II. Economic Institution: GATT and WTO 151
2) Hypotheses on American Strategy towards Regional Integration
Now, after having identified the American position in the postwar international system, hypotheses on US interest and strategy can be proposed. The postwar international system has been characterized firstly as a hegemonic one, though more accurately speaking, the structure shifted from bipolar to unipolar and international institutions enjoy an increasing impact in the daily-life of international affairs. Accordingly, the national interest of United States can be identified as maintaining its hegemonic position on both a structural level and institutional level. This synthetic concept of national interest is concrete and relatively stable. The positional hegemonic interests will continue until a radical change emerges in the hegemonic structure.
Since regional integration can directly influence the positional interests of the United States, we can clarify the conditions that will lead to a corresponding American strategy. If the power gap is so big that in the short term the integration process won’t prominently harm the US power position, and the regional great powers are supporters of the US-led hegemonic institutions, the hegemon will support the integration process because it will make the region a stronger partner or ally of the hegemon in international affairs. However, if the power gap is not very big, or the integration process prominently reduces the power gap, the hegemon will oppose or discourage the regional integration process to maintain its power position; and if the regional great powers attempt to challenge the US dominance in international institutions, especially when they try to “speak with one voice” and realize political integration, the US will oppose or discourage the process to maintain its institutional position. Under both of these two conditions, the regional integration process will
156 See Kenneth N. Waltz, Columbia University, “Globalization and Governance,” PS Online, December 1999, at:
http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/walglob.htm.
157 G. John Ikenberry, After Victory, p. 9.
cultivate a stronger competitor of the hegemon. The hegemon won’t support a regional integration process forever in which it is not a member and other potential great powers exist because the process will sooner or later lead to a challenger for its hegemonic power position and institutional position.
A concise model for the Neorealist hegemonic interests goes as follows:
Hegemonic ensure security, maintain the power power wealth, and prestige position
position (structural interest) Hegemonic
State
Hegemonic promote security, maintain the
Institutional wealth, and prestige institutional position position (institutional interest)
However, the regional integration process may affect the hegemonic interests from two aspects:
Increase in regional Reduction of the power power gap with the hegemon Regional
Integration Enhancement of regional Challenges to the hegemon’s
integrity and independence dominance in international institutions
Thus, The US strategy towards regional integration can be hypothesized through the following three steps:
(1) Conditions under which the US will support regional integration (a) Big power gap between the US and the region, AND
(b) The regional great powers support US dominance in institutions.
Under such conditions, the region will become a stronger partner of the hegemon in international affairs after integration.
(2) Conditions under which the US will oppose regional integration (a) Integration prominently reduces the power gap; OR
(b) The regional great powers challenge the US dominance in institutions
Under such conditions, the regional will become a stronger rival of the hegemon in international affairs after integration.
Actually, as specified in the discussion regarding the relationship between structural interest and institutional interest, a change in power positions will unavoidably lead to a change in institutional positions; or in other words, reducing the power gap will unavoidably lead to increasing institutional conflicts. Thus, it is likely that the power gap is big, but the institutional conflicts are a great many. However, the condition in which the power gap is very small, but institutional conflicts are very few does not exist. Another point that bears noting is that even if the regional integration process won’t create a unitary regional state to balance the hegemon, the tendency will cause the region to become more independent and some kinds of regional common interests will emerge.
Indeed, the integration process will enhance the power of the regional great powers, especially the leading country. The rise of these regional powers will also lead to a regional power center and a potential global challenger. Thus, the region is used as a whole here to describe the relationship between the hegemon and the process. Even before the integration process can completely challenge the existing hegemonic power position, this tendency will invoke sensitive reactions from the hegemon.
(3) Hypotheses for US strategy towards regional integration
Therefore, based on the synthetic Neorealist concept of national interest, we can simply conclude the hypotheses on American strategy towards regional integration processes as follows: (a) the US will support regional integration when the regional great powers support the hegemonic institutions AND the power gap is big; (b) the US will oppose regional integration when the regional integration prominently reduces the power gap OR the regional great powers attempt to challenge the hegemonic institutions. The following chapters will investigate the evolution of American strategy towards Western European, North American, and East Asian integration to examine the explanatory power of Neorealist theories. Based on the hypotheses of American strategy, some examples can be provided that demonstrate more specifically the empirical part of the hypotheses.
Figure 2 clearly shows the hypotheses of US strategy and possible examples.
Figure 2. The Hypotheses of US Strategy Based on a Neorealist Model of National Interest Power Gap Institutional
Conflicts
The US Strategy Examples of US Strategy Towards Regional Integration
Big Few Support/promote European integration before the mid-1960s;
North American integration; ASEAN; SEATO Big Many Oppose/discourage European military integration since the mid-1960s
Small Few Oppose/discourage (None, because a small power gap will inevitably increase institutional conflicts)
Small Many Oppose/discourage EAEG (EAEC); European economic integration since the mid-1960s.