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stated that Abbas lived in Gaza and that he was “allowed to go into Israel, except for Eilat, and into the West Bank and not allowed to drive a car in Israel”.291This is a fact that indicates the level of seriousness concerning the lack of freedom of movement. If the head of the Palestinian Authority is subject to restricted freedom, how much greater the restrictions on average man and woman in the OPT. Furthermore, Haaretz described VIP permits as the “hush money” that any PA official receives for his accommodation of the status quo.292 The paper reported that: “When the Palestinian Authority declared its intention for application to become a member as an observer-state of the United Nations, few dozens of senior PA officials were denied their VIP permits since middle of 2011. Israel revoked the permits as a ‘punishment’ for the PA’s move towards the UN”293
The Accords of Oslo produced an integrated system of corruption in Palestine mainly in the areas of politics, ethics and morals. The Palestinian people had not experienced such forms of corruption before Oslo.294Thus, one major outcome of Oslo was the introduction of a culture of corruption. Bribery, nepotism, financial frauds are closely linked to the institutions associated with Oslo and society changed like never before with customs and social practices being introduced that were considered alien to local society.295 In other words, Oslo brought with it the institutionalization of corruption in Palestine that became a complete system, widespread and yet defended. For example, the PA decided to allow the opening of the Jericho Casino in 1997 for gambling which worked against the fabric of Palestinian consciousness. The conservative Muslim majority of Palestinians could not understand or justify the opening of an international casino facility in a Palestinian town.
Gradually, Palestinian society began to realize that the desired political outcome remained as elusive as ever. The new Palestinian elite conducted a style of governance that risked and jeopardized Palestinians’ social cohesion and their traditional culture of resistance, whilst the military occupation continued to exercise its restrictions and rules over the civilian population. Consequently, social actors and civil organizations attempted to fill the gap created by the new political and social vacuum by implementing social services and programs. Muslim civil society organizations took the lead in this, especially after the beginning of the Second Intifada of 2001 when the administrative functions of the PA were restricted by the destruction of several ministerial and police buildings by Israeli aerial bombardment as this second uprising escalated. The subsequent weakening of the PA institutions, coupled with the rampant corruption, further prompted local civil society to act in the occupied territories.
The PA is the largest employer in the entire area of West Bank and Gaza.
The World Bank estimates the PA bureaucracy at 77,000 people without taking into account the numerous security apparatuses. The figure for these is estimated at 50,000 members. Both figures combined add up to a 120,000 employees. Moreover, if that number is multiplied by six, the average number of members of Palestinian families,
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it indicates that almost a million people depend on the PA payroll. In reality, this sector of the population is not only unproductive but constitutes a huge burden on the overall budget.296 Yet, the payroll depends largely on the donor countries with the approval of Israel and the US As a result, the average salary of a Palestinian public servant has become a political trump card in the hands of Israel, the US and the donor countries. As such, the salary is used politically against Palestinians; for instance, the associated family dependents were “mainstreamed”, required to behave and not to resist occupation. Thus, the PA found itself locked into a system of dependency at the price of the real issue and the real question.
Salam Fayyad, a former World Bank officer currently serving as the PA prime minister, has been criticized for not leading Palestine towards liberation or creating improvements in Palestinian daily life. In a statement made as recently as December 2011, Fayyad stated that “conditions are not ripe for resumption of a political process capable of delivering an end to the Israeli occupation”.297Thus, Fayyad argues that functioning institutions are a precondition rather than a consequence of political independence.298 To the Palestinian public, the implications of Fayyad’s argument were disturbing since they implied that the situation in Palestine was not about occupied territories but “disputed territories”, thus legitimizing Israel’s claims.299 Following the Accords, Israel had divided the West Bank into Areas A, B, C, asserting that it would withdraw from these defined areas if a negotiated settlement took place in the future; but it would not withdraw from East Jerusalem settlements or military bases. This created a precedent in the Israeli unilateralism of withdrawing from Gaza without negotiation with Palestinians. The result is that Gaza remained under “occupation” but from the outside. The same may apply in the future to Palestinian cities and towns in the West Bank embodied in several cases of
“Gazas.”The question raised by this is what kind of future is held for the Palestinians under the leadership style of Salam Fayyad? It would seem that Fayyad and the PA are poised to accept a status quo similar to apartheid in South Africa and the Bantustanization of Palestinian population. The checkpoint regime in the West Bank, with over five hundred Israeli checkpoints surrounding all Palestinian towns and cities, has had a drastic and regressive impact on the daily life of people and economy.300 It is neither reasonable nor wise to dismiss genuine insecurities and grievances of the average man and woman in Palestine. While injustices are being inflicted on their daily lives, this can lead to pressure causing confrontations and instability. The recent past has proven so in the shape of the two previous Intifadas in addition to the occasional outbursts of violence.
Neoliberal economic politics became a priority from the time Fayyad first became Prime Minister in 2007.301 Having worked for the World Bank, his policies brought splendid power and wealth to a small number of people in the West Bank.
The PA government in Ramallah city cut down social services, introduced austerity measures and downsizing of public sector in order to pay mounting debts and governmental deficits faced by many developing countries in similar situations. For a
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people living under occupation, such economic policies further aggravated the social and political crisis.302 Neoliberal polices invite the enforcement and enlargement of security apparatuses in a political structure. As the economic gap widens in society due to neoliberal structuring of the economy it causes more widespread poverty, joblessness and absence of social safety nets; moreover, security’s heavy hand is needed to quell potential protests and unrest of the disenfranchised of society. The PA security budget is estimated at one third of its overall budget.
Muslims around the world are watching the Palestinian scene closely as Jerusalem is the home of the third holiest place in Islam. In Turkey, it is not difficult to understand the extent to which the issue of Palestine affects a wide spectrum of Turkish society, including secularists, Islamically-oriented groups and Islamists, especially since, historically, Palestine was officially part of the Ottoman state. For the people of Turkey, the link between the Palestinians and the struggle for freedom for Muslims is more or less a general discourse. Thus, a failure to achieve peace will most likely generate repercussions in the whole region, including Turkey. The secularist Muslim governments, including the PA, are perceived to have come short of achieving the desired results in terms of social and political well-being. Muslim civil society in Turkey and Muslim communities of Europe acted promptly in response, attempting to fill the void by collaborating with local Palestinian networks as counterparts. Thus, a new form of cooperation and solidarity began to evolve encompassing local, regional and global networking of civil society in a seamless implementation of advocacy and assistance.