ANBP

124 George Ferks, Geert Compelman and Stefan van Laar with Bart Klem, The Struggle after Combat: The Role of NGOs in DDR Processes, “Afghanistan Case Study”, Cordaid, 2008 (Klem and Douma completed the associated Synthesis Study)

Progress was slow, finally pushed forward by the results of the Tokyo donor conference in February 2003, with US$141 million made available by eight nations... mainly Japan (also UK Canada, US, EC, Norway, Switzerland and NL). Japan was appointed as lead nation in DDR (primarily advocacy and funding) and ANBP programme administration and implementation was to be handled by the small UN political mission rather than a PKO, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA).¹²⁵ This was under the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) Lakhdar Brahimi, (of Brahimi Report 2000 fame) working closely with the Interim Authority’s Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission. ANBP was administered through a central office in Kabul and eight regional offices, each with both civilian and military staff and a Mobile Disarmament Unit (MDU). An international observer group (IOG) included representation from UNAMA and donors who offered

“impartial oversight.”¹²⁶

Bhatia and Muggah suggest that despite the donor focus on DDR in Afghanistan the processes didn't move until three years after the fall of the Taliban largely because of Japan’s insistence on the prerequisite of comprehensive defense reform.¹²⁷

Isezaki, Head of the Japanese DDR mission in Afghanistan 2003-2004, notes that UNAMA at this time, in pursuing its ‘light-footprint approach’ was maintaining a passive posture in avoiding association with the US ‘heavy hand’. It highlighted “special circumstance’ in Afghanistan; the weakness of the interim authority, absence of political leverage and its total dependence on the cooperation of the warlords, and was initially recommending offering the incentives associate with DDR prior to the disarmament. This proposed Reintegration, Disarmament and Demobilisation (RDD) rather than DDR (the carrot or benefits... before the stick of disarmament). He saw this as offering an opportunity to warlords to take advantage of the interim authority and the international communities intensions by off-loading their non-operational (aged, disabled, etc.) cadres while keeping effective cadres and their weapons, thus retaining leverage for future demands.¹²⁸ He successfully opposed this idea to the extent that he ensured that at the February 2003 donor conference in Tokyo, Karsai stated

125 This was much to Kenji Isezaki’s surprise, the man asked by the Japanese government to head up their end in Afghanistan. He had considered that in light of the provisions of the Japan’s Peace Constitution and in particular its Preamble and Article 9, Japan would be risk averse to handling in the international arena, anything associated with weapons. However, he presumes that its extraordinary experience in demobilising millions of its own troops at the end of WWII came to the fore on this occasion, offering Japan the opportunity to make a major contribution beyond ‘cheque-book diplomacy’. Isezaki agreed to grant 12 months from his career as a university professor to this task.

126 Ferks et al, Op cit, p16

127 Bhatia & Muggah, Op cit, p131

128 Kenji Isezaki, Disarmament: The World through the Eyes of a Conflict Buster, originally published in Japanese by Kodansha Gendai Shinsho, 2004, translated into English in 2011, pp 96-97

that the D and D must be completed before holding elections and that it must be completed within a year.

Confirming the numbers of actual combatants in the field was difficult. While preliminary estimates had been between 40,000 and 50,000, combined warlords were now claiming up to 250,000.

Concerned at containing the budget and scope of the programme, Isezaki forced the government to accept a total figure of 100,000 that he deemed closer to the truth. Isezaki further reasoned that by focusing on the main and most influential warlords of the Northern Alliance, particularly the two biggest groups that had been warring amongst themselves, the bulk of combatants would be included.

The easiest way to grab the lowest hanging fruit was to focus on their heavy weapons, tanks, artillery, etc.¹²⁹

Isezaki draws attention to the further complication in Afghanistan, irrespective of the much-lauded benefits of national ownership, the DDR is being implemented, not by a neutral PKO, but by the Government of Afghanistan that cannot be deemed as neutral (“international”) considering that the strongest Panjshiri warlord is the Minister for Defense (Marshal Fahim).¹³⁰ In an attempt to mitigate the potential for resulting conflict and concerned with the pacifist commitments of its own Constitution, Japan insisted, as referred to by Bhatia and Muggah, and controversially using conditional ODA as leverage, on parameters regarding the ethnic balance within the recruitment of the ANA and of defense officials. This insistence offered an element of equity that allowed the SSR process being led by US to move forward.¹³¹

Isezaki is particularly proud having persuaded Brahimi to provide his military advisors as the core of the Military Observer Team, while also persuading other national diplomatic missions in Kabul to provide their military attachés as observers, to monitor the DDR process... “the first international observer group based on bilateral aid.”¹³²

In the meantime, in an environment of insurgency and an ethnically and regionally fragmented society, the US is struggling in leading the establishment of a national army. In the new government, key ministries have been distributed amongst the most influential warlords including the Panjshiri faction, with their clients as officials. Isezaki talks of “the simultaneous execution by the US of a ‘war process’ led by the Department of Defense, intended to eliminate terrorism and a ‘peace process’ led by the State Department (US embassy) that seeks to build a country.” The two are incompatible.

129 Ibid, pp106-109

130 Ibid, p 117

131 Ibid, p 118

132 Ibid p 120

‘Precision’ bombing is killing civilians. Even the futuristic drone “whack a mole” technology, operated from computer monitors as far away as Florida, that is supposed to kill targeted high value terrorists, including US citizens, apparently from a Presidential kill list, is plagued by human error, not to mention issues of international law. Hundreds of Afghan civilians have been killed in error.

However, the US has used its airpower and mobilised local militias and tribal leaders in avoiding committing its own ground troops... that would escalate its own numbers killed in action. Those local militias and tribal leaders, while often receiving salaries and equipment from coalition forces, are masters in manipulating the US effort to their own ends, overstating local threats and in disrupting the DDR process. However, the US, its left hand not concerned with what its right hand is doing, has continued to pump large stocks of weapons into its favorite warlords, often rivals to those that have agreed to disarm thus totally undermining the impact of DDR and contributing to the security dilemma.

Isezaki could have limited impact in pressuring the US to reduce this activity. In pragmatically acknowledging the “only game town”, the US activities, Isezaki did deviate from his “rule book” and agreed to remove some militias, those needed to support the counter-terrorism effort, from the list of militia factions to be disarmed... until the ANA would develop the capacity to address the relevant security concerns. The US government independently chose 5,000 former army or militia members and called them the Afghan Guard Force, agreeing that it would take responsibility for their eventual disarmament.¹³³

From 2005 ANBP also undertook the destruction of anti-personnel mines and ammunition, destroying more than 5,000 tons of ammunition and mines during that year. Further it surveyed 722 ammunition caches containing more than 20,000 tons of ordnance, and cantoned and deactivated 12,248 heavy weapons across the country; approximately 98% of total estimated stock.¹³⁴

The actual method of cantonment in Kabul, where the example was to be set, undermined the cantonment process. This was due to ISAF, without taking professional guidance, having cut an independent deal with the factions. It effectively divided the city amongst factions and contributed to rearmament.¹³⁵ This mistake probably resulted from a convoluted and relatively uncoordinated command structure in the intervention, US, NATO, ISAF and UN, and mix of military and civilians with competing philosophies and egos.

133 Ibid, p 123

134 Ferks, Op cit, p 16

135 Isezaki, Op cit, p 111

Further, ISAF/NATO was not significantly deployed outside of Kabul and could not provide the level of deterrence that would support a DDR programme. US airpower only offered the ‘image’ of deterrence. This gave the resurgent Taliban scope for maneuver in the rural areas. As the elections of October 2004 approached, there were high expectations, not least by Isezaki, that the activities of PRTs offering infrastructural and socio-economic support to communities in unstable areas, operating under NATO control in the North and under ISAF in the South would ‘win the people’ in the context of a nod towards COIN interventions.¹³⁶ This, while the bulk of resources remained concentrated on counter terrorism... traditional kinetic operations. As we shall see, expectations of the PRTs were largely wishful thinking.

Ferks et al note that with the ANBP addressing only the Northern Alliance, and with the new national army (ANA) made-up exclusively by them, other major groups in Afghanistan, particularly the Pasthun in the South experienced a significant security dilemma. The exclusion of the Taliban from the process was also considered by many to be counterproductive.

Still, the listed achievement of the ANBP is significant. 93,000 AMF names were removed from the MoD payroll saving recurring budget of US$120 million. 63,380 were disarmed with lists of those to be demobilized being compiled by regional teams and verified by demobilisation verification committees (DVCs). Individual demobilisation packages included food, a Shalwar Kamiz (traditional Afghan man’s clothes), a medal of honour, and a certificate of good conduct. 260 units were decommissioned; 57,431 chose a reintegration support option; 57,629 SALW were collected, AMF was demobilized; conditions were created to facilitate the national deployment of ANA and additional associated benefits were distributed to 13,312 ex-combatants.¹³⁷ Cantonment of ex-combatants was avoided as most combatants resided in their communities.

Those opting for reintegration support initially received a cash grant that was later suspended and factored into a stipend to reduce rent-taking by commanders; career counseling and support in finding employment or self-employment. The livelihood options included those traditional sectors common to DDR processes; education, agriculture, skills training and entrepreneurial support but included innovative ideas such as contracting teams to undertake local infrastructural contracts in a cooperative arrangement; teacher training and demining teams. This was in addition to the option for selected ex-combatants of engagement in the SSR process through integration into ANA or the police.

136 Ibid, p 114

137 Ferks, Op cit, p 17

Approximately 50% opted for agriculture support, 25% for entrepreneurial support and about 20% for skills training.

A commander’s incentive programme (CIP) that included management and some foreign training was offered to about 500 senior generals and local commanders to encourage compliance and support for the programme.

By June 2005, UNDP was claiming that ANBP had effectively disarmed all Afghan Militia Forces and that it would therefore end the programme. However, total disarmament was not reflected by the facts on the ground. The Tajik-dominated units in Kabul and Panjshir remained active. Many had in fact reinvented themselves as police units.¹³⁸ As Hammes comments, while the ANBP was certainly efficient in that it removed a lot of hardware from the field and took significant numbers off the state recurring defense budget, it was not effective in that it did not demobilize the armed groups that maintained their core structures and significant numbers of weapons. Isezaki contends that the DIAG as a stand-alone DDR process as an aspect of SSR did in fact create a security vacuum that permitted the return of the Taliban.¹³⁹