Chapter 3: Politics of De-concentration: Sharing State Power with
3.4 Actor network creation
3.4.2 Prominence of Local Residents
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Figure 3.1: NEPC board members from 1987 to 2006
Source: Collected by the author from the Government Gazette on the Appointment of Energy Authority Commission from 1987 to 2006.
By percentage, the economic agencies were the dominant shapers of discourse on NEPC’s board. Their economic backgrounds would influence the board’s choice of ideas and language. That was apparent in the discourse promoting liberalization of state energy enterprises: it concentrated heavily on economic issues such as budget deficits, recovering economic growth through private investment, and helping public enterprise compete with foreign companies to generate more revenue for the government. But which groups controlled the counter-discourse of social movements? The next section addresses that issue.
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governments. Movements whose members came from the rural poor or local communities created their discourse in alliance with business, environmental, academic, and non-governmental organizations locally, regionally, nationally, and internationally.
The principal organization behind the Anti-Pak Mool Dam Movement was the Poor People’s Assembly composed of locals affected by the construction of the Sirindhorn Huai Ra Ha, Lam Kan Chu, and Lam Dome Yai dams218. But it also was supported by many advocacy networks, including academic groups like the Scholar Assembly for Poor People; environmentalist groups like the Esan Environmental Resource Network and the Club of Song Kram River Basin Restoration; activist groups like the Political Reform Monitoring Network, the October Network, and the People Right Protection Group; and international organizations like the World Commission on Dam, the International River Network, and the International Environmental Protection Group219.
The primary network supporting the Anti-Mae Moh Coal Power Plant Movement was the Association for Local Environment Protection in the Mae Moh District and the Mae Moh Patient’s Right Network of local residents living around the power plant site.
This movement also was supported by advocacy networks such as Greenpeace Southeast Asia and other environmental NGO groups in northern Thailand220. Bureaucratic entities such as the governor, public school teacher groups, provincial public health officers, local
218 Montrira Pupaknum, “A Survey of Happy Lifestyle: Mae Moon Meun Yeun, Being An Ad hoc Community Due to the Dam Construction,” Matichon, December 17, 1999, 12.
219 Manager, “NGOs around the World Support the Anti-Pak Mool Dam Movement,” May 20, 2000, 3; Khaosod, “University Lecturers Sign the Name for Sending a Letter to Condemn the Government,”
May 22, 2000, 12.
220 Manager, “Northern NGOs Go to the Mae Moh Power Plant Site to Convince Villagers for Joining the Movement,” April 1, 1999, 8; Bangkok Biz News, “Greenpeace Points the State Cancel Coal Power Plants,” August 22, 2002, 9.
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business groups such as the Chamber of Provincial Commerce, and local political groups were advocacy networks for the movement as well221. This phenomenon differs from the general case in Thailand because bureaucratic, business, and local political networks ordinarily support energy projects or take no action in their communities. In the case of the Antai-Mae Moh Coal Power Plant Movement, the governor’s participation made this case different. The province’s senior administrative authority connected the movement to provincial administrative groups, local politicians, and local businesses who joined the movement’s protest222.
The Group of Prachuap Lovers and the Group of Bor Nok Lovers were the primary networks supporting the Anti-Bor Nok-Hin Krut Coal Power Plant Movement223. The Student Federation of Thailand, the Commission for Natural Resources and Environmental Preservation, the Campaign for Popular Democracy, the Group of Alternative Energy Study, the Group of Writers and Artists,224and the senator’s group225 also supported this movement. The international network Greenpeace supported the movement by sending an open letter to the Thai government opposing construction of the power plant226.
221 Prachachat, “Mae Moh People Prepare the Demonstration on November 24,” November 19, 1998, 26.
222 Siamrat, “Mae-Moh Power Plant Emits Pollution, the Governor Asks EGAT How to Evacuate People to a Safety Zone,” September 1, 1998, 3.
223 Khaosod, “Opening Another Anti-Prachuap Power Plant,” December 19, 2000, 9.
224 Khaosod, “Poets and Writers Join the Demonstration in Bor Nok-Hin Krut,” March 1, 2002, 12; Bangkok Biz News, “NGOs Join the Big Demonstration for Anti-Prachuap Power Plant,” February 27, 1999, 11–12.
225 Bangkok Biz New, “Forty Senators Oppose the Power Plant,” October 10, 2000, 17–18.
226 Bangkok Biz News, “Greenpeace Suggests Thailand Should Cancel Prachuap Power Plant,”
October 7, 2000, 8.
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The main network supporting the Anti-Thai-Malaysian Natural Gas Pipeline Movement was affected local residents and communities227. Environmental groups, NGOs, academic groups, and international networks such as the Commission of Sixteen Institutes for Natural, Resource, and Environmental Preservation, the Study Group for Sustainable Natural Resources, the Non-Governmental Organizations of Southern Thailand, student federations of seven universities, the Federation of Southern Fisherfolk, and networks of fishermen in 12 Asian countries were among the movement’s advocacy networks228.
Affected local residents and communities constituted the core networks of these movements, and their discourse reflected their thought and expression. That is evident in their portrayal of the rural poor as marginalized populations, their concern with excluding local residents from decisions about construction projects, their aversion to limiting access by local residents to project information, and their refusal to let government stifle dissenting opinions.
Conclusion
This chapter clarifies how the Thai government formulated the privatization policy and what factors shaped discourse about it. Privatization policy was formulated during periods of the global energy crisis and influenced by international financial bodies that advocated liberalization and privatization. Three kinds of initiatives embodied the policy shift toward liberalization and privatization: deregulation to create public-private
227 Khaosod, “Songkhla People Gather for Anti-Thai-Malay Gas Pipeline,” July 1, 2001, 11.
228 Bangkok Biz News, “Joint Resolution by 12 Asian Countries for Anti-Thai-Malay Gas Pipeline,” January 30, 2002, 10; Matichon, “700 Scholars Announce They Do Not Want the Thai-Malay Gas Pipeline,” November 24, 2002, 2; Khaosod, “7 Student Organizations Oppose the Thai-Malay Gas Pipeline,” November 3, 1999, 9.
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partnerships, increasing private investment, and IPOs. Government’s discourse in advocating those initiatives emphasized such principles as the concerns over public finance, energy security, and market competition. The network that selected these discourse tropes was comprised composed of economic agencies such as the Ministries of Finance, Commerce, and Social and Economic Development.
However, social movements presented a counter-discourse to these policies and initiatives. Their opposing discourses emphasized environmental and health concerns, social class, transparency, informational access, and rights to disagree with and participate in policy decision. The rural poor or residents of communities surrounding energy project sites formed the network that controlled this counter-discourse.
This chapter elevated understanding of the thinking that compelled privatizing Thailand’s state energy enterprises and the influences motivating those who advocated it.
Second, the chapter extended the relevance of Sukkumnoed’s research into the four groups who produced four discourse tropes that guided energy policy discourse. This chapter refined these observations for the period 1987–2006, establishing how economic agencies shaped discourse in the energy policy arena. It also extended Sukkumnoed by ascertaining that affected residents and local communities constructed counter-policy discourse centered upon social class, democracy, and transparency.
The initial shift of Thailand’s energy policy—from state-centric to liberalization—began in 1987, but in 2006 a military government recentralized policy.
The second shift occurred on what kinds of global factor, policy option, and discourse, and actor network creation. The next chapter takes up those issues.
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