On the Dialectical
Meaning
of
Instantiation
in terms
of Mdyd-Drstdnta
in -the Indian
and Chinese
Mddhyamikas
Shohei
Ichimu'ra
Although traditionally the use of 'maya', 'dream', etc. has been taken for granted in Buddhist literature, this method of instantiation or illustrative
exem-plification requires much more attention than hitherto given as to its meaning.
When such instance is used in Madhyamika and Yogacara texts, . the usage is said to have borne a mark of the insight of s u nyata and to have arisen from
dialecti-cal discourse as distinct from ordinary logical discourse. In this paper, I shall
focus my attention to the Madhyamika usage of maya-drstanta with a question in mind, namely, 'Whether the usage was correctly, transmitted from the Indian cultural context to that of China. ' I have chosen for this cross-cultural study the
reductio-ad-absurduin method of argument of Nagarjuna, forefatherr of the
Madhyamika school in India, and the paradoxical method of Seng-chao [僧 肇],
disciple of Kumarajlva and author of the Chao-lun [肇 論], an earliest Madhyamika
in China.
II
Despite the cultural. difference between India and China, the logical systems
that evolved in these culturally independent regions bore a, fundamental-affinity
between the respective methods of inferential reasoning. What was essential to the Indian method of inference was the dual rules of anvay and vyatireka,
namely:, (1) verification of a given thesis by similar instantiation, and (2). 'falsi-fication of it by dissimilar instantiation respectively. In the Chinese logic, namely,
that of the classical Mohist [墨 子], these two rules were called the method of
-977-(10) On the Dialectical Meaning of Instantiation (S. Ichimura)
agreement [T'ung' or 同] and that of difference ['i' or 異]. Inboth systems, these
two rules were conceived to guarantee the validity of inferential reasoning, be it inductive or deductive. Despite this significant affinity reflecting the universality of human mind, the main difference was that the Indian inferential form includ-ed an illustrative 'example' as one of its components, while there was no such
' example' required in the Mohist form of inference. The Mohist system,
howe-ver, provided the principle of 'hiao' [効] instead, a kind of universal statement
well established by induction as the normative valid basis of inferences). Insofar as a reasoning is based on such a 'hiao' or model thought or normative truth, a resulting inference therefrom is conceived to be invariably, valid.
That this difference was incidental due to cultural difference can be inferred from the fact that Buddhist translators in China managed to bring the Indian usage of maya-drstanta into Chinese texts in terms of 'a mataphor, ' 'an analogy'
['pi-yu,' 'yu,' 比 喩, 喩]. Chinese Buddhist thinkers, including Seing-chao, as
freqd-ently used the method of 'pi-yu' for doctrinal exposition as Indian Buddhists did. Nagarjuna's standard use of maya-drstanta occurs in his Vigrahavya'vartani, Karika 232), in which he compares the way a svabhava-less sentence repudiates the existence of svabhava with the way a magician [himself created by his own magic] repudiates another object he magically created. It is obvious, because of his full knowledge of Indian logic, that Nagarjuna used such instance not as a mere analogy or metaphor but as an actual illustration of what constitutes the insight of sunyata. In parallel to Nagarjuna's usage, Seng-chao also used the similar instances in demonstrating the insight of sunyata as expressed in his
es-say: The Doctrine that Whatever is Unreal is Sunyata [不 真 空 論] as follows: 3)
We want to say that dharmas exist, but their existence is not a real produc-tion [非 真 生]. We want to say that dharmas do not exist, but phenomenal
forms [事 象] are already configurated. Phenomenal forms cannot be said as Qid
entical with nothing [不 即 無], but we only say that anything unrea [非 真]
is not a real existent [非 実 有]. It follows that the meaning of "Sunyata of
Whatever is Unreal" is thus revealed. Accordingly, the Pancavins'ati-sahasrika-prajnaparamita-sutra says : "Dharmas are called metaphorically as 'unreal'
[仮 号 不 真] just as a magically created man is. For, we cannot say that there is
-976-no magically created man but that such is not a real man [非 真 人].
Whether Seng-chao knew the Mohist system of logic hitherto has not been noticed or questioned, despite a possibility that, being a Taoist before conversion to Buddhism, he may have been exposed to the textual circulation of the Mohist logic while he was in the Taoist circles4). In fact there is definite evidence for the fact that he knew the logic. For, though only a single occasion, Seng-chao uses the term qhiao, [効], technical term of the Mohist Iogic, in his essay The
Doctrine that Nirvana is No-Naming [Ni-p'an Wu-ming-lun, [浬 繋 無 名 論]5). Here,
however, he uses the term not for denoting a valid basis of inferential reasoning as defined by the Mohist for logical discourse, but for denoting the translogical basis for dialectical discourse. The very fact that he uses the logical term 'hiao' to deliberately denote the translogical context indicates by itself not only his knowle-dge of the Mohist logic but also his awareness of the dialectical context underly-ing the Prajnd insight as the ultimate basis for realizunderly-ing Nirvana. Briefly, Seng-chao was concerned here with the relation between dharmas and pudgala and
tries to demonstrate the non-duality or non-difference of objective things [物]
and subjective self [我] from the standpoint of the transcendental insight of
Prajna. Quoting textual sources, he says: "Thus, the lord of gods [Indra] asked Subhuti : 'As to what reference should one intuit the Prajna insight ?' Subhuti
then replied: 'One ought not to seek for it in reference to a rupa [般 若 不 可 於 色
中 求], nor shquld he seek for it in reference to anything separate from a rupa'
[亦 不 離 色 中 求]. Subhuti further stated: Seeing the causality of 'dependent
origi-nation'[見 縁 起] means seeing the Dharma; Seeing the Dharma means seeing
the Buddha'"6) Seng-chao, then, referring to the above triads [i. e. seeing Prati-tyasamutapada, seeing Dharma, and seeing Buddha], uses the term 'hiao, ' saying :
This is but the ultimate causal basis for the insight of non-difference between
things (harmas) and an individual self (pudgala) [斯 則 物 我 不 異 之 効 也].
Elucidating this passage, Seng-chao extends his exposition, stating : "Thus, it is said in the Sutra [?] : 'One realizes Nirvana without separating himself. from
dharmas' [経 日, 不 離 諸 法 而 得 浬 繋], and also said: 'Because there is no limit with
-975-(12) On the Dialectical Meaning of Instantiation (S. Ichimura)
the (numbers) of dharmas, there is neither akmit with Enlightenment [諸 法 無 辺 故 菩 提 無 辺]. Thus, the path of Nirvaan is known as having no limi' [以 知 浬 藥 之 道] Hence it follows that gthings are neither different from an individual self [然 則 物 不 異 我], nor is the self different from things [我 不 異 物], and that things and self inexpressiVely meet lgether [物 我 玄 会]7).
IV
Indian logic defined logical discourse. as based on two conditions : (1) that the dual rules of anvaya and vyatireka ought to be operated separately as verifica-tion and falsificaverifica-tion ;, and (2) that the respective classes of variables must be de-marcated by boundary as similar (sapaksa) and dissimilar (vipaksa) references8). Take for instance a logical universal : "Wherever smoke, there fire, " the verifica-tion process (anvaya) applies this universal to a given referent, such as a hill, in view of. verifying this universal as true by referring to the class of similarr varia-bles which can be predicated as having smoke and fire, like a kitchen, etc. The falsification process (vyatireka), on the other hand, applies the same universal to the class of dissimilar variables, such as a water tank, for falsification, which can never be predicated as having fire and smoke. This constitutes the contrapositi-on : "Wherever no fire, no smoke. " In short, in the logical ccontrapositi-ontext, : first, verifi-cation and falsifiverifi-cation must be separate processes to be accomplished, second, by referring to their . respective classes of similar and dissimilar variables. These two conditions are also found in the Mohist system of logic as the method of agreement and that of difference9).
Nagarjuna-'s reductio-ad-absurdum argument, however, derives from a trans-logical or dialectical context in which the foregoing trans-logical context should radi-cally be changed. By 'dialectical context, ' I mean a necessary condition in which
(1) the-referential variables of sapaksa and vipaksa are totally identified over th. e spatio-temporal sphere where two mutually exclusive variables, e. g. light and darkness or fire and fuel, are in convention supposed to meet or to be link-ed. , together. This can be accomplished by (2) juxtaposition of . the process of verification (anvaya) and that of falsification (vyatireka). Although Nagarjuna gives no' clear hint about, these two standard conditions of dialectical context in
-974-On the Dialectical Meaning of Instantiation (S. Ichimura) (13) his reductio-ad-absurdun arguments, it is possible to detect them from. the way he manipulates propositions for inducing the dialectical context in which absurd-ity is to follow. Take for instance his argument over the metaphor of light and darkness in the Vigrahavyavartant', Karikas 36 through 39. It is a strike of inge-nuity with Nagarjuna that he creates a dialectical context by juxtaposing light and, darkness in reference to one and the same spatio-temporal sphere where convention requires them to meet for bringing the phenomenon of illumination into existence.
The following is a simplified translation for those Karikas together with my supplementary argument for Karikas 37 and 39 respectively: 10)
K. 36: Wherever [i. e. in reference to the meeting point in space and time] light illu-mines darkness, darkness also obstructs light [anvaya and vyatireka together]. K. 37: Wherever there is light there should be no darkness [because they are exclus-ive). How could light illumine anything ? [anvaya, while vyatireka -negated]. Sup-plement : Wherever there is darkeness there should be no light. How could light illumine anything ? [vyatireka, while anvaya negated]. K. 38: Does light illumine darkness at the moment of its arising ? No, light does not reach it from the very begin ning [anvaya and vyatireka together]. K. 39: If light here illumines darkness without
reaching it, this light here illumines darkness of all the world [anvaya, while vyati-reka negated]. . Supplement If darkness here destroys light without reaching it, this darkness here destroys light of all the world -(vyatireka, while anvaya negated). Although it is not detectable in ordinary language, Nagarjuna's method of reductio-ad-absurdum arguments reveals two significant insights behind the ap-parent absurdity of these statements : (1) that linguistic . convention operates in the depth of our mind as simultaneous application of verification (anvaya) and falsification (vyatireka), and (2) that the respective variables (sapaksa and vi-paksa), though exclusive with each other, are co-present in either phenomenon of illumination or its obstruction by changing their respective nature to accommo-date each other [i. e. light's illumination is accommoaccommo-dated by darkness' identification with light through negation and vice versa]. It follows that there is only one condi-tion for the fact of illuminacondi-tion, such that light and darkness are identical while, at the same time, different. This amounts to saying that light and darkness could
-973-(14) On the Dialectical Meaning of Instantiation (S. Ichimura)
reciprocally assume each other's nature, resulting in the causality of reciprocal dependence (parasparapeksata).
V
The two characteristic features of dialectical context, namely, (1) juxtaposition of anvaya and vyatireka and (2) dual natured reference resulted therefrom, are also found in Seng-chao's paradoxical method of arguments. As I pointed out in my article that appeared in this journal [Vol. 33, No. 2 (March 1985), 841-834]11), Seng-chao did not resort to the Nagarjunian type of reductio-ad-absurdum argu-ment but exclusively to his own paradoxical method. Out of many adequate pas-sages, I have chosen the following in which he responds to a quetison : "Is there any difference between Paramartha and Vyavahara ?" and which is found in his essay : The Doctrine that Whatever is Unreal is Sunyata :12)
In terms of Paramartha, things are known asnot (really) existent'[真 諦 以 明 非 有],
(and yet)in terms of Vyavahara, they are known also as 'not (totally)
non-exist-ent' [俗 諦 以 明 非 無]. Although the dual truth(satyadvaya) is invoked here, things
referred to are, indeed, one and the same(i. e. not two) [量 以 諦 二 而 二 於 物 哉]. Thus, because of their (phenomenal) existence, things are neither existent [有 其 所
以 不 有], nor non-existent [有 其 所 以 不 無]. Because of (phenomenal) existence, they do not (really) exist [有 其 所 以 不 有], (and)hence, though (pihehomenally) existent,
they are (transcedentally)non-existent [灘 有 耐 有]. Because of (phenomena)
existence, they are not(totally)non-existent[有 其 所 以 不 有], (and)hence, though
(transcendentally) non-existent, they are neither non-existent [故 錐 無 而 非 無]. Since things are non-existent and yet not non-existent [誰 無 而 非 無], this non-existence
does not mean 'absolute voidness'[無 者 不 絶 虚]. Since things are existent and yet
non. existent [錐 有 而 非 有], this existence does neither mean cabsolute real' [有 者 非 真
有]. If sdch existence is not identical with the real [若 有 不 即 真], its contrary non-existence is neither identical with the traceless void [無 不 夷 跡]. Therefore,
qexist-ence, [有] and qnon-existence' [無]are diferent in expression, their meanings have
one and the same reference [然 則 有 無 称 異 其 致 一 也].
VI
The two major criteria extracted from Nagarjuna's reductio-ad-absurdum
-972-On the Dialectical Meaning of Instantiation (S. Ichimura) (15) argument, namely : (1) Juxtaposition of anvaya and vyatireka and (2) dual na-tured reference resulted therefrom, are also equally identifiable in Seng-chao's paradoxical argument, especially when he ends it by stating that "though 'exist-ence' and 'non-exist'exist-ence' are different in expression, their meaning have one and the same reference. " Nagarjuna used the maya-drstanta obviously in com-pliance with Indian logical tradition, but his instantiation does not seem to have been a mere metaphor but an actual exemplification of that dual-natured refere-nce derived from the dialectical context, namely : simultaneously 'light' and 'dark-ness', 'existent' and 'non-existent', or 'identical' and 'different. ' Seng-chao's usage, though by way of textual quotation, also refers to that same reference that bears the dual nature as characteristic in the Madhyamika dialectical discourse.
The Very eVidence that he uses cHIAO '[効], essential logical term of the Mohist
system, despite a single occasion, is strong enough for us to assert that he must have been exposed to that system of logic before writing those essays comprised in his Chao-lun. It is at least possible for now to assert that his knowledge of the Mohist logic helped him to understand the Madhyamika critique of convention and the way the dialectical method ought to be formulated.
1) Cf. J. Chmielewski, "Notes on Early Chinese Logic (III), Rocznik Orientalisty-czny, XXVII, pp. 105-109. Chmielewski discusses on the affinity of Indian and the Mohist systems on p. 109.
2) nirmitako nirmitakam mayapurusah svamayaya srstam pratisedhayeta yadvat pratisedho 'yam tathaiva syat // 3) Taisho. Vol. 45, p. 152 b (17-22).
4) Cf. A. C. Graham: Later Mohist Logic, Ethics and Science [The Chinese Univ. Press, 1979], pp. 64-66; the Neo-Mohist canon seems to have been circulated at the turn of the 4th century among the Neo-Taoist circles.
5) Taisho. p. 161 a (12). 6) Ibid. a (10-12). 7) Ibid. , a (16-19).
8) The dual rules were defined by the author of Nyayaparavesa as: sapakse sattva (position) and vipakse asattva (contraposition).
9) Cf. Hu Shif : The Development of the Logical Method in Ancient China [Shang-hai: 1929), pp. 103-5; Chmielewski : loc. cit. , pp. 105-6.
10) Cf. Ichimura : "An Analysis of Madhyamika Dialectic in terms of Logical Prin-ciple of anvaya-vyatireka, " Studies in Buddhology : Professor P. V. Bapat Felicitation Volume, (ed. Samtani) rDelhi : Indian Books Centre, 1988, esp. , Sect. IV.
11) Cf. Ichimura : "A Determining Factor that differentiated Indian and Chinese Madhyamika Methods of Dialectic as reductio-ad-absurdum Argument and Parado-xical Argument respectively. "
12) Taisho. p. 152 b (17-22).
(Key Words) "-vfddhyamika Method, Maya-drstanta
(Institute of Buddhist Studies)
