6.4 定式化準備:変数一覧
内生変数 ( モデル内で決まる変数 ) : Y : GDP 、 R: 利子率。小文字の変数は外生変数 ( モデル外で数値が与えられる変数 )
IS : C : 消費、 I : 投資、 G : 政府支出、 T : 税金、 N X : 純輸出、 EX : 輸出、 IM : 輸入、
a : 基礎消費、 b : 限界消費性向、 m : 限界輸入性向、 i : 基礎投資、 d : 正の定数、 g : 基礎輸出、 n : 正の定数 LM : M s
depends on educational input in the previous period. Specifically, they are respectively given by y t = ωh t and h t = s β t−1 where ω is wage rate and β < 1 is an efficiency parameter.
Sixth, individuals are endowed with income-dependent relative preferences, meaning that in- dividuals are concerned with their own relative standing and that the degree of such concerns is increasing in income. Seventh, parents care about the well-being of their children as well as their own. However, as parents cannot directly observe their children’s utility, I assume that parents perceive children’s utility through empathy. Empathy helps the parents understand the feelings of children but through the parents’ own scale of utility. 1
This is rooted in the findings in Kageyama
(2012) , which empirically showed that the relationships between LEGAP and these happiness indicators are bidirectional. In one direction, LEGAP negatively affects both HPN and HPGAP . An increase in LEGAP raises women ’ s widowhood ratio, and, since widows are, on average, less happy, it lowers women ’ s average happiness, HPN, and HPGAP . We call this effect the “ marital-status composition effect ” as the marital-status composition plays a central role.
and significant. This result suggests that banks’ BCR matters in firms’ investment decisions when firms are productive and thus have higher demand for investment. Using the estimated model, we conduct counterfactual experiments to quantify the effect of capital injections that took place in March 1998 and 1999 in Japan. The counterfactual experiments suggest that the capital injections had a negligible impact on the average investment rate, although there is a reallocation effect, with investment shifted from low- to high-productivity firms. The paper most closely related to ours is that of GS, who also examine the effects of bank recapitalization policies on the supply of credit and client firm performance, including firm investment, using matched firm–bank data from the Japanese banking crisis. The authors find that the size of the capital injection is important for its success: If capital injections are large enough so that recapitalized banks achieve capital requirements, such banks increase the supply of credit and firms that borrow from the recapitalized banks increase their investment. This paper’s contribution beyond that of GS is as follows. First, we examine whether firms’ loan and investment responses to their banks’ recapitalization depend on their TFP. This question naturally arises because, theoretically, the higher firm productivity, the larger firm investment and the demand for external finance tend to be. Therefore, bank lending attitude, which likely depends on BCR under the banking regulation, may be more important for high-productivity firms. The finding that high-productivity firms increase their investments more than low-productivity firms in response to their associated banks’ recapitalization would suggest that the resource is allocated toward more productive firms as a result of capital injection. 3 Second, we use the BCR as the main variable to
• We have assumed that there is only one hedge fund style. What might change if we consider multiple hedge fund styles in the model industry? If the manager’s talent also involves an aptitude for one style over another, then this would be equivalent to having several styles calibrated independently. Since the policy results hinge on broad features of the model and the data, the outcomes of policy experiments are unlikely to change much. The only difference is that some styles tend to rely more heavily on leverage than others, so those are more likely to be hurt by leverage limits. In the working version of the paper, we show that most styles have reported leverage around 1. Out of the fourteen styles considered, four report leverage of around 2 (Convertible Arbitrage, Fixed Income, Equity Market Neutral and Relative Value), and three styles report leverage higher than 2 (Fixed income arbitrage, CTAs and CPOs). Table 8 shows the impact of a leverage cap of 1 on the industry
ponent of ) S i g ∀q and weakly decreasing in q ∀s g i , for g ∈ {P, I, D}.
Note that this assumption implies that learning other bidders’ signals does not affect one’s own valuation – i.e. we have a setting with private, not interdependent values. This assumption may be more palatable for certain securities (such as shorter term securities, which are essentially cash substitutes) than others, but is the most tractable one under which we can pursue the “demand heterogeneity” vs. “market power” decomposition. Note that under this assumption, the additional information that a primary dealer j possesses due to observing her customers’ orders, Z P
III.B. Search Costs/Information Frictions
An additional (but not mutually exclusive from product dif- ferentiation) possible explanation for the observed price disper- sion is the influence of search/information frictions faced by in- vestors. A large theoretical literature shows that costly search can sustain price dispersion in homogeneous product markets (e.g., Burdett and Judd [1983], Carlson and McAfee [1983], and Stahl [1989]). Given the very large number of mutual funds offered, it seems reasonable to presume that investors must make some information-gathering investments before deciding between fund alternatives. The presence of a sizable market to reduce investor search costs supports this notion. Several commercial mutual fund ranking services and information aggregators exist (Morningstar, Lipper, Valueline, Yahoo!Finance, etc.). There is even a commercial Internet site (IndexFunds.com) devoted to providing information about index funds. Many fund companies spend considerable sums on marketing and distribution, also consistent with (although neither necessary nor sufficient for) the presence of limited investor information. Survey evidence also suggests considerable information-gathering. The Investment Company Institute [1997] reports that surveyed investors con- sulted a median of two source types (four for those who had consulted a fund-ranking service) and reviewed a median of four- teen different information items (gross returns, relative perfor- mance, etc.) before their most recent purchase. 14 To the extent