Responsibility Attribution

Attribution theory deals with the study of perceived causation (Kelley &

Michela, 1980). Attribution theory was first developed in Fritz Heider’s seminal work The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations (1958) to explain how everyday people explained the causes of events. Over the years, Heider’s theory was refined by Weiner (1982; 1985; 1986; 1995a; 1995b) and Kelley and colleagues (Hovland, Janis, &

Kelley, 1953; Kelley, 1973; Kelley & Michela, 1980).

Russel (1982) developed Weiner’s findings into a causal dimension scale assessing causal perceptions in terms of locus of causality, external control, personal control, and stability. While this scale was originally developed for individuals, the fundamental elements are applicable to organizations. When applied to organizational actions, stability reflects whether the cause of the event is perceived as a one-time aberration or an overall pattern. If the same cause appears repeatedly, it is stable, but if it shows infrequently it is considered unstable. The personal control dimension embodies whether the cause of the crisis was controllable by the organization.

External control refers to whether the cause of the crisis was controllable or uncontrollable by anyone other than the organization. For instance, if another element controls what happens to stakeholders, external control is thought to be high (Coombs, 2007a). Locus of control reflects whether “the event’s cause is something about the actor or something about the situation” (Coombs & Holladay, 1996, p. 281). Since research on external control and locus demonstrates an overlap, Wilson, Cruz, Marshall, and Rao (1993) suggested that the two causal dimensions be combined into one. However, little research has been done into the potential universality of these concepts across cultural contexts.

4.1.2 Cultural Differences in Responsibility Attribution

Western social psychologists and crisis communication scholars have found causal attribution to be a necessary precursor to responsibility judgments (Coombs, 2007b; Coombs & Holladay, 2002; Schwarz, 2008; Shaver, 1985; Weiner, 1986, 1995a). Legal psychologists have argued that beyond causation, the judgment that a duty has been violated is an additional predictor of responsibility attribution (Hamilton & Hagiwara, 1992). A violation of a duty is a violation of one’s role responsibility. Role responsibilities range from general social norms, which all individuals should adhere to, to more specific obligations such as what is expected from the leader of an organization. The degree to which both actual deeds and the more contextual role responsibilities factor into responsibility attributions can vary across cultures. Japanese, for example, gave more weight to an actor’s role responsibilities and social context while Americans emphasized an actor’s deeds (Hamilton et al., 1983).

These differences in focus can be seen as linked to the fundamental differences between collectivist and individualist societies. In individualist societies, people are “autonomous and independent from their in-groups; they give priority to their personal goals over the goals of their in-groups, [and] they behave primarily on the basis of their attitudes rather than the norms of their in-groups” (Triandis, 2001, p.

909). This concept of the individual as independent and clearly separate from others leads to a self-construal that focuses primarily on internal characteristics such as personality traits, values, and abilities (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Evaluations of the actions of others reflect this view of the self, focusing on internal aspects rather than contextual explanations when assessing perceived offenses. Collectivist societies, on

the other hand, emphasize values that serve the group and elevate group needs over personal goals. Interdependence and harmonious relations are focal aspects of collectivism (Triandis, 2001). This value orientation, in turn, results in an interdependent view of the self, where “others become an integral part of the setting, situation, or context to which the self is connected, fitted, and assimilated” (Markus &

Kitayama, 1991, p. 227). The individual is, therefore, seen as less separate from others and more connected to the social context resulting in evaluations of the actions of others that are primarily context dependent. One key difference between Japan and many Western cultures that arises from these divergent views of the self in relation to others is the degree of responsibility attribution to individuals and groups.

While a manager may be held accountable for the mistakes of his subordinates or a parent might be called to take responsibility for a child or, in general, U.S.

Americans do not take responsibility for problems they did not cause (Sugimoto, 1998). This stands in contrast to many East Asian cultures. Menon, Morris, Chiu, and Hong (1999) suggested that East Asian audiences are more likely to attribute negative outcomes to characteristics of collectives rather than individual agents. Their survey of newspaper articles about “rogue trader” scandals revealed that Japanese newspapers made more mention of the organization, while U.S. papers referred more frequently to the individual trader involved. Kashima et al. (2005) found that Japanese subjects attributed considerably more agency to groups than North Americans and Europeans. Zemba, Young, and Morris (2006) referred to this tendency as collective agency orientation or proxy logic. This strong degree of in-group or hierarchical responsibility sharing is reflected in responsibility attributions and subsequent account giving that can, at times, seem utterly foreign to Western observers. In Japan, for example, it is not uncommon to see companies publicly apologize for the actions of

their employees as private individuals outside of working hours. Companies will, for example, apologize for employees who have caused accidents while drinking and driving (Horita, 2006). In the United States, with the exception of high-profile cases, the offender’s employer would have no connection to the offense and would not be mentioned in news reports. In Japan, on the other hand, newspaper articles and reports will regularly include the company affiliation of offenders. In general, Japanese will be held responsible for the offenses of a much larger circle of individuals than is typical in the United States (Sugimoto, 1998), and causal attributions are not necessary for a Japanese audience to make a responsibility judgment. An et al. (2010) examined proxy responsibility considerations in relation to crisis communication and contrasted post-crisis reactions of both Americans and Koreans. The study found that Korean subjects considered employees as part of the corporate family, which made strategies that attempted to blame individual employees ineffectual. This difference was attributed to the strong collective values present in Korean society. Overall, there seems to be a considerable likelihood that wider circles of responsibility and proxy logic consideration will impact both the initial assessment of crisis responsibility as well as the appropriateness of certain CRS.

The collective agency orientation is closely related to an interdependent self-construal. This view of the self focuses not on the individual but the self as a part of a greater whole. The drive for uniqueness and distinctiveness of the independent self-construal is replaced with a desire for connectedness and interdependence. For those with an interdependent self-construal,

the unit of representation of both the self and the other will include a relatively specific social context in which the self and the other are embedded. This means that knowledge about persons, either the

self or others, will not be abstract and generalized across contexts, but instead will remain specific to the focal context. (Markus &

Kitayama, 1991, p. 231)

Hamaguchi (as cited in Markus & Kitayama, 1991) wrote, that for the Japanese,

a sense of identification with others (sometimes including conflict) pre-exists and selfness is confirmed only through interpersonal relationships. […] Selfness is not a constant like the ego but denotes a fluid concept which changes through time and situations according to interpersonal relationships. (p. 228)

This view of individuals as being continuously redefined by their contexts is reflected in responsibility attribution processes. When deciding with whom to place responsibility for an offense, Japanese often focus on the offender’s social roles and the effect other parties, including victims, had on the context in which the misdeeds occurred, while Americans focus on an offender’s deeds and state of mind (Hamilton

& Sanders, 1992). This reflects findings that those from collectivist cultures focus more on contextual and situational factors rather than individual disposition. A number of researchers (Argyle, Shimoda, & Little, 1978; Bond, 1983; Miller, J. G., 1984; Morris & Peng, 1994) agree that members of collectivist cultures “are less likely to show the correspondence bias, or a preference for explanations of behavior in terms of traits, dispositions, or other internal attributes of the target” (Choi, I. et al., 1999, p. 47). Extending such cultural differences to responsibility judgments in organizational crises, we can expect to see a higher attribution of responsibility to the organization irrespective of causal attributions, especially in the case of

related-entity/employee malicious tampering or misconduct due to agency orientation and greater emphasis on role responsibilities. Similarly, collective agency might pose an obstacle for attempts by an organization to frame responsibility as residing with a single actor or group within the organization. Such attempts would further be hindered by the comparatively greater weight of contextual over dispositional or trait considerations.