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Advanced Microeconomics II (2013‐14) 

 

Course number: ECO601E 

Instructor: Yosuke YASUDA (yosuke.yasuda@gmail.com)  Teaching Assistant: TBA 

Term / Time / Room: Fall 2nd / TBA / TBA 

Course web: https://sites.google.com/site/yosukeyasuda/Home/teaching/micro13f_2     

 

1. Course Description   

This  is  an  advanced  course  in  microeconomics,  succeeding  to  Advanced  Microeconomics  I  (ECO600E)  in  which  we  study  individual  economic  decisions  and  their  aggregate  consequences  under  ideal  situations.  In  this  course,  we  extend  our  previous  analyses  to  incorporate  imperfectly  competitive  market  structures,  dynamic  market competitions, and incomplete information. To this end, we study game theory,  a collection of mathematical tools for analyzing strategically interdependent situations.   

 

2. Course Outline   

1. Expected Utility  2. Risk Aversion  3. Monopoly  4. Static Games  5. Mixed Strategies  6. Oligopoly 

7. Midterm Exam 90 minutes    8. Dynamic Games 

9. Repeated games 

10. Incomplete information Games  11. Auction Theory 

12. Dynamic Games with Incomplete Information  13. Bargaining and Cooperative Games 

14. Social Choice 

15. Final Exam 150 minutes   

 

3. Course Grade   

Course grade will be determined by combining grades on a midterm exam (40%) and a  final exam (60%). Problem sets with solutions will also be distributed. 

 

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4. Textbooks   

Advanced  Microeconomics  II  does  not  use  specific  textbooks.  Instead,  I  provide  my  own lecture notes, which is downloaded from my course website. 

https://sites.google.com/site/yosukeyasuda/Home/teaching/micro13f_2   

 

There are three textbooks that you may find useful to complement my lecture notes.  You  are  encouraged  to  purchase  the  first  one  ([G]);  its  level  and  coverage  are  most  appropriate for this course.   

 

[G] Robert Gibbons, Game Theory for Applied Economics, 1992 

[NS]  Walter  Nicholson  and  Christopher  Snyder,  Microeconomic  Theory:  basic  principles and extensions, 11th, 2011 

[JR] Geoffrey Jehle and Philip Reny, Advanced Microeconomic Theory, 3rd, 2011  The copies of related chapters will be distributed in class. 

 

For introduction to game theory, the following books are recommended:   

Avinash Dixit, Susan Skeath, and David Reiley, Games of Strategy, 3rd, 2009  Joel Watson, Strategy, 3rd, 2013 

 

Detailed textbooks at roughly the same level as Gibbons are:   

Martin Osborne, An Introduction to Game Theory, 2004  Steven Tadelis, Game Theory: An Introduction, 2012   

Those  of  you  interested  in  pursuing  game  theory  further  may  consult  the  advanced  and authoritative sources such as: 

 

Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole, Game Theory, 1991  Roger Myerson, Game Theory, 1991 

Martin Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein, A Course in Game Theory, 1994 

(You can download it for free: http://theory.economics.utoronto.ca/books/)   

A useful and concise textbook for theoretical analyses on oligopoly markets is:   

Luis Cabral, Introduction to Industrial Organization, 2000   

参照

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