Prepared for 10th JIIA-IFRI Joint Conference
“Japan-France Political and Security Dialogue”
From a Threat-driven to
an Interest-oriented Security Arrangement
Japan-US Alliance Management after the Cold War: Japanese Perspective
Ken Jimbo
Research Fellow, Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA)
1. Why has the Alliance Endured? ―From EASI to EASR
Alliances deteriorate and dissolve for several reasons. Historically, the most obvious and important cause is a change in the identity or nature of the threat that produced the original association. Alliances, however, are more likely to persist when the allies share similar political values and when the relationship is highly institutionalized. Such alliances will find it easier to adapt to new conditions and will be better equipped to handle the conflicts of interest that inevitably arise1.
In the immediate aftermath of the end of the Cold War, there was a great deal of concern in Asia, and among security specialists, that there would be a precipitous American withdrawal from Asia. Although the strategic implication of the end of the Cold War in Asia was far less immediate or apparent than in Europe, the notion of “peace dividend” accompanied with the “come home” symptoms was largely shared in the US administration and in the Congress. The concern over the disengagement was further encouraged when the ‘senior’ Bush administration issued the report for the East Asian strategy (Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: EASI2) in 1990, which aimed at decreasing the number of the US forward deployed forces gradually in three phases between 1990 and 1996. There was a fear that a partial but significant US withdrawal would leave a power vacuum in the region, which could be taken advantage of by emerging Asian powers.
The EASI, however, was not fully realized as it was originally planned. The plan had to be reviewed, primarily by the re-assessment of the situation in Korean Peninsula, notably the nuclear crisis, highlighted especially in 1994. As early as in 1992, the Pentagon
1 Stephen Walt, “Why Alliance Endure or Collapse,” Survival, Vol. 39, no. 1, Spring 1997, pp.156-79.
2 US Department of Defense, A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Looking toward the 21st Century, April 1990.
postponed the Phase II troop adjustments in South Korea, setting up more cautious approach against North Korea3. In the 1995 report (EASR), after the nuclear crisis, the Pentagon officially abandoned the three-phase force reduction approach, noting that continuing areas of uncertainty and tension require a reaffirmation of US security commitments to the region, and confirmed to maintain approximately 100,000 troops in the region4.
From a perspective of the US military operation, the EASI was also reviewed by the termination of Military Bases Agreement (MBA) between the US and the Philippines in 1992, followed by the Philippine Senate refused to renew the US’s land-lease contracts, forcing the closing of the Subic Bay Naval and Clarke Air Bases. Impending departure from Philippines made the US government conduct reevaluation of overseas access of the US forces, especially for the Navy and the Air Force, in the Asia-Pacific region. Thus, to maintain the operational capability of the forward presence, the bases in Japan as well as the logistic support of other Southeast Asian countries have become more essential.
With having these developments, the government of Japan and the United States undertook an intensive bilateral review of the security relationship from October 1994 through April 1996. Both countries have reached the consensus that the Japan-US alliance
“remains the cornerstone for achieving common security objectives, and for maintaining a stable and prosperous environment for the Asia-Pacific region5,” and for that purpose, both governments have agreed to maintain 100,000 US forward deployed military troops to meet its commitment.
3 US Department of Defense, A Strategic Framework for the Asia Pacific Rim, Report for the Congress, 1992.
4 US Department of Defense, United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region, February 1995.
5 Japan-US Joint Declaration on Security: Alliance for the 21st Century, 17 April 1996.
☆Major Events in the Japan-US Alliance Review 1990/Apr EASI-I
1992/Apr EASI-II
1993 Bottom-Up Review (BUR) 1994/Aug “Higuchi Report”
1995/Feb US East Asian Strategy Report (“Nye report”) 1995/Nov Japan’s New National Defense Program Outline 1996/Apr Japan-US Joint Declaration on Security
1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)
1997/Nov Review of the Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation
2. Emerging Concept of the Post-Cold War Alliance:
Interest-Oriented Arrangement
Despite the anticipation for the Korean contingency, maintaining the alliance solely by the deterrence aspect has become hardly manageable. In one sense, the state-to-state confrontation was not as acute as during the Cold War, and in the other sense, the single targeted alliance agenda would likely to dissolve, should the very agenda fade away. In absence of an officially recognized threat, the alliance inevitably has to try to adjust to the new circumstances equipped with broader agendas, and not just institutional inertia, to help maintain an acceptable regional status quo and hedge against uncertain environment.
In this regard, the logic for maintaining the alliance, especially one that would enough to obtain the public support, has become more ‘fragile’ compared to the times of the Cold War.
The emphasis on the alliance rationale also varies amongst security specialists.
The Realist school argues that alliances basically gain in importance when facing various security threats. One group describes that “the prospects for conflict in Asia are far from remote”, notably on the Korean Peninsula, across the Taiwan Straits, on the Indian Subcontinent and in Indonesia, and thus “the alliance would be more important than ever”
6. The Liberal / Institutionalism school urges that alliance should focus not just on deterring inter-state conflict but on other missions that advance liberal objectives7. Some assert that the alliance provides the stable strategic calculation for neighboring countries, and thus, that it works as the foundation for security reassurance8.
These differences in views derived from their assessment s of regional threats / uncertainties and their institutional expectations. The Realists focus on the remaining threats as the core motivation for maintaining the alliance. The ‘liberal vision’ may be needed but it is less accountable and may even loosen the foundation of the alliance. In contrast, the Liberals think that, by inclining too much toward the threat concept, the alliance would lose the flexibility to deal with the possibilities of future political dynamism in this region, especially for the case of the Korean Peninsula where trends favor a peaceful resolution of existing tensions.
The Japan-US review process clearly aimed at re-defining the alliance as ‘a
6 The United States and Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature Partnership, INSS Special Report,
Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, October 11, 2000.
7 Mike Mochizuki and Michael O’Hanlon, “A Liberal Vision for US-Japan Alliance,” Survival, vol. 40, no. 2, Summer 1998, pp. 127-134.
8 Dennis Blair, “The Role of Armed Forces in Regional Security Cooperation” Pac Net 34, Pacific Forum, CSIS, August 25, 2000. Courtney Purrington, “The Future of US-Japan Security Relations: The Challenge of Adversity to Alliance Durability,” in Jonathan Pollack eds., East Asia’s Potential for Instability & Crisis:
Implications for the United States and Korea, RAND, 1995.
mixture of multiple factors’ as prescribed by those words found in the 1996 Joint Declaration. The managers of the alliance in both countries recognized that a single rigid raison d’etre for the alliance might not be the best answer, given an ‘uncertain’ strategic environment. As in the words of Joseph Nye, the problem of the post-Cold War Asia-Pacific region is “not the divisions that uncertainty has, but the divisions that uncertainty can create9.” This notion has been widely shared.
For instance, in addition to prepare for the high-intensity scenarios, new Defense Cooperation Guideline in 1997 includes that Japan and US should cooperate in peace keeping, humanitarian and disaster relief, and noncombatant evacuation operations.
Dealing with these ‘low intensity’ scenarios, exercising the authority for global cooperation in these mission areas, which is taken up politically and operationally, would be very important dimension of the alliance management. Besides, the routine conduct of these relatively high probabilities, low intensity operation on a global basis amounts to invaluable practice for much more stressful and totally unprecedented high-intensity regional contingency operations10.
The ‘Reassurance’ concept remains to be an important aspect in the Japan-US
9 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “The Case for Deep Engagement” Foreign Affairs, July/August 1995.
10 Paul S. Giarra and Akihisa Nagashima, “Managing the New US-Japan Security Alliance: Enhancing Structures and Mechanisms to Address Post-Cold War Requirements,” Michael J. Green and Patrick M.
Cronin eds., The US-Japan Alliance: Past, Present, and Future, A Council on Foreign Relations Book, 1999.
☆Variations in Types of Rationale for Post-Cold War Japan-US Alliance A) Traditional Deterrence (Threat-driven Concept / Realist rationale)
① Korean Contingency
② Taiwan Strait
③ Proliferation of WMD, Ballistic Missiles …etc B) Crisis Management (Asymmetrical / Low Intensity Conflict)
① Humanitarian Relief
② Asymmetrical Threat (Counter-terrorism, Cyber Security)
③ Cooperation in Peace Keeping Operations
④ Future Cooperation in Peace Enforcement?
C) Reassurance
① Hedging Regime
② Insurance Regime1
③ Regime for Regional Cooperation
・Basis of the Strategic Calculation and Regional CBM
alliance. Some strategist assess that the Japan-US alliance is the most credible determinant variable in the strategic calculation for neighboring countries. One can expect that the US forward presence would remain engaged in this region, with having in mind that Japan would not be a single independent military power, as long as the alliance is maintained11. In addition to the deterrent function, US military presence in Asia serves to shape the security environment to prevent challenges from developing at all US presence mitigates the impact of regional tensions, which US government call it “presence plus12.”
Ironically, despite these ‘liberal’ efforts of the manager of the alliance, the realist logic has been highlighted with a number of events that happened in Northeast Asia from 1994 to 1998; i.e. the nuclear crisis in North Korea in 1994, Chinese occupation of Mischief Leaf in 1995 and Chinese military exercise in Taiwan straits in March 1996, India and Pakistan’s nuclear test in 1998. In Japanese domestic context, the alliance was also supported by some political incidents during the alliance review, which Japanese public made aware the need of re-evaluating the norms of exhibiting government’s strong interference to sustain the order of the society; i.e. the massive earth quake in Kobe, the Aum Shinrikyo’s salin gas attack in Tokyo in 1995, and terrorism to Ambassador’s official residence in Peru in 1997.
Experiencing these incidents in such a short period of time, the ‘crisis management’ has been a key concept to be pursued among policy makers, which might have affected the wider support of the US-Japan security relations and crisis operations like sending Japanese C-130 to stand-by in Singapore to rescue Japanese in case of emergence in Jakarta.
3. Why Enhanced Alliance Management? ―A Case for Japan
The alliance management during the Cold War could be characterized as “balanced asymmetry13.” The United States provided the strategic guarantees of the nuclear extended deterrence, power projection forces, and a context for the alliance of regional and global engagement. Japan provided for its own defense, US bases in Japan, and the financial host nation support (HNS). By design, combined US-Japanese planning, coordination, and decision-making were structurally precluded.
The modest Japanese role, with limiting herself to an “exclusively defense oriented policy14,” was an adequate stance for the alliance durability, when the situation of
11 Courtney Purrington, op. cit.
12 US Department of Defense, The United States and Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region, 1998.
13 Paul S. Giarra and Akihisa Nagashima, op. cit
14 The ‘exclusively defense-oriented policy’ means that military force cannot be exercised until armed attack is initiated, and that the scope and level of use of defense forces are kept to the minimum required
the Article 5 of the Japan-US security treaty, attack against Japan by the Soviet military in the Far East, was a dominant scenario. Japan’s increased capability of anti-submarine patrol (P-3C airborne patrol) to detect the Soviet Navy maneuver in the Pacific Ocean was an essential component of the alliance function throughout the Cold War years.
Given the changes in the Asia-Pacific region after the end of the Cold War, the Article 6 situation, lately called the “situations surrounding Japan,” was more likely the case to be dealt with. Under this situation, the modest defense oriented role of Japan could not be justified for the alliance management. There was a serious concern among the politicians and official over a scenario; if the United States acts to sacrifice its own citizens during a Far East crisis while Japan stands by, it would be impossible for the two to cooperate adequately and for the alliance to survive15. The 1994 nuclear crisis in Korea has highlighted this concern in Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in Defense Agency. Japan was not ready, neither for the defense doctrine, nor for the legal enactment to meet the new requirements for the alliance management in the post-Cold War.
New Doctrine for the Alliance Management
In September 1997, Japan and the US announced the revisions of the Defense Cooperation Guidelines, the basic rules and regulations that had governed their day-to-day military collaboration since 1978. Besides further outlining bilateral cooperation during normal circumstances and for the defense of Japan, the new Guidelines provided the basis for more effective bilateral cooperation during a regional crisis ‘that affects Japan’s peace and security’16.
In the new Guidelines, Japan has set forth a more definitive role in responding to situations in areas surrounding Japan. For instance, the revised Guidelines outline Japanese ‘rear-area support’ to U.S. forces responding to a regional contingency. This support may include providing access to airfields, ports, transportation, logistics, and medical support. Japan would also be able, as applicable, to cooperate and coordinate with US forces to conduct such missions and functions as minesweeping, search and rescue, surveillance, and inspection of ships to enforce UN sanctions.
Defense cooperation under the Guidelines, however, remain consistent with rights for the purpose of self-defense. Moreover, the defense capability to be possessed by Japan must be limited to the minimum necessary level. Thus, this policy refers to the posture of passive defense strategy that is consistent with the spirit of the Constitution.
15 Satoshi Morimoto, “Tighter Japan-US Alliance Based on Greater Trust,” Mike Mochizuki ed., Toward a True Alliance: Restructuring U.S.-Japan Security Relations, The Brookings Institution, 1997. Also see the details in, Yoichi Funabashi, Alliance Adrift, Council of Foreign Relations Press, 1999.
16 Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Guideline for Japan-US Defense Cooperation, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/guideline2.html
and obligations set forth in the Japan-US security treaty, the ‘limitations of Japan’s Constitution’ (that means that within the current interpretation of banning to ‘exercise the right of collective self-defense’) and basic principles of international law. Japan and the US will determine independently whether to cooperate, consistent with the Guidelines, in the event of a regional contingency. This decision will be based on the nature of the situation. As such, the concept "situations in areas surrounding Japan" embodied in the revised Guidelines is not geographical but situational.
Enhanced Japanese Role in Regional Security
―Emerging New Standards in Domestic Debate
Security debate in Japan after the end of the cold war has been focused on how Japan should realign the self-defense (national level), alliance with the United States (bilateral level), and multilateral security cooperation (multilateral level) to cope with the new strategic environment in the 1990’s17. The norms of debate after the Cold War has changed, comparing the time when an open debate on security in Japan was heavily constrained by the argument based on pacifism, which was widely accepted by the public.
The perceptions among the Japanese public could be divided in three categories.
The first group, which largely supported by former pacifists, insists that given the security situation that cold war is over and there is only mistrust between countries in East Asia, the multilateral security is the system best served for securing Asia and the alliance with the United States should finally be abolished. This group had had certain degrees of influence, especially in time when controversy over incidents in Okinawa had focused, but are currently losing its influence among the public because they seem to have started to notice the pessimistic prospects of multilateral security in Asia.
The second group admits that there is a need for the national defense capability and the U.S. -Japan alliance, while encouraging the multilateral efforts, but believe that Japanese contributions should be limited in non-military or less military means (“Global Civilian Power” Concept). This group contains a vast range of people who believe in peaceful ways of contribution and who have converted from the group one.
The third group strongly promotes the alliance with the United States to play a more effective role in order to promote peace and stability in the Asia Pacific region.
Multilateral security cooperation should also be considered, but as a compliment of the bilateral alliance. This group sees that the U.S.-Japan alliance does not only provide the deterrent force in this region but it also provides the basis of security cooperation among
17 Ken Jimbo, “Changing Japanese Attitude toward Security,” paper presented at 12th Asia-Pacific Roundtable, ISIS Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, 1998.
states. Japanese security contribution within the alliance should be largely achieved through the logistics and rear-area supports.
Recent developments in Japan signals that the former pacifists have clearly lost its influences but the majority of the public aspire for the greater role of Japan in the security arena. The intellectual ferment over security policy in Japan is stunning to long-time observers of this pacifist nation. For example, polls show that support for the U.S.-Japan alliance is higher in both countries than it has been since 1986, but within that broad support there is a growing consensus among Japanese that their nation must have more ownership of the alliance and do more on its own to influence the security environment.
Over 60 percent of the public now supports changing the Peace Constitution, surveyed in March 2000 by the Yomiuri Shimbun. More than one-third of all Diet members in favor of either revising the Constitution or reinterpreting it to allow a major expansion of Japan’s military role in the region18, and notably, 90 percent of Diet members under 50 want revision. Over 50 percent of Japanese now view China in a negative light. 30 percent think there could be a war in Northeast Asia in the near future. 80 percent support once-controversial contingency legislation to respond to security crises. In a word, Japan's security policy debate is steadily becoming more "normal" and more "realist" (in both the theoretical definition and the real word meaning) 19.
This ‘structural change’ has been emerging with following reasons. First, there emerged a growing awareness that Japan should contribute more ‘normally’ to the outside world. This derived not only from their recognition of the noblesse oblige suitable for its national power, but from the strong resentment and bitterness over the experience of dealing with the international crisis after the Cold War. There was no official ‘thank’ from Kuwait government over the Japanese financial contributions of the Gulf War. During the Cambodian peace building process, the pathetic-theological debate on whether Japan can join the peace keeping operations in the Diet made many people aware of extraordinary position that Japan was trying to play in the multinational operations.
Second, experts and the public became more cautious on the post cold war security environment surrounding Japan. Especially, the 1994 crisis in North Korea, Chinese occupation of Mischief Leaf in 1995, series of nuclear test in 1995-1996, and the military exercise in Taiwan straits in 1996, made aware the public on the tension in Northeast Asia. As mentioned earlier, the norms of exhibiting government’s strong interference to sustain the order of the society was re-evaluated with facing the massive
18 Uchida Kenzo, “Nihon no kiro o tou,” Bungei Shunju, vol. 74, August 1996.
19 Michael Green, ”Why Tokyo will be a Larger Player in Asia,” E-Notes, Foreign Policy Research Institute, July 27, 2000.
earthquake in Kobe, salin gas attack in Tokyo, and terrorism to Ambassador’s official residence in Peru. Experiencing these incidents in such a short period of time, the crisis management has been a key concept to be pursued among policy makers, which might have affected the wider support of the U.S.-Japan security relations and crisis operations.
Third, is the generational change. The public tends to pose more realistic attitude toward China as a strategic context. They don’t see China as an ideological partner as former AA-ken, the social liberals, had viewed, but China as an emerging power.
Incidents in Tinnanmmen Square, conducting of the nuclear tests, military exercise in Taiwan Straits, and continuing Chinese criticism on past Japanese behavior, shallow appreciation for the Japanese official development assistance (ODA) have urged Japan’s frustration toward China. There are decreasing number of pro-Chinese group that formally had existed. Japanese view toward China is shifting to what Michael Green and Benjamin Self called “from commercial liberalism to reluctant realism20.”
Fourth, and foremost, is the disentanglement from the 1955 regime in the Diet.
The reason of the continuance of the pacifist movement in those years was related to the position of which Socialist Party had remained for 38 years. Under the predominance of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), 1955 regime, the Socialist Party could not gain the seats in the Lower House (LH) in the Diet to overcome the LDP, which had stably maintained the majority of the LH. Only strategy that the Socialist Party being able to conduct with regard to reflect her opinion to national policy was to prolong the discussion in the diet in order to shelve and to prevent the approval of the bill. Adopting this strategy, and realizing the difficulty of taking over the LH, the Socialist Party continued to play a pacifist role especially as a performance to preserve the supporter’s vote who had believed in pacifism21. This prolonged domestic political situation had sustained some public to believe in the possibility of pacifism until early 90’s when the Socialist Party had her historic conversion to admit the Self Defense Force and the security treaty with the United States. By 1993, Japanese Socialist Party abandoned the major pacifist policy of denying the Self Defense Force and the Japan-US alliance. Public has lost its political ground for supporting their pacifist notions.
Current Agenda for Alliance Management: “Right of Collective Self Defense”
A debate over whether Japan should resort the right of collective self-defense has recently become one of the main issues for the alliance management. The constitutional
20 Michael J. Green and Benjamin L. Self, “Japan’s Changing China Policy,” Survival, vol. 38, no.2, Summer 1996.
21 Ken Jimbo, op. cit.
interpretation that has been adopted by the Japanese government is that ‘Japan has the right to collective self-defense but shall not exercise the right22’. Under the existing Japanese-U.S. defense arrangements, should a vessel of Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Force be attacked, in, for instance, the Sea of Japan, it would certainly be rescued by U.S.
warships in the vicinity. However, under the current framework of the Japanese-U.S.
security arrangements, should a U.S. warship be attacked in the Sea of Japan, the Japanese government would have to say that it was unable to go to the rescue of the U.S. vessel, given that it deems that it is unconstitutional to exercise the right to collective self-defense.
It is also possible to imagine a scenario in which Japan would insist that it had the right to shoot down a missile launched by North Korea if it was directed at this country, but could not do so if the missile was aimed across the Pacific Ocean at the United States, on the grounds that doing so would constitute the exercising of the right to collective self-defense.
From the rationale of the militarily operation, logistical support or medical assistance are intimately linked by a temporal sequence to a combat operation or that takes place at or near a combat area would be integrated with the use of force and therefore proscribed. Whether or not Japanese Self Defense Force could able to cooperate in the situation described above, a clear answer has yet to be given.
The current debate for the review was triggered by the “Armitage Report,” the report of a bi-partisan study group; noting as follows:
- Japan’s prohibition against collective self-defense is a constraint on alliance cooperation. Lifting this prohibition would allow for closer and more efficient security cooperation… Washington must make clear that it welcomes a Japan that is willing to make a greater contribution and to become a more equal alliance partner.
- The revised Guidelines for US -Japan Defense Cooperation, the basis for joint defense planning, should be regarded as the floor―not the ceiling.
After this report came out, Yukio Hatoyama, a leader of Democratic Party suddenly made a statement that Japan should admit that she can exercise the right of collective self defense. Taku Yamazaki, current Secretary-General of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), argues that the government should lift the prohibition within ‘the situation surrounding Japan.’ Shizuka Kamei, former head of Political Research Council in the LDP, stated that Japan has no prohibition for the right when an ally is attacked.
22 Collective self-defense is a universal, inherent right for a sovereign state, and is recognized as such in the UN Charter, Article 51. Treaties, including the Japan-U.S. security treaty, also acknowledge Japan's right of collective self-defense. Furthermore, the Japanese government claims that Japan has this right.
Despite these legitimate claims, the Japanese government denied itself of ‘exercising the right of collective self-defense’ in 1960 by interpreting Article 9 of the constitution as a prohibition of collective self-defense.
Among the proponents, some argued that the constitutional interpretation that has been adopted by the Japanese government, and never arrived at based on any ruling by a judiciary competent to decide on constitutional issues. This group says that Japan can lift the prohibition, whenever cabinet would decide so. The other group takes more incremental approach, that the government should not change the current interpretation, but should do so during the revision of Japanese Constitution.
4. Bush Administration and Defense Policy Review: Implication on the Alliance
(1) Comprehensive Review on US Defense Policy
One of the major policy agenda for the Bush administration in the field of national security is the ‘comprehensive defense review’ for the next Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).
The comprehensive review of the defense doctrine and the US military force structure includes the possible amendment of the “two major theater contingency (2MTC)” doctrine that for a decade has been dominant in determining the size of the US military forces.
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Andrew Marshall, the Pentagon official running the strategic review (Net Assessment), made following points23:
- The Pacific Ocean is the most likely theater of major US military operations, as China becomes more powerful and Russia less so. This would require a reorientation of a defense policy that has been geared since the end of World War II to keeping the peace in Europe and deterring the Soviet Union.
- Operating in the Pacific will require an additional emphasis on “long-range power projection,” which means greater attention to aircraft capacity and other ways of sending troops and firepower across thousands of miles.
- The proliferation of missiles and other weapons of mass destruction could cause US allies to limit access to overseas bases, requiring the US military to be able to sustain itself while operating at long distances.
- Missile proliferation in the Third World also means that the US military should place greater emphasis on acquiring planes, ships and vehicles that have “stealth,” or radar-evading, capabilities.
- To achieve these goals, the armed services should cut spending on older weapons systems that they are likely to stop using within the next 10 years or so.
Although the details of the defense review have not been crystallized (it is reported that the review completes by the end of July 200124), it will pose a greater strategic importance on
23 Washington Post, March 23, 2001.
24 US Department of Defense, “Background Briefing on the Quadrennial Defense Review,” News
Japan-US alliance if materialized as originally planned. Firstly, Marshall pointed out that the security emphasis would shift away from Europe and toward Asian theater. In his view, it is China - not Russia - that now poses the greatest potential threat to US security.
It is recognized that China's rising military and economic power, its ambitions in the South China Sea, and its growing need for imported oil are all motivating Beijing to assert its influence over a wider sphere in Asia and the Pacific.
Second, the reform would have great emphasis on the “power projection,” not the
“forward deployment.” This may result in the change in the concept of overseas presence.
Andrew Marshall believes that overseas bases and forward deployment forces are more vulnerable to asymmetrical attack, such as ballistic missiles and terrorism. The force projection must necessarily become an action that revolves not around aircraft carrier sorties and armor and infantry deployment, but long-range arsenal ships and planes, networked sensor arrays and precision-weapons. Although the Pentagon’s official line never stated that forward-presence levels will change in the near future. But the various
“vision” statements of the military services and chairman of the joint chiefs of staff all anticipate a much more agile, rapidly deployable, automated, precise, and long-range strike force by 2010 or 202025. Changed strategic circumstances, new technology will make possible to reduce the number of US troops deployed in many theaters abroad.
(2) Missile Defense
“New Framework” speech and Japanese Reactions
President Bush’s speech on missile defense on May 1, called the need for “new concepts of deterrence that rely on both offensive and defensive forces.” At the core of Bush’s speech was a major change in American nuclear doctrine that has long been sustained.
First, he stressed that the US and Russia should ”go beyond” the constraints of the 30 year old ABM treaty, with a willingness to discuss the issues with Russia and also China.
Second, the speech made no distinction between the NMD and the TMD.
Technologically, the boost-phase defense architecture and C4I (Command, Control, Communication, Computers and Intelligence) will pose more integrated approach between the US and allies over NMD/TMD. Diplomatically, the integrated concept of Missile Defense aims to soften the ‘decoupling’ argument between the US and its allies. There are Transcript, United States Department of Defense, June 14, 2001.
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2001/t0642001_t614bckg.html .
25 Michael O’Hanlon, “Can High Technology Bring U.S. Troops Home?,” Foreign Policy, Winter 1998-99.
Also see Michael O’Hanlon, “Come Partly Home, America: How to Downsize U.S. Deployments Abroad,”
Foreign Affairs, March/April, 2001.
also messages sent to potential adversaries, Russia and China, that the criticism for the missile defense programs could not be separately negotiated26.
For the Japanese response to the Bush’s speech, there were five points made27:
① Japan shares the recognition with the United States that the proliferation of ballistic missiles is causing a serious threat to our security.
② Japan and the United States are conducting cooperative research on ballistic
missile defense technologies. As such, bilateral cooperation is important for the security of Japan, and we will continue to cooperate on this research.
③ Japan expresses the understanding that the United States is considering the
missile defense program while making various diplomatic efforts to address the proliferation of ballistic missiles.
④ Japan welcomes President Bush's reference, in his recent speech, to further cuts
in nuclear weapons.
⑤ Japan hopes that the missile defense issue will be dealt with in a manner conducive to the improvement of the international security environment, including in the areas of arms control and disarmament. Japan welcomes the renewed announcement by the United States of the US side's intention to conduct close consultations on this issue with its allies and other interested states, such as the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China.
Japan also took a careful step for the “boost-phase” defense system. On June 15, a news source reported that the government would not participate in the US’s missile defense program, especially if it violates the current interpretation on the right of collective self-defense28. On June 17, Defense Minister Nakatani made a remark on the TV program that “Japan will not participate in the US missile defense program for foreseeable future.”
Government sources said they would convey the latest position, which could hurt Washington's hopes for the project, to US officials during a bilateral defense meeting slated for June 22. The defense establishments, however, at least wants to "research" how the project works because it would not be realistic for the government to cite (constitutional) constraints and distance itself from the missile project -- even in the research stage.
Defense Minister Nakatani’s statement on TV neither envisions the future possibility of technological development, nor does take the future alliance management
26 For example, Chinese Ambassador Sha Zukang made a statement that the aspiration for TMD that provide security for US forces is ‘understandable,’ despite strong opposition for the integrated technology for NMD.
27 Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Press Conference, 11 May, 2001.
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/press/2001/5/511.html#6
28 “Tokyo flinching from study of missile shield,” Mainichi Daily News, June 15, 2001.
http://www12.mainichi.co.jp/news/mdn/search-news/827311/missile20defense-0-1.html
into account, since the boost-phase missile defense has a big potential. Enemy missiles are easiest to locate when their rocket motors are burning, and there are few countermeasures to foil a boost-phase intercept because it is difficult to hide or mimic a large, burning rocket.
Boost-Phase defense also offer two distinct political advantages29. First, they should reassure friends and allies worried from decoupling argument, that an NMD deployment would defend only the United States―thereby making them more tempting target for attack. Secondly, boost-phase defense would not threaten the basic viability of either the Russian or the Chinese nuclear deterrents. Regardless of how they were deployed, they could shoot down only missiles launched within a few hundred miles of where they were based. In Japanese strategic context, The North Korean threat is the one of the most appropriate case to handle. Since North Korea sits on the peninsula, its missile can be defended against using sea-based interceptors alone, though a land base on Russian soil near Vladiostok might be worthwhile if Moscow agreed.
Japanese Stance on BMD
Japan's primary concern is providing for its own defense and obtaining U.S. assistance with that task. North Korea's launch of its Taepodong-1 missile over Japan in August 1998 quickly brought home to the Japanese their vulnerability to missiles and spurred interest in TMD. A month after the missile firing, Japan's parliament, the Diet, passed a resolution calling on the government to "take all measures to ensure the security of the Japanese people." In December 1998, Japan formalized a TMD joint research plan with the United States, and signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on August 16, 1999 that outlined the direction the plan would take. The research will be based on the Navy's Theater-Wide Missile Defense (NTWD), for the upper-tier system. U.S. and Japanese officials and defense contractors-led by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries in Japan and Raytheon in the United States-have developed a smooth and unpublicized joint research effort. Japan plans to spend $280 million over the next six years on the project.
Security specialist, Shinichi Ogawa argues that the TMD would have the following security benefits30.
- TMD system can negate hostile states' attempt to discourage U.S. friends and allies from cooperating with U.S. forces through intimidation by ballistic missiles armed with WMD.
29 James Lindsay and Michael O’Hanlon, “Defending America: A Plan for a Limited National Missile Defense,” Policy Brief #70, The Brooking Institution, February 2001.
30 Shinichi Ogawa, “TMD and Northeast Asian Security,” paper presented at workshop, “East Asian Regional Security Futures: Theater Missile Defense Implications,” The Nautilus Institute and United Nations University, June 24-25, 2000.
- Although adversaries possessing theater ballistic missiles equipped with WMD may threaten or use these weapons to deter or constrain U.S. military operations, a missile shield covering forward-deployed U.S. forces can lower such risks.
- Aside from a marginally effective TMD, a very effective TMD might dissuade ballistic missile countries from expanding their missile forces and thus contribute to the non-proliferation and reduction of ballistic missiles.
- TMD can counter the potential danger of accidental or unauthorized missile launches, which becomes higher with the proliferation of ballistic missiles.
- TMD system covering Japan and other U.S. friends in East Asia could supplement the U.S. nuclear umbrella.
- As a side-benefit, a TMD system protecting U.S. allies could contribute to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. This is because missile defense, coupled with U.S. extended deterrence, could contribute to reducing a state's desire to acquire nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. TMD could also enable the U.S. to reduce its reliance on nuclear deterrence in a regional contingency, thereby marginalizing the significance of nuclear weapons.
- TMD system covering Japan can protect U.S. forces in Japan, thereby contributing to efficient operations of the U.S.-Japan alliance that has evolved into a security-related "public good" in the Asia-Pacific region. Furthermore, U.S.-Japan joint technology research on TMD will deepen military technology cooperation between the two countries and thus strengthen the foundation of the U.S.-Japan alliance.
Assessment of Chinese Opposition
China and North Korea have been denouncing America's plan to deploy TMD in East Asia and the U.S.-Japan joint research on an NTW defense system. Russia, despite its signing of the 1997 TMD Demarcation Agreements that have paved the way for development and deployment of TMD systems, has joined China and North Korea in their criticism of the NTW defense system.
The most likely consequence of the deployment of BMD system, in which China and Russia often refer, is that the US and other countries will fall into offense/defense arms race. For example, if Washington chooses to try to cap China’s growing arsenal, this out come seems rather likely as it is intolerable to China to accept the loss of credibility of its deterrent, especially at a time of such deep concern about the US in its unipolar moment.
Of course there will be the net trade-off between drawbacks and benefits. Even if the potential drawbacks are there as Russia and China insists, the chief benefits of BMD
would be felt at a time of WMD aggression by a regional challenger, like North Korea.
NMD may well induce China to get bigger and faster. But China is already getting bigger and it is doing so fast. This is especially true with regard to MRBMs. Also we can analyze Chinese missile development is also driven by domestic political status and not only by the relative strength of their deterrence31.
There is also remarkable divide between academics over the strategic consequences of the BMD deployment. One argues that it provokes the arms race and some others argue that BMD can use a tool for persuasion and even as a tool for arms control. Simply speaking, this depends on how you estimate the percentage of interception and how you figure the system would affect to the opponents’ strategic perception. Academically, it is the matter of offense/defense ratio of the deterrence by punishment and deterrence by denial. The likely strategic implication of BMD from this offense/defense balance sheet should determine the security concept of the coming decade.
(3) From Wheel to Webs? ―Bilateral Alliances and Multilateral Networks
Another focal point for the alliance management in the Asia-Pacific is how the US deal with the multilateral security in Asia, though Bush administration has not made her position in detail.
On ‘multilateral’ approach, there should be a strict distinction between two types of multilateral security for the analytical purpose. One is the Bilaterally-Networked Multilateral Security (expanded bilateralism), and the other is Multilateral Security Cooperation (enhanced multilateralism)32. The former based on the belief that the bilateralism would best serve, but it could be expanded multilaterally. For example, even if B and C are perceived to be friends, A will find the prospect of sustaining A-B and A-C ties more efficacious than forming A-B-C (multilateral) arrangement. In contrast, the latter argument refers to a broad spectrum of collective state behavior with an accompanying wide array of norms and principles.
Bilaterally-Networked Multilateral Security
Within the concept of Bilaterally-Networked Multilateral Security, Admiral Dennis Blair, commander-in-chief of the US Pacific Command, promotes to create “security community”
31 Brad Roberts, “US Ballistic Missile Defenses: Implications for Asia,” Paper presented at the Second Cooperative Workshop on East Asian Security Futures, Nautilus Institute.
http://www.nautilus.org/nukepolicy/workshops/shanghai-01/robertspaper.html
32 I owe this argument from the article of Brian L. Job, “Multilateralism in the Asia Pacific Region,”
Discussion Paper Prepared for the 4th Workshop on the Bilateral System of Alliances in the Changing Environment of the Asia-Pacific, June 10-12, 1996, Japan Institute of International Affairs.
based on the “enriched bilateralism33.” In order to share the peaceful change and diminish the prospect of using force, he believes, it is essential to develop regional, multilateral approach to common security challenges. In his mind, the most effective method is to develop policy coordination, including combined military cooperation, on a particular regional security issue or series of related security issues. For that purpose, the armed forces of the US, in conjunction with allies and other partners in Asia, should undertake to enhance regional readiness for combined operations.
This year, the U.S./Thai bilateral exercise ‘Cobra Gold’ was linked with two other existing traditional U.S. bilateral exercises – ‘Tandem Thrust‘ (U.S./Australia) and
‘Balikatan’ (U.S./Philippines) -- into a joint combined exercise, ‘Team Challenge 01.’ U.S.
Pacific Command and forces from Thailand, Australia, the Republic of the Philippines and Singapore participated and 22 countries have observed in this umbrella exercise during April and May 2001. The three traditional bilateral exercises remain separate exercises under the common regional exercise scenario of TC-01. U.S. Pacific Command and the participating nations are linking these existing exercises under TC-01 to improve readiness and interoperability, and to increase security within the Asia-Pacific region. The multilateral framework of TC-01 compliments the existing strong bilateral relationships throughout the region, and provides additional training and engagement opportunities.
TC-01 uses United Nations Chapter VII (peace enforcement), non-combatant evacuation operation and crisis management scenarios and will have two phases. Phase I provides Combined/Joint Task Forces (CJTF) training for maritime forces in exercise Tandem Thrust (U.S./Australia) with supporting participation by Canada. Phase II provides CJTF Training for maritime, air and army forces by linking Cobra Gold 01 (U.S./Thailand/Singapore) with Balikatan (U.S./Philippines).
In addition to these joint training exercise, countries in Southeast Asia and Oceania have recently intensify the defense cooperation with the US34. Notable among these, Australia made the Sydney Statement also called Joint Communiqué of Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations on July 31, 1998. Apart from the extension of the treaty governing the Joint Defense Facility at Pine Gap, Australia's crucial role (known as US southern anchor) in the American East Asian strategy was reiterated and close collaboration in security issues was underscored.
Philippines’ signing of the Visiting Forces Agreement in January 1998 primarily deals with the legalities regarding the status of US troops while on official duties in the
33 Dennis C. Blair and John T. Hanley Jr., “From Wheel to Webs: Reconstructing Asia-Pacific Security Arrangements,” The Washington Quarterly, vol. 24, no. 1, Winter 2001.
34 G.V.C. Naidu, “Asia-Pacific Security: An analysis of trends,”
http://www.idsa-india.org/an-dec-00-9.html
Philippines, its psychological import is much greater on the rest of the region, particularly in the light of the intensified contest for islands in the South China Sea where Manila too has claims35. Third, Singapore in early 1998 announced its decision to build a new large naval base called Changi Naval Station and that it will be available to US naval combatants and include a pier which can accommodate an American aircraft carrier.
Multilateral Security Cooperation
Only security system that currently exists based on multilateralism is, and for foreseeable future, cooperative security like the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Cooperative security basically aims for prevention of conflict through having exchanges and confidence building measures, which do not have effective means to manage conflicts, once it occurs. The eight year-old ARF has not take drastic initiatives to systemize its effort for the collective action toward such measures, mainly due to the sensitivity on the principle of non-interference of sovereign rights, claimed by various member states, notably China and Vietnam.
The ARF is now in the transitional phase to seek for the possible measures for preventive diplomacy (PD). The debates on the PD in the ARF, however, are taking very cautious steps. For example, its ‘definition’ aims at “helping to prevent disputes and conflicts from arising between States that could potentially pose a threat to regional peace and stability,” which limits the application of the PD function only to State-to-State conflict, not to include intra-State conflict36. Its ‘principle’ also cautiously states that the PD measures should be 1) diplomatic, 2) non-coercive, and 3) respectful for sovereign equality, territorial integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs of State. Within these definitions and principles, the ARF proponents are seeking the possibility to create concrete measures, especially the enhanced role of the ARF Chairman. The prospects for materializing these measures, however, are not promising, since the ARF “continue to develop at a pace that is comfortable to all participants and reaffirmed their commitment to make decisions by consensus.37”
The only potential that the ARF could viably address the role for the regional security, is to promote institutionalization by synthesizing the security concept of member states. For example, China’s “New Security Concept” emphasizes multilateral effort, while criticizes the ‘entangling alliance systems.’ The ‘new concept’ refers an example of the CBMs between China and Russia on border issues and “Shanghai-Five” initiatives.
35 Ibid.
36 Concepts and Principles of the Preventive Diplomacy, Delivered at the Seventh ASEAN Regional Forum Ministerial Meeting, July 27, 2001. http://www.aseansec.org/politics/arf7c.htm
37 The 7th ARF Chairman’s Statement, http://www.aseansec.org/politics/pol_arf7.htm
Also, for the US, the ARF could serve as a complement framework of the alliance in more visible terms. If the low-intensity conflict, such as the case of East Timor, political crisis, and small-border conflict, could be dealt with autonomous framework in the Asia-Pacific Region, the US can refrain from over-commitment in regional affairs. With this context, and as the only trigger, China would be able to participate vigorously and to promote the PD. This Strategic Convergence may help to create the more promising architecture for
“Multi-Layered Security Network” in the Asia-Pacific Region.
