COIN Plan: Targeting the CPP-NPA .1 Oplan Bantay Laya (2002-2006) .1 Oplan Bantay Laya (2002-2006)

As soon as Arroyo issued EO 21, the AFP crafted a security document called the AFP 2001 National Military Strategy. From the document, it revealed the AFP’s challenges in simultaneously dealing with various armed fronts: namely the communist movement and the Muslim threat groups. The entire AFP inclusive of paramilitary and the police amounted to 120,000 personnel while the Communist Party of the Philippines-New People’s Army (CPP-NPA) consisted of 9,500 armed regulars, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) between 10,000 and 15,000, and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) 1,500,⁴² which demonstrated a force-to-space ratio dilemma. The AFP learned from their experience in their all-out-war with the MILF in 2000, that the redeployment of forces to Mindanao from other parts of the country left a vacuum in areas they were deployed from. The communists seized the opportunity to increase their influence in these areas.⁴³ Therefore, in order to maximize the effectiveness of their limited manpower, it was decided that the AFP would increase military offensives in priority areas while using minimal forces to contain threats from spilling over into other areas. This was also known as the “focus and contain”

strategy.⁴⁴

The so-called priority areas were initially determined to be the communist strongholds. Unlike the Muslim armed groups that were restricted geographically to the Southern Philippines, the communists were known to be operating in numerous provinces that covered the entire Philippines.⁴⁵ Furthermore, the AFP maintains that the CPP-NPA remains the largest threat to the stability of the country because of the group’s objectives in taking over the government.⁴⁶ To drive home the message that Arroyo meant business, she ordered the AFP to eliminate the communist threat and dismantle their political organizations by 2006.⁴⁷

How to implement the “focus and contain” concept was fleshed out in the AFP’s new COIN plan released in December 2002. Oplan Bantay Laya I (Operation Plan Freedom Watch) narrowed its mission to deal with the communists first before dealing with other threat groups. Many of its principles date back to

42 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2000-2001. London: Routledge, 2000, pp. 205-206.

43 Cornelio H. Valancia Jr., “ Kapit Bisig RP-US-Military Exercises: A Key to the War on Terror in the Philippines,” Research Report, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, April 2007, p. 12

44 General Headquarters Armed Forces of the Philippines, AFP National Military Strategy, Quezon City:

General Headquarters, 2001, pp. 20-21, 26-27 in Renato Cruz De Castro, “Abstract of Counterinsurgency in the Philippines and the Global War on Terror. Examining the Dynamics of the Twenty-first Century Long Wars, European Journal of East Asian Studies, 9,1, 2010, p. 147.

45 AFP National Military Strategy, 2001, pp. 20-21, 26-27 in Renato Cruz De Castro, “Abstract of

Counterinsurgency in the Philippines and the Global War on Terror. Examining the Dynamics of the Twenty-first Century Long Wars, European Journal of East Asian Studies, 9,1, 2010, p. 147.

46 Maj. Gen. Reynald D. Sealana, Deputy Chief of Staff and Chairman, GRP-CCCH, interview with author, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Civil Military Operations, J7, Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City, Philippines, August 3, 2009.

47 “5 years under Arroyo: A New Dictator Arises,” Davao Today, July 24, 2006. Available at:

http://davaotoday.com/main/2006/07/24/5-%C2%BD-years-under-arroyo-a-new-dictator-rises/. Accessed October 19, 2012.

Oplans formulated under Marcos, Aquino, and Ramos administrations.⁴⁸ It was based on the all-too-familiar operational methodology that hinged on sustaining military victories by coordinating with other civilian agencies to deliver basic services to the people in the post-conflict stage. CMO is included in each step. In the entry phase, CMO prepares for a possible encounter or battle. CMO operators interact with the population to gain a situational awareness on both the needs of the people and enemy activities. During military operations, initial CMO work such as information campaigns, if successful, can gain the support of the people, and help the military maneuver in battlespace through intelligence. When insurgents are cleared, CMO is geared towards establishing an environment where other civilian agencies can enter and resume services for the people. By the time troops pullout, these agencies will take lead.⁴⁹ The following fleshes out the Clear-Hold-Consolidate-Develop (C-H-C-D) methodology:

1. Clear – neutralize the insurgent (Main actor: military, inclusive of CMO)

2. Hold –prevent the return of the insurgent (Main actor: military, inclusive of CMO)

3. Consolidate – sustain the gains of the military by initiating development (Main actor: civilian agencies. Supporting role: military, inclusive of CMO)

4. Develop – spur economic development (Main actor: civilian agencies. Supporting role: military, inclusive of CMO).⁵⁰

5.2.3.2 Understanding the AFP’s Perceptions on the CPP-NPA Battlespace: Establishing the Groundwork for the Application of CMO

5.2.3.2.1 Background to “Knowing the Enemy”

While the developmental component of CMO was revived to support the nation’s holistic strategy towards insurgency and the subsequent release of Oplan Bantay Laya I revealed operational procedures for the military to follow, it was more difficult to discern how CMO was going to play out on the ground. A clearer understanding on the factors that necessitated CMO was demonstrated in a PowerPoint presentation dubbed “Knowing the Enemy.” In 2005, the General Headquarters of the AFP made this presentation available to the public. This 335-slide show was intended to brief the military audience on the strategy and tactics of the communist movement, its disposition, its political organization, the prevailing conditions on the ground, and to furnish the AFP leadership with recommendations on how to carry out a successful COIN operation.⁵¹ While CMO was not explicitly referred to in the presentation, it did underline the

48 Benjie Oliveros, “Oplan Bantay Laya as Arroyo’s Inhumane War,” Bulatlat, June 20, 2006. Available online at: http://www.bulatlat.com/news/6-20/6-20-obl.htm. Accessed June 18, 2009.

49 Lt. Col. Ferozaldo Paul T. Regencia, Philippine Army, presentation made to author, AFP National Development Support Command, Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City, Philippines, October 8, 2007.

50 General Headquarters Armed Forces of the Philippines, AFP National Military Strategy, Quezon City:

General Headquarters, 2001, pp. 20-21, 26-27 in Renato Cruz De Castro, “Abstract of Counterinsurgency in the Philippines and the Global War on Terror. Examining the Dynamics of the Twenty-first Century Long Wars,”

European Journal of East Asian Studies, 9,1, 2010, p. 147; Ecumenical Movement for Justice and Peace, “Oplan Bantay Laya Primer,” PowerPoint presentation, 2006, slide no. 19.

51 General Headquarters, Armed Forces of the Philippines, Knowing the Enemy, PowerPoint presentation, 2005.

Hereafter cited as AFP, “Knowing the Enemy,” PowerPoint presentation, 2005.

complexities of the battlespace that could not be resolved entirely with standard combat operations. Listed below are the main challenges the AFP faces in defeating the insurgents, and draws attention to areas that suggests the need for CMO.

5.2.3.2.2 Geography and Topology

The first challenge the AFP faces in defeating the insurgency lies in the geographic configuration of the islands. The Philippines is an island-nation, consisting of 7,107 islands and islets, of which approximately 1,000 islands are inhabitable. The Philippines shares no land borders with other nations. In terms of length, its coastline is ranked third in the world, with a combined length of some 36,289 km. The Philippines has 3 major island groups: Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao. Of the 88,574,614 Filipinos, more than half are concentrated in the largest island, Luzon which houses the nation’s capital, Manila.

The composition of the Philippine archipelago works both in favor and disfavor for the insurgents.

On one hand, the dispersed islands have hampered the communist rebels’ ability to amass their forces to defeat the government forces in their planned final offensive. Lacking naval transport, the sea is one natural barrier, which has kept them cloistered in their respective island-strongholds.⁵²

On the other hand, the remoteness of many areas in the Philippines has allowed the Communist Party of the Philippines-New People’s Army (CPP-NPA) to build their semi-independent bases that are located throughout the archipelago. Combined with a lack of government presence and difficult accessibility from outsiders, the CPP-NPA has been able to develop base areas with limited interference.

The CPP-NPA has deliberately scattered its bases across the islands so that the AFP forces would be spread out thinly, preventing the government forces from decisively defeating them.⁵³ The black dotted areas on the map show the disposition⁵⁴ of the communist guerrilla fronts produced from AFP intelligence.

52 Victor N. Corpus, Silent War, Quezon City: VNC Enterprises, 1989, p. 31. Hereafter cited as Corpus, Silent War.

53 General Headquarters, Armed Forces of the Philippines, “Knowing the Enemy,” manuscript version of the presentation, p.12. Hereafter cited as AFP, “Knowing the Enemy,” manuscript AFP, “Knowing the Enemy,”

manuscript, pp. 17-19.

54 In military jargon, disposition refers to stationing, arrangement, or positioning of troops/combatants to prepare for military action (defense and attack).