Three Dogmas of Modern Philosophy

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(1)Three Dogmas of Modern Philosophy by Teruaki Georges SUMIOKA, ph.D. 1985. ABSTRACT We call the principles of Subjectivism, Holism, and Descriptionalism, as the “three dogmas of modern philosophy”. We can see a complete structure of these dogmas in the “Wisdom-Library Theory”. It is an ideal kind of library that preserves, accumulates and evolves all the wisdom of mankind within the general form of language. However, first, even such a super-subject as the “Wisdom-Library” cannot exempt from the self-righteousness problem of the subject. Intending the whole consistency, it falls rather deeper into the problem. Second, there is much silence-wisdom that is never talked out, but supporting our daily lives, although such “Wisdom-Library” is not able to deal with it. Third, individual persons maintain the “Wisdom-Library” so partially that its whole consistency and direct development are never guaranteed. However, a ‘description’ does not depend on the correspondence with the reference, but on the same reaction of the listeners as the reference so that we are able to accept it sufficiently as a speech-act to change the action of the listeners as well as the described reference itself. Also, although the illusion as if there were the ‘whole’ wisdom somewhere should be denied indeed, yet we need to consider it moderately to understand the possibility of the (mis)understanding of the listeners. Furthermore, a ‘subject’ is not able to be the ground of all things, nevertheless, it is the status of the narrator as the owner of the authority and responsibility of the speech-act. And who judges an object is judged oneself about the personality of the judge-act. Then, trying to be judged ourselves by the whole world, we are able to show the whole world as a mirror inversely..

(2) 1. Wisdom-Library Theory Rorty criticized modern philosophy as “the mirror of nature” (1) and characterized it by “the epistemological conversion”. This conversion advocates like Copernican System that objects do not prescribe recognition, but recognition prescribes objects. On the basis of this thesis, modern philosophy has constructed the schema of the transcendentally recognizing subject that is reflecting the nature on itself. So, modern philosophy prescribed itself to examine this a-priori mirror, while other sciences search the nature reflected a-posteriori on this mirror. Furthermore, by “the linguistic conversion” at the beginning of the 20th century, the pictures of the mirror changed their form from the private idea to the inter-subjective and objective language. Quine has also studied the five “conversions” of modern philosophy from a different aspect.(2) The first was the shift “from ideas to words” which we see Locke. The second was the shift “from words to sentences” in Frege or Russell. The third was the shift “from sentences to theories” by Holism as Duhem or Hanson. The fourth was “unification of analysis and synthesis” by methodical Monism as Quine himself. And the fifth is “Naturalism” that Quine proposes anew, abandoning the completion of the primary philosophy. We are able to arrange their comments as follows: First, modern philosophy is accompanied fundamentally with the schema of the transcendentally recognizing subject that is reflecting the nature on itself. This is “Subjectivism”. Second, the objects projected from the nature are accumulating and have shifted from things, states, laws, and theories to knowledge itself. This is “Holism”. Third, the objects are identified and replaced with words or languages and this point of view is more enforced. This is “Descriptionalism”. And we call these philosophical principles: Subjectivism, Holism and Descriptionalism as the “three dogmas of modern philosophy”. We may read Popper’s “Objective Knowledge”(3) as the summary of what was “linguistic conversion”. He assumes the Nature-World and the Knowledge-World as the two kinds of objects. The Knowledge-World is a kind of ‘library’, which preserves and accumulates all the wisdom by language and evolves them into the general form. In this process, we are only the slaves of this “Wisdom-Library”. Namely, we have to describe the things of the Nature-World by the words into the Knowledge-World and select the wisdom with trial and error to develop the.

(3) “Wisdom-Library”. Even now many philosophers have the same idea as Popper. For instance, Quine and Lakatos propose holistic “network theory”. Kuhn’s “paradigm” is also similar. Furthermore, we can find it Phenomenology and Structuralism in the same way. Actually, large mass production of papers in academic studies of today is based on this simple faith of scholars and scientists that we can develop the wisdom of mankind by describing knowledge by language. And what gives this problem contemporary significance is that this is the very basic idea of the AI (Artificial Intelligence) of computer-system. The character of “Wisdom-Library theory” will become more evident in comparison with the similar philosophical theories. First, we think of Platonism as Dualism i.e. the two-world theory. Indeed, both of the Wisdom-World of Popper and the IdeaWorld of Plato consist of universal things, but there is an essential difference between them. Popper’s Wisdom-World grows and evolves, while Plato’s IdeaWorld is eternal and constant. In other words, Platonism is a-priori or primal, but the “Wisdom-Library theory” is a-posteriori or empirical. In return for it, the latter has a firm Realism of the eternal, universal Nature-World as the premise to measure its own evolution. Second, we could compare this with Barkley and earlier Wittgenstein’s Solipsism in the direct line of Subjectivism since Descartes. Here we must remind ourselves that Popper has advocated the “Wisdom-Library” for the criticism of such Solipsism. As called the ‘objective knowledge’, the “Wisdom-Library” should have overcome the ‘subjective or arbitrary knowledge’. In this place, subjectivities of the individuals should be no more the self-righteous ‘octopus-traps’ but only the ‘ventilators’ of knowledge that mediate the Nature-World and the Knowledge-World without any personalities. Such “Wisdom-Library” has some variations. Like Barkley, if you set up God over a lot of subjects, so it is the very super-subject. Or like Kuhn, if you take the super-subject as the social norms between the subjects, it may be an intersubject. And like Formalism, if you understand the super-subject as the real signlines made of letters, it is also another object and recurs in nature as well as references. Third, although the “Wisdom-Library theory” claims ‘logical development’, we should not confuse it as Hegelian dialectic. While Hegelian dialectic is aiming at the “absolute-wisdom” by itself, the formation of the “Wisdom-Library” is only.

(4) supported by the past wisdom so that Popper calls it “unpredictable emission”. And while Hegelian dialectic develops step-by-step, the “Wisdom-Library” integrates directly by-and-by.. 2. Its fundamental problem 1: Octopus-trap In fact, the whole of descriptions by language seems to have a more actual substantiality than God or whole of ideas. However, is it able to be the substance of wisdom? We have to check first the nature of such holistic super-subject. Davidson says that a super-subject should have the same difficulties as Solipsism.(4) The super-subject of a certain nation has fallen into the self-righteous recognition again and it is not able to admit neither languages nor recognitions of other nations. It is quite the national version of Solipsism or evil ‘Ethno-Centrism’. Davidson formalized this “Holism” as Dualism of the conceptual-schema and the empirical-content. After that, he analyzed the difficulties of this Dualism as follows: The relation between the schema and the content of our knowledge is either that the schema is primary or that the content is primary. However, even if we would think that the schema compiles the content artificially, it would be impossible, because compilation is to be applied only to plurality, but the content (experience or existence whatever) has been a single whole yet. As well, even if we would think that the content fits the schema accidentally, the fitness consists only within the schema, because, in fact, the concept of fitness is also offered only from the schema side. Davidson cites here Tarski’s postulation of truth: if and only if p, the sign-line s is truth, then p is the truth-condition of the sign-line s. For example, if we take ‘snow is white’ as the sign-line s, its necessary and sufficient condition p is when snow is white.(5) Then, if the sign-line s is by our language and also p is ruled by our language, then it is parrotry or tautology. As earlier Wittgenstein has argued in “Tractus”, here we are able to talk nothing more but only to point something. We cannot explain the mysterious way of pointing, too. Such language should have been private to each other..

(5) Krupke explains that later Wittgenstein has solved this problem not with the “truthcondition” of logic, but with the “assert-condition” of community.(6) However, the point does not become any better, even if we expand the matter of the individuals to the one of the community. Davidson also says that such an expanded truthcondition of Holism gets caught with the ontological individuation problem of object. We are not able to translate languages, even if we would do it with the reality as a common basis because these languages have the different ontological conceptualschemata of object, i.e. different realities. Quine himself picks up this matter and says that all substantiality are only ‘posits’ of the same kind relative to conceptualschema or language.(7) We may caricature this subjectivistic dogma of modern philosophy as “octopus-trap”. A big-head who has got into a trap by himself and not able to get out it anymore; nevertheless, he will recognize the outside and describe it on the outside only from the inside. Differently from Descartes, indeed we may say ‘here I am’, but we have nothing credible since we are not able to avoid our self-righteousness. It is similar to Plato, Francis Bacon and Lippman’s “cave”, Wittgenstein’ “fry-pot”, Ryle’s “machine”, Popper’s “bucket”, Putnam’s “vat”. We are not able to get out this selfrighteous problem only by thinking with ourselves purely like Plato. If we would do so, we should fall down deeper. We are now not “prisoners in bodies” but “prisoners in minds”. As Kant says, “pure speculation without experiential contents is vacant”, this problem consists similarly even in whole communities.. 3. Its fundamental problem 2: Silent-wisdom Second, there is another more fundamental problem whether we may identify knowledge and language. There is also silent-knowledge that cannot be stated or never has been stated yet. Such knowledge without linguistic expression is exerting a much influence on our daily lives, although the “Wisdom-Library” is never able to grasp it, since knowledge of common sense is too obvious to talk about by language. What makes us wise is the silent common-sense. Ryle distinguished ‘Know-How’ from ‘Know-What’. ‘Know-What’ is what we can explain by language, while ‘KnowHow’ is what we can do for ourselves.. However, as Wittgenstein found, language.

(6) itself is rather ‘Know-How’ in the first place and we learn language not by language but by training. In various training we may use the words “yes” and “no”, however, these are not the answers to any questions but only cheering. Of course, there are many books about how to do something, for example how to speak. Nevertheless, they are also rather a kind of cheering than wisdom itself, because even if we read such books and try to do the same as written, we must train it for ourselves all the same till we can do it easily. We have too many books about various ‘Know-How’ and ‘Know-What’ in libraries and they are exploding even now on. However, excepting the established classics or the latest information, almost all are no worth to read, since they insist extreme arguments out of the normal common-sense. For example, some of them are about ‘Know-How’ of diet, but if you do it actually, you will die surely. Some of them are about ‘Know-What’ of god, but we have no way to confirm it. However, only such books are published newly, because no one but the authors knows whether it is true or not. Conversation and information consist of the gap of the knowledge between the narrator or the author and the listener or the reader fundamentally. What both know need not talk about in the first place. We must say the same about the “Wisdom-Library”. Scholars and Scientists write a lot of papers about what others do not know yet. However, they read little of them and forget almost all of them. Anyway, no one is able to read and learn them all. On the other hand, people live far from academism from the beginning and they acquire and use another silent common-sense daily. So, whose wisdom does the “Wisdom-Library” have and collect? We wonder that it is far from wisdom, not even language, but rather only very papers full of spots. In “linguistic conversion”, for example in Carnap as well as Kant, it was required as “analysis” to talk out our natural silent common-sense. However, after that Quine and Gadamer also found the difficulties in it. Quine says that without limiting the range of language, we are not able to get the exchangeability of synonym by “analysis”.(8) On the other hand, Gadamer discusses that the synonymous exchangeability needs rather the wider view of “analysis” like era, because synonym does not consist in the individual sentences with a strong personality like poem.(9) Anyway, they regard synonym as the exchangeability without changing truth-value. However, this matter falls into the inescapable circulating definition of ‘synonym’ and ‘truth’ again. Our linguistic knowledge becomes far from pragmatic wisdom and it deteriorates the vacant operational rules of words or mere sign-lines..

(7) 4. Its fundamental problem 3: Fragmentary development Third, we pick up the original problem of the “Wisdom-Library theory”. It is that the autonomy of the “Wisdom-Library” is not self-sufficient. The autonomy consists of the means that the library lets people maintain and supply its wisdom. However, people develop and check the library logically only from fragment to fragment, from part to part. If the library were closed, we would be able to make its wisdom all consistent someday, but in fact, it is open and continuing always, so its whole consistency is very doubtful. furthermore, even if the people read all texts of the one era ago and write their rational developments, yet the rational transition from the two eras ago is never sure. In dilemmas, two assertions cause a vibration rationally. And in trilemma or polylemma, plural assertions cause circulation rationally. For instance, we actually choose Oligarchy than rabble Democracy, Autocracy than cliquey Oligarchy, Democracy than terrible Autocracy. Even if we mention all the past texts in our only one text, yet we never make good to accumulate the past correctly. We always read and write within our own “conceptual-schema” or “paradigm”. “Paradigm” is the silent common-sense of “Know-How” to understand objects. Even if we would try to arrange the past rationally, yet the rationality itself is subject to our “paradigm” so that we are not able to avoid the self-rightness of subjectivity here again. To reduce the inference of our own “paradigm”, we might try to limit our work to only preserving the literal quotations. However, as Quine’s “Network Theory”, even an expert abstract theory depends on the daily concrete usage and the daily concrete usage does again on “paradigm” of the days. So, even if we operate only the literal quotations as they are, after all, we make their meaning change as ever. For instance, even if we try to understand Aristotle’s opinion about a slave, we cannot at all because we have the social system of the days no longer. Without usage, the word is dead, loses the meaning and becomes mere a sign-line as well as other objects.. However, the usage is always of the present days..

(8) In addition, fields of studies are subdivided more and more so that the knowledge of scholars and scientists becomes limited to the smaller subject. As a matter of course, usage of words is different even in the same present days, for instance ‘body’ means a contrast of mind in philosophy, a contrast of limbs and head in surgery, and any objective material in physics. We understand technical terms in each discipline much less. Therefore, no one actually knows even the summary of all the texts in the present days. “Wisdom-Library” has at most the temporary ‘rationality’ between a part and a part. In addition, all the words or spots of ink in the “Wisdom-Library” accompany no meaning from the beginning. The readers in after days give a part of them the dubious interpretations with their own ‘paradigm’. It is what we are doing. We have to be aware of it. The development of “Wisdom-Library” may cause dilemma and antinomy in long term. Therefore, our knowledge is in fact including many contradictions and circulations.. 5. Salvaging Descriptionalism Speech-act Theory criticizes Descriptionalism since it regards all language as ‘description’. Today, the criticism becomes the common-sense of philosophical specialists. Then, how do we should understand ‘description’ in Speech-act Theory? Later Wittgenstein says that to say ‘in pain’ is not a description of the pain, but only a new behavior that adults have trained children to replace with a scream. Here, we have to ask again, why do adults bother to train children such a new behavior? A: the language game in a village. (1) Finding the enormous tidal wave in offing, someone cries “XX!” so that all the people run away to the mountain. Then, which is the meaning of this “XX!”, the description as “tide!” or the command as “run away!”? However, this question may be not of theirs. (2) Finding the mountain fire, someone cries “OO!” so that all the men run to the mountain and all women and children run to the seashore. (3) “ZZ!” But it is only a dog’s barking. Then, why it is not a word with meaning?.

(9) B: the language game in an army. (1) The captain is looking with a telescope. The enemy comes up. Then he shouts, “Fire!” (2) The guard is looking with a telescope. The enemy comes up. Then he shouts, “Fire!” But the captain may ask him “What?” The guard should say “The Enemy comes!” or “I have found the enemy!” (3) The guard shouts, “The enemy comes!” Then, the captain shouts, “Fire!” These cheap instances also give us a clue to understand a descriptive speech-act. In short, we name a speech-act as “description”, when it does not rule the listener his treatment unlike the command, or when the listener gets the same treatment as when he recognizes the situation by himself directly. So, like dog’s barking, what the listener has nothing to do with is not even a word. Here remains the problem of act-description of command.. However, like A (2), as. long as the listeners act for the same word differently, we have to think logically that the word side contains no imperative act-description. Nevertheless, you may say by force yet that the short simple word “OO!” would have a long complex meaning that “man must go to the mountain and woman and child must go to the seashore”. Then, how about a command not to do? For example, the captain shouts, “Do not sleep!”, then the men do various things like smoking, talking or walking. Does the order contain such many act-descriptions from the beginning? Anyway, introducing Speech-act Theory, we have abandoned the correspondence between word and reference. Nevertheless, we may be still able to hold ‘description’ as the “mirror” of the reference. Although we do not know whether the words copy the reference or not, as long as the listeners react to the words as same as the reference itself, then the words are ‘description’. It means that the nature of ‘description’ as a mirror is neither the disposition of the narrators nor the essence of the words. When the listeners gibe the same reaction for the words as for the real reference, we name the word as the ‘description’ of the real reference. For the competent detectives and spies, not only words but also everything is reflecting something. Namely, what is ‘description’ depends on the ability of the listeners to read it. We use ‘description’ when the listeners cannot recognize the reference directly by themselves. For instance, when I happen to see a tiger in the jungle, then I shout “Tiger!” and other people become cautious about a tiger under the shadow. Thus, we can make other people change by ‘description’ as same as they recognize the.

(10) reference directly by themselves. If so, is ‘description’ the most suitable means to philosophy, because the original role of a philosopher is a tocsin of people as Plato described in the metaphor of the cave?. 6. Salvaging of Holism Already we use the word ‘schema’ for easiness. The historical first usage of the concept may be Saussure’s “langue”. He says that it is “the real existence in the human brain”.(10) However, in fact, to understand words, we never decode it, nor refer to the whole code-table, nor compare it with others. As Krupke emphasizes, later Wittgenstein in “Inquiry” criticizes thoroughly this kind of real existence in the human brain. Our illusion as if there were the whole code-table somewhere is due to Platonic “anamnesis” or ‘retroduction’ to guess from that it is so-and-so to that there was what should be so-and-so originally as an “idea” or a “thing itself”. We have tendency to reproduce by review the possibility concealed there originally, or to replace the ‘quid iuris (justice or reason problem)’ of assertion with the ‘quid facti (fact or cause problem)’ of reference, namely, to lade the reference that he has posited just now by himself with the responsibility of his own assertion. As in Tarski’s postulation of truth, why we are able to say so-and-so is since it is so-and-so, and why it is so-and-so is since it has the possibility to be so-and-so originally. We name this the “illusion of reason-precedence”. Different from logic and mathematics, speech-act is always temporal. If in proposition and formula, we have to talk out all premises previously and to identify symbol and reference (for example, 3 means both of sign ‘3’ and something 3). However, in the usual language, all premises are in “silent common-sense”. In addition, we use words as citing of something mentioned already so that we must distinguish even the same words in the same speech of the same narrator according to each sequential order. Indeed, we may shorten “It is that it is so-and-so” to “It is so-and-so”, but we must not reduce “He said ‘He said so-and-so’” to “He said so-andso”..

(11) We also must not misunderstand these premises of language. We are able to say ‘I know it’ sufficiently even about what we have never learned. For instance, in chess, you must not let the king get on the rook, but there is not such a rule and such a silent common-sense is not concealed in the brains of chess players. It is only that no one has done such a thing so far. Only if someone has done it, we may say, “it is prohibited by the rule”. A person who thinks that, as long as we have the right to say so, there is such a rule in the silent common-sense from the beginning, may misunderstand the usages of such words as ‘rule’ and ‘silent common-sense’. To say, “it is prohibited with the rule”, is just the synonym for “stop!” There is no more “why?” That is chess. If you dare to ask more, you should find someone who invented the game first. Coping with the lineal difference of a former word and the latter one, the strong generativity of language is working in speech-act. Even if there is a paradox in the possibility of rules, this matter does not make a real paradox. For instance, we need not worry, that a rule says that a pawn and a knight can both go to the same square, but another rule says that two chessmen should not be on the same square, so these rules are contradicting. However, in fact, after either goes to the square, the others just become unable to go there. However, we must consider also the whole language as the possibilities of listeners or readers to understand the lineal difference between words and the strong generativity of language. We have to entrust the meaning of our own words to the listeners or readers. Words themselves are just sound of voice or spots of ink. Giving them their own reactions, the listeners or the readers receive and revive them. Thus, as long as we talk to other people, words are always ‘ex-central’ or ‘public’.(11) How much more in today’s information society or copy culture do we have to care about the open possibility of our own words to be read and heard at later days in a library? In such cases, we are not able to identify the reader and the listeners at all. Nevertheless, they will arbitrarily understand our words in their own context. Like Kant’s practical-reason, we have to postulate the non-empirical whole language beforehand as the ideal max of contexts or the ‘silent common-sense’. This idea is the very ‘objectivity’. Of course, we cannot get the complete whole of it actually. However, we must consider it as much as possible when we speak or write words not to lay ourselves open to misapprehension..

(12) 7. Salvaging Subjectivism Austin says that in an advanced society, we are able to clarify the “speech force” of our own words by ourselves independently of listeners.(12) “Speech force” means what kind the speech-act is, for example ‘I promise’ of ‘I promise that I will be there’. However, it is not the result of the advancement of society. It is permitted only to the person who is already able to use other general words sufficiently, to determine the meaning of his own words and to push it to the listeners. Even if a child says, “I am in pain”, yet the doctor is able to say, “You are a liar!” By contrast, if a decent person says so, then the doctor is never able to deny it, even if he doubts him. It is because of the social rule. Thus, the clarification of the “speech-force” is a privilege of personality that society gives decent persons. Let us remind the previous language games of the guard and the captain. The guard is not permitted ‘command’ as “Fire!”, but ‘description’ as “The enemy comes!” And if the shooting soldiers are asked ‘why?’, then they might reply, “Because the captain said ‘Fire!’” On the other hand, the captain should not answer any more like “Because the guard said, ‘The enemy comes!’” As long as he is a captain, he should only say, “I am a captain, so I ordered them.” About a personal-speech, the responsibility is asked, too. Namely, not only the words but also the narrator himself is brought out on the market of worth and the court of truth. Assessment is also a personal-speech so that who will assess other people are asked his own worth at the same time. For instance, the scientists who were not able to evaluate competent Einstein were assessed as incompetent inversely and the scientists who have appraised him correctly were regarded as competent similarly after that. We can say the same also about recognition. Recognizing an object, not only the object but also the recognizing ability comes into question. Who judges an object has to become the object to judge in regard to the justice and the ability of judgment? We are usually weak to the authority of narrators. However, it is not mere mistake or folly of listeners, but the essential personality of speech. The narrators admitted by society are able to become the reason of the other people by their privilege and responsibility, although they have no more reason.. Such persons are the ‘subjects’.

(13) for society. In the sound society where people have respect for others, everyone is able to be a ‘subject’ and to have his own voice and responsibility in his reaction for various things. In this meaning, we are all the mirrors of society that project whole the world like Leibniz’s ‘monad’.. 8. View to the next philosophy Our problems were the three dogmas: “Descriptionalism”, “Holism” and “Subjectivism”. Those have their own backgrounds for each: “Empiricism”, “Rationalism” and “Pragmatism”. In addition, those are based on different truth theories for each: “Correspondence Theory”, “Consistency Theory” and “Utility Theory”. However, in modern philosophy, we have unified those as “Positivism” like the “Wisdom-Library”. “Positivism” does not mean ‘aggressive’ nor ‘affirmative’ but stems from ‘ponere’ in Latin as ‘posit’ or ‘post’. Francis Bacon, Descartes, Encyclopedists, and a lot of modern scholars and scientists believe ingenuously as yet that we should and could rationally describe the nature of things. Indeed, the “Wisdom-Library” is expanding with a mount of papers infinitely even now, but do we really get wiser? I wonder we become rather duller and duller with a mass of books. We hardly read them anymore. Nonetheless, we have to get on with every day, referring to a little part of them. Depending on the mirage of “Wisdom-Library”, we will not see the nature directly with our own eyes and we will not talk any opinion clearly with our own tongues. Is the “Wisdom-Library” able to be a mirror of the real nature and our knowledge? As we have discussed here, the correspondence between the Knowledge-World and the Nature-World is an illusion at all and ‘description’ is only the peculiar speech-act to that the listeners react similarly as to the original reference. In addition, we can hope only the partial consistency of knowledge at most and we must rather consider the whole possibility of misunderstanding. We are not octopuses fallen in traps only with heads and hands to see and write. Not to mention, the “Wisdom-Library” is only a mountain of waste paper so that it is not able to be the brain of all human beings.. Now, we should remind that we have.

(14) full bodies and we can grasp everything around us with hands and sense and that we can represent it on ourselves by words and expression. Indeed, we are not able to be the fulcrum to support the whole Knowledge-World, but we need not be afraid that. When we talk our own words with our own responsibilities, certainly we would suffer a lot of criticism or we would be ignored at all. However, we can project on this matter the very whole world. In this meaning, each of us is the ‘subject’ for the knowledge of human beings. In philosophy or knowledge of human beings, a mirror of nature is not the “Wisdom Library”, but we ourselves. True knowledge or ‘silent common-sense’ is not in papers but in our society. If someone does something wrong, we get angry. If someone does something good, we get glad. Thus, we can teach children our morality without any texts that note what is wrong and what is good. Similarly, saying “yes” or “no” eagerly, we can also guide politics, science, culture and various things. We must stop leaving our thought to other people and we should take back sound society and real wisdom in our own hands and words again. In our own actions with our own responsibilities, there is the next philosophy. Very trying to be judged ourselves by the whole world, we are able to show the whole world as a mirror inversely.. 1. Rorty, R.; Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, 1980. 2. Quine, W. V.; “two dogmas of empiricism”: From a logical Point of View, 1953. Quine, W. V.; “five milestones of empiricism”: Theories and Things, 1981. 3. Popper, K. R.; Objective Knowledge, 1972. 4. Davidson, D; “the very idea of conceptual schema”, 1970: Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, 1982. 5. Tarski A.; “the concept of truth in formalized language”: Logic, Semantics, Mathematics, 1956 6. Krupke; Rule and Private Language, 7. Quine, W. V.; “posits and reality”: The Ways of Paradox and other essays, 1976 8. Quine, W. V., “two dogmas of empiricism”. 9. Gadamer, H. G.; “semantik und hermeneutik”: Kleine Schriften III, 1972. 10. Saussure, F. de; Cours de Linguistique Generale, 3rd ed. 1949, p.32. 11. Language is not ‘ex-centricalized’ with growing unlike Piaget says. Rather, from the first time trained the art to talk, it has no centricity on I. 12. Austin, J. L.; How to do things with words, 1962..

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