If we want to understand the root of the US’s overwhelming influence, we must know how these international organizations have come into being. Neorealists such as Robert Gilpin suggest that a great power creates favorable international institutions including some specific organizations;
therefore, there is one direct way to establish or modify the institution, and US preponderance can be derived from its overwhelming power status.
3.1 Relative Power and the US Influence on International Organizations
Power theory can also directly explain the US’s overwhelming influence on postwar international organizations.
First, international organizations have been established on the basis of the power superiority of the hegemon, a viewpoint upon which Hegemonic Stability Theorists insist and Neoliberal Institutionalists partly agree.46 Hegemonic Stability Theory emphasizes Neorealism institutional thought surrounding the rise and fall of hegemonic power. The theory argues that international organizations have been created by the hegemon and consequentially will benefit it more. If changes take place in the distribution of state capabilities, newly rising states will not be able to avoid challenging the existing hegemonic order.47 Therefore, peacefully or not, the influence of the hegemon on international organizations will decrease. Accordingly, the organizations themselves (including their principles, rules, and arrangements) will be altered. The more drastic the decline of the hegemon, the more likely rising countries will challenge the existing order. For instance, the power distribution in the IMF has been prescribed as a system of quotas based on the economic scale of the member states. Therefore, the incessant development (positive or negative) of every member state in the IMF will naturally lead to quota redistribution and voting power reallocation. As for global communication institutions, Krasner notes, the power evolution has evoked some corresponding changes in this regime.48
46 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, 1981; Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony:
Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, 1984.
47 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, 1981.
48 Stephen D. Krasner, “Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier,” pp.
336-56.
Second, according to Neorealist master Kenneth N. Waltz, the, great powers must learn from their successors in international competition in order to survive and thus become more similar in crucial state sectors. This is called “the socialization effect,” which is also transferred to the organization and reinforces the hegemon’s interest. If the hegemon declines or has been surpassed by other great powers, the hegemonic ideology and institution will lose its attraction in international organizations. Because it holds hegemonic status, US values, institutions, and ideology have great appeal to other states, which makes permeating international institutions with American concepts and ideology relatively easy. In the economic arena, a wide-ranging set of international economic organizations—including the IMF, the World Bank, and GATT—all grew up under a protective American “umbrella” and actually are often derived from American initiative. The world economy itself was heavily influenced by the rise of modern multinational corporations and banks whose contemporary form is largely of US origin. Accordingly, the US benefits greatly from the liberalized principles of postwar international institutions.
Third, the hegemon is able to affect the function and decision-making process of international organizations by providing indispensable funds, technology, and personnel. A well-known case that needs to be mentioned here is the US withdrawal from UNESCO in 1984. The US walked out of UNESCO to protest the organization’s growing politicization and “anti-Western” bias, rampant budgetary mismanagement, and advocacy of policies that undermine freedom of the press and free markets.49 When talking about returning to this organization, one American analyst commented on this issue negatively, “if the United States were to rejoin UNESCO, it likely would again become its largest financial contributor by providing 25 percent of the biennial budget (approximately $136 million every two years).”50 Therefore, it appears that when the most powerful states in a system cannot realize the goal they have originally set, they can reject that arrangement even though they may not be able to build a new one. The withdrawal of the US put huge pressure on UNESCO, but the institution lasted with the support of two newly rising great powers—Japan and the Soviet Union.
At the same time, US influence has been removed from this cultural organization for more than ten years.
49 Brett Schaefer, “Not the Time for the United States to Rejoin UNESCO,” at the Official Website of Heritage Foundation: http://www.heritage.org/Research/InternationalOrganizations/BG1405.cfm.
50 Ibid.
Although unfortunate, it cannot be denied that without the participation of the most powerful states, any kind of system will finally turn out to be an empty shell. As Richard Haas said, by action or inaction, the US affects the course of history.51 When President Clinton decided not to attend the World Summit for Social Development held in Copenhagen in 1995, the president of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) complained. He said that a summit without Clinton is like “Hamlet” without the king of Denmark.52 Another less familiar example concerns the war in Bosnia. In 1992, the Europeans essentially told the US, “Hands off, this is our war.” However, it only ended in 1995 when the U.S. grudgingly accepted the responsibility that comes with being No.
1 and dispatched a handful of cruise missiles to Pale, the capital of the Bosnian Serbs. In global diplomacy, nothing happens unless Washington shakes off its lethargy and grabs the reins.53
Fourth, hegemonic states enjoy the highest “prestige” in international politics; a prestige which Robert Gilpin has described as “monetary” in the world economy. This makes challenging US interest-oriented international institutions highly risky.54 At the symbolic level, the hegemonic state can be seen as a role model of how economic development can be achieved. Its policies may be emulated, even though they may be inappropriate for other states. If some country is reluctant to be subjected to changes due to dramatic asymmetries, military power can be used to coerce the weaker states into an open structure. At the same time, the hegemonic state can use its economic resources to facilitate international institutions. In terms of positive incentives, it can offer access to its large domestic market and to its relatively cheap exports. In terms of negative ones, it can withhold foreign grants and engage in competition that is potentially ruinous for weaker states in third-world markets. Therefore, the hegemon can frequently amass majority support through a number of diplomatic methods under the condition that most of the international organizations make important decisions through voting by the member states instead of executive decision. If the hegemon declines and becomes a secondary country in the international system, its capability for providing incentives and acquiring support will accordingly shrink.
Fifth, as the hegemon, the US provides security protection to many alliances, and thus a great
51 John T. Rourke, International Politics on the World Stage (9th Edition), Guilford: McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2002, p. 89.
52 Ibid.
53 Josef Joffe, “America the Inescapable,” 2003, p. 63.
54 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, 1981.
number of states support the US in the establishment and functioning of international organizations as a kind of exchange or cooperation. Realist in orientation has been the mainstream foreign policy strategy since 1940. This has specifically been manifested by containment, deterrence, and the maintenance of the global balance of power. Facing a dangerous and expanded Soviet Union after 1945, the United States stepped forward to fill the vacuum left by a waning British Empire and a collapsing European order to provide a counter-weight to Stalin and his Red Army. Although containment and global power balancing ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, this strategy yielded a bounty of institutions and partnerships for America.55 Among the most significant ones have been NATO and US-Japan alliances. American-led security partnerships have survived the end of the Cold War by providing a bulwark for stability through commitment and reassurance. The United States maintains a forward presence in Europe and East Asia, where its allies gain security protection as well as a measure of regularity in their relationship with the world’s leading military power. This strategy relies on a loose framework of consultations and agreements to resolve differences. The purpose of alliances always went beyond their primary influence in countering a specific threat from a hostile state or bloc. For example the post-war alliance system has been important not only in balancing and ultimately removing the threat posed by the Soviet Union, but also in managing relations between the various alliance partners and their neighbors. This influence has survived the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. A good example is the contribution that the United States’ alliance with the Republic of Korea has made toward maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula.
3.2 The Measure of National Power
At first glance, the disparity between American power and that of the rest of the world looks overwhelming. “In terms of military power, the United States is the only country with both nuclear weapons and conventional forces with global reach. American military expenditures are greater than those of the next eight countries combined, and it leads in the information-based ‘revolution in military affairs.’ In economic size, America’s 31% share of world product (at market prices) is equal to the next four countries combined (Japan, Germany, Britain and France). In terms of cultural
55 G. John Ikenberry, “America’s Imperial Ambition,” in Foreign Affairs, September/October, 2002.
prominence, the United States is far and away the number-one film and television exporter in the world.”56 However, US superiority was not so prominent during the 1960s and 1970s when it was confronted with challenges coming from the USSR, Europe, and Japan. Since Chapter 2 examines US power evolution in detail, here, the focus is on the measure of national power and the influence of relative power status on a state’s influence on international organizations.
First, in international politics, absolute power doesn’t make much sense and we must refer to relative power distribution. According to realism, international society has been in a state of anarchy, which means that there is a lack of a central government to ensure security and enforce laws. All states must try their best to enhance their military and economic capabilities at the same rate as other great powers. However, the status of state power cannot merely depend on its own efforts; it is always calculated by comparison with the other great powers. The relative distribution of power constitutes the core concept of Waltzian Structural Realism. “Structures are defined, by the distribution of capabilities across units. Changes in this distribution are changes of system.”57 Morgenthau also elaborated on this issue, “when we refer to the power of a nation by saying that this nation is very powerful and that nation is weak, we always imply a comparison. In other words, the concept of power is always a relative one. When we say that the United States is at present the most powerful nation on earth, what we are actually saying is that if we compare the power of the United States with the power of all other nations, as they exist at present, we find that the United States is more powerful than any of the others.”58
Second, national power is a comprehensive concept covering political, economic, military, and even cultural factors. However, what are the factors determining the power of a nation in the international arena? Morgenthau has put forward eight elements for measuring national power:
geography; natural resources; industrial capacity; military preparedness; population; national character; national morale; and the quality of diplomacy.59 However, Morgenthau also emphasizes that the importance of these factors might change over time and thus cannot be regarded as permanent. He adds that we should not give any single factor any more importance than the others.60
56 “Decline of America,” at: http://members.optusnet.com.au/futurewatch/id57.htm.
57 Kenneth N. Waltz, “Political Structures,” in Robert O. Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and Its Critics, p. 96.
58 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle For Power and Peace, p. 112.
59 Ibid., pp. 80-108.
60 Ibid., pp. 114-122.
Kenneth Waltz and Robert Gilpin are also supporters of the comprehensive national power conception. In his book War and Changes, Gilpin writes, “through a process of diffusion to other states, the dominant power loses the advantage on which its political, military, or economic success has been based. Thus, by example, and frequently in more direct fashion, the dominant power helps to create challenging powers.”61 Waltz further points out that we cannot measure the economic, military, and other powers of various states respectively. His standard includes five elements:
population; territory; national resources; economic power; political stability and capability.62
Third, the measure of the postwar power structure is based on the capabilities of individual states without including national alliances or groups.63 During the modern era, alliance politics has played a central role in the struggles between great powers. However, under the multi-polar system, the alliances have been too changeable and unstable and they cannot be considered as a part of national power despite their acting as an external-balancing instrument. After World War II, the structure of the international system was radically transformed with the emergence of the superpowers. Other great powers have become peripheral in the foreign policy of the hegemon. That is to say, they cannot radically alter the power distribution between the Soviet Union and the United States. Consequently, it’s not rational to consider the power aggregation of all the developing states as a pole or unitary great power in world politics.
Hence, the influence of a state, especially the hegemon, is closely related to its power status in the international system. If certain changes in the international structure occur and affect the power status of the hegemonic state, its influence in international organizations will also correspondingly change for better or worse. As the Hegemonic Stability Theory tells us, if the hegemon has lost its leading status in the international structure, other great powers will challenge or even replace it with a new institution or, more specifically, a brand-new international organization.