Based on the remarkable development of their security relations in recent years, Japan and Australia should promote bilateral security cooperation in various ways. Japan and Australia should help promote good law and order in Antarctica and the Southern Oceans.
Participant List Japanese Participants
Australian Participants
Biographies Japanese Participants
Tonooka served in the Public Relations Division of the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) before it became a Ministry as Deputy Director from June 2005 to September 2006. He previously worked in the Strategic Analysis Branch of the Office of National Assessments worked.
Summary
Day One – 23 July, 2009
Australia is one of the most important countries in the extended North-South Asian region. The White Paper expects the US alliance to continue, but prepares for the event that this alliance is withdrawn.
Day Two – 24 July, 2009
It would also test the validity of the multilateral diplomacy centered on these six-party talks and the credibility of the US-Japan alliance. One participant asked for an explanation about Australia's perception of the future or the role of the United States in Asia. It has been suggested that for Australia the usefulness of the alliance with the United States will diminish in the future.
The US is no longer willing to be the center of the alliances and wants to create a security network. Japan and the US should also discuss a no-first-use policy on the US side. India's stubbornness in terms of joint security cooperation appears to be a hallmark of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs.
The participant stated that one of the biggest differences between the Howard and Rudd governments in Australia is the stock placed on the G20 by the Rudd government. Obama has also tried to change the perception of the US in the world. One participant stated that Obama is aware of the critical importance of enhanced deterrence.
Papers Session One
Maritime cooperation: challenges and opportunities
It is in the collective interest of the region to ensure that energy continues to flow to North Asia. The Straits of Malacca and Singapore now form the most economically important waterway in the world. Japan has actively used the JCG as a “foot in the water” in Southeast Asian waters.
The commitment by coastal states to cooperation on maritime security constitutes another major step forward in regime building in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. We do not yet have an agreement on a common maritime threat assessment for shipping in the Asia-Pacific region. The sea is a lifeline for Japan, so safety in the oceans is essential to your national security.
We have not understood their importance as central to the nation's future in the twenty-first century. Until about thirty years ago, our shipping industry was mostly in the hands of foreigners. It is not excluded that the wars for resources could spread to Antarctica in the future.
Maritime Cooperation Challenges and Opportunities
Japanese Perspective…
- Rising Maritime Power of China
- Reassurance of Japan-US “Maritime Defense” Alliance
- Cooperation with Other Reliable Influential Maritime Nations
- Regional Maritime Security Cooperation
- Maritime Security Coalition
Considering the recent international economic situation and security environment, Australia is one of the most important countries in the "North-South Extended Asia" region. Moreover, if the Australian Defense Force were to join military actions with Japan and the US based on Guam, this could provide considerable strategic importance in the "strategic waters of the delta" and its southern periphery. For Asian countries, India becomes one of the most important countries in the "East-West Extended Asia".
Japan has in the past taken an active initiative in regional cooperation in the field of maritime security for many years. Maritime security” and “management of marine interests” will become important to maritime powers as a way to effectively deter China's aggressive and unlawful advance anywhere in the “broad sea lane.” Both Japan, the US and Australia, perhaps India, harbor a very positive and enthusiastic will to be a 'responsible stakeholder' for the 'Maritime Security Coalition' in the 'Expanded Asia'.
Cooperation and coordination with reliable maritime countries of each region is necessary, such as Australia, which is one of the most important countries in the "North-South Extended Asia". India is one of the most important countries in the "East-West Extended Asia". In the Southeast Asian region, we can find some reliable maritime countries like Singapore, just like India in the Indian Ocean. On the other hand, Japan has taken an active initiative in regional cooperation in the field of maritime security for many years in the past.
Session Two
Defense and Security Policy Developments in Japan and Australia
- Japanese system of making a security strategy and defense policy
- Present Japanese security strategies and defense policy
- Prospect for A New National Defense Program Guidelines
- Prospect for Japan-Australia cooperation to improve international security environment
What are the focal issues of contention in the current reexamination of Japanese security strategy and defense policy. National Defense Program Guidelines describe the basic points regarding the build-up, maintenance and operations of Japan's defense capabilities in light of the security environment surrounding Japan. Following the establishment of the Self-Defense Forces in July 1954, the National Defense Council (Kokubo Kaigi) would be established which would deliberate and formulate a "National Defense Program Guidelines" as the basis for mid-term defense procurement.
For it was feared that the opposition party intended to send a former Imperial Army officer to the National Defense Council as an unofficial civilian member5. Left-wing opposition parties and political forces strongly objected to the creation of the self-defense forces as unconstitutional and criticized the security agreement with the United States. The main features of the current Japanese security strategy and defense policy are as follows.
However, it may be recalled that NDPG 2004 views some elements of the Basic Defense Force Concept as still valid given the uncertainties in the regional security environment. Third, participation in the activities of international peace cooperation has today been made a primary mission of the Self-Defense Forces through a revision of the Law on the Self-Defense Forces. A member of the Council on Security and Defense Capabilities raised the idea of making Japan and Australia a “quasi-alliance.”
Defence and security policy developments in Japan and Australia
Most importantly, the statements assess that "future strategic stability in the Asia-Pacific region will depend to a large extent on the continued strong presence of Australia's closest ally, the United States". Overall, the statement's description of the national security environment was largely as expected. Where the statement gets interesting is what it says about the organization of Australia's national security bureaucratic infrastructure as a result of the Review of Homeland and Border Security.
With a time horizon of twenty-one years, Force 2030 takes a long-term view of the development of the Australian military. With some minor changes, Force 2030 continues the post-Vietnam conception of Australia's defense built around defending the continent against armed attack. Where the two documents differ is in the assessment of the strategic environment and in some aspects of the planned response.
More importantly, Force 2030 boldly sets out the expectations of the assistance Australia expects under the ANZUS Alliance. Although there were some short-term reprieves from previously planned expenditure in the 2009 budget, the Australian Defense Force appears to have largely escaped the effects of the recession so far. Hold regular staff discussions between the Japanese Self-Defense Forces Joint Staff and the Australian Joint Operations Command at ADF Headquarters. IV).
Session Three
Obama’s administration’s foreign and security policy and its implications for Australia and Japan
- Change and continuity in US foreign and strategic policy under the Obama administration
- The Obama administration’s approach to the Asia-Pacific region
- Specific issues for US alliance relations with Australia/Japan
- Japan-Australia-US trilateral security cooperation
The speech was a key part of Obama's philosophy of trying to put a better face on the US's role in the world. Overall, I believe that Asian affairs are slowly beginning to set the broader agenda for global affairs – albeit limited in the short to medium term by the enduring difficulties of the Middle East. The UN and other multilateral bodies have provided some political traction—particularly the G-20 in the wake of the global financial crisis.
But the second is a newer and growing point: a point about the 'longevity of the American era', if I may put it that way, and a growing concern about great power 'transition points' in Asia. The key lesson from the history of the ANZUS alliance is that the relationship is not a fixed quantum: it evolves; it waxes and wanes. The 'tightness' of the alliance typically reflects how we behave when under pressure.
This is not to say that Australia would always have a role alongside the US in every crisis (eg we would probably have no role to play in the event of a crisis in Mexico), but we tend to be aware of the lesson. We think this is the logical consequence of Japan continuing to assume a major role in Asia-Pacific security while remaining, like Australia, a close ally of the United States. A bipartisan belief that Japan should be encouraged to take on more of the attributes of a.
Obama Administration’s Foreign and Security Policy and its Implications for Australia and Japan
- The “Af-Pak” Challenge
- The North Korean Nuclear and Missile Challenge
- The Long-term China Challenge
- The Nuclear and Proliferation Challenge
The centrality of the US-Japan alliance to US strategy in Asia is likely to remain intact, as will the robust US-Australian alliance for the foreseeable future. It would seriously destabilize the regional balance of power and possibly trigger an arms race in the region. As Secretary Gates said in the Shangri-La Dialogue, the North Korean nuclear program does not represent a direct military threat to the United States at this time.
Faced with North Korea's growing nuclear and missile threat, Japan would feel compelled to do three things. As we all know, Japan is the first and only country in the world that suffered the consequences of nuclear bombing. Shaping China's strategic decisions and policies would be critical if a new security order in the region was to be open, secure and sustainable.
We will welcome China as a responsible major power that plays a key role in maintaining a stable and peaceful security order in the region. It would be essential to strategically and proactively co-opt China in building architecture in the region. A strong US-Japan alliance, a harmonious US-Japan-China partnership, and a developing East Asian community would be essential ingredients of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region of the 21st century.
