36
secretariat would write a draft, revise the draft based on council discussions and compile the final report. The committee members and the chairman could express their views on the report, but they would not have specific knowledge of the process by which the draft was written. Public criticism of government councils is on the rise, which could diminish their power. Nonetheless, the secretariat still retains power over the process. All in all, though there have been some progress in openness, there still is no fundamental change in the nuclear policymaking apparatus. People can express their views to some extent and disclosure of information has been encouraged, but public opinion has an insignificant impact on government policy (Yoshioka, 2013).
37
Figure 1.6 Safety Oversight: Changes Pre- and Post-Arisawa Committee
Source: Figure is based on authors’ interpretation and analysis of various sources.
As we have seen from the examples given above, METI’s priorities dominated government
decision-making. Simply put, its goal was to achieve energy independence for Japan by promoting nuclear power and facilitating the construction of new power plants. While it was not the intention of the Arisawa Committee, their recommendations codified a fragmented safety oversight process, distributing it across the government and placing responsibility for safety oversight of power reactors with METI, even though safety was a secondary concern for the Ministry. The NSC, while remaining an independent advisor on safety, had a staff of just 20 and thus was inherently limited in its ability to do meaningful oversight.
Safety oversight remained a back-burner issue for the government until the 1990s, when a series of accidents occurred that raised questions about Japan’s ability to manage more complex
technologies. The fatal criticality accident was especially disturbing, and so the government revisited the question of nuclear safety oversight. STA was responsible for the organizations that had the major accidents, which left STA in a politically vulnerable position. METI on the other hand had managed to maintain an unblemished record and so was able to benefit from STA’s problems. Using its authority to regulate commercial power reactors, METI established the NISA and an inspection staff (called JNES), which together grew to more than 800 (See Figure 1.7).
NISA’s responsibilities included:
Regulating nuclear power refining, fabrication, storage, reprocessing and waste disposal businesses and nuclear power generation installations and matters relating to ensuring the safety of these businesses and installations;
The safety of nuclear power relating to its utilization as an energy source;
Control of explosives, safety of high-pressure gas, mine safety, and other safety matters under its jurisdiction;
International cooperation pertaining to affairs under its jurisdiction.
38 Figure 1.7: Safety Oversight: Post-Criticality Accident
Source: Figure is based on authors’ interpretation and analysis of various sources.
The NSC had a modest a staff of 100 that was based in the Cabinet Office. While now part of government and no longer just an advisor, the NSC was clearly overtaxed. It had authority to obtain reports from NIMA and review (in its double-check role) NIMA’s work and regulatory decisions for a rapidly expanding fleet of nuclear power plants. The NSC also was responsible for oversight of MEXT’s nuclear mission, including JAEA (the re-incarnation of STA) activities, which covered nuclear R&D, nuclear materials safeguards, radioactive dose standards, as well as safety oversight of advanced reactors and reprocessing activities. With all the “here and now” tasks that the NSC had to execute, the staff had little time to consider how to prepare for low probability/high consequence accidents scenarios, such as what happened in 2011.
Figure 1.7 provides a top-level organizational perspective of Japan’s safety oversight mechanisms that were in effect in 2011. The government’s strongest advocate for safety (NISA), shown on the left side of the Figure, had to distribute its priorities among nuclear and industrial matters. Worse, NISA was positioned within the Agency of Natural Resources and Energy, which focused on a wide range of energy issues, of which nuclear was only one. On the right side of the chart were oversight mechanisms that had largely been discredited because of the rash of accidents in the 1990s; and as we have said, the staff within the Cabinet Office were over-taxed. Thus, safety oversight was hobbled by a combination of divided loyalties and discredited bureaucracies. This set the stage for the Fukushima disaster which was still more than a decade in the future,
References
Adachi, M., Matsuo, R., Fujikawa, S., Nomura, T., 1995. The Decommissioning Plan of the Nuclear Ship Mutsu, Department of Nuclear Ship Decommissioning, Japan Atomic Energy
39 Research Institute, JAERl-Conf 95-015,
http://www.iaea.org/inis/collection/NCLCollectionStore/_Public/27/029/27029493.pdf>
(accessed 18.04.01).
AEC (Atomic Energy Commission of Japan), 1957. Showa 31-nen Ban, Genshiryoku Hakusho (the FY1956 Edition, the Atomic Power White Paper), December 1957,
http://www.aec.go.jp/jicst/NC/about/hakusho/wp1956/index.htm>(accessed 17.09.04).
AEC (Atomic Energy Commission of Japan), 1967. The Long-Term Atomic Energy Research, Development and Utilization Plan, 1967.04.12,
http://www.JAEC.go.jp/jicst/NC/tyoki/tyoki1967/chokei.htm#sb10101> (accessed 6 June 2017).
AEC (Atomic Energy Commission of Japan), 1996a. Genshiryoku Seisaku Entaku Kaigi no Kaisai (About the Holding of Nuclear Policy Roundtable Discussion), the Nuclear White Paper, 1996, http://www.aec.go.jp/jicst/NC/about/hakusho/wp1996/sb1010203.htm>(accessed 17.06.08)).
AEC (Atomic Energy Commission of Japan), 1996b. 1. Monju 2-ji-kei Natoriumu roei jiko no Hassei (Occurrence of the Sodium Leak Accident at Monju’s Secondary System), Nuclear White Paper, 1996,
http://www.aec.go.jp/jicst/NC/about/hakusho/wp1996/sb1010101.htm>(accessed 17.06.08).
AEC (Atomic Energy Commission of Japan), 1997a. Kosoku Zoshokuro Kondan-kai (Dai 5-kai), Giji Yoshi (The FBR Discussion Group Meeting, the 5th Meeting, the Summery
Proceedings), http://www.aec.go.jp/jicst/NC/senmon/old/koso/siryo/koso05/5-1.htm>(accessed 17.06.07).
AEC (Atomic Energy Commission of Japan), 1997b. Kosoku Zoshokuro Kondankai Hokokusho -an ni k-ansuru Go-iken o Kiku Kai (The meeting to hear Public Views on the Draft Proposal by the FBR Discussion Group), 7 November 1997,
http://www.aec.go.jp/jicst/NC/senmon/old/koso/sonota/sonota02/so-si02.htm>(accessed 17.06.15).
AEC (Atomic Energy Commission of Japan), 1997c. Kosoku Zoshokuro Kondan-kai (the High-Speed Breeder Reactor Discussion Group), the 1st-12th session, February 1997 - November 1998, http://www.aec.go.jp/jicst/NC/senmon/old/koso/menu.htm>(accessed 18.06.12).
AEC (Atomic Energy Commission of Japan), 1998). Donen Kaikaku ni tsuite (About the Reform of PNC), Genshiryoku Hakusho (Nuclear White Paper), 1998,
http://www.aec.go.jp/jicst/NC/about/hakusho/hakusho10/siryo201.htm>(accessed 17.06.05).
AEC (Atomic Energy Commission of Japan), 1999. Genshiryoku Entaku Kaigi no Joho Kokai ni tsuite (About the Public Disclosu of the Information of the Roundtable Discussion Meeting), 26 May 1997,
http://www.aec.go.jp/jicst/NC/senmon/old/koso/siryo/koso06/siryo01.htm>(accessed 17.06.08.
AEC (Atomic Energy Commission of Japan), 2007. (Japan Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), 2007. Genshiryoku Seisaku Entaku Kaigi (the Nuclear Policy Roundtable Congress), the 1st-11th Session, 1996, Website,
http://www.aec.go.jp/jicst/NC/iinkai/entaku/index.htm>(accessed 17.06.02).
AFDC (Alternative Fuel Data Center), 2018. “Hydrogen Production and Distribution,” US
Department of Energy, https://afdc.energy.gov/fuels/hydrogen_production.html, (accessed 22 December 2018).
Aida, H., 2015. Shiso Tairitsu ga Okoshita Fukushima Genpatsu Jiko (Fukushima Nuclear Accident Triggered by the Conflicts of View), Dai-San-sho Fukushima Jiko no Toriga ga Hikareta hi (Chapter 3 The Day When the Trigger of Fukushima Accident was Pulled), Soejima
40
National Strategy Institute (SNSI), 10 August 2015,
http://www.snsi.jp/tops/kouhouprint/1840> (accessed 17.05.31).
Ashida, T., Ito, H., Miyamoto, K., Nakamura, T., Koga, K., Oohara, N., et al., 2016. Development of Inspection and Repair Techniques in Reactor Vessel of Experimental Fast Reactor “Joyo”
Retrieval of the Bent Test Subassembly, Transactions of the Atomic Energy Society of Japan, Atomic Energy Society of Japan, Vol. 15 (2016), No. 4, pp 210-222,
https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/t15/4/15_J15.032/_article>(accessed 17.08.06).
Behling, N. H., 2013. “Fuel Cells Current Technology Challenges and Future Research Needs,”
Elsevier, 2013.
Behling, N.H., Managi, S. & Williams, M.C., 2018. “Updated Look at the DCFC: the Fuel Cell Technology Using Solid Carbon as the Fuel,” Society for Mining, Metallurgy &
Exploration, 13 November 2018, https://doi.org/10.1007/s42461-018-0022-x
Cabinet Office, 2013. Genshiryoku Iinkai no Yakuwari (1950-nen-dai ~ Genzai) (The Role of the Atomic Energy Commission (the 1950s to Present), July 2013, the Nuclear Energy Policy Office, Material 3, http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/genshiryoku_kaigi/dai1/siryou3.pdf>
(accessed 18.02.28).
CAS (Cabinet Secretariat) National Strategy Office, 2012. Genshiryoku Iinkai Minaoshi ni tsuite (About the Review of the Atomic Energy Committee),” Material 3, the Cabinet Office, http://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/committee/council/basic_problem_committee/033/pdf/33-3.pdf>(accessed 18.03.28).
CAS (Cabinet Secretariat), 2016. “Monju” no Toriatsukai ni Kansuru Seifu Hoshin (Government Policy regarding How to Deal with “Monju”), the Ministerial Conference on Atomic Energy, 21 December 2017,
http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/genshiryoku_kakuryo_kaigi/pdf/h281221_siryou2.pdf>(acc essed 17.08.10).
Deshimaru, T., 2013. Recent Progress and Status of Monju, JAEA, March 2013,
https://www.iaea.org/NuclearPower/Downloadable/Meetings/2013/2013-03-04-03-07-CF-NPTD/T9.1/T9.1.deshimaru.pdf>(accessed 17.08.02).
Dolley, S., 1999. Japan’s Nuclear Criticality Accident, Nuclear Control Institute, 4 October 1999, http://www.nci.org/i/ib10499.htm>(accessed 17.08.02).
FEPC (The Federation of Electric Power Companies), no date. Kosoku Zoshoku Genkei-ro “Monju”
Jiko (Accident of Fast Breeder Prototype Reactor “Monju”,
http://www.fepc.or.jp/nuclear/safety/past/monju/>(accessed 17.08.02).
Houko, 2018. Genshiryoku Iinkai Setchi-ho (Atomic Energy Commission Establishment Law), http://www.houko.com/00/01/S30/188.HTM#s4>(accessed 18.03.01).
IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency), no date. INES: The International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale, Information Series/Division of Public Information, 08-26941/E, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/ines.pdf> (accessed 17.08.02).
Iwasaki, S., 2009. Fugen no Reikyaku-sui Roei Jiko ni tsuite (About Fugen’s Cooling Water Leak), Osaka University,
http://www.naoe.eng.osaka-u.ac.jp/~hase/education/senpakuseinosekkei/H21/resume/iwasaki.pdf>(accessed 17.08.02).
JAEA (Japan Atomic Energy Agency), (no date)a. Kaku-nenryo Saikuru Kogaku Kenkyujo (Nuclear Fuel Cycle Engineering Research Center), Pamphlet,
https://www.jaea.go.jp/04/ztokai/moushikomi/ztokai_pamphlet1.pdf> (accessed 17.09.01).
JAEA (Japan Atomic Energy Agency), 2009. Nihon Genshiryoku Kenkyu Kaihatsu Kiko no Kosoku Jikken-ro “Joyo” no Yakuwari to Kongo no Hitsuyo-sei ni kansuru Kento Hokoku-sho (A JAEA Study Report on the Role and Future Need to FBR “Joyo”), JAEA, the Study
41
Committee on “Joyo” Use, April 2009, https://www.jaea.go.jp/04/o-arai/joyo/joyo-advisory/reported/20090421.pdf>(accessed 17.08.07).
JAEA (Japan Atomic Energy Agency), 2011. Kosoku Zoshoku Genkei-ro Monju, Ronai Chukei Sochi no Kore-made no Jokyo oyobi Kongo no Susume-kata (Prototype FBR Monju, the Current Status and the Future Plan Concerning the IVTM), Material 1-2-1, The First Meeting of the IVTM Study Committee, 18 January 2011,
https://www.jaea.go.jp/04/turuga/jturuga/press/posirase/1101/o110118-2.pdf>(accessed 17.08.07 ).
JAEA (Japan Atomic Energy Agency), 2015.“Heisei 27 Jigyo-Nendo, Zaimu Shohyo Ten’pu Shorui, Jigyo Hokoku-sho (The FY 2015 Fiscal Year, Business Report with Attached Financial Documents), https://www.jaea.go.jp/02/pdf/zaimu27-3.pdf>(accessed 17.08.26);
(QST, no date). (QST, no date. Introduction, Website,
http://www.qst.go.jp/ENG/about/outline.html>(accessed 17.08.26).
JAEA (Japan Atomic Energy Agency), 2017a. “Contamination at Plutonium Fuel Research Facility of Oarai Research and Development Center,” September 29, 2017,
https://www.jaea.go.jp/english/news/press/p2017092902/h02.pdf, (accessed 9 January 2018).
JAEA (Japan Atomic Energy Agency), 2017b. “Monju” no Kore-made no Keii (History of Monju Until Now), Press Release, 4 August 2017, JAEA,
https://www.jaea.go.jp/04/turuga/jturuga/press/2017/07/w170707t1.html>(accessed 17.08.06).
JAEA (Japan Atomic Energy Agency), 2018. Genshiryok-Sen Mutsu (Nuclear Power Ship Mutsu), Website, https://www.jaea.go.jp/04/aomori/nuclear-power-ship/index.html>(accessed 18.04.01).
JAIF (Japan Atomic Industrial Forum), 2016. Nuclear Industry Trends Report 2016, An Industrial Survey, http://www.jaif.or.jp/data_archives/n-industry/sangyodoukou2016.pdf>(accessed 18.03.28).
JAPC (Japan Atomic Power Company), 2018. Tokai Hatsudensho (Tokai Power Station), ebsite, http://www.japc.co.jp/haishi/tokai.html> (accessed 18.03.03).
JNC (Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Agency), no date. Outline, Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute (JNC), http://www.jaea.go.jp/jnc/jncweb/>(accessed 17.06.05).
J-Power, 2018. J-Power Corporate Brochure, 2017-2018,
http://www.jpower.co.jp/company_info/pr/pdf/jpower2017.pdf> (access 19.03.03)).
Kataoka, N., 1972. Nihon Genshiryoku Hatsudensho Jiken: Rokku-Auto no Seito-sei no Genkai (The Case of the Japan Atomic Energy Power Plant: The Limitation of Justification of Lockout), Labor Law, Jurist, Vol. 823, pp. 175-177, 11 October 1972,
http://www.yuhikaku.co.jp/static_files/shinsai/jurist/J0535175.pdf> (accessed 17.04.14).
Kinefuchi, E., 2015. Nuclear Power for Good: Articulations in Japan's Nuclear Power Hegemony, Communication, Culture & Critique, Vol. 18, Issue 3, 27 January 2015.
Kingston, J., 2012. Japan's Nuclear Village, Volume 10, Issue 37, Number 1, September 9, 2012, https://apjjf.org/2012/10/37/Jeff-Kingston/3822/article.html>(accessed 28 March 2018).
Kingston, J., 2013. Nuclear Power Politics in Japan, 2011-2013, Asian Perspective, suppl. Special Issue: After Fukushima: The Right to Know 37.4, Oct-Dec 2013).
Kodama, T., 2016. Kiko no Genjo ni tsuite (About the Current Status of JAEA), JAEA, Material 1, 29 March 2016, https://www.jaea.go.jp/about_JAEA/advisory/3-no01/s1.pdf>(accessed 17.08.26).
42
Koga, K., Oohara, N., Ino, H., Kondo, K., Ito, H., Ashida, T., et al. 2015.Experimental fast reactor 'Joyo', Retrieval for the bent MARICO-2 test subassembly using remote control devices,”
FAPIG (Tokyo), ISSN 0014-5645, (no.190). p. 3-8).
Kokuritsu Kokkai Toshokan (National Diet Library), 2012. Fukushima Daiichi Genpatsu Jiko to Yottsu no Jiko Chosa Iinkai (Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident and Four Accident Investigatory Committees, Issue Brief, Number 756, 23 August 2012,
http://dl.ndl.go.jp/view/download/digidepo_3526040_po_0756.pdf?contentNo=1&>(access ed 1 November 2017).
Kondo, S., Deshimaru, T., Konomura, M., 2013. Recent Progress and Status of Monju,” Fast Reactors and Related Fuel cycles: Safe Technologies and Sustainable Scenarios, ER 13, Proceedings of an International Conference, Paris, France, 4-7 March 2013, Vol. 2,
http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/SupplementaryMaterials/Pub1665Vol2Web.pdf>
(accessed 17.08.06).
METI (The Ministry of Economy, Trad and Industry), 2013. Monju Kenkyu Keikaku (Monju Research Plan), Reference Material 1, Sogo Shigen Enerugi Chosakai (The Comprehensive Energy Resource Investigatory Committee), Kihon Seisaku Bunka-kai (The Basic Policy Subcommittee), Monju Kenkyu Keikaku Sagyo Bukai (Monju Research Plan Working Subgroup), the 7th meeting, September 2013,
http://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/committee/council/basic_policy_subcommittee/007/pdf/007_
000.pdf>Accessed 17.07.01).
Nakai, K., 2007. Kagaku ga Shinrai-sare Sonkei sareru Shakai no Keisei (Formation of a Society Where Science would be Respected), a Memorial Essay Collection Compiled by JAERI’s First Employees at the 50th Anniversary of JAERI, September 2007,
http://park17.wakwak.com/~tokai/PCC/pdf/KinenBunsyu.pdf>(accessed 17.04.14).
Nakao, M., no date. Radiation Leaks from Nuclear Power Ship Mutsu, 1 September 1974, on the Pacific Ocean near Aomori (800 km east of the Cape Shiriya), Institute of Engineering Innovation, School of Engineering, the University of Tokyo, Failure Knowledge Database / 100 Selected Cases, http://www.shippai.org/fkd/en/hfen/HA1000615.pdf>(accessed
18.04.01).
NRA (Nuclear Regulation Authority), 2012. Heisei 24-nen-do Genshiryoku Kisei Iinkai, Dai 15-kai Kaigi Giji-roku (PDF) (15th NRA General Meeting Minutes, Fiscal Year 2012), 5 December 2012, https://www.nsr.go.jp/data/000047403.pdf>(accessed 17.08.03).
NRA (Nuclear Regulation Authority), 2015. “Genshiryoku Kisei Iinkai Kisha Kaiken-roku (NRA Press Conference Minutes),” 25 March 2015,
http://www.nsr.go.jp/data/000101638.pdf>(accessed 17.08.03));
Ohira, H., 2015. Progress on Fast Reactor Development in Japan, JAEA, 25-29 May 2015, https://www.iaea.org/NuclearPower/Downloadable/Meetings/2015/2015-05-25-05-29-NPTDS/Country/14_Progress_on_Fast_Reactor_Development_in_Japan_(2015).pdf
>(accessed 17.08.05).
Reuters, 2017. Five workers exposed to radioactive material at Japan nuclear research facility, 7 June 2017,
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-nuclear-contamination-idUSKBN18Y0XI> (accessed 17.08/03).
RIST (The Research Institute of Industrial Science and Technology), 1998. Gen-ken Uran Noshuku Kenkyu-to no Uran Kasai Jiko (04-10-02-02) (Uranium Fire Accident at JAERI’s Uranium Enrichment Research Facility (04-10-02-02)), Atomika, October 1998,
http://www.rist.or.jp/atomica/data/dat_detail.php?Title_Key=04-10-02-02>(accessed 17.08.17).
43
RIST (Research Organization for Information, Science and Technology), 2000. Tokai Sai-shori Kojo ni okeru Kasai Bakuhatsu Jiko (04-10-02-01) (A Fire and Explosion Accident at Tokai Reprocessing Plant), February 2000,
http://www.rist.or.jp/atomica/data/dat_detail.php?Title_No=04-10-02-01>(accessed 17.08.02).
RIST (Research Organization for Information, Science and Technology), 2003. Doryoku-ro, Kaku-Nenryo Kaihatsu Jigyo-dan (13-02-01-12), (Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation, (PNC) (13-02-01-12)), Genshiryoku Hyakka Jiten ATOMIKA,
http://www.rist.or.jp/atomica/data/dat_detail.php?Title_No=13-02-01-12>(accessed 17.05.09).
RIST (Research Organization for Information, Science and Technology), 2007. Ningyo-toge no Uran Noshuku Shisetsu 05-02-01) (Uranium Enrichment Facility at Ningyo-toge (04-05-02-01), December 2007,
http://www.rist.or.jp/atomica/data/dat_detail.php?Title_Key=04-05-02-01>(accessed 17.06.29).
Royal Society of Chemistry, 2018. “Periodic Table, Hydrogen,” http://www.rsc.org/periodic-table/element/1/hydrogen, (accessed 22 December 2018).
Ryall, J., 2010. Monju back after 14 years, World Nuclear News, 6 May 2010, http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/RS_Monju_back_after_14_years_0605101.html> (accessed 17.08.02).
Sobajima, M., 1999. Issues on Accepting Nuclear Energy,” JAERI-Review, 99-011, March 1999, http://jolissrch-inter.tokai-sc.jaea.go.jp/pdfdata/JAERI-Review-99-011.pdf>(accessed 17.08.04).
Tolliday, S., 2012. Crumbling Dream: Japan’s Nuclear Quest, 1954-2011, Business History Conference, Wilmington, Business and Economic History On-line: the BHC Annual Meeting 10: 1-22. Wilmington: Business History Conference,
https://thebhc.org/sites/default/files/tolliday.pdf>(accessed 17.05).
USDOE (US Department of Energy) “Fuel Cell Handbook,” produced by EG&G Technical
Services for the USDOE Office of Fossil Energy, National Energy Technology Laboratory, 7th edition, November 2004.
USNRC (US Nuclear Regulatory Commission), 2017. Stages of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle, Last Reviewed/Updated Tuesday, 17.08.02, https://www.nrc.gov/materials/fuel-cycle-fac/stages-fuel-cycle.html> (accessed 18.03.02).
Wikipedia, 2017. Monju Nuclear Power Plant, Last edited on 4 September 2017,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monju_Nuclear_Power_Plant>(accessed 17.10.30)); (Yomiuri Online, 2013). (Yomiuri Online, 2013. “Monju” Jumbi Teishi Meirei…Nendo-chu Saikai Konnan ni (An order to suspend Monju preparation…Making it difficult to reopen within this fiscal year), 30 May 2013,
https://web.archive.org/web/20130604142913/http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/science/news/2013 0530-OYT1T00544.htm>(accessed 17.08.03).
Wise-Paris,1998. Two Accidents Have Left Their Traces: Monju and Tokai, Sodium Leak and Fire at Monju, Plutonium Investigation, No.2 January 1998, p.4,
http://www.wise-paris.org/index.html?/english/ournewsletter/2/page7.html&/english/frame/menu.html&/engl ish/frame/band.html>(accessed 17.06.21).
WNA (World Nuclear Association), 2017. Fast Neutron Reactors, Updated October 2017, http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/current-and-future-generation/fast-neutron-reactors.aspx, (accessed 18.04.18).
44
WNA (World Nuclear Association), 2018. Outline History of Nuclear Energy, updated January 2018,
http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/current-and-future-generation/outline-history-of-nuclear-energy.aspx> (accessed 18.01.17).
Yoshioka , H., 2013. Shinpan, Genshiryoku no Shakaishi, Sono Nihon-teki Tenkai (New Edition, Social History of Nuclear Energy, The Japanese Case), the 4th edition, 2013, ISBN978-4-02-259983-4, Asahi Shimbun Publishing, Tokyo.
45