After the USSR break formed ａ new regional organization consisting (CIS) of ｇ member states (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan) and two associate members (Ukraine and Turkmenistan), in 2008 Georgia withdrew its participation in CIS237. By the end of 2016 twelve former Soviet republics (excluding the Baltic States), Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Georgia, Moldova, Armenia, Ukraine, Russian Federation, and Tajikistan joined the WTO. Another four countries, Belarus, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan are still in the process of accession｡
Considering the above mentioned the author will try to ana‑
lyze the experience of some of the CIS member countries joining the WTO. For example, Kyrgyzstan joined the WTO as one of the first among CIS countries in 1998, and the process of accessions
237 Unified Register of legal acts and other documents of the Commonwealth of Independent States, "Details on the Ratification of Documents Adopted within
the CIS in 1991 − 2016 Years," n.d.,http://ｃiｓ.minsk.bｙ/reestr/ru/index.html#
reports/rat/sved.
was just two and half years238 . Commitments to tariff rates adopted by Kyrgyzstan as ａ result of negotiations with the WTO countries are in the range from Ｏ to 50%.No bids have been ac‑
cepted for the following products: construction, agricultural, chemical products, non‑ferrous metals, furniture, etc. With a rate of 10% and above: eggs, meat, cocoa, vegetables, clothing, etc.
Weapons and ammunition were 50% bid until 2000 and after that became 15%239. According to the expert Roman Mogilevsky, when
Kyrgyzstan entered the WTO, at the time, the country has experi‑
enced an economic downturn, there was nothing to protect the do‑
mestic market − exports were mainly raw materials and the processing industry had not been developed. Fast accession of Kyrgyzstan to the WTO can be explained by the structure of the country and open foreign trade regime, which has been selected by the government of the country to carry out economic reforms.
Kyrgyzstan did not have any export subsidies and practically no budget to support for agriculture. Thus, entering into the WTO, Kyrgyzstan did not have to go to extreme measures to open its market or accept any onerous conditions240｡
After three years of negotiations, in 2000 Georgia joined the WTO. Georgia is a predominantly agricultural country, which spe‑
cialized in the production of wines, tobacco, and textiles. It does not have its own advanced production processing industry that
could produce products with high added value. That is why the country acceded to join the WTO so quickly241 ｡
Negotiations on the accession of Armenia to the WTO began
238 http ｓ://ｗｗｗ.ｗtｏ.ｏｒｇ/english/thewto̲e/whatis̲e / tif ̲e/org6̲e .htm 239 World Trade Organization, "Report of the Working Party on the Accession of
the Kyrgyz Republic," July 31， 1998･
240 Director, Center for Social and Economic Research CASE‑Kyrgyzstan (Bishkek)
241 World Trade Organization, "Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Georgia to the World Trade Organization. " WT/ACC/GEO/31, 31 August 1999.
63
in 1996 and lasted more than six ｙｅａｒｓ242. The negotiation process was made easier by the fact that since the beginning of market re‑
forms in the country, it held a liberal economic policy. The foreign trade regime was over liberal − the maximum size of import duties was 10 °/o2气The only protective barrier that do not comply with WTO requirements was the fact that the Armenian agricultural
products are exempt from VAT. As ａ result of negotiations Armenia has undertaken to eliminate this benefit after six years, replaced by government subsidies introduced in 20092 气
Regarding the services market, the longest and most difficult were the negotiations on the telecommunications services sector･
WTO member countries are required to fully open this market, but it was impossible to satisfy this requirement as the exclusive pro‑
vider of telecommunication services in Armenia was the company
"Armentel" and the government granted the right to ａ monopoly for it with a term of 15 years, up to 20 13. As ａ result of negotia‑
tions Armenia is obliged to open the telecommunications market
after the expiry of the monopoly, or before, if the right to ａ mo‑
nopoly is terminated prior to the expiration2 气
To comply with the principles and requirements of the WTO, the Government of Armenia has implemented many legislative and institutional reforms, which mainly related to areas such as cus‑
toms, taxation, protection of intellectual property rights, technical
242 http ｓ／ ｗｗｗ.ｗtｏ.ｏｒｇ/english/thewto̲e/countries̲e/armenia
２４３ GLOBAL SPC Business and Legal Consulting, "Invest in Armenia 'Import and Export Regime 尸
244 ¨ＷＴＯ Accession and Sustainable Development: Post‑Soviet Countries Assess Perspectives. Country Reviews. Armenia," Prepa Γed under the Pr 可郎t of the
￡αΓth Council, Eco‑Accord, and IIS.￡) "Broadening PaΓａｃφation in the?Emergin Global Econom ダwith Support of the Ford Foundation, 2002 ， http://trade.
ecoaccord.org/english/countries/armenia.htm.
245 Tatul Manaseryan, " 0 ΓpaHH^eHHe Ko HKypeHUMH Ｂ Cm c t e Me TejieKOMMyHMKaiiMM: OnbiT ApMeHHM 'Restriction of Competition in the Telecommunications System: The Armenian Experience,'" International Centre ルｒ 77Γade and Sustainable Devel 叩merit Volume １， Number 10 ， M O C T bl (August 1 ， 2008).
barriers to trade, ｅtc气
Tajikistan applied for WTO membership in May 2001 and on the ２ ０ｆ March 2013, after l l years of negotiations, Tajikistan be‑
came ａ full member of the WTO. Based on the results of bilateral negotiations with WTO members on market access for goods, the
weighted average tariff for all products is 8%, for agricultural products is 10.4%, and for non‑agricultural goods is 7.6% 气Based on the results of bilateral negotiations with the WTO on access to the services market, Tajikistan had committed in l l service sec‑
tors, including 111 sub‑sectors248. During the negotiations on mar‑
ket access for goods and services, the Republic of Tajikistan was able to protect the country's interests. For example, the results achieved related to the fina 囗evel of import tariffs is 8%, and this figure is better than in Kyrgyzstan (7.5%), Georgia (7.4%), and Russia (7.8%)2 气
Negotiations on accession of Kazakhstan to the WTO began in 1996 and lasted 19 years. The package of documents on the repub‑
lie's accession to the WTO was approved by its General Council on July 27 ， 2015 and signed by the Director General of the WTO,
Roberto Azevedo, and the President of Kazakhstan, Ｎ. Nazarbayev2o °｡
At that time, the President of Kazakhstan noted that member‑
ship in the WTO opens new horizons for the country's ｅｃｏｎｏｍｙ･
Nazarbayev said that: ¨lt provides our companies access to foreign markets and consumers − ａ large selection of goods and services･
Today 90 percent of our trade is with the WTO member countries･
Therefore, this decision is very important for us. Kazakhstan is be‑
coming more attractive for foreign and domestic investors. We are
246 World Trade Organization, "Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the Republic of Armenia" WT/ACC/ARM/23 26 ， November 2002.
247 The Misnistry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Tajikistan.
248 The Misnistry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Tajikistan.
249 WTO, ITC and UNCTAD, "World Tariff Profiles 2015," 6.
250 World Trade Organization, "Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the Republic of Kazakhstan. WT/ACC/KAZ/93, 23 June 2015."
6 ５
able to create new industries and jobs."251
For many goods items, import duties for Kazakhstan were significantly lower in the WTO than the Common Customs Tariff in The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU)252. After the final WTO
accession, the average weighted tariff of Kazakhstan decreased from 10.4 to 6.1%. At the same time the average tariff on agricul‑
tural products for Kazakhstan amounted to 7.6%, whereas for the other countries of the Eurasian Union it was 17%,and for non ag‑
ricultural goods it was 5.9%253. Also Kazakhstan undertook the task to liberalize the conditions of work in the domestic market of serv‑
ices. As ａ result, after 2.5 years from the accession of Kazakhstan to the WTO, foreign companies will be able to fully acquire local operators of interurban and international communication, and foreign banks, after the 5 years, will have the right to directly open branches and to conduct banking business in the country 气
In order to combine Kazakhstan's membership in both associa‑
t
ｉｏ ｎs( ＷＴＯ and EAEU), members of the Eurasian Union actually agreed to give it ａ special customs status. Kazakhstan pledged to prevent re‑export to other countries of EAEU products imported at lower import duties from WTO member countries. The supply of goods that are included in the list of exemptions from Kazakhstan to other states of the Eurasian Union the information will be entered in the accounting system with reference to customs data and the rate at which the goods were imported from third countries. For the movement of goods to the other States of the
2５１ Tengri News, "Kazakhstan Officially Joined the WTO," July 27･ 2015･ https://
tengrinews
252 Kirill Sokov, ¨ＫａＫ Ka3a χCT3H COBMeCTHT ^neHCTBO Ｂ BTO Ｈ EA3C 'How Kazakhstan Combine the Membership in the WTO and the EAEU,'" Ritmeursia, February 16 ， 2016･
253 Aitolkyn Kourmanova, "Kazakhstan and the Ｗ Ｔ Ｏ: Ａ New Center かｒ Ｓ￡Γα ￡ｅがc and International Stu ぷes, July 2 ， 2015, httpｓ:// ｗｗ ｗ.csis.ｏｒｇ/analy‑
sis/kazakhstan‑and‑wto‑new‑era.
254 World Trade Organization, "Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the Republic of Kazakhstan."
Union ａ special shipping document will be needed200｡
Kazakhstan, along with other commitments when they joined the WTO, accepted the obligations, including in the sphere of pro‑
tection of IPR on medicines. In Kazakhstan, the market is mainly comprised of old generic drugs. The introduction of ａ long‑term exclusive period would slow down the entrance into the market of new generic drugs. Following the negotiations, Kazakhstan has
committed on the introduction of ａ six‑year period of data exclu‑
sivity. The period of exclusivity will apply not to the new method of use or indications, but only on new active substances206｡
Accession to the WTO has positive and negative effects on the economy of the country. That's why many countries prepare for
their membership for ａ long time and carefully. Among positive ｅ仁 fects, as already mentioned, can be noted MFN status; access to the mechanism for settlement of trade disputes within the Ｗ ＴＯ;op‑
portunity to participate in the development of new international trade rules; expansion of trade borders; predictability and trans‑
parency; trade competition; improving the image of the country,etc. Among negative effects is the threat of rising unem‑
ployment if the company cannot compete with foreign producers;
and the reduction of import duties could lead to the fact that ａ number of products will be too unprofitable to produce in country and so ｏｎ｡
For example, the experience of Kyrgyzstan's participation in the WTO as ａ whole is regarded by other members of the CIS coun‑
tries as ａ negative for the following reasons: it has not experienced expected growth of foreign direct investment in the ｅｃｏｎｏｍｙ; be‑
255 " BcTynmi Ｂ Cmiy ripOTOKOJl ｏ PeajiH3auMH 06a3aTejibCTB Ka3a χCTaHa no y^a ｃ TMK) Ｂ BTO'Entry into Force of the Protocol on the Implementation of the Obligations of Kazakhstan on Participation in the WTO,'" Eurasian Economic Comission, November 1 ， 2016.
256 World Trade Organization, "Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the Republic of Kazakhstan."
67
cause of too rapid accession to the WTO, the country insufficiently worked out the terms of accession; the country has undertaken too high commitment at the level of developed countries, which Kyrgyzstan is not; there was ａ sharp deterioration in relations with traditional trading partners who are not members of the ＷＴＯ; and Kyrgyzstan's neighbors imposed customs restrictions to protect their manufacturers207｡
It is also necessary to draw attention to the study of Korean economist Ha‑Joon Chang, who, at the conclusion of his book, con‑
eludes that the United Kingdom and the United States, during the period of economic development, enjoyed protection measures ｅ仁 fectively, and the newly industrialized countries, in the period of industrial development, similarly supported their economies･
That's why developed WTO member countries convince poor coun‑
tries under the pretext of economic development to act in the direc‑
tion opposite to that which they are moving by themselves208｡
More and more countries are acceding to the WTO and it ｗ１ １ １ come the time for Uzbekistan to also join. Uzbekistan should care‑
fully prepare to the accession of the WTO in order to have more positive effects to its economy. The continued delay of Uzbekistan in entering the WTO makes it more difficult to fight for the inter‑
ests of the country. Countries that are not part of the WTO have severe issues in their foreign relations and trades with other na‑
tions who are WTO members. Particularly, there exists a big dis‑
crimination probability against goods from Uzbekistan in the market, internally even though it is of more advantage to mem‑
bers of the WTO to carry out trade amongst themselves, compared to nations who are not part of the organization. The process of ac‑
257 Tatyana Filippova, "Kbip ΓbI3CTaH Ｈ BTQ riOflBOflH ＨＴｏΓＨ fleCHTMJieTHH 'Kyrgyzstan and the ＷＴＯ: Summing up the Decade,'" 召八幽es Volume 2‑Number 1 (February 23 ， 2009).
258 Ha‑Joon Chang, Kicking Away the Ladder ご Development Ｓ￡Γα￡昭?y 加 月istoパｃαZ Perspective (Great Britain: Anthem Press, 2003), 139.
cession for joining the WTO for Uzbekistan started in 1994. About 70 percent of the countries who were in the Soviet Union have joined the WTO already. The low IPR protection in Uzbekistan is
among the main reasons for its accession delays to the WTO. The fake goods inflow destroys the local industry, suppresses processes that are creative, leads to salary suppression, and causes loss of jobs. Furthermore, this leads to decreased turnover economically, due to tax revenue decreases ,and results in developed countries being discouraged from investing･
When the process of negotiation was ongoing, becoming ａ member of the WTO was required so that a high bar adoption of
the level of subsidy can be accomplished. This will make it possible for the country to keep the subsidy scale to ａ particular area and then through ａ period of transition, decrease it slowly to smaller portions. Recognition of achievement is also needed for ａ develop‑
ing country like Uzbekistan. This leads to ａ reduced subsidization level at ａ pace that is very slow for ａ longer period.
Joining the WTO, gives ａ lot of effects that are positive, in‑
eluding being able to sell the agricultural products from Uzbekistan at the international market, demands of consumer sat‑
isfaction based on the high‑quality products on domestic market appearance, increments in foreign direct investment, which further comes with some expenses. The negative effects of accession to the WTO varies based on the economic development level of the state.
The state, when becoming ａ member of the WTO, would need to de‑
velop ａ technique for developing agriculture as well as other eco‑
nomic sectors that are related.
Uzbekistan's production comparative advantage can be in‑
creased through processing and production costs reduction as well as agricultural products processing so that they go into the inter‑
national market with ａ competitive price, agricultural products production, corresponding international quality standards re‑
quirements, and packaging that is appropriate｡
69
First of all, the Convi?ntion ｏ/゛ Geneva Phonographs accession should reduce the number of products for sound recording, which are unlicensed in the local market of Uzbekistan. Also, the with‑
drawal of the reservation of Uzbekistan to the 召erne Convi?ntion Article 18 1s recommended. The effect of retroaction, caused by Article 18 ， does not impose consequences of ａ financial nature any longer based on ａ protected work's illegal usage in the past. The reservation is therefore no longer required. Also, the customs re‑
cord system creation of Uzbekistan's IPR goods will aid the detain‑
ing of goods, which infringes IPR by customs officer when they are still at the border. Furthermore, knowledge enhancement and training of IPR customs officers are recommended so that they can easily identify fake goods from originals. Also, divisions of IP es‑
tablishment in the Uzbek courts ｗ111 lead to an improved IPR pro‑
tection effectiveness in Uzbekistan and increase IP cases handling quality. Finally, ａ thoughtful choice should be taken by Uzbekistan to determine if it would increase penalties for IP‑
related crimes and add its Ｃ八minal Code threshold so that it can adequately discourage and decrease more counterfeiting and pi‑
racy｡
The study is a premier comprehensive investigation of the im‑
pact of Uzbekistan's weak protection of intellectual property in the context of world trade for the country. The world law aims at ｏ仁 fering the urgent need of Uzbekistan to strictly enforce protec‑
tions so that it can be admitted into the WTO, which should bring much relief to the country｡
Considering WTO IPR protection based on public law, interna‑
tionally it is still insufficient. The process is complicated by inade‑
quate official WTO documents and translation of authentic documents into Russian or Uzbek languages. Extant translations come with statements that are contentious and cannot be used as ａ source that is reliable. Furthermore, the process of learning is
confusing due to the fact that information and documents similar
to accession process negotiation in Uzbekistan to the WTO are stated as confidential as well as limited access to journalistic non‑
scientific people. Sources that are more reliable and based on for‑
eign scholars work are needed for WTO member representatives to look into problems carefully with better access to the main practice and data｡
Protection of patent and trademarks were not fully covered in this research. There is however ａ need to carry out ａ comprehen‑
sive examination. For instance, it has been noted by the WTO that the law of Uzbek gives national treatment exceptions. Stateless in‑
dividuals, foreign entities, and foreign individuals are made to ｐａｙ more fees for registration and dues for intellectual property ob‑
jects compared to those with CIS entities and CIS nationals209. The various treatments are different from the provided national treat‑
ment in Article 2 0f the Paris Conm?ntio 刀 かｒ 沽 巳 Protec ぴon of Indus び 沁Z Property which was added into the TRIPS Agreem･? 肘 ｉｎ
Article 2.1. Based on Uzbekistan Invi?肘ions, び￡消 印Models and Industrial ￡)･?signs Law, software for computers and designs of cir‑
cuit layout that was integrated cannot be patented. TRIPS Agreem･?nt Article 27.1 however needs all technology fields inven‑
tions, including processes or products that are modern, to include ａ step that is inventive and applicable industrially which can be
patented｡
Despite protection of trademark and patent violations which is widespread in Uzbekistan, stronger protection and copyright cases would form ａ major foundation for ａ stronger case for Uzbek. Ａ better investigation of incompatible areas with world instruments would also improve Uzbekistan protection and enforcement of IPR and would be accession case‑strengthening. A protection of trade‑
mark and patent that is robust would result in streams of revenue
259 WT/ACC/UZB/4, "Working Party on the Accession of Uzbekistan − Accession of Uzbekistan − Additional Questions and Replies," April 20 ， 2001, 54.
７7
that are stronger for the government of Uzbekistan.
Bibliography
Books, Journals and Newspapers
Aaditya Mattoo 尸'China's Accession to the ＷＴＯ: The Services Dimension." Oxford 研liversity Press, 2003.
Aaronson, Susan. "Does the WTO Help Member States Improve Governance?World Trade Review, Camb 八面 ｅ 研liversity Press, October 19 ， 2013.
Accession to the World 77Γαｄｅ Organiza ぴ077ごIssues and Recommenda ぴons for Central Asian and Caucasian Economies 加 Transition. Vol. 48. Tashkent: United Nations, 2001.
Ahmedova Ｌ 尸'The Losses from the Counterfeiting Products for Uzbekistan." The
￡αｓ￡True. August 12， 2010, sec. 3･
Anders, Aslund, and Dombrovskis Valdis. How L 晩 訴a Came 77 九rough the Financial Crisis (Peterson Instituteかr Interna ぴonal Economics: Special R 印ort). Peterson Institute for International Economics: Special Report (Book Institute of International Economics, 2011.
Andras, Racz. "Russian WTO Accession and the Geneva Agreements: Implications for Russia and Georgia." T ＼Γansantlantic Academy, December 201 1.
Anuradha Dayal‑Gulati, and Angela Ｙ. Lee. "Kellogg on China: Strategies for Success." Northwest ぽ71びniversity Press, 2004.
Athanasakou, K. K 尸China IPR Enforcement: Hard as Steel or Soft as Ｔｏｆｕ? Bringing the Question to the WTO under TRIPS." Georgetown Journal o/ 匸International
￡αに39 (2007):217‑693.
Bandura, Elena. "Vstuplenie Rossii ｖ ＷＴＯ: celi, zadachi, perspektivi,[Russia's WTO accession: goals, objectives, prospects]Tamojnya Ru. Moscow, September 19 ， 2012.
Bliznec I.A. and Novoselova L.A./Cya no Mh t e ji ji e k t y a ji b HbiM npaBaM Ｂ CHCTeMe ＯｐΓａＨｏＢ ΓQcyziapcTBeHHOM BjiacTH Ｆq)(ＩＰ Court in the System of Russian Federation State Authorities)Prospect, 2014.
Borsheva. A. "Development of a System of State Support of Agriculture in Russia's Entry in to WTO ."Omsk State Agrarian University, 2010.
Brion Anderson and Yuriy Klimov. "Uzbekistan: Trade Regime and Recent Trade Developments." 研liversity of Ｃｅ公Γal Asia, 2012･
Carlos Esplugues. "China's Accession to WTO." Chinese 召Ixｓ加ess La 叫2009.
Carlos Ｍ Correa. "Implementing TRIPs in Developing Countries." Third World
￡ｃ呪 〇mics, July 16 ， 1998･
Chang Hong. "The Political Economy of Tariff Protection in China: Evidence from WTO Accession," Cana ぷα77 Journal of Economics, November 4 ， 2013.
Cheong Ching, Hung Yee Ching. "Handbook on China's WTO Accession and Its Impacts." World Scien ￡听ｃ Publis九加ｇ Co. Pte. Ltd･, 2003･
"China's Accession to the ＷＴＯ.≒Jones Day Publications, January 2002･
Dexi, Q. "Survey of Intellectual Property Issues in China‑US Trade Negotiations under the Special 30 1 Provisions, A." Pacific R丿m Law & Policy Journal. 2 (1993):
259.
Dieter Heinzig. "The Soviet びnion and Communist China, 194 万一1950ごThe Arduous Road to the Alliance.″An East Gate 召ｏｏた, 2004.
Dobrinin. O.V. " Cya no Hh t e ji ji e k t y a ji b HbiM npaBaM KaK μeMCTBeHHbIM MexaHH3M,