The United States' response in the aftermath of the March 11, 2011 earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear disaster has dispelled any doubts about America's commitment to its ally. Both Japan and the US are seen as welcome interlocutors to balance China's growing power.
Conference Summary Brad Glosserman, Rapporteur
That presence in general, and the Japan-US alliance in particular, is essential to reassure the Japanese about the credibility of the expanded US deterrent. The US must reassure Japan (and potential adversaries) that Japan remains protected by the extended deterrent (both conventional and nuclear).
A Time for Courage from Japan By Richard L. Armitage
They were important because they go to the heart of what kind of state China will be. If this missile goes well for them, I don't think they can say "oh, my bad, we're not going to do it." Not now. So my prediction is that we're going to have trouble with North Korea for a while.
You don't just post a description of the problem without giving a prescription for what you want to do about it. One thing we do know is that under the current economic situation there will not be an increase in the defense budget in Japan.
Japan as “Bridge across the Pacific”
This would lead to the revision of the Security Treaty in 1960 to clarify America's defense commitment in terms of the treaty. To Prime Minister Yoshida, however, the unified command was not acceptable, because he felt that it would make Japan look like a pawn of the United States. How to deal with China has become one of the most important tasks for the US-Japan alliance.
Looking back at the origins of the alliance, there was a difference between Japan and the United States regarding China. Both President Obama and Secretary Clinton understand this and emphasize the importance of the Asia Pacific region.
The United States in the Asia-Pacific Region
At the same time, some in the United States believe that China wants to dominate the Asia-Pacific and push the US out of the region. Washington should also make efforts to avoid putting allies and friends in the position of having to "choose" between the United States and China. Those who accept China's territorial claims want the United States to play a high-profile role as a stabilizing force in the region.
Finally, let me say a few words about the assets that the United States will bring to bear on all these challenges, and more, in the coming years. Outside the Asia-Pacific region, coordination on Iran policy should be a particular priority for the United States and Japan.
Beyond Tomodachi
Domestic Politics in Japan and the US-Japan Alliance By L. Gordon Flake
However, the central government's role in both disaster response and reconstruction continues to be widely criticized. There is an ongoing process to restart some of the reactors that are currently idle. The DPJ's initial and by some accounts truncated attempt to empower the political class at the expense of the bureaucracy has compounded this disruption.
For half a century, one-party dominance, which ended in the 1990s, hid some of the flaws in Japan's postwar parliament. This is partly reflected in the fact that none of the main parties is able to secure more than 20 percent of public support.
US Foreign Policy in a Time of Change By Toshihiro Nakayama
In the 1990s, people all over the United States talked about the closing of the American mind, the division of America, and the rise and fall of the great powers. In other words, it is about the search for a new foreign policy structure in the post-American world. And indeed, the foreign policy implications of who is in the White House are quite large.
In the 60s you had groups like SDS and YAF at each end of the ideological spectrum. But in 2012, there will be a fundamental shift in the way the two camps approach the world.
Japan and Asia-Pacific Economic Integration By Yoshiji Nogami
Nobody these days talks about Japan's big economy, but people talk about China's big economy, even though the size of the two economies is about the same. I have nothing against Paraguay or Nicaragua, but no one talks about "a great country like Paraguay or Nicaragua." External perception may be determined by GDP size, but domestic policy is always determined by income per capita. inhabitant. Another important aspect is that China does not have effective macroeconomic instruments like other advanced economies.
The problem for advanced economies is that these macroeconomic instruments cannot be used effectively due to political constraints. This is a point I want to make about China as well, but it's very difficult for the Japanese to talk about the future of the Chinese economy because everyone will say, "oh, it's just sour grapes."
Friends in Decline By Robert Madsen
Unfortunately, much the same thing applies to the rest of the Western alliance system. The problem is that Europe and the United States both made some of the mistakes that Japan made. Two of the critical elements in this process are the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and India.
Whether this is possible depends largely on Japan's internal politics and the government's ability to overcome industrial resistance. The members of the Western alliance system have made a mess of their economies, and the result will be slower GDP growth and fewer diplomatic and military resources.
The US-Japan Alliance in 2012 and Beyond By James J. Przystup
There are undeniably legitimate questions about the budget's impact on defense and the U.S. force structure. To put Darwin's decision into historical perspective, since the breakdown of basic negotiations between the US and the Philippines in 1991, US strategy towards the region has focused on expanding “access”; the first example is taking up Singapore's access offer. At the same time, even as Southeast Asian initiatives unfold, in Northeast Asia, U.S. alliances with Japan and the ROK will remain the cornerstones of U.S. security strategy direction and foundation.
This charge was redefined as one of the primary missions of the US Armed Forces in the Strategic Guidance of January 2012. The recommendations of the Council and the NDPG align well with the US interest in strengthening capabilities that respond to an A2/AD environment .
Has Japan Avoided Wasting the Crisis?
A Somewhat Weak “Yes”
According to the survey, conducted every three years, a percentage of respondents said they had a good impression of the JSDF. The U.S. military presence in Japan has provided Japan with a consistent deterrent since the end of World War II and continues to make a significant contribution to Japan's security. As a result, many Japanese were unsure about the contribution of the US military presence in Japan to Japan's security.
Before 3/11, a significant portion of the Japanese people said that perhaps the United States was simply using Japan for its global or regional strategy. This is another indication of the declining anti-military sentiment among the Japanese people.
The Future of the Alliance By Hiroshi Nakanishi
Operation Tomodachi can be a model for future operations in terms of the salience of the cohesion and combined nature of operations, together with mobility and information/intelligence. Flexible changes in roles, including who controls the entire operation, will be another part of the alliance in the future. Since Okinawa is at the maritime crossroads between the US, Japan and China, the political will of the people of Okinawa to be part of the security framework will be more important.
Japan and the US must set the rules of conduct for this region, avoiding holding back a rising Asia and subjugating rising powers. The Fukushima accident is a rude awakening, but the weakening of the NPT by North Korea, Iran, India and Israel also calls into question the validity of the NPT regime.
Japan: Look East to North America By James A. Kelly
This does not suggest that Japan's smaller share of US trade is less economically significant than it was or that its years of reduced economic growth have any impact on its larger relationship with the US. The point of all this is to suggest the consideration of a much closer tightening, outside of East Asia, of the relationship between the US and Japan. Australia is a valuable partner, but probably best done in three-way cooperation with the US.
Japan has a special alliance with the US, but its future in working with the US in a broader, North American context has real potential. The economies of the US (and in various ways Canada and Mexico) can – potentially – provide options for Japan beyond Asia.
About the Contributors
Gordon Flake is executive director of The Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation
Toshihiro Nakayama is a professor of American politics and foreign policy at the School of International Politics, Economics and Communication (SIPEC), Aoyama Gakuin University. He was a Special Correspondent for the Washington Post at the Far East Bureau Special Assistant at the Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations in New York Senior Research Fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs and Associate Professor at the Department of International and Cultural Studies at Tsuda College (2006-10). Przystup is a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University.
His last assignment at the Department of State was at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, where he helped establish the Independent Task Force on U.S.-China Relations and served as the task force's first director. He also served as Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Seoul and served as Chargé d'Affaires at the Embassy for most of 2001.
APPENDIX A
This session examines the political setting in each country and its impact on the alliance. How do Japanese view American politics and how does it influence American defense and security policy in general and the alliance in particular? This session explores the economic, political, social and cultural dimensions of the alliance and regional security.
How are both sides expanding and deepening the non-military dimensions of the alliance, focusing on both shared interests and shared values. How does the decision to allow the export of components related to missile defense affect the alliance.
APPENDIX B
