to self-punishment as it can. commensurate. generate considerable costs both financial. regarding the conduct of states.. and otherwise, including violent retribution. Second,. interdependence. and. institution. Smart. rise. power. combination. of. in is. hard. the. expectations. the. sophisticated. and. soft. power.. building has led to the creation of webs of. Practitioners of soft power will always. relationships among numerous actors that. view international relations from a broader. have spawned more avenues of co-operation.. perspective. While it may be necessary to use. These. the. hard power in short term tactical situations,. potential for violent conflict and shifted the. in the end it will be the application of soft. competition among actors away from force. power that will gain and sustain state. and coercion to other modes of non-violent. compliance of international covenants and. interaction.. conventions. In the long term, winning the. networks. have. diminished. Third, the spread of democracy among. hearts and minds of others should lead to the. emerging states has made governments. isolation or acquiescence of adversaries, and. more vulnerable to the wishes of their. thus reduce the potential for conflict.. constituents.. As. these. states. gain. in. economic power, many citizens, especially. The Post War Order: A Neoliberal World. in democratic states, view the consequences of force as jeopardizing their prosperity.. According to Ikenberry(2014b), a liberal. They will exercise their political power so. international order grew out of the ashes. that state action reflects their sentiments. of the Second World War and developed. against the use of force. In addition, the state. under the dark shadow of Communism and. itself has become aware of the imperative. the Cold War.8 Realism was the theoretical. 8. Ikenberry in an earlier article (2011), explains the roots of the modern liberal order to be the product of two previous global order building projects; 1) the Peace of Westphalia formalized the principle of state sovereignty and; 2) the liberal order project begun by the British in the early 19th Century with agreements made at the Congress of Vienna which established rules and practices among mainly great powers. According to Ikenberry, it was a forerunner to some extent of the United Nations, particularly its Security Council (see p. 57, 58).. −68−.

(11) Interdependence, Institutions and Smart Power. lens applied to the rivalry between the US. sovereignty, and global order” (2011, p. 60).. and the Soviet Union. Realist policies aimed. This milestone treaty came to be a universal. at reducing the threat of nuclear war were. legal and moral guide for the conduct of. the strategies of choice for the statesmen. nations.. of the era on both sides of the East-West. In addition, the participation of the US. divide. However, for the opponents of. in multilateral institutions, alliances and. communism, the US underwrote a liberal. political. international order that offered open trade. good faith of the US(with the exception. and a variety of mechanisms to solve. of some instances such as the Vietnam and. international. the. allies. Iraq Wars)to abide by international norms and procedures that, in effect, constrained. this framework. Multilateral institutions. its own power. The institutions that have. were. this. had the largest influence on world order. Liberal order. Their principal function. are arguably the ones related to the liberal. was to augment co-operation among states. economic agenda. Notwithstanding some of. and to maintain an open global market to. the negative outcomes of policies advocated. foster growth and development among. by the World Bank, the IMF and the WTO. participants.. on. main. pillars. Western. demonstrated. thrived and flourished economically within the. disputes.. partnerships. upholding. many. developing. countries,. these. The US, in Ikenberry s (2014b) words,. institutions have also been the guardian. used alliances, partnerships, multilateralism. of open trade policies that are responsible. and democracy as tools to create this new. for the impressive growth in countries. liberal order. The concept of democracy. as diverse as China, Turkey, Brazil and. was particularly important in that the. South Africa. Open markets and global. U.S. used its own democratic system as. commerce assured these countries access. an example to others. America s open. to. society, which allowed for dissent and the. international. trade,. investment. and. 9. technology transfers.. energetic voicing of opinions, was closely. Cold War realism also played a part in. scrutinized and admired by other states.. the growth of the global liberal order that. American democratic values and individual. was taking place outside of the great power. freedoms were transplanted and enshrined. rivalry between the US and the Soviet. into the Universal Declaration of Human. Union. The nuclear arms stand-off ensured. Rights a document championed by Eleanor. stability as the logic of mutual assured. Roosevelt.. Ikenberry,. destruction made the possibility of war. since the adoption of the Declaration,“A steady stream of conventions and treaties. remote and gave the US and its western. followed. an. the liberal order (Ikenberry, 2014b). The. extraordinary vision of rights, individuals,. nuclear stalemate also had the effect of. As. that. explained. together. by. constitute. powers time and space to develop and grow. 9. While it is true that developed nations were the main beneficiaries (some would argue at the expense of developing countries) of the open liberal economic system in the early post war years, developing countries later learned how to use the system to their advantage through sometimes protectionist national and trade policies. Nonetheless, these countries owe much of their success to the open character of the world economic system spearheaded by the US.. −69−.

(12) 総合社会学部紀要 第 4 巻 第 1 号. making the Soviet Union feel secure and. 1980 s that powered international finance. this ensured that Soviet leaders would not. in the 1990 s and later. First, there was. engage in risky adventurist policies that. the policy to allow for the free movement. could endanger the system. For Ikenberry. of capital through the lifting of capital. (2014b), these periods of historical stability. controls. An international fixed exchange. are few and far between. They offer the. rate system was abandoned for a system. unusual opportunity for the leaders of the. of free-floating exchange rates. The old. hegemon of the era to establish global order. fixed rate system created inefficiencies. as they see fit. The post war liberal order. and prevented capital from being put to. was such an era; the US was able during. best use (Zakaria, 2011). The new system. this time to create a world order in its. meant a vast and ever expanding pool of. own image, albeit with some self-imposed. capital could move freely from country to. restraints. The liberal order provided other. country (Zakaria, 2011). The practice of. countries with the optimal environment in. financial leveraging exploded among bank. which their economies and societies could. and non-bank entities fuelling investment. make impressive gains.. particularly in the housing and commercial. With the fall of the Berlin Wall, the. real estate markets. This growing economic. world witnessed a global deepening and. confidence among capitalist countries led. an eastward expansion of the liberal order.. to dramatic changes in finance. It began in. Indeed, it was the birth of a neoliberal. the 1990 s with the development of complex. order. While the organizing principles of. financial. the West, including the rule of law, open. in the collapse of Lehman Brothers in. and reciprocal trade, and a commitment to. 2008. The second policy change was the. democratic government and human rights. taming of inflation through the creation. were retained, the number of countries and. of independent central banks. As Zakaria. regions to embrace these practices rose considerably. The expanded support from. points out,“this broad atmosphere of low inflation has been crucial to the political. these states further strengthened the liberal. stability and good economic fortunes of the. international. emerging nations” (2011, p. 26).. system.. Countries. moved. to make these principles truly universal. instruments,. and. culminated. At the same time, the revolution in. in nature through the formal adoption. communication. of international treaties and agreements. internet had a tremendous effect on both. particularly in the fields of economics(e.g.,. economics. the creation of the WTO) human rights. the Liberal international order. On the. (e.g., treaties to advance women s rights). economics side, pricing information could. and the environment (e.g., the Kyoto. be. Protocol).. the. technologies. and. conveyed. politics. and. that. reinforced. instantaneously. integration. of. global. the. fostering. stock. and. In the early 1980 s, Western capitalist. financial markets. With the introduction of. countries were experiencing strong growth. technology-intensive production methods,. after the oil crisis of the previous decade.. and the internationalization of the supply. According to Zakaria(2011), there were two. chain, corporations were able to increase. major policy revolutions in the 1970 s and. their productivity and reduce their costs.. −70−.

(13) Interdependence, Institutions and Smart Power. These new technologies allowed for the. of the challenges to the emerging system. location of production to shift around. including the threat from self-professed. the globe to locations where labor was. Islamist groups, nationalism and the rise. abundant and inexpensive.. of other regional powers such as China.. On the political side, ideas, information,. Yet,. notwithstanding. these. challenges,. and news spread in real time and this has. Ikenberry believes that recently empowered. leveled the political playing field among. states. state and non-state actors. The IT revolution. opportunities to engage positively in this. has furnished individuals and non-state. new order and thereby advancing their. actors with the digital tools to challenge the. own interests:“For these states the road to. state s previous monopoly over information. modernity runs through - not away from ‒. and. ongoing. the existing international order.”(2011, p.. the. events.. narrative This. has. concerning empowered. are. finding. incentives. and. non-state. 58). As for the violent groups, i.e., Islamist. actors and individuals to take political. groups and others, they will need to be. action through violent and non-violent. defeated through a combination of state-led. means. One of the most dramatic examples. development, democratization, education,. was the role played by social media in the. and military force.. events leading up to the Arab Spring. These. economic. changes,. coupled. adoption. of. and with. Liberal. According to neoliberals, the priorities. technological the. universal. principles,. have. of this new order will resemble something very different from those of the old Cold War order of military build-up and self-. transformed the global Cold War liberal. defense. associated. order into a neo liberal order characterized. emerging states will want to take advantage. by the shift in global power to new non-. of the fact that security is not paramount.. state actors and the birth of a multi-polar. This will allow them to channel scarce. world. The U.S. still remains at its center,. resources to areas other than self-defense.. but is challenged by rising states seeking. They will also want to profit from the. their share of power. Ikenberry (2011),. global network of partnerships among non-. however, points out that while the power. state actors to engender national economic. balance has indeed changed, the core. growth and social prosperity. International. principles of the system are intact:“as this hegemonic organization of the liberal. organizations. international order starts to change, the. system. The use of hard power will always. hierarchical aspects are fading while the. be necessary to confront actors who do not. liberal aspects persist” (p. 58). Indeed, the. conform to global norms, but its practice. current neoliberal order can be identified by. will be diminished.. and. with. political. realism.. soft. The. power. will act as guarantors of stability for the. the increasing number of non-governmental channels. of. contact. between. societies,. Obama s Neoliberal Foreign Policy. and the relative decline of security as the principal issue defining international relations.. In managing this neoliberal order, the Obama administration has adroitly applied. Zakaria (2011) has pointed out some. neoliberal principles to resolve complex. −71−.

(14) 総合社会学部紀要 第 4 巻 第 1 号. global issues. The administration s foreign. compete with us, and governments seek. policy has focused on three geographical. a greater say in global forums”(para. 7).. areas; 1) the Middle East particularly. Obama also singles out terrorist networks. Iraq, Syria, Iran and the rise of Islamist. as an unfavorable example of the new. violence in the region; 2) the Ukraine. distribution of power to non-state actors. and Russian border area; 3) China and. and the risk they pose to states.. Asia. where. the. Obama. administration. Given these trends in the world order,. has made a“pivot”to the region. To gain a better understanding of the neoliberal. Obama believes a new kind of leadership is. principles. foreign. leadership are consonant with neoliberal. policy particularly in these three regions,. principles. The first element is the balance. it is helpful to analyze some of his public. between hard and soft power. In areas of. comments concerning the administration s. security in which core national interests,. actions in international affairs. His speech at. namely defense issues that relate directly to. West Point Military Academy in May 2014. the United States and its allies, hard power. was one of his most expansive and detailed commentaries on foreign policy and so. is and always will be the preferred choice, “unilaterally if necessary”(Obama, 2014,. warrants particular scrutiny. In the speech,. para. 17). Terrorism directed against the. the neoliberal principles of interdependence,. U.S. is one issue which qualifies as meeting. institution building and smart power appear. these conditions and therefore the United. prominently.. States reserves the right to use military. underlying. Obama s. The speech describes the four elements of. essential. The four elements of American. force when it has actionable intelligence.. American global leadership but is prefaced. In issues of indirect impact on US. with his understanding of the emerging. interests, the second element of American. neoliberal order. Obama counters the claim. leadership comes to the fore. In these cases,. that America is in decline by pointing out. the application of the neoliberal principle. that American military might is unmatched. of conflict management via alliances or. in the world. However, he recognizes, like. partnership building is appropriate. As. Zakaria, Nye and other neoliberals, that. Obama remarks, the United States, when. power is being diffused in two directions,. confronting these indirect threats, must. towards. consider. non-state. actors. and. towards. diplomacy,. sanctions,. appeals. other non-western states, especially those. to international law, and if necessary,. located in Asia. For Obama and many other. multilateral military action. All of these. neoliberals, the question is not so much. actions. who will lead ‒ the U.S. will maintain its. partnerships in order for any of them. global leadership position ‒ but how will the. to. U.S. lead. In other words, in order to avert. international terrorism is one such threat. conflict in this new world order, the US. that falls under this rubric. As such,. will have to manage its relative decline as. terrorism. power diffuses to other states especially, but. partnerships to combat it. These informal. not only, to China. As Obama(2014)states, “From Brazil to India, rising middle classes. alliances, in turn, are built by appealing. be. require successful.. strong. alliances. and. Obama (2014) notes. necessitates. the. creation. of. to the common nature of the threat. As. −72−.

(15) Interdependence, Institutions and Smart Power. neoliberals note, alliances and partnerships. He notes that democracies are not likely to. are most productive when interests overlap.. go to war with each other; open economies. In these types of security partnerships. and. absolute, not relative, gains become more. American businesses which in turn create. important for states as the costs and. binding relationships of interdependence.. benefits are readily apparent.. Respect for human rights also acts as a. The. for. counterweight to instability which is often at the root of economic underdevelopment. one: the strengthening of the international. and the rise of terrorism.. organizations.. formal As. of. opportunities. American. through. element. create. leadership is an extension of the second order. third. markets. institutions. noted. by. and. Principles. and. good. intentions. are. Keohane. important. However, deeds speak louder. (2012), one of the main purposes of these. than words. The next section will evaluate. institutions from a neoliberal perspective. Obama s foreign policy in action and note. is to check power especially the use of hard. the consistency it has with the concepts of. power. This is done as explained by Obama. interdependence, institutional co-operation. (2014) in two ways. First, institutions. and smart power.. that. As Obama(2014)noted in his West Point. countries agree to abide by. The actions. speech, just because America has the best “hammer”, i.e., the best military, does not. develop. norms. and. conventions. and policies of countries are then restrained of rules can transform into a body of. mean every problem is a“nail”. One of Obama s main priorities upon assuming the. international law that can be used to indict. presidency was to wind down the war in. rogue nations in the International Court of. Iraq. He argued that America had waged. The Hague or in the court of world opinion.. this war under false pretenses. The costs of. Second, the transgression of these norms. the war in American and Iraqi deaths and. by any single country can lead to collective. injuries, as well as the financial costs far. action against the violator in the form of. outweighed any of the benefits that resulted. sanctions or, in serious breaches, the use of. from it. The amount of soft power lost in the. collective military action.. Middle East was incalculable: indeed, the ill. to within these norms. This new collection. The final element of American leadership. will generated from the intervention in Iraq. is the intelligent use of soft power. America,. was a leading cause of the birth of Al Qaeda. according to Obama, must lead by way of example. Nye (2011) expounds on this. in the Middle East. As Obama explained, “We must not create more enemies than we. type of soft power at length. When other. take off the battlefield” (Obama, 2014, para.. states view the foreign policy of a country. 34). For Obama, the war in Iraq did not meet. as legitimate and having moral authority it “translates into the behavior of attraction. the threshold of a direct, core interest of the. that can influence others toward favorable. ill-conceived, rush to war after the 9/11. outcomes”(Nye, 2011, p. 84). As Obama. attacks. The Saddam Hussein regime should. points out, America s support of human. not have been perceived as a direct threat. rights and democracy is not some idealist. to the United States. Eight years after the. tendency but a matter of national security.. fall of the regime, the decision by then. United States and was simply an irrational,. −73−.

(16) 総合社会学部紀要 第 4 巻 第 1 号. Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, who. to unorganized opposition groups to fight. had become increasingly sectarian and. the Bashir regime. Until there is a workable. nationalistic, to not formalize in a treaty the. coalition of local and international partners,. stationing of American troops in Iraq made. it is unlikely the administration will make. it nearly impossible to justify a continuing. any military attempts to dislodge Bashir. American presence in the country. For all. from power. For Obama, one of the main. of these reasons, in 2011 Obama fulfilled his. considerations in supplying arms to local. original election pledge and completed the. fighters is that they not fall into unintended. withdrawal of troops from Iraq.. hands. This would empower opponents. Since the departure of American soldiers. of US foreign policy and thereby directly. from Iraq, Obama has been steadfast in. endangering national security. This, in turn,. applying the principle of partnerships and. could result in the use of unilateral force by. coalition building, as opposed to using. the U.S., a situation Obama wants to avoid. unilateral force, to confront issues that have. due to the high cost in lives, money and soft. only indirect impact on national security. In. power.11. fact, alliances and partnerships have been. The emergence of the Islamic State in. one of the principal cornerstones of Obama s. Iraq and in Syria(ISIS)has not altered the. policy in the region. First in Libya, the US. strategy of coalition building for the Obama. forged a military coalition of countries,. administration.. with the consent of the United Nations,. that local alliances with organized groups. to protect civilians that ultimately led to. are just as important as international. the ousting of Libya strongman Gadhafi.. alliances. Obama refused to assist in the. Obama tied together an alliance of countries. fight against ISIS until Iraqi Prime Minister. from Europe, backed by NATO, with local. al-Maliki was replaced by a new leader.. 10. militias to accomplish this goal.. Obama. has. understood. In the. The sectarian government of al-Maliki was. case of Syria, without viable local partners. unabashedly dominated by and for Shiites.. and no international consensus concerning. With the recent election of Haidar al-Abadi,. military intervention, Obama has been. the alienation of the Sunni population in. unwilling to unilaterally commit resources. Iraq has eased. Without the co-operation. 10. There has been criticism that even this type of internationally sanctioned intervention was both unnecessary and, in the end, harmful (see, for example, Kuperman, 2015 and Bandow, 2015). For a broader argument in favor of isolationism see Posen, 2013). This author sympathizes with this view. However, the intervention in Libya at the time met all the minimum neoliberal requirements for intervention: it had the authorization and backing of a number of international organizations (the UN, NATO), civilians were in danger which triggered the “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) doctrine (therefore giving the intervention international legitimacy, i.e., soft power) and, finally, there was a viable local force willing to take on the role of ground forces. In the future, better forecasting of outcomes will be necessary. If the cost in treasure and lives (both American military and local civilians) is too high, then intervention should be avoided. There is no point in trying to save a country or people if they must be destroyed in the process. 11 The Obama administration has begun training Syrian rebels to fight ISIS - but not to fight the Bashar regime. It is no secret that the Obama administration would like to see the fall of the regime but since there is no international consensus for direct military intervention to accomplish this goal, Obama is against the committing of resources. This is in line with his strategy of partnership building. More importantly, the U.S. would be responsible for the people of Syria if the regime were to have a chaotic collapse as a result of unilateral American support for local militias. Finally, acting in accordance with international opinion and in conjunction with international partners creates good will and increases U.S. s soft power.. −74−.

(17) Interdependence, Institutions and Smart Power. of local Sunni leaders and groups in Iraq,. to. it is unlikely the fight against ISIS will. through the United Nations. While leaving. be successful. Obama has recognized that. all options open, Obama has been able. winning the allegiance of Sunnis (via. to win the co-operation of both China. soft power, i.e., through the creation of a. and Russia on the Security Council to. new sympathetic Iraqi leadership) is as. impose sanctions on Iran. These sanctions. important as the military strategy (hard. seem to have had the intended effect of. power) that has followed. At the time of. bringing Iran to the negotiating table. The. this writing, the counter-offensive in Iraq. alternatives offered to Iran ‒ the lifting. against the ISIS-controlled towns of Tikrit. of economic sanctions and re-entry into. had begun with the support of the American. the international community ‒ seem to. air force and military advisors. In addition. be sufficiently enticing to merit serious. to ensuring local co-operation with(or at. consideration by the Iranian government.. least acquiescence of)the Sunni population. Obama has effectively leveraged Iran s. in Iraq, the Obama team has formed an. dependence on the international economy. international coalition to fight ISIS with air. through its oil sales to draw concessions.. strikes in co-ordination with local militias. For the moment, Iran has agreed to freeze. on the ground across Iraq and Syria.. its nuclear program until the conclusion. Some have misinterpreted the bombing. coalition. building. and. sanctions. of negotiations. Keohane and Nye (2012). of ISIS as a realist approach to the Middle. define this type of relationship as one of. East(see Yglesias, 2014). This would be a mistake. As pointed out, Obama will use. assymetrical or sensitivity interdependence: “A less dependent actor [in this case, the. hard power. However, it must be within an. U.S.] in a relationship which the actor may. overall rubric of smart power and neoliberal. be able to initiate or threaten will be less. principles. Obama made the removal of. costly to that actor than to its partner [i.e.,. Maliki. Iran in this case](p. 10).. a. condition. before. committing. military resources. This ensured a proper. It should be clear by now that the Obama. narrative to gain the co-operation of local. administration s Middle Eastern policies. Sunnis. He also insisted on forming an. fall within the rubric of smart power,. international. particularly. gained. The. administration. latter. has. the. wielding. of. America s. international. soft power. Obama is acutely aware that. legitimacy and acceptance for the use of. America s actions in the Middle East will. military force. In the end, a final solution. affect its image not only in that region but. to the Middle Eastern predicament will. globally. Partnerships and alliances breed. not come without full reconciliation and. trust and legitimacy with both partners. agreement among Sunni and Shia peoples. inside the coalition and observers outside. on. of it. The theory is explained eloquently by. a. the. coalition.. modus. predilection. vivendi.. for. Hence,. partnerships. Obama s with. the. Ikenberry:. international and local communities before using military force in the region. In the attempt to deny Iran of nuclear weapons, Obama has once again resorted. −75−. This is a sober intellectual vision that resists the foreign policy of big gestures and grand designs in favor of small steps and the search.

(18) 総合社会学部紀要 第 4 巻 第 1 号. for achievable gains. Obama is playing the long game , seeking to shift global partnerships and alignments in America s direction...The idea is that the United States needs to find ways to lead through new sorts of coalitions. Some might call this leading from behind , but it is closer to an idea that Obama framed in his 2013 UN General Assembly speech: America will lead if others are behind us(2014a, p. 3).. Obama also understands that hard power alone will not vanquish ISIS and Islamic terrorism in general. In fact, in a recent policy shift he has gone to great lengths to distinguish true Islamic faith from the perverted version of Islam espoused by these violent groups. Obama insists that these groups are not part of the Islamic faith and that a new narrative will be needed to weaken support for these groups. The task of creating such a narrative will fall to governments opposed to the terror groups and to leaders from within the faith. Obama s strategy is to form partnerships of trust and respect with leaders and followers of the Islamic faith in order to gain a deeper mutual understanding of each others values and beliefs. This strategy will also put the Islamic faith in a better light to the general public. As Nye(2012)notes, sometimes it is the best story ‒ not the best army that will win a war. In addition to the logic of coalition building and sanctions via organizations such as NATO and the European Union, the Obama administration has used the principles of interdependence to oppose Russia s action with respect to the Ukraine. Obama. is. making. Russia s. stance. as. costly as possible given its vulnerability. in the economic sphere. Russia, through oil and other commercial relationships with western countries, had progressively integrated itself into the world economy after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Substantial. economic. growth. and. the. burgeoning of a middle class in Russia is a testament to the successful assimilation of. Russia. However,. into. President. global. capitalism.. Putin s. nationalism. is jeopardizing these accomplishments as Obama and his European partners penalize him through sanctions and international isolation.12 Obama has been clear from the outset of the Ukraine-Russia crisis that it does not meet the conditions of a direct threat to national security since Ukraine is not a NATO member. Therefore, a hard power response is not warranted. However, Obama has stated that this could change if a NATO ally such as one of the Baltic countries were attacked. Obama is considering sending defensive arms to the Ukraine but it is not clear whether that will be necessary. The simple cost calculations and unlikely success of employing hard power in a geographical. area. where. the. opposing. party has the military advantage makes the argument for weapon shipments to Ukraine a difficult one to sustain. Obama is betting that the economic and political gains to be made from co-operation vis-avis the costs of sanctions will eventually convince Russia that it is in its interest to. discontinue. Ukraine. have. to. The. the. aggression. United. recognize. States Russia s. towards will. also. legitimate. national security interest in the region and. 12. While it is recognized that the decline in oil prices have had a heavier economic impact on Russia than sanctions, it cannot be denied that sanctions have also wreaked havoc on the Russian economy. See Boghani (2015).. −76−.

(19) Interdependence, Institutions and Smart Power. accommodate this in some manner. This. cooperation on global economic, financial. will likely involve Ukrainian action to. and environmental matters (Brzezinski,. abandon its bid for NATO membership and. 2010).. to agree to some form of neutrality. Such an. multilateral forums as well as on a bilateral. outcome would once again reveal Obama s. basis in what is a de facto G2 partnership. instinct to reach for tools other than hard. with China (Brzezinski, 2010). As Indyk,. power in issues of indirect significance to. Lieberthal. national security. In the case of Ukraine,. reported, not everything has gone smoothly.. Obama is employing not only a strategy of assymetrical interdependence but also one. The greatest failure has been the“inability to mitigate distrust over each other s long. of partnerships and institutions. Obama. term intentions” (Indyk et al., 2012, p. 33).. has relied extensively on his EU and NATO. On the one hand, China believes the United. allies to confront Russia. Frequent visits. States main goal is to stifle or contain its. by European leaders to Moscow have. rise. On the other hand, the United States is. made it clear that the US is not alone in its. unsure of the intentions of China especially. opposition to Russian policy.. in respect to its aggressive actions in the. Obama s. pivot. to. Asia. is. the. This. is. and. being. done. through. O Hanlon (2012) have. best. South and East China Seas. The United. illustration of the practice of the three core. States doubts China s willingness to play by. principles of neoliberalism. Obama s focus. international rules and to conduct itself as. on Asia is recognition of the global power. a responsible, rule abiding member of the. shift to the region. The administration. global order.. believes that too much time and attention. Obama is bringing all of his foreign. are being drawn to other issues namely. diplomatic tools to bear on this volatile. the terrorist threat from ISIS and other. but important relationship. Obama has. 13. groups.. Obama is fully aware of the rise. used hard power gestures, such as the. of Asian powers and the need to give them. tightening of military alliances with Asian. a larger voice in global affairs especially. partners, to signal that the United States. China. A breakdown in the relations with. is willing to use its military capabilities. China could spell global disaster. For all. to keep China in check. Yet, it is in the. intents and purposes, other foreign policy. sphere. of. issues, such as ISIS and the Russia-Ukraine. power. that. crisis, are in comparison of much lesser. his efforts in bringing to fruition the. importance.14. goal. of. interdependence, Obama. has. accommodating. and. soft. concentrated China s. role. Obama is engaging the region mainly. as a rising global power. The goal also. through a strategy of interdependence. The. includes convincing China to accept the. US is trying to draw China into constructive. basic framework and ground rules of the. See Obama (2015) interviewed by M. Yglesias: “We devote enormous resources to that (i.e., terrorism) and it is right and appropriate for us to be vigilant and aggressive in trying to deal with that... But we also have to attend to a lot of other issues, and we ve got to make sure we re right‒sizing our approach so that what we do isn t counterproductive”(p. 7). 14 See Zakaria (2011) especially pp. 10‒18. He argues the threat from terrorism must be considered within the larger context of world affairs. Terrorist activities, while worrisome, are limited in scope and geographical areas ‒ mainly the Middle East. 13. −77−.

(20) 総合社会学部紀要 第 4 巻 第 1 号. neoliberal global system. This can be done. rise of China.15 If successful, it will be a great. by gaining China s recognition of the. accomplishment of America s soft power.. contribution that constructive participation. China willingly submitting to the rules and. in the system can make to its successful rise. norms of the world neoliberal order would. (Indyk et al., 2012). In the end, as Ikenberry. be a reflection of the triumph of Nye s. notes, there is virtually no alternative to the. (2011)second face of soft power: America s. international neoliberal order and, therefore,. ability to set the agenda and choices. China and its elite. available via international institutions for those states who agree to abide by rules. ...will want the protections and rights relating to trade and investment. And they want to use the rules and institutions of Liberal internationalism as platforms to project their influence and acquire legitimacy at home and abroad. The UN Security Council, the G-20, the governing bodies of Bretton Woods institutions ‒ these are all stages on which rising non-western states can acquire great power legitimacy(2011, p. 60).. On. the. institutional. front,. Obama. of international organizations to shape China s behavior. This includes the ASEAN Regional forum where geopolitical issues are discussed and APEC where economic issues are negotiated. The United States found itself in a similar predicament after World War II:“The country operated within layers of regional and global economic, and. security. states will reap the economic and social benefits of system participation. In sum, the US-China relationship will revolve around two questions. First, can the US accommodate and accept China s rise as a legitimate power with an important voice on issues of regional and global significance? Second, can China learn to. and his Asian partners are using a web. political. of the international regime. In turn, these. institutions. and. constructed new ones ‒ thereby making itself more predictable and approachable and reducing the incentives for other states to undermine it by building countervailing coalitions” (Ikenberry, 2011, p. 68). Obama and the U.S. s allies will need to use the same strategy in order to achieve the peaceful. constrain its behavior and to act within the limits of internationally accepted norms? If the answer is yes to these questions, then both nations will prosper. The US will continue to play a central, if not leading role in world politics. China will be able to profit economically and otherwise from participation in the system. It will also rise to be a global leader winning the respect and trust of its neighbors. An affirmative answer to these questions will invariably be the result of applying neoliberal principles to their relationship. As explained by Moravcsik (cited. in. Goldsmith,. 2014),. Liberal theory understands the variance in the potential for co-operation or conflict that is dependent on state preferences. The latter preferences, in turn, can be influenced by soft power, economic interdependence. 15. This author believes, however, the recent decision by the Obama administration to not support the China conceived Asian Development Bank and to encourage others to refrain from joining it is a mistake. It suggests America is not willing nor ready to accept China s role as a leader in regional affairs. It will also confirm China s suspicions that the US is trying to contain rather than engage it. American opposition to the bank is in contradiction to the neoliberal policies adhered to by the administration until now and is a rather unsettling development.. −78−.

(21) Interdependence, Institutions and Smart Power. and membership in institutions. The realist. Concluding Reflections. alternative of strategic competition, in which distrust and military build-up are. In this paper, I have given an account of. manifest, is likely to lead to a new Cold War. liberal and neoliberal thought as it pertains. that could quickly deteriorate into military. to the field of International Relations.. conflict with disastrous consequences for. I have also attempted to make the case. both parties and, indeed, the world.. that since the fall of the Berlin Wall in. In general, Obama s foreign policy, from. the early 1990 s, we have entered a more. his strategies to combat insurgent groups. pronounced neoliberal world in which the. and political crisis in the Middle East and. concepts of institutions, interdependence. elsewhere, to his advocacy of nuclear. and smart power are the most appropriate. arms. rapprochement. tools both for the analysis of the global. with Cuba, is a demonstration of benign. system, and for the management of stability. and enlightened leadership. It limits the. and world order. In the final section, I. unilateral use of force to direct threats. argued that President Obama s approach. to. upon. to foreign policy is well grounded in. coalition building or formal institutional. neoliberal thought. The use of smart power,. support for the use of military force in. institutions and partnership building as. other situations. To secure or maintain. well as interdependence permeates both his. peace, it pursues interdependence among. words and actions.. reduction. national. or. security. the. but. insists. Nye (2012) has. nations. These policies are all elements of. famously. remarked. an overall strategy to strengthen America s. that power in the international system. soft power. This is central to America. has evolved in such a way as to evoke. maintaining its position as the world s. the description of a three dimensional. powerbroker. It appeals to global public. chessboard. On the top board, military. opinion and endears friendship. This type. power is dominant. On the middle board,. of soft power must be distinguished from. economic power is the main force at play. those who insist that one of the best forms. with numerous rising states taking their. of soft power is the support of democratic. rightful place as influential players on the. movements in countries where democracy. board. The bottom board is characterized by. has yet to be established. These calls often. transnational relations that are conducted. imply the imposition of democratic change. outside the domain of governments. Here,. through direct intervention, militarily if. international organizations, multinational. necessary. The experience of Iraq, Libya. corporations,. and elsewhere are sobering lessons for this. organizations,. kind of adventurist foreign policy. In the. individuals take primacy interacting with. long run, a more sophisticated approach to. governments or with each other. On this. foreign policy that nurtures development. board power is diffuse. The metaphor of the. and reform is a better way to secure both. three chessboards to describe our world is. America s soft power and global security.. pertinent. In this paper, I have emphasized. non-governmental terrorist. groups. and. the salience of soft power, partnerships and linkages among state and non-state actors.. −79−.

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