2.1 Political Structure Transition from Imperialism to Globalism
2.1.1 Galtung’s structural theory of imperialism
If globalism justifies “treating the whole world as a proper sphere for political influence”, it can be associated with imperialism.9 In order to fully understand the kind of influence globalism can have on political structures, social structures should first be analyzed as they appear within and between nations under modern imperialism. Several dependency theorists of the 1970s such as Galtung (1971) and Wallerstein (1976) have attempted the analysis of the imperialist matrix in both its traditional and modern forms.
In his works, peace researcher Johan Galtung (1971:437) does not define imperialism as a type of society or community in itself, but as structural changes that follow the will of a nation to expand its power and influence outside its original borders. Imperialism would be a form of political domination that builds dependency relations between collectivities, and particularly between nations. Galtung defines imperialism as follows.
Imperialism is a system that splits up collectivities and relates some of the parts to each other in relations of harmony of interest, and other parts in relations of disharmony of interest, or conflict of interest (Galtung 1971:438).
There is conflict, or disharmony of interest, if the two parties are coupled together in such a way that the Living Condition gap between them is increasing, and there is no conflict, or harmony of interest, if the two parties are coupled together in such a way that the Living Condition gap between them is decreasing down to zero” (Ibid).
9 Imperialism is a policy of extending a country's power and influence through diplomacy or military force (New Oxford American Dictionary 2013).
Conflict of interest between pressure groups naturally develops within most nations, and generally splits up communities into two distinct parts that Galtung respectively refers to as “Centers” (where the elite, governments and centers of decisions are located) and
“Peripheries” (where the rest of the population is located).10 Access to means of
satisfying the collective interests and values of the nation is then distributed in an unequal way (more for the elite, less for the people), leading to numerous dysfunctions and
conflicts between governments and populations. Such an analysis obviously relates to Marx and Engels’ (1848) class conflict’s theory, in which Centers and Peripheries are observed in terms of social classes.
Imperialism starts when one nation’s Center decides to interact with the one of another nation. The interaction is usually engaged with a less politically structured or economically weaker country, in which the imperialist country then takes a dominant position, reproducing the same kind of dichotomy-based relationship than with the
Periphery inside its own borders. According to Galtung, the Center/Periphery relationship therefore also exists between countries, creating Center and Periphery nations. The nation with the highest level of development that initiates and has authority over the interaction is called the Center nation, or “Mother country.” Decision centers will tend to be located there rather than in Periphery nations, which will create a power gap in all areas of interaction, namely economic, political, military, communicational and cultural. This will also lead to unequal distribution of labor, as Periphery nations will be more expected to
10 Throughout this research, the first letters of those terms will be capitalized whenever they refer
provide manufacturing labor, while Center nations will provide decisions. As Galtung states, once this kind of interaction has been established, it is very hard for the Periphery nation to modify its terms, or even leave the interaction completely.
In an imperialist structure, any decision or idea produced by the Center country acquires a certain “aura of legitimacy” and becomes the model to imitate on the
perspective of the Periphery (Galtung 1971:454). The degree of legitimacy of leaders and decisions therefore emanates from their geographical origin rather than from their quality or relevance. The countless implications of the interaction with the Periphery country (i.e.
creation of new jobs, institutions, buildings, infrastructures, etc.) also generate several spin-off effects that reinforce dependency toward the Mother country. However, the interaction being primarily designed to benefit the Center, it does not improve the situation of the Periphery as fast and sustainably, and the gap between the two tends to remain, and in some cases, broaden. In order to evaluate the degree of conflict of interest between Centers and Peripheries, Galtung defines the concept of Living Condition (hereafter referred to as L.C.) as something that can be measured by indicators such as income, standard of living, quality of life and autonomy.11
Once conflict of interest has appeared between two social groups, activities from both parties tend to maintain and reinforce it. A situation in which there is inequality between Center and Periphery from the start is therefore more likely to produce
11 Although measuring these factors with precision may be a tedious task, Galtung argues that this is not as important as the overall presence of L.C. gap. He also points out conditions in order for his definition to be valid: both countries must be interacting, and the L.C. evaluation must take place on parties, not on actors (as those can move in and out of the parties with time), etc.
interaction in which equality is maintained, than to raise the L.C. of the Periphery to the same level as the Center’s. The gap in L.C. is often both the cause and consequence of the split between Centers and Peripheries. On the long term, the conflict of interest between Centers and Peripheries leads to social chaos or revolutions, as both parties pursue incompatible goals. What structural mechanism can maintain such a gap? In
“Structural Theory of Imperialism,” Galtung (1971:441) illustrates the Center/Periphery relationship through a diagram, shown in figure 1.
Figure 1. The Structure of Imperialism by Johan Galtung (1971)
Galtung takes the example of a two-nation world, where the first nation (called Center nation) holds power over the second one (called Periphery nation). He then defines imperialism as a relation between the two so that:
1. There is harmony of interest between the center in the Center nation and the center in the Periphery nation.
2. There is more disharmony of interest within the Periphery nation than within the Center nation.
3. There is disharmony of interest between the periphery in the Center nation and the periphery in the Periphery nation.
When engaging the relationship, the center in the Center nation will primarily negotiate with the center in the Periphery nation. Under representative governments, little or no participation is required from populations. Because of the power they hold over their respective peripheries, the harmony of interest shared by both Centers brings them to work together, and thus form a separate social stratus above both nations. A network of small elite groups therefore develops, and their bond with each other usually grows much tighter than the one they share with their own Peripheries. This center-center social group develops into an elite class enjoying political power that eventually stands above standard
citizen status in both nations.12 The L.C. gap between centers and peripheries therefore tends to remain constant.
Galtung (1971) also notices that in most imperialist relations, there is more disharmony of interest within the Periphery nation than within the Center nation. This means that the Periphery country suffers from more inequality than the Center one. Even in the case of resources redistribution by the Center, certain L.C. aspects may be subject to improvement (i.e. incomes, access to food or medications, etc.), but the gap between Center and Periphery will remain, and the people will rarely granted more political power.
In the end, the interaction with the Center nation is much more in the interest of the Periphery nation’s center than in the one of its periphery.
Conflict of interest also relates to a conflict in goals. One government may use its power to increase its own L.C. more than the one of the rest of the nation, i.e. by
accepting financial compensation for allowing policies that are in the interest of external actors, but not in the interest of the local population. According to Galtung (1971:439), this would be enough to declare a government as illegitimate under self-proclaimed democracies. Unfortunately, access to evidence to evaluate the nature of the L.C. gap or the actual increase in disharmony of interest in such cases often proves difficult. Legal procedures against incriminated government officials can often be tedious, because of the political immunity that those often receive. With time, Centers and vertical political
12 Galtung largely bases this analysis on Lenin (1969:139), himself borrowing from Marx and
structures tend to become increasingly protective of their officials, and the turnover of actors moving in and out of it may prevent observers from pointing out exactly what went wrong, and who is actually responsible for abuse. In other cases, both parties’ L.C. may increase together, while the gap between them remains constant. Should no effort be made to bring both parties to the same level, the disharmony of interest level will thus tend to stagnate. Finally, degrees in harmony and disharmony of interest (strong or weak), as well as time and speed should also be taken into account while evaluating L.C.
Narrow/wide, as well as decreasing/increasing gaps in interest should also be
distinguished. As a value premise for equality, Galtung (Ibid) claims that “an interaction relation and structure set up so that inequality is the result is seen as a coupling not in the interest of the weaker party.” However, the weaker party may not always be in position to refuse or end the interaction. Peripheries may realize their alienation only after years of interaction, and the structure may have become so solid that they are unable to dismantle it.
One should be aware that harmony of interest does not necessarily mean equal relationship. A strong power hierarchy still exists between and within centers. In the case of a two-nation world, as in figure 1, the second center is still under the control of the first one. Once conflict of interest has appeared between two social groups, activities from both parties contribute to maintain and reinforce it. A situation in which there is inequality between Center and Periphery from the start is more likely produce an interaction where that equality is maintained, than to improve the L.C. level of the
Periphery. The gap in L.C. is often both the cause and consequence of the split between Centers and Peripheries. In theory, strengthening the economy of Periphery countries should result in a reduced gap of L.C. with their Mother countries. Desire for
emancipation, autonomy or economic decolonization drives the hopes of many third-world countries.
However, the economic superiority of Mother countries maintains vertical interaction with Periphery ones, following a vicious logic. It is extremely difficult for Periphery nations to obtain total autonomy from the imperialist structure, as the core link of the structure is maintained today by the Center’s banks, Center political structures and associated multinational firms, strengthening their grip both on foreign countries and on their own Peripheries (i.e. Africa, U.K./India, France/North-Africa, North America/South America, Japan/Korea, etc.). The gap in processing, means of production, raw materials and markets often prevents Peripheries to emancipate over short periods of time. There is often a gap in the benefit that one gets out of the other, due to several factors. In order to measure these factors, Galtung (ibid) distinguishes inter-actor effects (the value-exchange between the actors), and intra-actor effects (the effects inside the actors). Inter-actor effects refer to the flow of materials and services between the actors, in other words, what is coming in and out of them. Those can be measured at their point of entry and exit.
Intra-actor effects are the changes brought within the actors as a result of the interaction.
By observing both movements, it appears clearly that some countries benefit much more from the interaction than others.
Referring to Ricardo (1817)’s theory of comparative advantages, Galtung
(1971:446) argues that countries have complementary resources (oil, food, raw materials, etc.) and skills (craftsmanship, engineering, etc.) pushing them to engage in exchange with each other. These interactions and exchanges tend to greatly improve both countries’
economic and social conditions, which in turn will influence their overall development.
However, exchanges under the imperialist logic do not bring only advantages to the involved parties. International trade induces several spin-off effects that are not always officially registered or accounted when evaluating the interest of countries have in interacting. Even in the case of fair trade, those can actually broaden the L.C. gap between countries instead of narrowing it. Spin-off effects can be either positive or negative. They might not be so obvious, and even unstated in the terms of the contract between the parties. But their effect and consequences will become more obvious on the long term as countries develop. For instance, extracting raw materials from a developing country may have positive economic consequences for both parties, but creates global pollution and local labor exploitation.
When negotiation occurs, these negative effects may not be taken into account by the parties, or be regarded as “unavoidable” aspects of the trade, yet they can have devastating effects on the exploited countries in the long term. On the one hand, the inward flow or materials and services to the developed country may produce several benefits on the long-term, such as new means of production (and destruction), reinforcement of authority position toward the periphery country, new means of communication, broadened knowledge and fields of research, specialization of staff in
production, scientists and engineers, new business opportunities and overall an improved level of self-reliance and autonomy. On the other hand, the exploited country won’t see much of its industry develop, will have its periphery position and military dependency reinforced, outdated transportation or communication structures, few knowledge on how to exploit their own resources and possibilities, and may not be able to develop skill specialization, social welfare or education (Galtung 1971:447). Overall, the periphery nation will be reduced to provide materials only, which won’t help improve its L.C.
quality and even reinforce its dependency position toward the center nation.
It must also be stated that providing capital for organizing the extraction of raw material requires much less effort than the extraction itself. This is especially true for countries that are home to the world central banks and can print internationally used currencies. The manufactured goods resulting from delocalized production will often be targeted at highly developed countries’ market at a high price, out of reach for the L.C. of the producing country. The vertical relation existing between nations forces the periphery ones into the interaction, irrespective of the negative interest the latter may have in it.
This will, in turn, reinforce world inequalities as well as the supremacy position of imperialist nations and their dominion over periphery ones. This is why Center nations are so prone to provide loans and large amounts of money to developing countries, in order to bind them into this dependency relation. Intra-actors effects and spin-off effects resulting from the interaction, although very seldom claimed as such, are the real purpose of vertical relations between nations.
Theorizing the notion of conflict of interest between Center and Periphery nations may cast light on the way power gaps between the two tend to be maintained, yet does not explain why communication and exchanges are prevented between peripheries. Along with the Center/Periphery dichotomy, Galtung distinguishes another fundamental
mechanism that maintains inequality in power distribution and exchange regulation: the feudal structure. Galtung (1971:450) illustrates this feudal structure in figure 2.13
Figure 2. A Feudal Center-Periphery Structure by Johan Galtung (1971)
13 This diagram is obviously an arbitrary example of the simplest kind of feudal structure that may exist. The number of Centers, as well as Periphery attached to any given Center nation can vary. There can also be Centers within (or above) the Centers working in the same fashion.
Galtung (1971:450) describes the feudal center-periphery structure by four distinct rules.
1. Interaction between Center and Periphery is vertical.
2. Interaction between Periphery and Periphery is missing.
3. Multilateral interaction involving all three is missing.
4. Interaction with the outside world is monopolized by the Center, with two implications:
a) Periphery interaction with other Center nations is missing.
b) Center as well as Periphery interaction with Periphery nations belonging to other Center nations is missing.
The figure clearly shows that trade relations concentrate on Centers, as each Periphery is being forced to handle most of its trade with its own Center. Centers
maintain their key position by negotiating and/or associating with other Centers. Galtung illustrates this by the saying: “if you stay off my satellites, I will stay off yours” (Galtung 1971:450). Centers obviously have interest to protect their own privileged bonds with their Peripheries. This feudal center-periphery structure brings about the same kind of interaction monopoly in communities smaller than countries. The subordination implied by such a structure may remind one of how medieval local landlords ruled over regions or prefectures, themselves having to report to local landlords, king or states. Even in the nation age, feudal power structures still prevail, and greatly benefit imperialism. The
previously mentioned vertical relations can be defined as follows.
Vertical interaction between Center and Periphery points at the same kind of dependency and power concentration previously analyzed. Periphery countries usually have fewer commodities or primary products to export to the Center, and those are often unevenly distributed between regions. This prevents such regions from becoming
autonomous, and forces them to trade with the Center for refined consumer goods, coming from higher up in the structure. The higher they climb within the hierarchy, the more harmony of interest power holders develop. Such closeness is what gives birth to class-consciousness.
The missing horizontal interaction between Peripheries is one of the key mechanisms of the feudal structure. By “cutting off” (discouraging or forbidding)
horizontal relations between peripheries, Centers ensure that most of the trade, exchanges and communication transit through them. The flow of wealth therefore always travels upwards in the structure. With every passage through intersections (Centers), products are identified, taxed, registered and redirected by local centers to their desired
destinations. Monopolizing the roads of human trade and occupying the role of intermediaries to collect wealth at its intersections is the goal of the feudal structure.
Center knots in the structure are what shifts the exchange interaction from horizontal to vertical.
As a result of trade monopoly and priority given to vertical interaction,
multilateral interaction is obviously missing, and no Center effort is made to encourage it.
This is, in many cases, voluntary, and can take place through many strategies such as exclusivity contracts for the resource exploitation of Peripheries’ resources. Trade monopoly reduces multilateralism by creating hierarchy among actors of the trade, and by always having the closest center represent the only connection to the whole network, or in other words, the outside world.
Replacing such feudal structure inside a greater one, the point of contact between one society and the outside world (or other structures) is always monopolized by Centers.
Those are the intersections of all interaction between all actors, internal and external alike. This implies several things. First, the relationship between periphery and other center nations is missing, meaning that it is hard for peripheries to understand their place and role in the overall structure. Such a structure may be found to have a blinding
“smokescreen” effect, aimed at reducing consciousness of the network structure and prevent empowerment at the local level. However, Peripheries are not the only ones who suffer from the smokescreen. Centers that are located lower in the structure cannot interact with other Peripheries than the ones they have been assigned to. This means that intermediate Centers are also excluded from external interaction with other structures.
This leads to the realization that there is gradation in the level of power control that is not limited to Peripheries, but also applies to Centers. The degree of power, wealth and liberty that actors enjoy depends on how high they are located in the feudal structure. In