CHAPTER VII CONCLUSION
7.5. Toward Future Directions
Despite its promising results, it should be noted that the effectiveness of PBG is subject to pre-requisites. UNCDF (2010) suggests that PBG by itself is not a solution for all accountability problems, and it is most useful and effective under certain conditions, e.g. solid analytical works, involvement of key stakeholders in its design, and transparent and publicly disclosed information. The research acknowledges these conditions and strongly recommends that, in addition to PBG implementation, other aspects that support good governance should be improved at the same time. For example, clarity in function assignments needs to be promoted so as not to create confusion about who should do what and be responsible to whom.
The design of PBG also needs to be adjusted and perfected, and the implementation procedures enhanced over time to accommodate the experience gained from previous PBG projects. In the following sections, the research suggests alternative schemes for PBG implementation and factors to consider in PBG allocation in a nation’s priority service areas.
a. Alternative scheme for PBG
In PBG for drinking water in Indonesia, the motivation to comply with all requirements may be due, or partly due, to the pre-financing requirement. The requirement makes local governments ‘pledge’ their budget as ‘collateral’ to the result of project implementation. Knowing that the funds used for pre-financing can be lost in the case of
incompliance, local governments are motivated to attain the standards so as to get the funds reimbursed. This is beneficial from the viewpoints of accountability and performance standard.
This requirement is rather strict as local budgets assume all pre-financing. In some circumstances, it might be necessary to acknowledge that potential PBG recipients are facing serious financial constraints which make them unable to assume full pre-financing.
For this reason, the research suggests that future PBG schemes can consider adapting alternative approaches with less strict requirements such as:
- Partial pre-financing scheme.
In this scheme, a portion of PBG is transferred up-front to support pre-financing from the local budget. The pre-financing portion will be reimbursed later if PBG requirements are satisfied. This scheme also requires local governments to provide
‘collateral’, but less burdensome than the full pre-financing.
- Installment transfers scheme.
In this scheme, PBG is transferred in several installments. The first installment is transferred up-front as working capital for a local government. The verification result of the first installment will determine the local government’s eligibility for the second installment, and so on. This scheme makes the local government ‘pledge’ the project instead of money from the local budget. Unless it complies with the PBG requirement, the project is at risk of being unfunded and unfinished.
- Reward scheme.
This scheme does not require a contribution from the local budget; rather it offers a reward if local governments can reach a certain achievement. No punishment is imposed if the target is not reached. For example, rewards are given to a local government whose region’s sanitation coverage improves by at least x%, or to local
governments whose audited financial statements are unqualified, etc. The challenge for this scheme is to determine indicators for such achievements.
b. Factors to consider in PBG allocation
The case on Indonesian intergovernmental grants provides an insight into how carefully designed conditional grants can easily shift into equalizing grants, as in the case of DAK. Although this can be justified as helping to reduce fiscal disparity, the resulting absence of conditional grants’ role in intergovernmental grants system can have adverse impact investment in public service. To correct this, the role of conditional grants needs to be restored and improved.
Learning from Indonesia case, the research suggests that intergovernmental grants need to be more focused on utilization, rather than mobilization, of financial resources.
Input-based grants put a lot of emphasis on financial resources mobilization by supplying local governments with unconditional and conditional grants, but what the input would become is of little interests in this instance. Central governments sometimes use an allocation formula that is meticulously designed to ensure fairness in input allocation, however without sufficient consideration on the result, the mobilization of input can have distorted consequences and not in line with the grants’ original purpose.
Focus on performance rather than input is strongly encouraged to improve accountability. Besides accountability, focus on performance also fosters local governments’
commitment to improve certain public service sectors. Also, conditional grants need to take into account the readiness and willingness of local governments to receive the grants and participate in the projects. In PBG, incentives are offered but at the same time so are the consequences for failure. Therefore, local governments need to consider whether they are willing to participate. In line with the spirit of decentralization, which upholds local
autonomy, local governments should be given the liberty to use their autonomy to decide whether to receive or not to receive certain grants from central governments.
In input-based conditional grants, allocation is made by central governments without prior approval from local governments, signifying a top-down approach. Since PBG requires strong commitment from local governments to comply with rather strict requirements, local governments’ approval should be taken into account before PBG allocation to each recipient. This approval is also necessary considering the punitive mechanism that is implicitly embedded in PBG: failure in complying with PBG requirements will results in delay, or even cancellation, of grants transfer. This consequence needs to be well communicated to minimize negative reactions from local governments in case they fail to fulfill the requirements.
Adopting PBG on a greater scale in any nation may require a lot of adjustments of institutional arrangements, both in local and central bureaucracy. Since PBG requires verification of a project’s implementation before transferring the funds, this system requires strong policy support from the central government, in particular the sectoral ministry, to handle the work and to cope with the pressure of making unpopular decision when local governments perform below standards. Political will to enforce negative consequences needs to be present.
Further research in institutional arrangements, as well as political and social factors surrounding PBG implementation, are strongly encouraged.
Bibliography
Ahmad, Ehtisham and Thomas, Ravi (1997). Financing Decentralized Expenditures. Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, Cheltenham.
Ahmad, J., Devarajan, S., Khemani, S., and Shah, S. (2005). Decentralization and Service Delivery. In Ahmed, Ehtisham and Brosio, Giorgio (ed.) Handbook of Fiscal Federalism.
Ahmad, Raza (2010). The Endemic Crisis of Federalism in Pakistan. The Lahore Journal of Economics 15:SE (September 2010), pp. 15-31.
Asfaw, A., Frohberg, K., James, K. S., & Jütting, J. (2007). Fiscal decentralization and infant mortality:
Empirical evidence from rural India. The Journal of Developing Areas, 41(1), 17-19,21-35.
AusAID (2009). Working Paper 2: Indonesia – Independent Evaluation of Australian Aid to Water Supply and Sanitation Service Delivery in East Timor and Indonesia. AusAID Office of Development Effectiveness, December 2009.
AusAID (2010). Dokumen Desain Program Komponen Penyediaan Air Minum sam Sanitasi Perkotaan:
Prakarsa Air Minum dan Sanitasi–Indonesia. Indonesia Infrastructure Initiatives, April 2010.
Australia-Indonesia Partnership (2011a). Consolidated Report of Verification Survey for Water and Sanitation Hibah.
Australia-Indonesia Partnership (2011b). Midterm Review and Verification Survey for Water and Sanitation Hibah.
Bahl, Roy and Wallace, Sally (2007). Intergovernmental Transfer: The Vertical Sharing Dimension. In Fiscal Equalization: Challenges in the Design of Intergovernmental Transfers. Edited by Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge and Searle, Bob. Springer Science Business Media, LLC. New York, USA.
Bergvall, D., Charbit, C., Kraan, D., and Merk, O. (2006).Intergovernmental Transfers and Decentralized Public Spending. OECD Network on Fiscal Relations across Levels of Government, Public Governance and Territorial Development Directorate O.E.C.D. Working Paper No. 3
Besley, Timothy and Ghatak, Maitreesh (2003). Incentives, Choices, and Accountability in the Provision of Public Services. The Institute of Fiscal Studies, Working Paper 03/08.
Bessho, Shun-Ichiro (2010). Implementation of Public Works and Intergovernmental Relationships in Japan.Policy Research Institute, Ministry of Finance, Japan, Public Policy Review, Vol.6, No.1, February 2010. Pp 167-198.
Bird, Richard M (2000). Transfers and Incentives in Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations. In Annual Worl Bank Conference on Development in Lation America and the Caribbean 1999: Decentralization and Accountability of the Public Sector. Edited by Burki, Shahid Javed and Perry, Guillermo. The World Bank, Washington D.C.. (2000).
Bisri, Hasan (2008). Peranan Lembaga Pemeriksa dalam Mengawal Transparansi dan Akuntabilitas Pengelolaan Keuangan Daerah. Pemeriksa No, 112/April-Juni 2008/Tahun XXVIII.
Blochlinger, H., Merk, O., Charbit, C., and Mizell, L. (2007). Fiscal Equalization in OECD Countries.
OECD Network on Fiscal Relations across Levels of Government. Working Paper No. 4/2007.
Boschmann, Nina (2008). Fiscal Decentralization and Options for Donor Harmonization. Development Partners Working Group on Local Governance and Decentralization. Berlin, December 2008.
Brinkerhoff, Derrick W. (2004) Accountability and Health Systems: Toward Conceptual Clarity and Policy Relevance. Health Policy and Planning; 19(6): 371–379.
Broadway, Robin (2007). Grants in a Federal Economy: A Conceptual Perspective. In Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers: Theory and Practices. Edited by Broadway, Robin and Shah, Anwar. The World Bank, Washington D.C..
Broadway, Robin and Shah, Anwar (2007). Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers: Theory and Practices. The World Bank, Washington D.C..
Broadway, Robin and Shah, Anwar (2009). Fiscal Federalism: Principles and Practices of Multiorder Governance. Cambridge University Press.
Brodjonegoro, Bambang and Martinez-Vasquez, Jorge (2002). An Analysis of Indonesia Transfer System:
Recent Performance and Future Prospect. In Alm, Martinez-Vasquez, and Indrawati (2004):
Reforming Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfer and Rebuilding Indonesia. Edward Elgar Publishing.
Brousseau, Eric (2008). Contracts: From Bilateral Sets of Incentives to the Multi-level Governance of Relations. In Brousseau, Eric and Glachant, Jean-Michel (ed.), New Institutional Economics: A Guidebook, pp. 37-66. Cambridge University Press, UK.
Calavan, M., Zuhro, S., Setiyono, M., Connerley, E., and Ashari, L. (2009). Democratic Decentralization Strategic Assessment: Indonesia – Final Report. United States Agencies for International Development (USAID), February 2009.
Camm, Frank and Stecher, Brian M. (2010).Analyzing the Operation of Performance-Based Accountability Systems of Public Sevices. RAND Education, CA.
Clarke, J., Gewirtz, S., and McLaughlin, E. (2000). New Managerialism, New Welfare? SAGE Publication Ltd, London, UK.
Coucouvinis, Jim (2010). Better Governance for Better Water Services. Prakarsa– Journal of Indonesia Infrastructure Initiative, Issue 4/October 2010.
Easterly, William. (2001).The Elusive Quest for Growth: Economists’ Adventures and Misadventures in the Tropics. MIT Press.
Eckardt, Sebastian (2008). Political Accountability, Fiscal Conditions, and Local Government Performance – Cross Sectional Evidence from Indonesia. Public Administration and Development 28, 1-7 (2008).
Edwards, J. D. 1998. Managerial Influences in Public Administration. International Journal of Organizational Theory and Behavior, 1(4): 553-583.
Ehrhardt, D., Rekas, M., and Richards, K. (2010). Investments in Indonesia’s Water Sector: Evidence of Financing, Capacity, and Governance Effects. Paper presented at the International Conference on Infrastructure Economics and Development, Toulouse France, January 14-15. 2010.
Faguet, Jean-Paul (2011). Decentralization and Governance. Economic Organization and Public Policy Discussion Papers, EOPP 027. London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK Fane, George (2003). Change and Continuity in Indonesia’s New Fiscal Decentralization Arrangements.
Bulletin of Indonesia Economic Studies, 39:2, 159-176
Ferrazzi, Gabriele (2008). Exploring Reform Option in Functional Assignments: Final Report.
Decentralization Support Facility (DSF), March 28, 2008.
Feruglio, Nicoletta and Anderson, Dallas (2006). Fiscal Decentralization Handbook. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).
Fiszbein, A. (1997). Emergence of Local Capacity: Lessons from Colombia. World Development, 25:
1029-43.
Friedman, Mark (2009). Trying Hard is Not Good Enough: How to Produce Measurable Improvements for Customers and Communities. Fiscal Policy Studies Institute.
Gervais, Maurice (2010). Hibah Daerah Transfer – Towards an Effective Demand-Driven System for Intergovernmental Grants. Indonesian Infrastructure Initiatives–Australia Indonesia Partnership.
Glynn, John J. (1993). Public Sector Financial Control and Accounting: Second Edition. Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, UK.
Halpern, J., Kenny, C., Dickson, E., Ehrhardt, D., and Oliver, C. (2008). Deterring Corruption and Improving Governance in the Water Supply & Sanitation Sector: A Sourcebook. Water Supply and Sanitation Working Note 18. The World Bank in September 2008.
Haque, M. Shamsul (2007). Revisiting New Public Management. Public Administrative Review, Jan/Feb 2007; 67:1. Pp 179-182.
Harvey, P. and Reed, R. (2007). Community-Managed Water Supplies in Africa: Sustainable or Dispensable? Community Development Journal 42(3):365-378.
Hawes, David (2010). From Jerricans to Taps: Bringing Water to the People. Journal of the Indonesia Infrastructure Initiatives, Issue 1, January 2010, pp. 6-13.
Herath, Gamini (2005). Analysis of the Potential and Problems of New Institutional Economics for Third World Development. International Journal of Social Economics, Vol. 32 Issue 10, pp.877–892 Hood, Christopher (1991). A Public Management for All Season? Public Administration 69 (1991): 3-19.
Hughes, Owen (2008). What is, or was, New Public Management? Paper presented at The Twelfth Annual Conference of the International Research Society for Public Management (IRSPM XII), 26-28 March 2008, at Queensland University of Technology, Australia.
Huther, J., Roberts, S., and Shah, A. (1997). Public Expenditure Reform under Adjustment Lending.World Bank Policy Research Paper No. 362 (1997).
Indonesian Investment Coordinating Board (2011). Identifikasi Peluang Investasi – Water Supply (Identification of Investment Opportunity–Water Supply).
Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistics (2007). Financial Statistics of Regency/Municipality Governments 2005-2006.
Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistics (2009). Financial Statistics of Regency/Municipality Governments 2007-2008.
Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistics (2011). Financial Statistics of Regency/Municipality Governments 2009-2010.
Indonesian Government Regulation No. 2/2012 on Regional Grants.
Indonesian Government Regulation No. 38/2007 on Functional Assignments between Central Government, Provincial Governments, and City/Regency Governments.
Indonesian Government Regulation No. 55/2005 on Balancing Funds.
Indonesian Law No. 32/2004 on Local Governments.
Indonesian Law No. 33/2004 on Fiscal Balance between Central Governments and Regional Governance.
Indonesian Minister ofFinance Decree No. 245/PMK.07/2010 on Regions’ Fiscal Capacity Map.
Indonesian Minister of Finance Decree No. 244/PMK.07/2011 on Regions’Fiscal Capacity Map.
Indonesian Minister of Home Affairs Decree No. 66/2011 on Regional Government Administrative Code and Data.
Indonesian Minister of Home Affairs Decree No. 52/2012 on the Management of Local Investments.
Indonesian Minister of Public Works Decree No. 15/PRT/M/2010 on Technical Guidance on Specific Allocation Funds (DAK) for Infrastructures.
Indonesian Ministry of Finance (2010a), Financial Note 2011.
Indonesian Ministry of Finance (2010b). Handbook Supplement 2011. Directorate General of Fiscal Balance, Jakarta.
Indonesian Ministry of Finance (2011). Handbook Supplement 2012. Directorate General of Fiscal Balance, Jakarta.
Indonesian Ministry of National Development Planning/National Development Planning Agency (Bappenas) (2010). Report on the Achievement of Millennium Development Goals (MDG) in Indonesia 2010.
Indonesian Ministry of Public Works (2010). Pedoman Pengelolaan Program Hibah Air Minum: Revisi Juni 2010.
Indonesian Ministry of Public Works (2011). Arah Kebijakan DAK Bidang Infrastruktur 2012.
Indonesian Ministry of Public Works, The World Bank, and Water Partnership Program (2012). Indonesia Water Investment Roadmap 2011-2014.
Indonesian People’s Representative Assembly Decree No. III/MPR/2000 on the Source of Laws and Hierarchy of Laws.
Inman, Robert P. and Rubenfeld, Daniel L. (1997). Rethinking Federalism. Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 11 No. 4 (Fall 1997) pp. 43-46.
Joskow, Paul L. (2008). Introduction to New Institutional Economics: A Report Card. In Brousseau, Eric and Glachant, Jean-Michel (ed.), New Institutional Economics: A Guidebook, pp. 1-19. Cambridge University Press, U.K.
Jun, Jong S. (2009). The Limits of Post-New Public Management and Beyond. Public Administration Review, Jan/Feb 2009; 69(1), 161-165.
Khemani, Stuti (2005).Local Government Accountability for Health Service Delivery in Nigeria. Journal of African Economies. Volume 15, No. 2, pp. 285-312.
Klein, P.G. (1999). New Institutional Economics. Department of Economics, University of Georgia, 0530, pp. 456-463.
Kumorotomo, Wahyudi (2010). The White Paper on DAK: Arguments and Possible Solutions. Working Paper No. 2, December 2010. Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta, Indonesia.
Lewis, Blane and Smoke, Paul (2008). Incorporating Subnational Performance Incentives in the Indonesian Intergovernmental Fiscal Framework. United States, Washington: National Tax Association.
Litvack, Jennie and Seddon, Jessica (1999). Decentralization Briefing Notes. World Bank Institute Working Papers, The World Bank.
Lynn, Laurence E. (1998). The New Public Management: How to Transform a Theme into A Legacy.
Public Administration Review May/Jun 1998:58.3.
Martinez-Vasques, Jorge and Boex, L.F. Jameson (1997). Fiscal Capacity: An Overview of Concepts and Measurement Issues and Their Applicability in the Russian Federation. Georgia State University, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies. Working Paper No. 97-3. June 1997.
Meijer, A. J., & Schillemans, T. (2009). Fictional Citizens and Real Effects: Accountability to Citizens in Competitive and Monopolistic Markets. Public administration and management, 14(2), 254-291.
Mochida, Nobuki (2006). Local Government Organizations and Finance: Japan. In Shah, Anwar (ed.).
Local Governments in Industrial Countries. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, Washington D.C..
Mohamad, Ismail (2007). Minimum Service Standards as Public Service Improvement Efforts: The Indonesia Experience. Eastern Regional Organization for Public Administration (EROPA), November, 2007,
Molenaar, K., Brown, H., Shreve, C., Smith, R. (2002). Corporate Culture. Professional Safety 47.7 (July 2002):18-27.
Mulgan, R. (2000). Accountability: An Ever-expanding Concept? Public Administration 78: 555–73.
Musgrave, Richard A. and Musgrave, Peggy B. (1973). Public Finance in Theory and Practice.McGraw-Hill.
Nevis, Sonia M., Backman, S., and Nevis, C. (2003). Connecting Strategic and Intimate Interaction: The Need for Balance. Gestalt Review 2003 Vol. 7 No. 2.
Neyapti, Bilin (2005). Equalization via Fiscal Decentralization. Turkish Economic Association.
Discussion Paper No. 2005/11, August 2005.
Nikolov, Dimce (2005). Decentralization and Decentralized Governance for Enhancing Delivery of Services in Transition Conditions. Background paper for the Regional Forum on Enhancing Trust in Government through Leadership Capacity Building. St. Petersburg, 28-30 September 2006.
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA).
North, Douglass C. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. Cambridge University Press.
North, Douglass C. (2008). The Foundation of New Institutional Economics. Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE), Washington D.C..
Nugrahanto, A.S., and Muhyiddin (2008). Fiscal Decentralization and Regional Inequality in Indonesia 2001–2004. Journal of Development Planning, Edition : 01/XIV, 2008
Oates, Wallace E. (1972). Fiscal Federalism. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc.
Oates, Wallace E. (1993). Fiscal Federalism. Gregg Revival, 1993.
Oates, Wallace E. (1999). An Essay on Fiscal Federalism. Journal of Economic Literature Vol. XXXVII (September 1999) pp. 1120-1149.
Olken, Benjamin A. (2010). Direct Democracy and Local Public Goods: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia. American Political Science Review Vol. 104, No. 2 May 2010
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (2008). Service Delivery in Fragile Situation: Key Concepts, Findings, and Lessons.
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (2010). OECD Economic Survey 2010.
Oxford Analytica Daily Brief Service, June 9, 2010.
Pearson, Mark (2011). Results-based Aid and Resul-based Financing: What Are They? Have They Delivered Results? HLSP Institute, London U.K., January 2011.
Pollitt, C., Birchall, J., and Putman, K. (1998). Decentralizing Public Service Management. MacMillan Press Ltd., London, UK.
Prud’homme, Remy (1995).The Danger of Decentralization. World Bank Research Observer Vol. 10 No.
2 pp. 201-220 (August 1995). Oxford University Press.
Raghavan, G. Narasimha (2004). New Public Management: Chennai. Centre for Civil Society Research Paper 2004. New Delhi.
Rhodes, R.A.W. (1996). The New Governance: Governing Without Governance. Political Studies (1996) XLIV, pp. 652-667.
Rodden, Jonathan A. (2006). Hamilton Paradox: The Promise and Peril of Fiscal Federalism. Cambridge University Press, NY, USA.
Rodriguez-Pose, Andres and Ezcurra, Roberto (2010). Is Fiscal Decentralization Harmful for Economic Growth? Evidence from OECD Countries. IMDEA Ciencias Sociale Working Paper Series in Economics and Social Science (2010/09).
Rondinelli, Dennis A. (1990). Decentralization, Territorial Power and the State: A Critical Response.
Development and Change, Vol. 21, Issue 3, 491-500, July 1990.
Rondinelli, Dennis A. and Nellis, John R. (1986).Assessing Decentralization Policies in Developing Countries: The Case for Cautious Optimism.Development Policy Review, Volume 4, Issue 1, pages 3–23, March 1986.
Ruttan, Vernon W., and Hayami, Yujiro (1984). Toward a Theory of Induced Institutional Innovation.
Discussion Paper No. 200, February, 1984. Center for Economic Research Department of Economics University of Minnesota
Satriyo, H.A., Abidin, A., Kusdaryanto, H., Bulosan, L.A. (2003), Indonesia Rapid Decentralization Appraisal (IRDA)–3rdReport. Asia Foundation, July 2003.
Schedler, A. (1999). Conceptualizing Accountability. In: Schedler A, Diamond L, Plattner MF (eds). The Self-restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 13–29.
Schillemans, Thomas (2008). Accountability in the Shadow of Hierarchy: The Horizontal Accountability of Agencies. Public Organization Review, 8(2), 175-194.
Schneider, Aaron (2003). Decentralization: Conceptualization and Measurement. Studies in Comparative International Development, Fall 2003, Vol. 38, No. 3.
Scott, Anthony and Schurer, Stefanie (2009). Financial Incentives, Personal Responsibility, and Prevention. Discussion Paper in Australian National Health and Hospital Reform Commission (NHHPC), June 2009.
Shah, Anwar (2006). A Practitioner’s Guide to Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers. Policy Research Working Paper Series 4039, The World Bank.
Shah, Anwar (2010). Sponsoring A Race to the Top: The Case for Result-Bases Intergovernmental Finance for Merit Goods. Research Policy Working Paper No. 5172.The World Bank.
Shah, Anwar and Thompson, Theresa (2004). Implementing Decentralized Local Governance:
Treacherous Road with Potholes, Detours and Road Closures. Policy Research Working Paper 3353.World Bank, Washington D.C..
Shah, A., Qibtiyyah, R., and Dita, A. (2012). General Purpose Central-Provincial-Local Transfer (DAU) in Indonesia: From Gap Filling to Ensuring Fair Access to Essential Public Services for All. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 6075, The World Bank.
Skoufias, E., Narayan, A., Dasgupta, B., Kaiser, K. (2011). Electoral Accountability, Fiscal Decentralization, and Service Delivery in Indonesia. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No.
5614.
Slack, Enid (2007). Grants to Large Cities and Metropolitan Areas. In Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers:
Theory and Practices. Edited by Broadway, Robin and Shah, Anwar. The World Bank, Washington D.C. (2007).
Steffensen, Jesper (2007). Introduction to the Principles for Design of Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfer Systems: An International Comparison of Allocation Criteria and Modalities. Nordic Consulting Group.
Steffensen, Jesper (2010). Fiscal Decentralization and Sector Funding: Principles and Practices. Annex 5:
Performance-Based Grant System – Concept and International Experiences. Danmarks Udviklingssamarbejde (Udenrigsministeriet - Danida).
Steffenson, Jesper and Larsen, Henrik Ferdborg (2005).Conceptual Basis of Performance-Based Grants.
Ter-Minassian, Teresa (1997). Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in a Macroeconomic Perspective: An Overview. In Fiscal Federalism in Theory and Practice, ed. By Ter-Minassian. International Monetary Funds, Washington D.C..
The World Bank (1995). Better Urban Service: Finding the Right Incentives. Washington D.C., USA.
The World Bank (2004). World Development Report 2004.
The World Bank (2006a). Review of Public Financing for Water Supply and Sanitation in Indonesia.
Water and Sanitation Program–East Asia and the Pacific (WSP-EAP). The World Bank, Jakarta.
The World Bank (2006b). Indonesia: Enabling Water Utilities to Serve the Urban Poor. World Bank Office Jakarta.
The World Bank (2007). Spending for Development: Making the Most of Indonesia’s New Opportunities.
The World Bank Jakarta, June 2007.
The World Bank and Global Partnership of Output-Based Aid/GPOBA (2009). Indonesia: World Bank-administered GPOBA Supports Expansion of Piped Water Supply to Surabaya’s Poor.Press Release No. 2009/2
Thomas, John Bossert (1998). Analyzing Decentralization of Health System in Developing Countries:
Decision Space, Innovation, and Performance. Journal of Social Science and Medicine. Vol. 47 No.
10 pp. 1513-1527, 1998.
Thomas, John Bossert and Mitchell, Andrew David (2011) Health Sector Decentralization and Local Decision-Making: Decision Space, Institutional Capacities and Accountability in Pakistan. Social Science & Medicine, Volume 72, Issue 1, Pages 39-48.
Tidemand, P., Steffensen, J., and Pyndt, H. (2003). PWC Design of Capital Grants Programme and Capacity Building Programmes for Local Governments Volume II, December 2003.
Toye, John (1995). NIE and Development Theory. In The New Institutional Economics and Third World Development. Harriss, J., Hunter, J., and Lewis, C.M. (eds). Routledge, New York.
Tremolet, Sophie and Evans, Barbara (2010). Ouput-based Aid for Sustainable Sanitation. OBA Working Paper Series No. 10, September 2010. The Global Partnership on Output-Based Aid (GPOBA).
United Nation Development Programme/UNDP (1997). Decentralized Governance Programme:
Strengthening Capacity for People -Centered Development, Management Development and Governance Division, Bureau for Development Policy, September 1997, p. 4.
United Nations Capital Development Funds/UNCDF (2010). Performance-Based Grant Systems:
Concepts and International Experience.
Usman, S., Poesoro, A., Suryahadi, A., Sampford, C. (2008). The Specific Allocation Funds (DAK):
Mechanism and Uses. SMERU Research Institute, April 2008.
Uzzi, John (1995). Re-engineering Doesn’t Have to be a Dirty Word.National Underwriter 9916 (April 17, 1995):49.
Vazquez, William F. (2011). Household Preference and Governance of Water Service: A Hedonic Analysis of Rural Guatemala. International Food Policies Research Institute (IFPRI), Working Paper No.
01152, December 2011.
Wallace, Sally and Bahl, Roy W. (2005), Public Financing in Developing and Transition Countries. Public Budgeting & Finance, Vol. 25, No. 4S, December 2005.
Weingast, Barry (2009). Second generation fiscal federalism: The implications of fiscal incentive. Journal of Urban Economics, 2009, vol. 65, issue 3, pp. 279-293
Whittington, D., Davis, J., Prokopy, L., Komives, K., Thorsten, R., Lukacs, H., Bakalian, A., and Wakeman, W. (2009). How Well is Demand-Driven, Community Management Model for Rural Water Supply Systems Doing? Evidence from Bolivia, Peru, and Ghana. Water Policy 11(6):696-718.