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Game Theory (2011) 

 

Course number: ECO290E 

Instructor: Yosuke YASUDA (yosuke.yasuda@gmail.com)  Term / Time / Room: Winter / Wed. 9:00‐12:00 / 5J 

Course web: https://sites.google.com/site/yosukeyasuda/Home/teaching/game11  Office Hours: Wed. 14:30‐16:30 (my office is C‐911) 

 

1. Course Description   

This  is  an  introductory  course  in  game  theory,  which  will  provide  you  with  mathematical  tools  for  analyzing  strategically  interdependent  situations,  i.e.,  the  situations  in  which  your  optimal  decision  depends  on  what  other  people  will  do.  In  particular,  we  will  study  central  solution  concepts  in  game  theory  such  as  Nash  equilibrium,  subgame  perfect  equilibrium,  and Bayesian equilibrium.  To  illustrate  the  analytical value of these tools, we will cover a variety of applications, e.g., international  relations,  business  competition,  auctions,  marriage  market,  and  so  forth.  There  is  no  prerequisite  for  this  course,  although  some  background  on  microeconomics  and  familiarity of probabilistic thinking would be helpful. 

 

2. Course Outline   

1: Introduction and motivation  2: Static games and Nash equilibrium 

3: Why and how is Nash equilibrium reached?  4: Applications of static games 

5: Mixed strategy equilibrium 

6: Dynamic games and backward induction  7: Midterm exam (90 minutes, 50 points)  8: Games in extensive‐form 

9: Applications of dynamic games  10: Bargaining 

11: Repeated games 

12: Static games of incomplete information  13: Applications of incomplete information games  14: Behavioral game theory 

15: Review session 

16: Final exam (90 minutes, 50 points)   

3. Grading   

Course grade will be determined by combining grades on a midterm exam (50%) and a  final exam (50%). There is no take‐home assignment. 

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4. Textbooks   

There is NO official textbook for the class. While lecture notes will be the main material  for  the  class,  the  following  textbook  is  recommended  for  those  who  need  supplementary readings. 

 

Robert Gibbons, Game Theory for Applied Economists, 1992   

A useful text at roughly the same level as Gibbons, but contains variety of examples, is:   

Martin Osborne, An Introduction to Game Theory, 2004   

The following introductory textbooks contain full of intuitive explanations:   

Avinash Dixit, Susan Skeath, and David Reiley, Games of Strategy, 3rd, 2009  Joseph Harrington, Jr. Games, Strategies, and Decision Making, 2008   

Those  of  you  interested  in  pursuing  the  subject  further  may  consult  the  following  advanced and authoritative sources. 

 

Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole, Game Theory, 1991  Roger Myerson, Game Theory, 1991 

Martin Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein, A Course in Game Theory, 1994 

(You can download it for free: http://theory.economics.utoronto.ca/books/)   

The following books contain many examples of game theory in action, both in business  and in everyday life. 

 

Avinash Dixit and Barry Nalebuff, The Art of Strategically, 2008 

The old version titled with Thinking Strategically (1991) is also recommended.  Preston McAfee, Competitive Solutions, 2002 

John McMillan, Games, Strategies, and Managers, 1992   

Finally,  the  following  recent  textbook  provides  a  lively  introduction  to  the  game‐theoretic  perspective  on  economic  development,  which  may  especially  attract  your interests. 

 

Bruce Wydick, Games in Economic Development, 2007       

 

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