Principle 7 : Concern for Community
5.2 The development of the Zimbabwe land reform
153 | P a g e operate within a group, the 14 days payment period is easy to accept as compared when they are individuals.
Maize policy after the FTLRP
After the implementation of the FTLRP, the government took control of the maize markets (through the apparatus of the GMB). The GMB received subsidies from the government, bought maize at controlled prices and sold it to the millers at subsidized rates. This affected profitability of the maize producers as seen through just over half of the A1 (53%) and A2 (58%) farmers were selling through the GMB (Binswanger-Mkhize & Moyo, 2012, p. 65). The policy soon after the reform punished the farmers and protected the urban consumers, and this is in stark contrast to the rice policy in Japan where prices are still kept artificially higher for the benefit of the grain producers.
After dollarization in 2009, maize markets were liberalised, which saw the increase in importation of cheaply produced grains from the region. Although this improved access to grains, it negatively affected local producers as they had to compete from cheaper processed GMO maize from South Africa. Although the markets were liberalised, GMB still plays a significant role in the market primarily through the maintenance of the strategic grain reserve (290 thousand tonnes). One of the latest and most interesting developments in the maize policy is the Targeted Command Agriculture Programme or better known as Command Agriculture.
It is a Zimbabwe government-led Special Maize Import Substitution ‘contract-farming’ scheme for large and small-scale farmers using domestic finance capital resources. It brings state, private sector and farmers together to produce food (Mazwi, Chemura, Mudimu, & Chambati, 2019, pp. 6-9). Prior to such a program, the private sector was involved in maize markets through complex supply chain interlinkages (small-scale agricultural producers, traders and millers); however, for the first time, their participation has been observed in financing the production of maize under ‘contract-farming-type’ arrangements.
154 | P a g e p. 71). After colonization had been completed, land markets were controlled by the state, and in most cases, the local indigenous populations were not allowed to purchase freehold land. It was only later in the 1930s that the Native Purchase Areas were created for a few black elites to participate in the land markets. The process of land alienation and land grabbing, which began with the arrival of the white settlers was reinforced through more laws in the mid-1900.
From the 1930s, through a few laws (Land Apportionment Act of 1930, Land Husbandry Act of 1931, and the Tribal Trust Lands Act of 1965) oversize tracks of land were appropriated by the white-settlers and converted to private property lands creating a dualistic agrarian structure (Moyo S. , 1992). It is imperative to understand the structure and conduct of the land markets and the resulting agrarian structure because this has a significant bearing on the types of cooperatives that can be formed in these agricultural areas (see Chayanov 1991). In this section, I discuss the attempts to redistribute land under different economic models from 1980.
5.2.1 The Zimbabwean land markets and production (1980-2018)
Up to 1980, the contribution to the national agricultural output for the small-scale farmers (SSF) was limited due to several constraining policies under the colonial regime of Rhodesia.
In 1980, the new government faced the task of trying to correct this imbalance which was deeply embedded along racial and class lines. The bi-modal agrarian structure at independence had 39% of the arable land under white commercial farming, while one million black farmers possessed 49% (Moyo & Nyoni, 2013, p. 202). The white-settlers had private property rights while the blacks had customary tenure for their land. The land reform carried out by the state in the 1980s transferred 15% of white-controlled lands to 6% of the small-scale farmers (Moyo S. , 2000a, p. 72). People who benefited in this era form what is known today as the old resettlement areas. Indigenous land-seekers could also buy land through the willing-buyer-willing-seller system, which favoured black middle-class workers and those individuals close to the elites who had access to loans from the Agricultural Finance Corporation. One of the most exciting outcomes from this period (for my study) was an attempt to establish Collectives (under a scheme known as the Model B) like those in China, Russia and Tanzania. The scheme failed because it had weak financial backing, inadequate infrastructure and had higher degrees of poor management.
155 | P a g e Land reform attempts between 1980 to 1997
In the first decade after independence, the government sought to access and control land within the framework set by the 1980 Lancaster House Conference (LHC) agreement16. From 1980 to 1985, the sovereign state was still in its most infant stages, thus understanding the land tenure system it had inherited proved to be a herculean task (Herbst, 1987). In addition to the Communal Lands Act of 1981, the government set out the Land Acquisition Act (1985) to speed up the market-based land reform. This Act secured the right of first refusal to the government; thus, any agricultural land that would be sold in Zimbabwe had to be offered to the state before it was sold to anyone else. This had limited effect as the land supplied was very low, of poor quality, and priced artificially higher. The land redistribution in the markets (through state-mediated market mechanism) was profiting the white-settlers more while delaying land redistribution and re-establishing the white-settler control in both land markets and financial markets. The LHC agreement proved to be the most significant impediment to a faster land redistribution system between 1980 and 1990.
A few black elites managed to purchase land from the market through private loans secured from such institutions as the Agricultural Finance Cooperation (AFC). However, the rest of black Zimbabweans, traditional authority and Zimbabwe National War Veterans Association (ZNWVA/WVA) were excluded from the land markets, and the force of their agency to access land was not yet radicalized (Sadomba, 2011). It is noteworthy that women’s access to land was shallow at that stage. Even in the white-settler farms, women-only owned an average of 5% of the title deeds, and the land markets were extremely male-dominated. The funding from the UK, Germany and the USA had not flowed to the government as informally agreed during the LHC (not entrenched in the agreement) (Masiiwa, 2005, pp. 217-218). By 1988, the flow of funds had drastically reduced, and only £44 million had been received amid increased conditions set by the Conservatives of the UK government. In addition to setting the price of land they wished to sell, the LHC agreement gave the white-settler the right to choose in which currency they preferred to be paid in. This further complicated and delayed land market transactions given the shortages of foreign currency that was rampant at that time. Although some scholars (Kinsey, 2004, p. 1671) underplay the effect of the LHC on the pace of land
16 The LHC agreement was held in London (December 1979) to bring an end to the armed struggled between the Rhodesian white army and the black guerilla freedom fighters. It was an agreement to a cease-fire, renounce use of force for political gain, peaceful post-cease-fire election campaign and a pledge to accept the outcome of the elections thereof (Rhodesia, 1979).
156 | P a g e reform, it stunted progress of land redistribution from 1980 to 1995 (Moyo S. , 1995, p. 124).
Only 60 thousand families were resettled against a target of 160 thousand households on 2.1 million hectares (7% of the arable lands) by 1990 (Masiiwa, 2005, p. 218).
The LHC agreement expired in 1990, and land reform was expected to speed up; however, the adoption of ESAP made sure that this did not happen. The effect of this in the land market was a U-turn in power relations from state-led redistribution to market-based/white landowner-controlled transactions which was even worse than the LHC agreement. At this stage, the government was not sure of the implications of continued land redistribution (the Land Acquisition Act of 1992 which sought to acquire land compulsorily), while at the same time following a market-based economic mode of production. The Land Apportionment Act had much potential to accelerate the land reform had it been supported by the local farmers, donors and the international community. Instead, it was ridiculed. The IMF and World Bank recommended re-focusing of support to large-scale commercial production instead. Land redistribution was shelved during ESAP as focus shifted to the implementation of the economic reforms under supervision of the Bretton Woods institutions (Moyo, Chambati, & Siziba, 2014, p. 2).
Moyo and Skalness (1990) therefore stresses that: i) the purchase of land by influential party elites, ii) the unity accord of 1987, and iii) the continued economic crisis extinguished any thoughts of a state-led radical land reform. By 1995, the prospects of a state-led reform looked grim. By 1996, we start to see agency coming from below, increases in peasant’s rate of squatting in commercial farms, land occupations, widespread protests, armed confrontations and resource poaching as a form of agency against a state unwilling to do a redistributive land reform (Moyo S. , 2000a, pp. 10-11; Moyo & Yeros, 2005, pp. 182-186). By 1997, ESAP had caused disaster and untold mayhem in the land markets and to the lives of the rural poor by increasing differentiation in land use, labour and commodity marketing. More black-business capitalist joined the white-settlers in their quest to access land. CSOs and CBOs were silent in this stage. The farmer organisations were also quoted as useless in collecting the peasants’
voices as in most cases, were formed by white master-farmers who opposed land redistribution (Masiiwa, 2005). Here we learn that the peasant organisations that existed in the rural areas did not represent the socio-political needs of the peasants. Isolated and low intensity that had started in the 1980s (by war veterans and non-war veterans, peasants, traditional leaders and farm workers) and were heavily repressed by the state had persisted and kept the land reform agenda alive (Sadomba, 2011). I argue in this thesis that if there had been reliable social
157 | P a g e organisation in the rural areas, amicable land reforms would have occurred or if not, the radical land reform would have happened earlier than it did.
Land markets and reform policies, 1997 to 2010
Although ESAP was officially abandoned in 2001, the government had started to move away from it from 1996 onwards. The budgetary support from the UK had officially expired. The new Labour Party made it clear that it was not going to support further land reform programs through the infamous Clare Short letter (Secretary of State for International Development). The intensity of land squatting, inversions and occupations was picking up pace. The WVA which had been formed in 1989 took it upon themselves to initiate restructuring of land markets.
Between 1996-1997, the government used the Land Acquisition Act (1992) provisions such as land under-utilisation, multiple farm ownership, derelict land, absentee farm-owners and proximity to Communal Areas (CA) to identify 1471 farms for resettlement (Chayanov A. V., 1991). Sadly, the program failed. It was implemented within a liberalized market which was to respect private property rights. Just as in the 1993 and 1995 court cases against the state’s compulsory land acquisition program, the land-owners challenged and won back 40% of these farms.
It was at this stage that farm occupations intensified beginning with the famous action in Svosve village in 1998 which spread to other areas such as Manicaland, Masvingo and even Matabeleland (Sadomba, 2008, pp. 98-105). This time around, the peasants (through the WVA) had amassed political connections and were not facing state repression anymore. While other scholars viewed this social movement as the works of powerful elites in the ZANU PF party, others argued that it was, in fact, the WVA who had established itself with influential elites (Moyo S. , 2000a) and that the government, realising the extent of the land occupations and pressure for land by the poor, had co-opted it into its land acquisition agenda. The 1998 donor conference was subsequently organised to try and mobilize funding to the Zimbabwe government so that it would pay compensation. The property rights (enshrined in the constitution in 1980) were still being protected under laws and delayed the compulsory land acquisition process much to the chagrin of the state. In the meantime, WVA and elite political leaders further fuelled radicalism. The donor conference resolutions crumbled. By 1999, GoZ still could not smoothly redistribute the remaining 60% of the farms as more court challenges came. This unified the peasants, the state, WVA, party officials and traditional authority to push the land reform agenda forward. For the first time since independence, the WVA had amassed adequate power to challenge the inequitable land distribution (see Table 5.1). Once
158 | P a g e the peasants had a unified voice, we see the power of social organisations and the ability to link with the state apparatus in action for the first time since independence.
Table 5.1: Source, type and effectiveness of land demand 1997-2014
Source: Adapted from Moyo (various writings); Muchetu (2018, p. 76)
In the wake of failed donor’s conference, failed land reform and a rejected referendum (1997-2000), small cases of land occupations, farm inversions and squatting then developed into full-scale occupations that would last until 2003-2004. Once the peasants and WVA had pressured the state to implement the Fast Track Land Reform Program (FTLRP) through a new Land Acquisition Act of 2000 which finally removed the need to pay compensation for the invaded farms. In this respect, a state-led economic model of production was adopted, which saw the GoZ reasserting authority throughout the agrarian markets from input distribution to output marketing.
Although the WVA were already carrying out land occupations, officially, the FTLRP was launched in July 2000 as part of the second phase of the land reform (Sachikonye L. M., 2005, p. 33). It was a completely different creature from the previous land delivery systems. It was ideologically different in that it no longer respected the property rights held by the white-settlers. This reform was institutionally supported by the state as seen through increased constitutional amendments to allow for no compensation, remove legal challenges and protection of the land occupiers from eviction (Rural Land Occupiers Act of 2000). Some of these acts had to rely on presidential decrees vested in the ‘Presidential Powers Act’ to be passed. Moreover, the FTLRP was to be taken on an accelerated manner with speeding up of land identification, planning, demarcation and resettlement of the people (Moyo & Yeros, 2005, p. 192; Sadomba, 2008, p. 180). However, just like the previous reform program, the FTLRP was hinged on achieving equitable land ownership, poverty reduction, increased productivity which formed the socio-economic objectives of the reform. Furthermore, it targeted the