Conclusion

117 Graph 4.6.1. Relationship Between MPR and PrivateMPR

(N=8; r=0.9372; p=0.0006)

246810

MPR

2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5

Private MPR

The scatter plot exposed in Graph 4.6.1 shows that there are no significant outliers among the data points: all the data follows a similar pattern. Outliers may affect the strength of the result of the Pearson correlation coefficient, but the graph proves that this was not the case.

118 security personnel and the total public defense expenditures increased consistently.

This was reinforced by the extended presence of foreign PMSCs that trained the national armed forces and supported their offensive actions against rebel groups. The process was further complemented by the creation of a network of informants and divisions of peasant soldiers as a means of boosting the numbers of the national armed forces and involving the civilian population largely in the fight against insurgents and drug traffickers.

Along with the increasing number of military and police personnel, an industry of private security companies sprang up during the 1990s. From 1994, when these companies were obliged to register for the first time before the Superintendency of Surveillance and Private Security, until 2002, the year in which the number of private security providers reached its peak, the total number of companies increased by almost 400%. Although the number of companies did not continue to increase at the same rate in the following years, the industry itself continued to grow in terms of total income.

The parallel growth of the public defense forces and the private security industry in Colombia contradicts the existing theory that explains the global rise of private providers of military and security services after the end of the Cold War (as described in Chapter 2). Instead of following a demilitarization process in the 1990s, the country ramped up public defense spending and encouraged the recruitment of more police and military personnel. Furthermore, the domestic private security industry rose in the

119 absence of a demilitarization process, challenging the accepted reasons and explanations for the emergence of PMSCs.

Due to the protracted internal armed conflict, the Colombian government did not intend to reduce the size of the national armed forces; instead, policies were oriented towards strengthening public defense. In the beginning of the 1990s, the government could not afford to scale back its counterinsurgency efforts at the precise moment when the paramilitary groups were declared illegal and became another target of the national armed forces. Likewise, after the unsuccessful peace process undertaken with the FARC between 1999 and 2001, the possibility of a negotiated solution to the conflict faded away and the only apparent viable solution was a strong and straightforward military offensive against guerrilla groups.

The supply and demand effect that Singer and Avant have presented in their works as one of the main reasons for the rise of PMSCs did take place in Colombia – but with some variations. The increase in the supply of security services did not correspond to cutbacks in the defense sector that generated jobless former military and police personnel, but instead to a higher demand for security generated by the expansion of rebel groups’ field of action. The urbanization of the armed conflict also triggered a higher demand of security. This process of conflict urbanization increased the demand for security in major cities – a demand that could not be met by public defense forces, despite their growing numbers. Therefore, the private security companies became a perfect solution: they could provide the required security services,

120 enabling the police and military to concentrate on fighting insurgents and drug traffickers.

In other words, “and referring to negotiation techniques, it was a win-win type of relationship” (C. Krüger, personal communication, November 7, 2012).

One of the most interesting characteristics of the domestic industry of private security that highlights its political and economic relevance and calls for a widening of the academic concept of militarization is the correlation between MPR and PrivateMPR.

A Pearson correlation analysis showed that the private security industry presents a strong and significant relationship with the national armed forces: as the number of national armed forces increases, so does the number of private security forces. In other words, although the ongoing militarization process did not trigger the rise of the private security industry in the country, an increase in the number of military and police forces would always go along with an increase in the number of private security agents.

Finally, although not directly involved in counterinsurgency or counternarcotic operations, private security companies proved to be useful as instruments of military intelligence. Together with local villagers in rural areas, certain private security companies were encouraged to become part of the network of informants created by the government in 2003. Moreover, their role in the provision of preventive security contrasted perfectly with the reactive task of the public defense forces; the increase in the number of military and police personnel was adequately complemented by the presence of a domestic private security industry.

121 It has been made clear that private security companies are not part of the Colombian national armed forces and therefore are not taken into account in any analysis of militarization of the country according to the narrow definition of the concept.

However, it is clear that these companies play indeed an important role in the militarization process. Jacklin Cock argues that the doctrine behind militarization should

“refer both to the military as a formal, state institution and to various non-state forms, expressions and instruments of organized violence” (Cock 2005: 791). Therefore, since private security companies complement the security services provided by the military and police, indirectly support counterinsurgency and counternarcotic operations, and the main service they provide is armed security (as seen on Graph 4.5.5), these companies should be definitely included as part of the wider notion of militarization.

122 5. The Impact of Militarization and the Privatization of Security on Democracy

and Economic Growth