Mari Nomura
To begin with, let us look at an example demonstrating the level of historical awareness amongst contemporary Japanese youth regarding the war of aggression that Japan conducted against China. If I were to ask a class in university, ‘What happened on 7 July 1937?’, just how many students would be able to reply correctly? They might answer that July 7th is the date of ‘Tanabata’
(the Star Festival), but most would be unaware that the 7th of July, 1937 was the date of the Lugou Bridge Incident. It is also doubtful how much students might know about the Nanjing Massacre perpetrated by the Imperial Japanese Army in December of that year.
In China, the Lugou Bridge Incident is called the July 7th Incident. On that day, the Japanese Imperial Army and the Republic of China’s National Revolutionary Army clashed on the Lugou Bridge, located in the south-west of Beijing, setting off the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945). The history of the era of Japanese colonial rule is taught in detail in Chinese schools, and in China, there are probably no university students ignorant of the July 7th Incident and the Nanjing Massacre. This does not indicate conflicting historical memories or awareness, but the vast difference between the emphasis these historical events are given in schools in China and how they are taught in Japan.
In the 1990s, when the existence of the comfort women came to light, the absence or belatedness of post-war Japan’s ‘struggle to come to terms with the past’ (Vergangenheitsbewältigung) began to attract the attention of the Japanese people. Consequently, Japanese scholars of both Japanese and German contemporary history naturally focused on post-war West German historical policies as a model for Japanese historical policies.
Through its wars of aggression, Germany inflicted immense human and material destruction on the countries to its east and west, and slaughtered an estimated six million Jews in the Holocaust. For these reasons, Germany was convicted for crimes against peace and against humanity at the Nuremburg trials. Expressing remorse and apologies for these crimes, as well as making amends through practical war reparations and compensation, were the absolute conditions for Germany’s resumption of its place in the international community.
Germany’s struggle to come to terms with its past is comprised of the following four points: Compensation for victims of Nazi persecution; continuing prosecutions of Nazi crimes; policing of neo-Nazis; and the teaching of history with an emphasis on the twentieth century.
However, this struggle to come to terms with the past was not met with enthusiasm by the German people. According to a public opinion survey conducted in 1949 by the Allensbach Institute for Public Opinion Research, in response to the question ‘Has anti-Semitism become stronger or weaker since 1945?’, 19 per cent answered that it had ‘become stronger’, while 13 per cent replied that it ‘remains strong’, a total of 32 per cent. On the other hand, the percentage of people who replied that it had ‘weakened’ was 32 per cent, showing that anti-Semitism still remained strongly rooted in German society. Similarly, another survey conducted by the Allensbach Institute in the same year found that 58 per cent of the respondents agreed with the statement ‘Nazism was good in principle, but was carried out badly’1.
Because the policy of compensating victims of Nazi persecution created a huge financial burden for Germany, it was strongly opposed by the general public and within the Bundestag. Konrad Adenauer, West Germany’s first post-war Chancellor, sidestepped this opposition and resolutely implemented the compensations policy. Under Adenauer’s government, the Reparations Agreement between Israel and West Germany (the Luxemburger Abkommen, or Luxembourg Agreement), was signed with Israel in 1952, and the German Restitution Laws (Bundesentschädigungsgesetz) were passed in 1953 and 1956.
1 Yuji Ishida, Kako no Kokufuku: Hitora Go no Doitsu (Vergangenheitsbewältigung:
Germany after Hitler), Hakusuisha Publishing, 2002, p.83.
However, it must be noted that prior to enforcing the compensations policy, Adenauer implemented a large number of policies granting amnesty to those found guilty of Nazi crimes and war crimes in German courts under the Allied occupation, as well as policies reappointing civil servants dismissed from their posts during the occupation. In order to obtain a national consensus for compensations, it was necessary to restore a national spirit wounded by Germany’s war of aggression and subsequent defeat.
Despite these complications, as Germany’s post-war recovery progressed and the lives of its people stabilised, its struggle to come to terms with the past did achieve national consensus as well as international recognition. In Germany, surely no university student would now be unable to answer correctly when asked, ‘What happened on 1 September 1939?’ or ‘What occurred at Bełżec and Treblinka?’
As Professor Hashimoto points out, Germany’s struggle to come to terms with its past has at times been overly idealised by Japanese scholars and liberal intellectuals, who continue to struggle with conflicting emotions regarding Japan’s own recent history. Unlike the Nuremburg trials, the Tokyo Trials only dealt with crimes against peace and war crimes, and there is no comparable example of prosecution for crimes against humanity in a Japanese context. The Nanjing incident was denounced as a war crime, and accordingly Japan was not forced to implement compensation policies comparable to Germany’s Luxembourg Agreement or restitution laws; by taking care of the issue of war reparations to former enemy countries, Japan resumed its place in international community. This of course does not mean that Japan should not express regrets or apologise, particularly to the people of Asia, after having inflicted vast damage and suffering on many countries through colonial rule and invasion. However, while on one hand the Japanese people were intensely conscious of being the world’s first victims of atomic bombs, on the other their awareness of Japan’s responsibility as a perpetrator of colonial rule and a war of aggression remained shallow. The Japanese government’s humble acceptance of the historical fact of aggression, their painful expressions of feelings of deep remorse and heartfelt apologies, all came about after the exploitation of comfort women was
acknowledged in the 1995 Murayama Statement (Statement by Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama “ On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the war’s end”, 15 August 1995).
Even after the Murayama Statement, it is still difficult to say whether the country’s responsibility as an aggressor is being sufficiently acknowledged in Japanese educational settings. If anything, under the current Abe administration Japan’s struggle to come to terms with the past is actually regressing. When the current state of affairs is observed in Japan, it is evident that criticisms of the Japanese historical policies modelled on German policies have still not lost their practical relevance, which Professor Hashimoto does not deny. However, beyond this, Hashimoto emphasises that we must now take research to the next step. He asserts that we need to recognise the ideological nature of the historical viewpoints that form the basis of German and Japanese historical policies; that we need to move beyond comparing the historical policies of two countries (Germany and Japan) to regional comparisons of historical awareness among central and eastern European countries (including Germany) and east/southeast Asia (including Japan); and that we must move towards comparisons broader in scope than comparisons merely between two countries. German and Japanese historical policies are predicated on the historical view of the Nuremburg and Tokyo trials; although Nazism, the Holocaust, and Japanese militarism are regarded as absolute evils, Soviet oppression in regions that came under their control via the secret protocol of the Treaty of Non-Aggression with Germany in 1939 and Western countries’ responsibility for colonial rule in Asia are overlooked.
For example, the three Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia came under Soviet control under the secret protocol of the Treaty of Non-Aggression between Germany and the Soviet Union. Though they were occupied by Nazi Germany during its war with the Soviets beginning in 1941, their incorporation into the Soviet Union was fixed after the war. After the revolutions of 1989, these three countries began to raise fierce objections to the then-prevalent Soviet historical view of the Great Patriotic War, in which the Soviet Union was seen as a liberator against Nazi Germany. In the German
historical context, Nazism and the Holocaust were seen as absolute evils, incomparable to other political regimes or genocides. Considering Nazism and Communism as two comparable totalitarian systems was strictly repudiated as an attempt to relativise the crimes committed by the Nazis. In contrast to this, the three Baltic states saw Soviet Communism as equivalent to Nazism, and at times as an even more repressive form of totalitarianism, and demanded apologies from Russia (the Soviet Union’s successor state) for atrocities committed by the Soviets against their people.
After the beginning of Nazi Germany’s war with the Soviet Union, nationalists of the Baltic states saw the invading German Army as liberators and joined the Nazi Waffen-SS in order to fight the Soviets. Even after the defeat of Nazi Germany in 1945, this group continued their underground armed resistance against the Soviet regime, and were secretly dubbed the ‘Forest Brothers’ by the people of these three nations. While it was taboo to speak of the Forest Brothers during the Soviet era, following the dissolution of the USSR and the restoration of independence to the Baltic states, the rebels enjoyed a restoration to fame. It goes without saying that this move by the Baltic states agitated the Soviets. For the Soviet Union, which viewed the Great Patriotic War as the centre of its national identity, the repudiation of that war was difficult to tolerate. Furthermore, as some members of the Forest Brothers were Holocaust collaborators, the revival of their fame triggered an intense Jewish backlash.
Nazi Germany was an occupier of the Baltic states during the Second World War, but was seen as a liberator when compared to another occupier, the Soviet Union. This type of skewed representation is also apparent in evaluations of Japan’s war of aggression. In the Asian countries that had been Western colonies, Japan was simultaneously invader and liberator, doing away with Western colonial rule. As such, some citizens of these former Western colonies collaborated with the Imperial Japanese Army during the Asian nationalist independence movement.
In the Baltic states, historical judgments regarding the Nazi German and Soviet occupations are divided variously amongst Baltic nationalists, Jews and Russian nationalist groups. Similarly, memories and assessments of the
Japanese invasion of Asian countries also differ depending on the standpoint of those involved. In central and eastern Europe, as well as in east and southeast Asia, a number of different historical understandings of the Second World War are presently in marked conflict. For Professor Hashimoto, this type of historical conflict should not be cause for intolerance or the exclusion of those with differing historical understandings. Rather, the question is how do we foster peaceful co-existence among people with conflicting historical perceptions? Professor Hashimoto’s question is something that we must seriously consider.