Descriptive statistics

In the dataset created by this research there are no missing values for any of the 91 prod-uct lines, as such all variables have the same number of observations and statistical results are robust. From all product lines considered in this study, the total number of observa-tions per variable and their respective percentages can be seen in Table 5.

Table 5. Observations and percentages per variable.

Variable Observations Percentage

New entrant 43 47%

First mover 42 46%

Worse performance 63 69%

Shift in basis of competition 58 64%

High-end product 24 26%

Product cannibalization 19 21%

New market disruptive innovation 26 29%

Low-end disruptive innovation 29 32%

Radical innovation 52 57%

Architectural innovation 16 18%

Discontinuous innovation 42 46%

Open innovation 50 55%

Market disruption 33 36%

Variable

This research found that from 91 product lines analyzed 43 product lines (47%) were in-troduced by new entrants, 63 product lines (69%) lowered performance at least temporal-ly, and 58 product lines (64%) shifted the basis of competition. These three independent variables represent concepts used by Christensen, and provide an understanding of the orthodox interpretation of disruption theory.

The variables entrant, worse performance, and shift in basis of competition were analyzed in detail previously in Chapter 2.2, for this reason their findings have only been summa-rized in this section. To facilitate the comparison among all variables, the total number of observations per variable seen in Table 5 have been represented visually in Figure 20.

From all product lines analyzed 42 product lines (46%) were first movers, 24 product lines (26%) were high-end products, and 19 product lines (21%) had the risk of product cannibalization. These three independent variables represent concepts used by researchers critical of disruption theory but who have tried to improve it, and provide an understand-ing of the pluralistic interpretation of disruption theory.

Despite the similar percentages of product lines that were introduced by new entrants (47%) and first movers (46%), only 23 products lines (25%) were product lines intro-duced by a company that was both a new entrant and a fist mover. As can be seen, the overlap is only approximately half, meaning that this two concepts are not only different in theory, but also in practice.

Market creation 33 36%

Market mainstreamization 14 15%

Market commoditization 26 29%

Self-disruption 14 15%

Success 64 70%

Lasting success 20 22%

Observations Percentage Variable

!

Figure 20. Observations per variable.

Among all the six variables representing concepts of disruption theory, the two variables with the smaller number of observations were high-end products, and risk of product can-nibalization. To some degree this validates a counter-argument made by the orthodox in-terpretation of disruption theory, which says that the phenomena studied by the pluralistic interpretation of disruption theory are less common that the original phenomenon of

dis-New entrant First mover Worse performance Shift in basis of competition High-end product Product cannibalization New market disruptive innovation Low-end disruptive innovation Radical innovation Architectural innovation Discontinuous innovation Open innovation Market disruption Flexible market disruption Market creation Market mainstreamization Market commoditization Self-disruption Success Lasting success

Observations

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70

20

64 14

26 14

33

45 33

50 42 16

52 29

26 19

24

58 63 42

43

The remaining six independent variables represent innovation types. From all product lines analyzed 26 product lines (29%) were new market disruptive innovations, 29 prod-uct lines (32%) were low-end disruptive innovation, 52 prodprod-uct lines (57%) were radical innovations, 16 product lines (18%) were architectural innovations, 42 product lines (46%) were discontinuous innovations, and 50 product lines (55%) were open innova-tions.

There are considerable variations in the frequency of different innovation types. Radical innovations and open innovations had the highest number of observations, and were al-most three times higher than the number of observations of architectural innovation, the type who had the lowest number of observations. Frequency alone does not imply that one concept is more important than other, as will be covered later when analyzing correla-tion, however frequency gives a picture of how common a type of innovation is in the market. Admittedly, architectural innovations are not as common as other types of innova-tion.

When counted separately, new market disruptive innovation, and low end disruptive in-novation were less frequent than radical inin-novations. However, when counted together 54 product lines (59%) were disruptive innovations regardless of subtype. This number comes much closer to the frequency of radical innovations. Although not an important assumption of disruption theory, it is implied in Christensen’s framework that disruptive innovation is rarer in comparison to radical innovations, however, in practice it can be almost as common.

From all product lines analyzed 29 product lines (32%) were radical innovations that also were disruptive innovations regardless of subtype. This means that from the total of 52 radical innovations, or the total of 54 disruptive innovations, the overlap was approxi-mately half (54% or 56%). Based only on the characteristics of an innovation, this means that the overlap between radical innovations and disruptive innovations is the same as could be expected randomly (50%), this backs up one of Christensen’s assertions, which states that disruptive innovations can be radical or incremental.

In regard to the eight dependent variables that represent market effects, from all product lines analyzed 33 product lines (36%) disrupted the market according to Christensen’s definition of disruption, 45 product lines (49%) disrupted the market according to the more flexible definition of disruption proposed by this research, 33 product lines (36%) created a new market, 14 product lines (15%) mainstreamed the market, 26 product lines (29%) commoditized the market, 14 product lines (15%) self-disrupted the company, 64 product lines (70%) were a success, and 20 product lines (22%) were a lasting success.

There are considerable variations in the frequency of these market effects. Success was the dependent variable with the highest number of observations, while in comparison last-ing success was one of the variables with the lowest frequency. From 64 product lines who were a success only 20 products lines (31%) were able to remain successful in the long term. Self-disruption was the rarest of all variables, with only 14 observations of this phenomenon. This confirms that beating disruption is not as easy as the strongest critics of the theory propose.

Disruption of the market is not so infrequent, regardless of whether Christensen’s or this research’s definition is used. Because the definition of disruption used by this research is more flexible, this results in more observations being counted, especially product lines that created a new market, but might have failed at a later stage as that market evolved.

This finding backs up the notion that disruption is a fairly common phenomenon.

Given that creation of a new market, mainstreamization of the market, and commoditiza-tion of the market are more specific market effects it was to be expected that they would be less frequent than success, or the flexible definition of disruption. However, the sum of observations of these three market effects is less and does not necessarily overlap with the number of observations of success. These three market effects represent to some degree a strategic achievement on their own for a company, they inform the decision to categorize a product line as a success or not, but do not determine it. In other words, success is more than just the ‘altruistic’ contribution of a company in creating, mainstreaming, or

com-moditizing a market. A company needs to look up for its own profitability and benefit di-rectly from a product line, regardless of its contribution to the market.