progressive inquiry scrutinized also by Dewey. When seeking solutions to our current research problems we cannot stop here, but have to continue our path of inquiry by the following cognitive trails.
these views and try to understand the transition from single-loop (cf. Learning II unconsciously) to double-loop (cf. Learning III consciously) learning.
What are then the necessary ingredients for a double bind situation maybe making the transition from single-loop (cf. Learning II) to double-loop learning (cf. Learning III) to happen? According to Bateson (1972, p.206-207) a double bind needs two or more persons, repeated experience, some contradictive injunctions (primary, secondary and tertiary) 171 until the set of these ingredients can be learned by the individual in question. Bateson offers a useful example to clarify the double bind situation with a story of a Zen master and his pupil,
The Zen master attempts to bring about enlightenment in his pupils in various ways. One of the things he does is to hold a stick over the pupil’s head and say fiercely, “If you say this stick is real, I will strike you with it. If you say this stick is not real, I will strike you with it.
[Then what may the student do in this “what do you do if you “cannot” do nothing situations?] The Zen pupil might reach up and take the stick away from the master. (ibid, p.208)
In this example the Zen master offers some hints about the proper set of alternatives but the pupil does not act according to ready-made alternatives; he solves the double bind by revising the available set of alternatives, as the purpose of the Zen master was. The very nature of the pupil’s actual and indeterminate situation seems to evoke inquiry for the potentials of the situation (cf. Dewey, 1938: 1991, p.109) accelerated by the intentionality of the pupil.
Yrjö Engeström has developed the double bind concept further and defines it as follows:
A double bind is a social, societally essential dilemma which cannot be resolved through separate individual actions alone – but in which joint co-operative actions can push a historically new form of activity into emergence (Engeström, 1987, p.165; italics added).
What kind of relation may there exist between double binds and contradictions and do the human needs and intentionality play some role in this game? Engeström explains that to him the double bind is the psychological and experienced counterpart of the secondary contradiction of the activity (Engeström, 1987, p.188-189; 322). But what then is the role of the primary contradiction in this episode?
Being already familiar with Engeström’s view on contradictions (cf. chapter 4), it needs to be reminded that the theoretical analysis of contradictions is also a wider sociological
171 Also Argyris and Schön have for a long time proposed that in all kinds of organizations people are familiar with double bind and contradictive situations. They describe these as a no-win game where the rules (governing variables) of the game are undiscussable (Argyris, Schön, 1978, p.118, 121-123).
phenomenon. According to Giddens the concept of contradiction is an indispensable one in social theory, and his proposal is to use it in two senses (Giddens, 1984, p.193, 197, 373): that of “existential contradiction” and that of “structural contradiction”. By existential contradiction he refers to an elemental aspect of human existence in relation to nature or the material world (cf. the famous Cartesian split). Structural contradiction refers to the constitutive features of human societies where structural principles operate in terms of another but yet also contravene each other (e.g. the necessity to cooperate while competing). But in all kinds of societies the suppression of existential questions and problems cannot be wholly complete. Indeed, they are fundamental to the structural contradictions of capitalism.
Giddens argues that the primary contradiction of the capitalist (nation-)state is to be found in the mode in which a “private” (an individual) sphere of “civil society” is created, but is separate from and in tension with the “public” (a social) sphere of the state (Giddens, 1984, p.197). Contradictions tend to emerge because of divisions of interests between different groupings or categories of people, but there exists something more fundamental. For example the sociologists Raymond Boudon (1982) and Jon Elster (as well as Giddens) associate contradiction with the unintended consequences of action172. Contadictory consequences ensue when every individual in an aggregate of individuals acts in a way which, while producing the intended effect if done in isolation, creates a perverse effect if done by everyone173 (Giddens, 1984, p.311).
Here it is argued that the key to understand the roots of “existential contradiction” lies on the conceptualization and understanding of the human being. Does he have a relatively free will and intentionality and to what extent his actions are determined by social structures? Further on it seems to be essential whether his sphere of interest is a narrow individualistic not considering the effects of his actions on others or not (cf. Boudon, 1982, p.153-205)?
It seems to be intrinsic to us as humans to be curious in order to live. Because we are fundamentally social beings, the admission of this prerequisite seems to be more appropriate than ever. Traditionally we tend to see the extension of human conscious control over nature, but it is a logical impossibility e.g. when remembering our unknown unconsciousness and its coefficient consequences. A fundamental shift of view seems to be needed and the main question is not what needs to be changed in the public sphere but ultimately how to improve our private sphere (ourselves) in order to act more responsibly in the public sphere. If this curiosity
172 The unintended refers to the phenomenon that is partly but not fully anticipated in advance.
173 As a clarifying example can be seen the officers of the FNDC acting according to the “static warrior premises” the societal consequences being unintended and perverse ones – unadaptability to the local and global culturally evolving conditions.
emerges in the public sphere it is a proof of human intentionality and need to act according to some collective purpose. But even then the collective can not control the whole system without most of us controlling ourselves. How do we personally activate and solve our double binds while facing societal contradictions? In this process the individual has relationship with the world and both actively generate each other (Engeström, 1987, p.163) while solving their existential contradiction.
It needs to be added that the individual double binds need to be taken into account, but it has to be done in concert with organizational contradictions. In a sense there is an intrinsic tension between individual double binds and social contradictions. The capability to solve one’s own double binds in the public sphere implies the individual source of energy for the movement (i.e. development) of activity system. On the other hand contradictions cause174 some social self-movement of the activity system. In other words, these consequences emerge partly because of human intentionality but partly because of “unintended” consequences in the public sphere.
Chris Argyris and Donald Schön give us an illuminating example about the inner contradictions of bureaucratic organization (Argyris, Schön, 1978, p.120-123; in Engeström’s terms secondary contradictions). According to them designers of organizations tend to think hierarchically about the organizations, just as they think hierarchically about complex problems in general. In order to minimize the organization’s loss and maximize its gains, complex tasks (the mini-max strategy) have to be broken down into relatively simple ones and grouped for ease of recognition and control. The resulting specialization of work, with its associated pyramid, appears to the designers to make it easier to find people, educate them to the requirements of the organization, and manage them.
The inner contradictions arise from the fact that the mini-max strategy is used on individuals, forgetting their individual potentials. The forgetting is even more lethal when understanding that both the external environment and the internal environment of the organization demand continual reflection and monitoring to meet the various challenges (e.g.
“chaos”; complexity; requisite variety; information overflow)
As mentioned above in order to have double-loop learning we should make our undiscussable governing variables (beliefs, values; root causes; principles and even basic
174 In chapter 3 this argument was set against the question posed by Larry Cuban (1999): “How to explain the identified stability in the midst of several contradictions?” Here it seems to be useful to be reminded of the set of alternatives possible for the individual human being in question: nonlearning (presumption, nonconsideration, rejection), nonreflective learning (preconscious learning, skills learning, memorization) and reflective learning (contemplation, reflective skills learning and experimental learning) (Jarvis, 1987; 1992). But on a societal level the causes of contradictions are fundamentally a matter of time and how we understand the root causes of the societal change.
premises) into discussable ones and change them consciously (a shift from Model I theories-in-use to Model II theories-in-theories-in-use). Based on several decades of field studies Chris Argyris and Donald Schön argue that all people tend to use the same theory-in-use (actual rules in use) especially when facing embarrassment or threat. On the other hand people have a wide scale of espoused theories of action but they are not actually governed by them (cf. e.g. Griseri, 1998).
The shared governing values (variables) of Model I theories-in-use are: define goals and try to achieve them (define goal and purpose alone; be a strong leader), maximize winning and minimize losing (changing them would be a sign of weakness), minimize generating or expressing negative feelings (permitting others to express their feelings tends to be seen as a poor strategy) and be rational (the counterpart to minimize feelings value) (Argyris, Schön, 1974, p.66-67; 1978, p.61). These shared values will be challenged during this analysis in the reverse order (cf. chapter 8): could it be possible that instead of rational decision makers we are more or less arational or occasionally even irrational actors? Is it possible that feelings play some role in our decision making system? Is it possible that instead of “win-lose” games we could have “win-win” games, finally understanding how dependent our success is of the vitality of the whole network? How well defined and shared goals do we as “rational” decision makers have?
Governed by the above mentioned values people tend to adopt some general action strategies: design and manage the environment unilaterally, own and control the task, unilaterally protect yourself and unilaterally protect others from being hurt (Argyris, Schön, 1974; 1978). Carrying out these action strategies effectively leads to a paradox. The paradox is that implementing these strategies requires other people to act ineffectively by the very terms of Model I. But as mentioned, by challenging the governing values and variables of the dominant Model I theories-in-use we could cause some changes in our habituated ways to act.
In the process of organizational learning the individuals should be guided by the governing values of Model II theory-in-use: valid information, informed choice, and responsibility to monitor how well the choice is implemented (Argyris, 1990, p.104). In the organizations conditions for error tend to exist but by corrective responses, guided by Model II values, the solution of the paradoxical situation can be found (cf. e.g. Argyris, Schön, 1978, p.59).
Consequently, organizational theories of action could be restructured.
In chapters 6 and 7 the intent was to take the governing variables under discussions while tacit features were converted into an explicit form with the aim of revising the current habituated sets of alternatives at the FNDC. The revision can be done by other alternatives progressively sought by social scientific research.
Interestingly, the question of contradictions allows us to see the looming question of an appropriate sphere of interest. If then contradictions can be seen playing an essential role in our learning processes could the sphere of interest (or field of vision) restrict or enable us to feel the double binds and contradictions? In a way the widened sphere of interest increases the amount of potential contradictions and double binds, consequently potentially accelerating the research process and learning175. Hence, the crucial question seems to be whether we continue to focus on trees instead of forests. This question is especially important to the agents dealing with human security issues. What kind of a role contradictions play and how we otherwise conceptualize our perspective on the societal change will be later clarified.
The analysis suggests that the resolution of individual double binds and social contradictions enables the transition towards qualitatively higher levels of learning to happen.
This potential transition is a concrete phenomenon involving continuous movement from operations to actions to activity – or vice versa (cf. Engeström, 1987, p.154, 163; Leont’ev, 1981) during learning activities (cf. chapter 4). At this phase the Leont’evian three-level scheme can be linked to the chosen learning theories and to the human dimension as presented in figure 8.2.
Figure 8.2 Leont’evian three-level scheme linked to the chosen learning theories Source: Cf. Engeström, 1987, p.154.
175 According to the Peter Senge, Otto Scharmer, Joseph Jaworski and Betty Sue Flowers (2005) two types of learning can be identified. Both types of learning seem to be a real possibility and the main difference between these types of learning is the depth of awareness and the consequent source of action.
In the Age of Innovations it is crucial to understand how these innovations are made on all the Leont’evian levels. It is even more interesting to recognize that above the Leont’evian levels there is a “fourth level” playing an ever-increasing role also in innovations (cf. Tuomi, 2004;
Hamel, 1996176, 2000177).
The “fourth level” is justifiable when remembering that all activity systems are mediated by both material and psychological tools (i.e. concepts). Some special activities, for example the social scientific research, produce concepts (e.g. the Nonakaian knowledge assets or Bereiterian conceptual artifacts) to be used in other activities as mediators. This means that to some extent these activities (both the initiator and end-user activities) are guided by these concepts, and consequently we can say that the meaningful “fourth level” emerges above the Leont’evian three level scheme.178 Consequently, continuous movement between the four levels is a necessary but not sufficient condition for transformational learning.