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Political leadership: defining the 'irreducible fact in politics'

Part I: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK:

1. Political Leadership. Some theoretical considerations

1.3 Political leadership: defining the 'irreducible fact in politics'

As the epigraph of this chapter states, in any social community there is an “irreducible fact” in politics: some shall be the rulers and some the ruled. Defining a concept such as political leadership is therefore not only necessary, but it is also indispensable if we are to clearly understand the real dynamics of social relations.

As some scholars rightly suggest, defining the concept is a complex task that imposes the need of a “double description.” Foremost, it is imperative to understand what we mean by the adjective political. Then, we must also comprehend the meaning of “leadership” in order to be able to conceptualize adequately the notion of “political leadership”. Regarding

“political,” there is disagreement and seemingly endless discussions among political scientists about the main ontological question of their field of study, namely what is the “nature of the political” in political science. The term politics could be approached in different ways that could be summarized into two lines of thought. The first one defines politics mainly as the context of government, the institutions and people who seek to have influence in this milieu.

The second approach explains politics as a social process in which there is a permanent power struggle in diverse settings. Both approaches point to politics being related to the concept of social power and the public domain, and they are analytically useful because they provide a basis to understand politics broadly and not exclusively in terms of “the work that politicians do.”

Kellerman (1984) explains that in political leadership, the term “political” refers to the control of the decisions about public policy. A more inclusive definition will also argue that in political leadership, the term political is also related to the leadership exercised in the realm of social movements, or other situations in which the struggle for power is taken to the public sphere.

In order to define leadership it is necessary to clarify the concept with respect to the definitions of other processes that are similar. In this context, it is important to make a distinction between leadership and headship, as Kellerman (1984) points out:

Headship is associated with the rights and duties of an office or status in a hierarchical structure, whether a formal organization or an informally stratified collectivity. Headship is identified with superior position, and followership with subordinate ones. It is maintained through an organized system, and it implies a considerable distance between the group members and the head. Leadership, too, is associated with the one who shapes the action of others. But the focus here is not on role, or position, but on the special nature of the relationship between leader and follower. Leaders, in contrast to heads, are accorded their authority spontaneously by group members who, it turn, follow because they want to rather than because they must (Kellerman, p. 71).

Political leadership can be defined as an interactive process between the one who exercises the control of political power (the leader) and those who are the recipients of that power (the followers), creating a consistent and visible impact in the orientation and functioning of the group. This definition presents a number of variables that are easy to operationalize: (a) leadership is the result of the relation and interaction between members of

a group (leaders and followers); (b) leadership is measured and determined by the effect created by the leader’s policies on the structure and activity of the group and by the ability of the leader to make his policies a reality; (c) leadership is defined as a “process” that allows the study of power exercised by a leader in a consistent way. This implies that leadership is not completely uniform and is subject to changes over a certain a period of time. The important issue is to be able to observe its impact during or at the end of the process, and (d) the ends of such a process are open. All these variables are especially relevant to the study of political leadership and although this definition does not try to be completely exhaustive, it does summarize different approaches while presenting a more pragmatic conceptualization of the phenomenon and an easily operative and working definition.

The above concept presents some critical elements that define the leadership process.

Not only is leadership defined in terms of a leader–follower relationship, but this interaction is explained as a relationship of power. Thus, Blondel (1987) describes power as “the central ingredient of leadership,” while Bertrand Russell (1938) stated that the concept of power is as central to the study of political science as it is the concept of energy to the study of physics.

These viewpoints show the complexity of the issue. “Power,” albeit a fundamental notion, still creates confusion and endless disagreements regarding its scientific analysis and the operationalization of the concept. “Power” is often specified in analytical categories that are diametrically opposite, such as a concept essentially contested or as a desirable “mean” to achieve some social and individual benefits.6 Consequently, the definition of leadership in terms of relations of power within a group is equally difficult to explain. This research does not attempt to present an exhaustive discussion about the definition of power. Nevertheless, it

6 For a detailed analysis of power as a concept “essentially contested,, see Steve Lukes: Power. A Radical View, (1974). For a presentation and discussion of arguments that maintain and reject the categorization of power as a concept “essentially contested,” see Ruth Zimmerling, “Poder y Libertad: Observaciones críticas a la concepción

is necessary to clarify how the concept is employed within the theoretical framework used to analyze political leadership.

Power in political leadership is social power. Baernes (1993) points out that social power is the capacity to produce effects derived from the existence of social relations and organized social interactions. This power rests on the continuous interaction between leaders and followers. What is particular in the case of political leadership is that within a relation where A exercises power over B, B refers to a large number of B’s, usually a whole country.

The areas and subjects over which power is exercised are wide and varied (e.g. defense, foreign policy). On the other hand, this relation of power is lasting and can be maintained for a long period (Blondel 1987; p. 5).

The concept of leadership defined as a phenomenon of power raises several issues.

Janda (1972) maintains that even though every relation between leaders and followers refers to a relation between those “who hold power” and those who are the “recipients” of such a power, not every relation of power implies leadership. Within this framework, the exercise of political leadership requires legitimacy as a basis. This statement contains a value judgment that appears to indicate that the concept of leadership is intrinsically linked to the concept of legitimacy and even to that of law, while in the definition of power such a consideration is absent. The main problem with this type of analysis is that it creates confusion when describing the characteristics of those who are considered “leaders” and “followers.” Should a leader be legitimate in order to be considered a leader? In this case, what are the sources of legitimacy that create or reinforce the leadership? If we accept that political leadership is power, but power existing exclusively within a legitimate framework then it is worth asking if those who wield power through coercion or force can truly be called “leaders.”

In order to answer the previous questions, it is necessary to study the dichotomy that exists in the political leadership literature regarding “real leaders” and “power wielders.”

Burns (1986) points out that a “real leader” has moral purposes while a power wielder may have selfish purposes contrary to the social and individual goals of the followers. According to Burns, the power of a leader is used to achieve goals shared by members of the group so that the purpose of political leadership is the most important variable to comprehend the distinction between leaders and power wielders. This variable, nevertheless, makes the concept more limited. A leader induces his followers to act in order to achieve common objectives that come to represent the needs and values of both leaders and followers, while the power-wielder pursues more individualistic goals, which are disassociated from the objectives pursued by the group he leads.

Despite the attractiveness of this dichotomy, especially from an ethical point of view, there presently exists a tendency to expand the concept of leadership in terms of the classical concept of power. In this manner, Blondel (1987) articulates that political leadership consists in the ability that one or few have in order to make others do a number of things (positively or negatively) that they would not or at least might not have done. Blondel (1987) explains, nevertheless, that not all exercises of power are instances of leadership:

Power that occurs in a once-and-for-all context is not leadership; nor is leadership the reciprocal or successive influence of a variety of members of a committee. Leadership suggests continuity, not merely the occasional use of power. This means that leadership will tend to be exercised in the context of well organized groups, which is why it is critically important in bodies such as the state, though, of course, it is also relevant in other institutions and, at the limit (but only at the limit), in very informal bodies (Blondel, p.15)

By understanding that the impact of leadership may be positive or negative, it becomes clear that the theoretical base of the argument is not the relationship between power and legitimacy within the framework of leadership; rather, it is the impact or the effect of the exercise of this power regardless of whether there are “moral purposes” on the part of the leader. In summary, the leader is the person who has the ability to achieve objectives. This is

the standard, albeit limited, concept of power. This conception does not take into account the legitimacy of the means employed, nor does it consider the need for common goals between followers and leaders. Rather, it exposes the ability of the leader to exercise power over followers to effectively make the latter carry out the will of the former.

To reconcile these antagonistic positions is indeed difficult. Both definitions differ fundamentally in their arguments regarding the bases on which power is exercised. While the

“moral vision” of political leadership maintains that legitimacy is the base of leadership, the

“pragmatic version” holds that leadership must be measured or determined in terms of the impact that the leader has over the behavior of his followers, regardless of ethical or moral considerations. From the former, we observe another important aspect in which both definitions differ: the relationship between the means and objectives in the exercise of leadership.

Those who maintain that leaders must have “moral goals” pay particular attention to the means through which power is exercised because it is believed that a leader with moral goals automatically rejects methods that may be considered harmful to the welfare of the followers. The defenders of the pragmatic position, on the contrary, support the idea that a leader is able to manage different means in order to achieve his objective, especially if the followers share these objectives, but even when they do not.

There are several reasons that explain why followers decide to obey a leader and the literature about the subject covers approaches as diverse as psychoanalysis, biology and military science. In their seminal article, French and Raven (1959) analyzed the basis that underline the relationship between the social agent who exercises power (O) and those people upon whom power is exercised (P) focusing on those elements that explain why P comply with O’s commands. Both authors argue that in a specific power relationship, there are, in general, several sources or variables that define it and therefore it is not limited to only one

source. They distinguish five bases of social power. These are:

A) Reward power: based on P’s perception that O has the ability to mediate rewards for him. It therefore depends on O’s ability to effectively manipulate positive rewards and eliminate negative valences.

B) Coercive power: supported by P’s expectation that he will be punished by O if he does not comply with O’s attempts to exercise his will. In this case, the strength of the power will depend on the magnitude of the threatened punishment. While reward power increases P’s attraction towards O, coercive power tends to alienate P in regard to O by decreasing the attraction felt by P towards O.

C) Legitimate power: defined as the power relationship originated when P’s internalized values determine that O has a legitimate right to influence his behavior and, consequently, the follower feels it his obligation to accept this influence. Those values range from culturally learned patterns to acceptance of authority as prescribed in a specific system of hierarchy within a given social structure.

D) Referent power: based on the identification of P with O. In this case, the follower develops a “feeling of oneness” that expands his desire to become associated with the leader. If he is already associated with his leader, as in the case of political party membership, he will want to maintain this association.

E) Expert power: has its basis in O’s knowledge and expertise in a given area as attributed by P. The evaluation made by P may be based upon his own knowledge or on some more general paradigms and standards.

The authors warn that there can be numerous bases for power and there does not seem to exist a general agreement regarding the definition of a set of causes that make a follower obey rules commanded by a leader. This could include variables as different as admiration or fear, and different researchers refer to different variables according to their particular field of

study. Thus, psychoanalysts refer to the individual’s need for protection as a possible variable that define follower-leader relationship. Sociologists, on the other hand, focus on the structure of the social system and the relationship between individuals within a group and an organization to explain the leadership phenomenon. Taking French and Raven’s framework to define the basis of social power, we are able to understand that an individual who follows the guidelines of a leader responds to different variables and not only to those that are considered

“moral.” We can easily find several examples of leaders who have resorted to questionable methods to achieve their goals. On some occasions, their followers have shared their goals, while in other occasions, they have not. Perhaps, as expressed by Wildavsky (1989) in an extensive study of the subject, one of the aspects that distinguish leaders is the degree in which they coerce their followers.

One of the main consequences of the division between leaders and power-wielders and the preeminence of the “moral vision” within the research of political leadership is that a large part of the literature has focused on studying what political leadership must be and not on what it actually is. The influence of the normative precepts in the literature has limited the development of a concept more appropriate to political reality. In order to present a more practical definition of political leadership, Tucker (1981) defines it as a “fact or activity” that comes in different forms, but it is always a value-neutral phenomenon. For Tucker, “politics is in essence leadership…it is what we factually find when we study closely the political process” (p. 3). To make the concept operative, he describes political leadership as a process in three phases. The first phase is the “diagnosis” of the problem or situation. Once the problem has been clearly defined, the second phase involves the prescription of a course of action designed to solve the problem in question. The last phase is the mobilization of support that will allow the leader to take the actions he considers necessary. The work of Tucker is important in that it defines leadership as a process that takes place in a given period of time

and may thus be divided into phases or stages.

All the different definitions of leadership exposed have contributed to the clarification of the concept in divergent ways. For example, the emphasis on psychological variables does not define leadership, but instead shows that leaders do posses certain particular characteristics. While there is disagreement regarding the nature of these personal traits, it cannot be denied that leaders are to be distinguished from followers in many instances. Generally speaking, leaders differ from followers in their ability to exercise influence in a group, and this, in turn, can be said to depend, in part, on the leader’s personality that allows the leader to differentiate clearly from the masses. Nevertheless, research has also shown that many of the so-called characteristics of leaders are culturally determined and that the situation may demand different abilities from a leader according to the environment and the specific requirements of the group members in time.

In conclusion research must put emphasis on the interaction that occurs between leader and followers as a central element in the conceptualization of leadership. In the particular case of political leadership, it is important to remember that leadership is exercised as a relation of social power between those who lead and those who follow.