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The Politics of Obedience: The BJP System and the 2020 Bihar State Assembly Election

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(1)[Special Issue: The Future of Democracy in India]. The Politics of Obedience: The BJP System and the 2020 Bihar State Assembly Election NAKAMIZO Kazuya. I. Emergence of the BJP system In the 2019 general election in India, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government was re-elected with an increased presence of the BJP (from 282 to 303 seats). The BJP, led by Narendra Modi, had received the majority of seats as a single party in Lok Sabha (the lower house of parliament) in the 2014 general election for the first time since 1984 (Nakamizo, 2020b). Most scholars of Indian politics tended to be initially reticent about whether the BJP victory in 2014 heralded the emergence of a ‘new party system’. The 2019 result, however, led many to abandon their earlier caution and to generally accept that the BJP has indeed become only the second ‘dominant party’ to emerge in Indian political history, the first being the Indian National Congress (INC). One of the earliest political analysts to point out the emergence of the ‘second dominant party system’ was Palshikar, who made the claim following the NDA’s comprehensive victory in the Uttar Pradesh state assembly election in 2017 (Palshikar, 2017, 2019). After the 2019 general election, Vaishnav and Hintson (2019) analysed the BJP as a system-defining party that represents the emergence of a ‘new fourth party system’ based on the classification of Yogendra Yadav (1999). Chhibber and Verma (2019) also pointed out the rise of the second dominant party system as a ‘BJP-led dominant party system’, emphasizing a new form of ethno-political majoritarianism that is delinked from religious Hindu nationalism. Additionally, Takenaka cautiously suggested the emergence of a ‘BJP system’ based on the observation of Uttar Pradesh politics (Takenaka, 2019). For Jaffrelot and Verniers (2020), however, the BJP’s victory of 2019 marked not merely a change within the party system but also, notably, a change in the political system, particularly in the way that the BJP has impacted the quality of Indian democracy. The author also argued for the emergence of the ‘BJP system’ immediately after the 2019 general election (Nakamizo, 2019) and proposed that the system can be politically characterized as the ‘politics of obedience’ (Nakamizo, 2020b: 86–88). In the ‘politics of obedience’, which contrasts with the ‘politics of consensus’ of the INC (Kothari, 1964), three pillars can be identified: first, economic development; second, the institutionalization of Hindutva (Hinduness);1) and finally, the oppression of religious minorities, especially Muslims, through smaller-scale but pervasive forms of violence. The first pillar, economic development, requires little explanation. Modi’s rise to the prime ministership was largely due to the attraction of his promise of economic development (Nakamizo, 2015). He labelled himself ‘Vikaas Purush’ (Development Man), and his ‘Gujarat model’, which achieved an increased rate of economic development in his home state, Gujarat, had a strong impact on voters’ attitudes. After he became prime minister, India regained economic growth after the stagflation of the last phase of the INC-led United Progressive Alliance 40. アジア研究 Vol. 67, No. 2, April 2021.

(2) (UPA) government, though economic development has been stagnating since the sudden declaration of controversial demonetization in November 2016. Regarding the second pillar, the institutionalization of Hindutva, however, the Modi government has moved with particular alacrity, especially after being re-elected in 2019. In particular, the decision in August 2019 to abolish Article 370 of the Indian Constitution, which had allowed considerable regional autonomy to the only Muslim-majority state of Jammu and Kashmir in India, was made quickly and without sufficient discussion. The abolition of Article 370 reduced the state of Jammu and Kashmir to two union territories and thereby brought it directly under the control of the central government. This was soon followed by the Modi government’s decision in December 2019 to enact the Citizenship (Amendment) Act (CAA), which excluded Muslim migrants from citizenship rights. The CAA provides citizenship rights to ‘any person belonging to Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist, Jain, Parsi or Christian community from Afghanistan, Bangladesh or Pakistan, who had entered into India on or before the 31st day of December, 2014’ (Ministry of Law and Justice, 2019). According to the eminent political scientist Achin Vanaik, this is the first act since India’s independence that bases citizenship rights exclusively on religion (Vanaik, 2020). Immediately after the passage of this law, the first huge protest movement since the inauguration of the Modi government, the anti-CAA movement, quickly spread across the country. One participant explained the reason for protest by saying, ‘It is not written in the Constitution that one can give certain rights to a person based on his or her religion. Also, who has proper documents these days? Today, it is the Muslims, tomorrow it will be other minorities such as the Sikhs and the Christians.’2) However, the widespread and massively attended anti-CAA protests were forced to be suspended after the Indian government suddenly made the unprecedented decision to institute an All-India Lockdown in March 2020 as a so-called emergency measure against the spread of COVID-19 (Nakamizo, 2020a). The third pillar of the politics of obedience concerns the role of vigilante groups, which tend to receive overt and covert support from government machinery such as the police (Nakamizo, 2021). Under the Modi government, vigilante groups such as Gau Rakshaks (cow protection groups) have been active in attacking and even in some instances killing Muslims by alleging that minorities are involved in the slaughter and smuggling of cattle. While small-scale but ferocious acts of vigilantism were normalized in the first tenure of the BJP (between 2014 and 2019), in February 2020, medium-scale riots occurred in Delhi. The Delhi riots were instigated by local BJP leaders against the anti-CAA movement to ‘teach a lesson’ (Nakamizo, 2020a). Violence, in other words, is increasingly becoming routinized and has resulted in making Muslims vulnerable and turning them into inferior citizens (Vanaik, 2017: 23–24). In this way, on the one hand, the ‘politics of obedience’ provides rewards for accepting its ideology in the form of economic development, while on the other hand, it metes out punishment against those who oppose it in the form of institutional exclusion and violence. What we must ask is how the ‘politics of obedience’ works to sustain the BJP system and secure its place within the Indian political landscape. Sircar analysed the victory of the BJP in the 2019 election and concluded that although the economy was sluggish, it was the ‘politics of vishwas’ (trust/ belief) that ultimately carried the day for the BJP (Sircar, 2020). According to him, ‘the extraordinary level of support for Modi and BJP’ was because voters expected a delivery from Modi in the future and were not judging him based on what he had actually delivered over the previous five years (Sircar, 2020: 179). Although Sircar’s analysis is compelling and could explain Modi’s victory of 2019, it tends to emphasize the aspect of reward, or actually the expectation of reward, in describing the BJP system. Instead, I argue that the ‘politics of obedience’ offers a much more multi-dimensional understanding of the BJP and Modi’s political tactics, including the ‘punishment’ side, by linking aspects of presumed economic development, the institutionalization of Hindutva and the strategic use of violence such as vigilantism. To test how Modi’s The Politics of Obedience. 41.

(3) appeal could carry through in different contexts, I will examine the effect of the ‘politics of obedience’ by analysing the recent Bihar state assembly election of 2020.. II. The 2020 Bihar state assembly election The North Indian state of Bihar has been ruled by the NDA since 2005 except for the four years from 2013 to 2017. In the latest state assembly election in October and November 2020 as well as in the pre-election, the NDA secured 125 seats among 243 seats in total, although the power balance within the NDA changed.3) The BJP secured the dominant position in the ruling circle for the first time since independence; however, Janata Dal (United) (JD(U)) lost its seats and fell to the second position (Table 1). The 2020 Bihar election is crucial for the future course of Indian politics in the following three ways. Table 1 Performance of major parties in the 2015 and 2020 Bihar state assembly election Party BJP JD(U) INC RJD. 2015 53 71 27 80. Number of Seats 2020 Gap (2020–2015) 74 +21 43 –28 19 –8 75 –5. 2015 24.4 16.8 6.7 18.4. Vote Share (%) 2020 Gap (2020–2015) 19.5 –4.9 15.4 –1.4 9.5 +2.8 23.1 +4.7. (Source) Election Commission of India (Abbreviations) BJP: Bharatiya Janata Party; JD(U): Janata Dal (United); INC: Indian National Congress; RJD: Rashtriya Janata Dal.. First, Bihar is infamous for its poverty and low level of development. For example, in 2018, it was the lowest among 28 Indian states and seven union territories in terms of the Human Development Index that was published in 2018.4) In Bihar, Modi’s promise ‘Achhe din aane waale hain’ (Good days are coming) was truly up for trial. Second, the 2020 election was the first major election after the All-India Lockdown under the guise of preventive action against the spread of COVID-19. As the data show, the Modi government’s All-India Lockdown policy was an utter failure in containing the spread of COVID-19, which led India to have the second-largest cumulative number of confirmed cases since the first week of June 2020 at the time of writing (February 2021).5) Instead of containing COVID-19, the sudden declaration of the All-India Lockdown caused grave damage mostly to the poorer segments of society, typically migrant labourers. According to data from the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy, the unemployment rate jumped to 26% at the time of the lockdown, a threefold increase (Singh et al., 2020: 25). It is estimated that at least 140 million people were working as migrant labourers in cities in 2020 (Rajan, 2020). They lost their jobs and had to return home, but there was no plan to protect them. Unable to obtain transportation, many of them had to walk long distances to return home. While the news of the ‘bicycle girl’ who carried her injured father on the back of her bicycle for 1,300 kilometres to Bihar was reported around the world as an astonishing and beautiful story,6) many others lost their lives in traffic accidents or for other reasons during the journey.7) Bihar is one of the major states that sends migrant workers to all major cities in India, so it suffered severely from the COVID-19 crisis. In May 2020, when the government finally provided transportation for migrant workers, 2.36 million workers returned to Bihar, which caused the spread of COVID-19 (Singh et al., 2020). Thus, this election is an important case for evaluating Modi’s anti-COVID-19 policies. Finally, Bihar has been a state of secularism and ‘social justice’ since 1990. The Laloo Prasad Yadav-led Janata Dal government (Rashtrya Janata Dal government after 1997) succeeded in 42. アジア研究 Vol. 67, No. 2, April 2021.

(4) overturning the upper-caste rule (‘social justice’) and containing religious riots in the turbulent years of communal violence (Nakamizo, 2020c: Chapter 7). Owing to its strong commitment to secularism and ‘social justice’, Bihar is the only Hindi-heartland state that has not yet produced a BJP chief minister.8) Current Chief Minister Nitish Kumar has been aligned with the BJP since 1996 and obtained the chief ministership in 2005, but he cut his ties with the BJP after Modi became the prime minister candidate for the party in 2013. The reason was mainly that he was afraid of being labelled a communal politician, which would make him an easy target for the ‘champion of secularism’, Laloo Prasad Yadav. After a humiliating defeat in the 2014 general election, Nitish joined hands with his arch-rival Laloo in forming the Maha Gathbandhan (Grand alliance; MGB), which led him to victory. However, he cut his ties with the MGB in 2017 and returned to the NDA, which was rumoured as a political manipulation by BJP. In past, BJP tried to enforce presidential rule during the second Vajpayee-led central government (1998–99) to get control of Bihar, but it failed to do so. After the 2000 state assembly election, BJP nominated Nitish as the chief minister despite of lacking majority, which failed again to secure the confident votes. As this brief history of political development shows, it is the BJP’s most cherished desire to gain control of Bihar. The BJP is one step closer to achieving this goal because of its dominance over the NDA in this 2020 election. The last bastion of defending secularism is nearing collapse, which will have a grave impact on the future of Indian democracy. Considering these three factors, the analysis of the 2020 election is of crucial importance in examining the effect of the ‘politics of obedience’ on the future course of Indian politics.. III. 2020 Bihar election survey This section presents an analysis of the relationship between important issues and voting behaviour based on our 2020 Bihar state assembly election survey.9) To gauge the impact of the ‘politics of obedience’ on voters, this article addresses the following issues. First, confirms the most important issues involved in this election. Second, it examines religious issues such as the CAA, the Ayodhya verdict by the Supreme Court in 2019, the abolition of Article 370, communal violence, and concern about the oppression of religious minorities. Third, it analyses the impact of COVID-19, given that this was the first major election after the COVID-19 crisis, as mentioned. Specifically, I want to consider the issue of economic conditions after the lockdown, evaluate the lockdown policy, and evaluate government (central and state) policies, and voting behaviour of migrant labourers. Last, I consider the leadership factor. 1. Most important issues in this election First, we asked the voters about the most important issues in this election. As Table 2 shows, unemployment was mentioned by the most of voters (33% in total) irrespective of party support. This is understandable, considering the economic hardships caused by the All-India Lockdown, as will be analysed shortly. The second-ranked issue was education, and the third was poverty, which were also concerns shared by voters from all parties. COVID-19, however, was not so high in the ranking (just 3% in total). The communal issue (maintaining communal harmony) ranked lower than COVID-19 (just 1% in total) in our survey. 2. Religious issues Before examining specific issues, let us confirm the relationship between religious identities and voting behaviour. As Table 3 shows, more Hindus voted for NDA (39% in total) than MGB (29%), though RJD succeeded to obtain more Hindu votes (25%) than BJP (22%). Muslims had a distinctive preference for MGB (51%), contrary to NDA (15%), though RJD secured only 15% of votes, which shows the considerable decline from the time of MY (Muslim-Yadav) The Politics of Obedience. 43.

(5) Table 2 Most important issues in the 2020 Bihar state assembly election (Top 3) JOB Creation/EMPLOYMENT opportunities Access to EDUCATION Caring for and protecting the poor. BJP 31% 15% 11%. JD(U) 35% 14% 13%. INC 30% 19% 10%. RJD 32% 21% 13%. Total 33% 17% 12%. (Source) 2020 Bihar election survey (Note) The figures are percentages. The party names are the parties for which voters voted. For INC voters, the issues ‘Dealing with corruption’ and ‘Safety of women’ as well as ‘Caring for and protecting the poor’ ranked third (10%). (Abbreviations) BJP: Bharatiya Janata Party, JD(U): Janata Dal (United), INC: Indian National Congress, RJD: Rashtriya Janata Dal.. Table 3 Religious identity and Party Support Hinduism Islam Total (vote percentage). BJP 22% 8% 19%. JD(U) 17% 7% 15%. INC 4% 36% 10%. RJD 25% 15% 23%. (Source) 2020 Bihar Election survey (Note) Figures show the vote percentage of specified community. For example, 22% of Hindus voted for BJP. (Abbreviations) BJP: Bharatiya Janata Party, JD(U): Janata Dal (United), INC: Indian National Congress, RJD: Rashtriya Janata Dal.. combination during the rule of Laloo Prasad Yadav. INC gained most of supports (36%). (1) Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019 Next, let us examine the core policies of the ‘politics of obedience’. Since its re-election in 2019, the Modi government has been accelerating the institutionalization of Hindutva. The most important policy is the enactment of the CAA, as mentioned. How much support did this policy receive? Figure 1 shows the results. Despite the surge of the anti-CAA movement nationwide, 61% of voters supported the CAA. In terms of party affiliation, more voters of the NDA (BJP and JD(U)) supported it (64%), but the figure was almost the same for RJD voters (63%). Only INC voters showed a lower support rate (35%) and almost equal opposition (30%). Thus, the CAA was supported by a majority of voters. (2) Ayodhya judgement Next, what about the Ayodhya issue, which is one of the three main agenda items of the BJP and has been driving Hindutva mobilization since 1984? In the 2019 general election survey, almost 80% of NDA voters strongly supported the construction of a Ram temple in Ayodhya (Nakamizo, 2020b: 86). After the 2019 general election, the Supreme Court delivered a judgement in November 2019 that enabled the construction of a Ram temple at the site of Babri Masjid, which was destroyed by Sangh Parivar in 1992.10) Figure 2 shows the results. Overall, 78% of voters supported the Ayodhya verdict, though its contradiction was pointed out.11) In terms of party affiliation, NDA (BJP and JD(U)) voters supported it (83%) more than MGB (INC and RJD) voters, and the difference for RJD voters was minimal (just 3 points). The rate of INC supporters dropped to 49%, but it still approached a majority. This is a Supreme Court verdict, so we cannot define it as a government policy; however, it was speculated that the chief justice of the Supreme Court had some deal with the Modi government.12) Immediately after this verdict, Chief Justice Gogoi retired and received a nomination to Raja Sabha (Upper House) later, which supported the speculation.13) Whether or not the judgement was politically manipulated, 71% of the voters believed in the independence of the Supreme Court from political power, according to our survey. Thus, the majority of voters approved of one of the main pillars of the Hindutva agenda. 44. アジア研究 Vol. 67, No. 2, April 2021.

(6) Figure 1 CAA and party support in the 2020 Bihar state assembly election. (Source) 2020 Bihar election survey (Note) The statement is ‘The Citizenship (Amendment) Act is a good policy’. ‘Agree’ is the sum of the scores for ‘Strongly Agree’ and ‘Tend to Agree’. ‘Disagree’ is the sum of the scores for ‘Strongly Disagree’ and ‘Tend to Disagree’. (Abbreviations) BJP: Bharatiya Janata Party, JD(U): Janata Dal (United), INC: Indian National Congress, RJD: Rashtriya Janata Dal.. Figure 2 Ayodhya judgement and party support (2020 Bihar election). (Source) 2020 Bihar assembly election survey (Note) The statement is ‘The Ayodhya verdict by the Supreme Court (2019 November) is a landmark judgement’. ‘Agree’ is the sum of the scores for ‘Strongly Agree’ and ‘Tend to Agree’. ‘Disagree’ is the sum of the scores for ‘Strongly Disagree’ and ‘Tend to Disagree’. (Abbreviations) BJP: Bharatiya Janata Party, JD(U): Janata Dal (United), INC: Indian National Congress, RJD: Rashtriya Janata Dal.. (3) Abolition of Article 370 What about the abolition of Article 370, which is another of the BJP’s main three agenda items? As mentioned, the Modi government suddenly declared the abolition of Article 370 and enforced direct control by the central government. Many opposition leaders were arrested, and communication, including the internet, was completely shut down.14) How did voters evaluate The Politics of Obedience. 45.

(7) this policy? Figure 3 shows the results. First, 72% of the voters evaluated this measure as a good policy. In terms of party affiliation, NDA (BJP and JD(U)) voters gave it more support (77%) than MGB (INC and RJD) voters, and the margin between them and the RJD was small (just 3 points), as for the previously examined issues. The rate for INC voters dropped to 54%, but it still represented a majority. Thus, the BJP’s long-cherished desire was approved by the voters of Bihar. Figure 3 Abolition of Article 370 and party support. (Source) 2020 Bihar election survey (Note) The statement is ‘The abolition of Article 370 is a good policy’. ‘Agree’ is the sum of the scores for ‘Strongly Agree’ and ‘Tend to Agree’. ‘Disagree’ is the sum of the scores for ‘Strongly Disagree’ and ‘Tend to Disagree’. (Abbreviations) BJP: Bharatiya Janata Party, JD(U): Janata Dal (United), INC: Indian National Congress, RJD: Rashtriya Janata Dal.. (4) Communal Riots In addition to the institutionalization of Hindutva, violent oppression against religious minorities has continued since the 2019 election. A typical example is the 2020 Delhi riots, which were instigated by local BJP leaders. The riots were intended to crush the anti-CAA movement, which had become increasingly strong in Delhi, and the member of Sangh Parivar attacked participants in the movement, shouting slogans such as ‘Jai Shri Ram’ (Victory to Ram). Ultimately, more than 50 people were killed, and most of the victims were Muslims. Delhi police, under the jurisdiction of Home Minister Amit Shah, were said to have been actively involved in the riots rather than containing them (Nakamizo, 2020a: 20). How did voters judge the government’s response to the communal riots? The results are shown in Figure 4. Overall, 65% of the voters evaluated the central government’s response positively. Following the general tendency examined before, NDA voters were more positive (70%) than MGB voters, but the difference was not as large in the case of RJD voters (65%). Only the INC rate (43%) dropped below 50%. Although containing religious riots has been one of the major achievements of Bihar politics since 1990, the data seem to show a prevailing indifference to communal violence. Let us examine this topic in more detail. (5) Concern about the oppression of religious minorities Thus far, our analysis has shown that Modi’s policies are endorsed by the majority of Bihari voters, which seems to go hand in hand with indifference to the oppression of religious minorities. How much are voters concerned about such oppression? Figure 5 shows the results. In total, 47% of voters were concerned rather than indifferent about the oppression of reli46. アジア研究 Vol. 67, No. 2, April 2021.

(8) Figure 4 Communal violence and party support (2020 Bihar election). (Source) 2020 Bihar election survey (Note) The statement is ‘The central government has played an active role in addressing incidents of communal violence’. ‘Agree’ is the sum of the scores for ‘Strongly Agree’ and ‘Tend to Agree’. ‘Disagree’ is the sum of the scores for ‘Strongly Disagree’ and ‘Tend to Disagree’. (Abbreviations) BJP: Bharatiya Janata Party, JD(U): Janata Dal (United), INC: Indian National Congress, RJD: Rashtriya Janata Dal.. gious minorities (42%). The difference between the NDA and MGB showed a contrast. While the rate of indifference was higher than that of concern for NDA voters, the trend for MGB voters was the reverse, although the gap was not large. Based on this question, we asked further about the reason for indifference. The results are shown in Figure 6. Among the voters who showed no concern about this topic, 69% revealed that the reason for their indifference was ‘It is none of my business’. We did not find a major difference between NDA and MGB voters except for JD(U) voters, whose rate of ‘no oppression’ was higher than that of voters of other parties. Needless to say, the attitude of indifference has a dangerous aspect. Robert Gellately, in his analysis of German society under the Nazi regime, repeatedly emphasized the indifference of the German public to harsh oppression of the ‘enemies’ of Nazism, including Jews, of course, which resulted in a genocide of a magnitude that was unprecedented in human history (Gellately, 2001). Although we must note many important differences between German society under the Nazi regime and present-day India, it is crucial to pay careful attention to the phenomena that they have in common. Thus, my analysis has shown that Modi’s Hindutva project succeeded in obtaining resounding support from Bihari voters. This tendency has continued since the 2019 general election (Nakamizo, 2020b). 3. COVID-19 What is the impact of COVID-19 and the government’s response to it? As mentioned, the Modi government’s COVID-19 policy failed to prevent the spread of COVID-19, which damaged Bihar, one of the most vulnerable states. Let us first examine economic conditions after the lockdown and then evaluate central government and state government policies. (1) Economic situation after the lockdown Figure 7 shows the results. Overall, 77% of the voters suffered from economic distress. There is a clear difference between NDA voters and MGB voters, with MGB voters suffering more. The Politics of Obedience. 47.

(9) Figure 5 Concern about the oppression of religious minorities and party support (2020 Bihar election). (Source) 2020 Bihar election survey (Note) The question is ‘Do you have any concern about the oppression of religious minorities?’ (Abbreviations) BJP: Bharatiya Janata Party, JD(U): Janata Dal (United), INC: Indian National Congress, RJD: Rashtriya Janata Dal.. Figure 6 Reason for no-concern and Party support (2020 Bihar election). (Source) 2020 Bihar Election survey (Note) Figures are percentage. Question is ‘What could be the possible reasons for NOT concerned about the oppression of religious minorities?’ (Abbreviation) B  JP: Bharatiya Janata Party, JDU: Janata Dal (United), INC: Indian National Congress, RJD: Rashtriya Janata Dal.. (2) Evaluation of Lockdown Then, how did voters evaluate the lockdown policy? Figure 8 shows the results. In total, 69% of the voters evaluated the lockdown positively. Proportionally, MGB voters evaluated it less positively than NDA voters; however, their rate was still more than 60%. Despite economic hardships, the majority of voters supported Modi’s lockdown policy. 48. アジア研究 Vol. 67, No. 2, April 2021.

(10) Figure 7 Economic conditions after lockdown and party support (2020 Bihar election). (Source) 2020 Bihar election survey (Note) The question is ‘What is the condition of your current household income compared to before the government’s appeal to work and learn from home (to prevent the spread of the coronavirus)?’ (Abbreviations) BJP: Bharatiya Janata Party, JD(U): Janata Dal (United), INC: Indian National Congress, RJD: Rashtriya Janata Dal.. Figure 8 Lockdown and party support (2020 Bihar election). (Source) 2020 Bihar election survey (Note) The statement is ‘Lockdown is a good policy’. ‘Agree’ is the sum of the scores for ‘Strongly Agree’ and ‘Tend to Agree’. ‘Disagree’ is the sum of the scores for ‘Strongly Disagree’ and ‘Tend to Disagree’. (Abbreviations) BJP: Bharatiya Janata Party, JD(U): Janata Dal (United), INC: Indian National Congress, RJD: Rashtriya Janata Dal.. (3) Government policies against COVID-19 How did voters evaluate the central government policies against COVID-19 including the lockdown and other measures? Figure 9 shows the results. Overall, 71% of the voters evaluated Modi’s policy positively. The difference between NDA and MGB voters, however, is discernible. The NDA rate was almost 80%, and the UPA rate was below 70%. For INC voters, the rate dropped to 48%. This reflects more severe hardships among MGB voters. The Politics of Obedience. 49.

(11) Figure 9 Evaluation of Modi’s policy for COVID-19 (2020 Bihar election). (Source) 2020 Bihar election survey (Note) The question is ‘With respect to the coronavirus, do you believe that PM Narendra Modi is doing a good job?’ ‘Distrust’ is the sum of the scores for ‘Strongly Distrust’ and ‘Distrust’. ‘Trust’ is the sum of the scores for ‘Quite Trust’ and ‘Strongly Trust’. (Abbreviations) BJP: Bharatiya Janata Party, JD(U): Janata Dal (United), INC: Indian National Congress, RJD: Rashtriya Janata Dal.. What about the state government policies? According to Figure 10, we can observe the same tendency as for the central government; however, the rates of ‘Trust’ are lower than for Modi’s policy. In particular, the percentage of ‘Distrust’ voters overwhelmed that of ‘Trust’ voters among INC voters. In contrast, the rate for JD(U) voters was quite high (73%). According to our survey, JD(U) voters were more privileged in receiving financial support from the state government than voters from other parties.15) This may be one of the reasons for their support. (4) Voting behaviour of migrant labourers Lastly, let us examine the voting behaviour of migrant labourers. As mentioned, they were one of the most damaged social sections by COVID-19 crisis. Though the samples of our data are limited,16) we can guess the general tendency. Figure 11 shows the result of voting behaviours of those who were out of Bihar at the time of declaration of All-India Lockdown in March 2020 and had go back to Bihar after that. We cannot observe much difference between NDA (30%) and MGB (32%). Though they have to go back to Bihar with much hardships, BJP got most of supports (20%). As analysed, we can observe the difference in popularity between the central government and the state government, which may concern about the leadership issue. How does leadership matter in this election? Let us examine this question in the next section. 4. Leadership Modi’s strong leadership has been the focus of debate in discussing the BJP system (Palshikar et al., 2019; Shastri 2019; Jaffrelot 2019; Sircar 2020). In Bihar, the Modi factor did not work in the 2015 assembly election, facing the MGB, which united former Janata Dal forces that championed the ‘social justice’ platform and secularism. How did the Modi factor work this time? (1) Evaluation of Nitish Kumar Let us start with current Chief Minister Nitish Kumar. As an overall tendency, the ‘poor’ rating (37%) was higher than the ‘good’ rating (34%). In terms of party affiliation, we can observe stark differences between the NDA and MGB. The highest was the JD(U) (69%), and the lowest was the INC (6%). It is quite difficult to say that Nitish obtained overall support from voters. 50. アジア研究 Vol. 67, No. 2, April 2021.

(12) Figure 10 Evaluation of the state government’s COVID-19 policies (2020 Bihar election). (Source) 2020 Bihar election survey (Note) The question is ‘With respect to the coronavirus, do you believe that Nitish Kumar/Sushil Modi are doing a good job?’ ‘Distrust’ is the sum of the scores for ‘Strongly Distrust’ and ‘Distrust’. ‘Trust’ is the sum of the scores for ‘Quite Trust’ and ‘Strongly Trust’. (Abbreviations) BJP: Bharatiya Janata Party, JD(U): Janata Dal (United), INC: Indian National Congress, RJD: Rashtriya Janata Dal.. Figure 11 Migrant labourers (outside of Bihar) and party support. (Source) 2020 Bihar election survey (Abbreviations) BJP: Bharatiya Janata Party, JD(U): Janata Dal (United), INC: Indian National Congress, RJD: Rashtriya Janata Dal.. (2) Evaluation of Tejashwi Yadav Next is the youngest candidate for chief minister from the MGB. According to Figure 13, ‘good’ (39%) scored higher than ‘poor’ (24%) in total. As was the case for Nitish Kumar, we can see a clear difference between the two alliances. Party partisanship is remarkable. (3) Evaluation of Narendra Modi Last is the current prime minister. According to Figure 14, the overall ‘good’ rate (57%) was much higher than the ‘poor’ rate (20%). In terms of party affiliation, though partisanship is clear, the ‘good’ rating from the MGB camp was higher than in Nitish’s case. Even JD(U) The Politics of Obedience. 51.

(13) Figure 12 Evaluation of Nitish Kumar and arty support (2020 Bihar election). (Source) 2020 Bihar election survey (Note) The question is ‘How do you rate the past performance of the following party leaders?’. ‘Poor’ is the sum of the scores for ‘Very Poor’ and ‘Poor’. ‘Good’ is the sum of the scores for ‘Good’ and ‘Very Good’. (Abbreviations) BJP: Bharatiya Janata Party, JD(U): Janata Dal (United), INC: Indian National Congress, RJD: Rashtriya Janata Dal.. Figure 13 Evaluation of Tejashwi Yadav and party support (2020 Bihar election). (Source) 2020 Bihar election survey (Note) The question is ‘How do you rate the past performance of the following party leaders?’. ‘Poor’ is the sum of the scores for ‘Very Poor’ and ‘Poor’. ‘Good’ is the sum of the scores for ‘Good’ and ‘Very Good’. (Abbreviations) BJP: Bharatiya Janata Party, JD(U): Janata Dal (United), INC: Indian National Congress, RJD: Rashtriya Janata Dal.. voters rated Modi higher (81%) than Nitish (69%). Modi is most popular in this election. We can confirm Modi’s popularity by analysing other data. Table 4 shows how popular he is in the NDA camp. If 43% of NDA voters cast their votes for another party, the NDA would definitely not have been elected in this election. According to the CSDS post-poll survey, the rate was 51%, higher among BJP voters in the 2019 general election (Jaffrelot, 2019: 155, note 8). Modi’s popularity worked well in this election. 52. アジア研究 Vol. 67, No. 2, April 2021.

(14) Figure 14 Evaluation of Narendra Modi and party support (2020 Bihar election). (Source) 2020 Bihar election survey (Note) The question is ‘How do you rate the past performance of the following party leaders?’ ‘Poor’ is the sum of the scores for ‘Very Poor’ and ‘Poor’. ‘Good’ is the sum of the scores for ‘Good’ and ‘Very Good’. (Abbreviations) BJP: Bharatiya Janata Party, JD(U): Janata Dal (United), INC: Indian National Congress, RJD: Rashtriya Janata Dal.. Table 4 Modi’s popularity and Party support (2020 Bihar election) Would have voted for some other party Would have made no difference Don’t Know/Can’t Say Total. BJP 43 44 13 100. JDU 42 45 13 100. Total 43 45 13 100. (Source) 2020 Bihar election survey (Note) Question is ‘If Modi is not PM, would you have voted for some other party instead of BJP/NDA or this would have made no difference on your decision?’ Figure is percentage. (Abbreviation) BJP: Bharatiya Janata Party, JDU: Janata Dal (United).. IV. Conclusion: Prospects for Indian democracy How did the ‘politics of obedience’ work in the 2020 Bihar state assembly election? How can we interpret the results of this election? What is the meaning for the prospects for Indian democracy? Three main points can be emphasized. First, it is significant that the ‘politics of obedience’ seems to have been endorsed by many Bihari voters. Previously, although the NDA had secured the majority of seats since 2005, the BJP had been a junior partner to the JD(U). This election, however, was the first state assembly election that gave the BJP a leading position. This was not just a matter of the number of seats but showed the BJP’s ideological dominance, as our survey results show. While the main opposition party, the RJD, secured the position of the single largest party with a narrow margin of just one seat and claimed to be the champion of secularism and social justice, the majority of its voters supported the Hindutva agenda. According to Manor, ‘One Bihar BJP leader said “hard Hindutva didn’t work in Bihar”. Another added, “Bihar is not Uttar Pradesh”’ (Manor, 2019: 128). However, this time, the Hindutva agenda found increasing favour, as noted by Palshikar (2019), who suggested that there has been steady progress of the ideological hegemony of The Politics of Obedience. 53.

(15) Hindutva. This is shaking the very foundations of secularism in Bihar and in India. Second, the Modi factor worked well in this election. Although his policy against the spread of COVID-19 failed and caused severe damage to Bihar society, the majority of voters endorsed it. As the issue of unemployment ranked as the most important issue in this election, voters’ expectations of him were quite high, especially among NDA voters. This is the expression of the ‘politics of vishwas’ (Sircar, 2020), which means that the nationwide phenomena of the 2019 general election were repeated in the 2020 Bihar election. While Jaffrelot and Verniers pointed out ‘delinking state politics from national politics’ as one of the factors of the new party system (Jaffrelot and Verniers, 2020: 145), as far as this election was concerned, our survey suggests that state and national politics were linked via Modi’s popularity. Last, the crisis of democracy runs deep. As Jaffrelot and Verniers (2020) pointed out, the quality of democracy is deteriorating. The ongoing crisis of COVID-19 is accelerating this process. The author named this derogating character of Indian democracy ‘Disaster Authoritarianism’, which develops authoritarian politics by taking advantage of the emergent situation caused by devastating disaster,17) thus applying Naomi Klein’s concept of ‘Disaster Capitalism’ (Klein, 2007). Modi’s sudden declaration of the All-India Lockdown aimed mainly to crush nationwide anti-CAA movement rather than to contain COVID-19. The utter failures to contain the spread of COVID-19 and manage the migrant labour crisis strongly support this hypothesis. Additionally, in the monsoon session of parliament in 2020, the Modi government abolished the ‘question hour’, which provided a precious opportunity to question government policies in detail. Moreover, it shortened the duration of sessions to almost half the former length, using the COVID-19 crisis as an excuse. In this parliament, the Modi government passed the controversial three corporate-friendly farm laws and labour laws amidst strong protests by opposition parties, which claimed, ‘It will be a great blot on our democracy to have these Bills passed unilaterally today’.18) Modi’s ‘Disaster Authoritarianism’ is supported by his popularity. This naturally raises the question of ‘After Modi’. Sangh Parivar is well known for its organizational strength (Chhibber and Verma, 2019: 134–135; Takenaka, 2019: 74–75). In my interview with the BJP cadres at the time of the 2019 general election, they boasted of the construction of an election machine at the deepest booth level.19) To overcome the vulnerability of relying on personal charisma, the BJP will further strengthen its organizational power and institutionalization of Hindutva. This is the world of ‘politics of obedience’. The recent degradation of democratic institutions and norms, as argued by many (Diamond, 2017; Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018), is not unique to India. The recent rise of right-wing populism is now a well-documented and widely debated worldwide phenomenon (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017; Müller, 2017). While the ‘politics of obedience’ in India continues to gain traction and remains powerful, in recent days, a powerful farmer protest movement has erupted against the aforementioned new three corporate-friendly farm laws.20) This peaceful and energic movement has drawn massive support and suggests that it is a novel form of the Civil Disobedience Movement for the 21st century. The hope of democracy lies in this movement in India, and perhaps in the rest of the world as well.. Acknowledgements I would like to thank Dr. Taberez Ahmed Neyazi (National University of Singapore) for his dedicated efforts to conduct the 2020 Bihar election survey and data checking. I would also like to thank Retired Prof. Achin Vanaik (Delhi University), Pamela Philipose (Former Senior Associate Editor, The Indian Express) and Prof. Chiharu Takenaka (Rikkyo University) for giving me a precious opportunity to organize a session at the 2019 JAAS Autumn Convention 54. アジア研究 Vol. 67, No. 2, April 2021.

(16) and their valuable comments. Participants in the Asian Consortium for South Asian Studies (ACSAS) webinar (December 5, 2020) also gave me valuable comments. My colleague Professor Rohan D’Souza (Kyoto University) helped me greatly, as usual. Needless to say, all errors are mine and mine alone. This article is a product of the JSPS Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (A) (18H03624, Representative: Prof. Kazuya Nakamizo, Kyoto University).. Notes. 1) Hindutva is the title of a book that was published by the Hindu supremacist ideologue V. D. Savarkar in 1923 (Savarkar, 1989). In this book, he claimed that India should be made into a Hindu rashtra (nation/state) that excludes non-India-origin religious believers such as Muslims and Christians. In this article, I refer to their project of making Hindu rashtra as Hindutva. For details of their ideology, see Nakamizo (2020c: 148–151). 2) Soibam Rocky Singh, ‘Dadis of Shaheen Bagh hoist Tricolour on R-day’, The Hindu, January 27, 2020, p. 3. 3) The NDA alliance included JD(U), BJP, Vikassheel Insaan Party and Hindustan Awam Morcha (Secular). As an opposition alliance, the Maha Gathbandhan Alliance (MGA) included Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD), INC, Communist Party of India (CPI), Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPM) and Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) (Liberation). See Kapoor and Ravi (2020: 1). In this analysis, I pick up only four important parties; BJP, JD(U), INC, and RJD. 4) Bihar’s figure is 0.576 against the Indian average of 0.647. The highest is the southern state of Kerala (0.779). See Global Data Lab, ‘Subnational Human Development Index (4.0)’ (https://globaldatalab.org/shdi/shdi/IND/?levels= 1%2B4&interpolation=0&extrapolation=0&nearest_real=0, last accessed on February 12, 2021). 5) See Our World in Data, ‘Corona Virus Pandemic Data Explorer’ (https://ourworldindata.org/coronavirus-data-expl orer?zoomToSelection=true&time=2020-03-01..latest&country=IND~USA~GBR~CAN~DEU~FRA&region=World &casesMetric=true&interval=total&smoothing=0&pickerMetric=total_cases&pickerSort=desc, last accessed on February 14, 2021). 6) ‘“Bicycle girl” Jyoti turns down offer from Cycling Federation, to focus on studies’, The Hindu, May 24, 2020, p. 14. 7) At least 134 migrant labourers had died in traffic accidents by mid-May. See ‘Members of PM’s COVID-19 task force say lockdown failed due to unscientific implementation’, The Caravan, May 19, 2020 (https:// caravanmagazine.in/health/members-pm-covid-19-task-force-say-lockdown-failed-due-to-unscientificimplementation, last accessed on February 20, 2021). 8) The Hindi heartland states are Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Jharkhand, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Himachal Pradesh, Haryana and Delhi, which contain 44.3% of the Indian population. See Census of India 2011, ‘Provisional Population Tables: India: Census 2011’ (https://censusindia.gov.in/2011-prov-results/prov_rep_tables. html, last accessed on February 12, 2021). These states are considered to have heavy political weight in terms of not only population but also political influence. From independence to 1991, a period of more than 40 years, most prime ministers were from Uttar Pradesh. For BJP, Hindi heartland states are their traditional strong base. 9) The 2020 Bihar election survey was conducted by the author and Dr. Taberez Ahmed Neyazi (National University of Singapore) as a two-wave pre- and post-poll panel survey using funding from the JSPS Grant-in-aid for Scientific Research (A) (18H03624, Representative: Prof. Kazuya Nakamizo, Kyoto University). The respondents were selected by multi-stage sampling among 49 state assembly constituencies. The face-to-face CAPI survey was conducted by trained interviewers from IPSOS, who worked closely with the main researchers in all aspects of sampling and data collection. The pre-poll survey was conducted from 26 September to 10 October 2020 and received responses from 2,497 voters, for a response rate of 53% WAPOR RR1. The post-poll survey was conducted from October 29 to November 9 among the same respondents from the pre-poll survey and obtained responses from 1,766 voters, for a response rate of 71%. After the declaration of the results, we conducted a telephonic survey among agricultural labourers regarding the issue of migrant labour. This survey was conducted from December 23, 2020, to January 4, 2021. We obtained responses from 193 of 224 agricultural labourers (response rate: 86%). To correct data bias, we applied weights for gender, religion based on 2011 census figures and vote percentage based on Election Commission reports. 10) Sangh Parivar (family of organizations) is an umbrella term for Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (national volunteer corps) and other affiliated groups, and the Bharatiya Janata Party forms its political arm. Its main purpose is to realize the Hindutva project. 11) See, ‘Supreme Court’s Ayodhya Verdict Rests on a Glaring Contradiction’, The Wire, November 9, 2019 (https:// thewire.in/law/supreme-court-ayodhya-verdict-possession, last accessed on Frbruary 20, 2021). The Politics of Obedience. 55.

(17) 12) See Sruthisagar Yamunan, ‘Ranjan Gogoi’s tenure as chief justice was marked by deafening silences on crucial issues’, Scroll.in, Nov. 18, 2019 (https://scroll.in/article/944015/ranjan-gogois-tenure-as-chief-justice-was-markedby-deafening-silences-on-crucial-issues, last accessed on February 15, 2021). 13) V. Venkatesan, ‘CJI Ranjan Gogoi’s nomination to the Rajya Sabha: More than a sinecure’, Frontline, April 24, 2020 (https://frontline.thehindu.com/the-nation/article31248619.ece, last accessed on February 15, 2021). 14) See, ‘Kashmir Under Siege: One Month of Silence’, The Wire, September 5, 2019 (https://thewire.in/rights/ kashmir-under-siege-one-month-of-silence, last accessed on February 15, 2021). 15) While 43% of JD(U) voters received financial support from the state government, the rates for other parties’ voters were quite low (BJP: 23%, INC: 25%, RJD: 22%). 16) We conducted telephonic survey regarding this issue as above mentioned (note 9). The reason for targeting agricultural labourers is that most agricultural labourers are seasonal migrant labourers as a general perception. In fact, 153 persons (81%) are seasonal migrant labourers among 193 agricultural labourers respondents. 17) See, Nakamizo (2020a). Maerz et al. (2020) classified India as ‘major violations’ in their Pandemic Democratic Violations Index (PamDem, v3), which is the highest rank. 18) See Sobhana K. Nair, ‘Monsoon session ends in a flurry of protests’, The Hindu, September 24, 2020, p. 1. 19) Interview with BJP cadres at BJP Headquarters in Delhi. April 30, 2019. 20) See, V. Sridhar, ‘Farmers’ protests in India turn into a tidal wave of anger’, Frontline, January 1, 2021 (https:// frontline.thehindu.com/cover-story/india-support-for-farmers-protest-against-farm-laws-benefit-corporates/ article33320334.ece, last accessed on February 15, 2021).. References [Japanese] Nakamizo, Kazuya (2015), ‘Keizaiseichō to Shukyō nashonarizumu—2014nen senkyo kara mita Indo shakai’ (Economic Development and Religious Nationalism: The Analysis of Indian Society in the 2014 General Elections), Asian Studies, vol. 61, No. 4, pp. 3–21. — (2019), ‘Mōdī ha Naze Asshō shitaka—2019 nen Indo Sōsenkyo no Bunseki to Tenbō’ (Why Modi won: The Analysis of 2019 Indian General Election and the Future of India), Sekai (World), 923, pp. 250–261. — (2020a), ‘Koronaka to Sanjibinjougatakenishugi—Indo no Shiren’ (COVID-19 Disaster and Disaster Authoritarianism: The trials of India), International Affairs, pp. 15–26. Takenaka, Chiharu (2019), ‘Indo Minshushugi to Aidenthithi Seiji—Kokumin, Ka-suto, Shukyo no Kyogo’ (Indian Democracy and Identity politics: The Dynamic Relationship between Nation, Caste and Religion), in Japanese Association for Comparative Politics ed., Aidenthithi to Seito Seiji (Identity and Party Politics), pp. 53–80. [English] Chhibber, Pradeep and Rahul Verma (2019), ‘The Rise of the Second Dominant Party System in India: BJP’s New Social Coalition in 2019’, Studies in Indian Politics, 7(2), pp. 131–148. Diamond, Larry (2017), ‘The Authoritarian Temptation’, Seminar, May, 693 (https://www.india-seminar. com/2017/693/693_larry_diamond.htm, last accessed on February 15, 2021). Gellately, Robert (2001), Backing Hitler: Consent and Coercion in Nazi Germany, Oxford, Oxford University Press. Jaffrelot Christophe (2019), ‘Class and Caste in the 2019 Indian Election—Why Have So Many Poor Started Voting for Modi?’, Studies in Indian Politics, 7(2), pp. 149–160. Jaffrelot, Christophe, and Gilles Verniers (2020), ‘A New Party System or A New Political System?’, Contemporary South Asia, 28:2, pp. 141–154. Kapoor, Mudit and Shamika Ravi (2020), ‘Bihar Assembly Elections 2020: An analysis’ (https://arxiv.org/ftp/ arxiv/papers/2012/2012.06192.pdf, last accessed on February 15, 2021). Klein, Naomi (2007), The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism, Penguin Books. Kothari, Rajini (1964), ‘The Congress “system” in India’, Asian Survey, Vol. IV, No. (12), pp. 1161–1173. 56. アジア研究 Vol. 67, No. 2, April 2021.

(18) Levitsky, Steven and Daniel Ziblatt (2018), How Democracies Die, New York, Crown. Maerz, Seraphine F., Anna Lührmann, Jean Lachapelle, Amanda B. Edgell (2020), ‘Worth the sacrifice? Illiberal and authoritarian practices during Covid-19’, Working Paper, Series 2020: 110, The Varieties of Democratic Institute, Department of Political Science, University of Gothenburg, pp. 1–23. Manor, James (2019), ‘Can Modi and the BJP Achieve and Sustain Hegemony?’, in Chatterji, Angana P., Thomas Blom Hansen, and Christophe Jaffrelot (eds), Majoritarian State: How Hindu Nationalism Is Changing India, New Delhi, HarperCollins Publisher, pp. 117–130. Ministry of Law and Justice, India (2019), ‘The Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019’, The Gazette of India (http://egazette.nic.in/WriteReadData/2019/214646.pdf, last accessed on February 15, 2021). Mudde, Cass, Cristobal Lovilla Kaltwasser (2017), Populism: A very Short introduction, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Müller, Jan-Werner (2017), What is Populism?, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Nakamizo, Kazuya (2020b), ‘Dismantling Democracy: The 2019 Indian General Election and the Formation of the “BJP system”’, Asian Studies, vol. 66, no. 2, pp. 76–92. — (2020c), Violence and Democracy: The Collapse of One-Party Dominant Rule in India, Kyoto, Kyoto University Press and Trans Pacific Press. — (2021), ‘Democracy and Vigilantism: The Spread of Gau Rakshaks in India’, in Mio, Minoru, Kazuya Nakamizo, and Tatsuro Fujikura eds., The Dynamics of Conflict and Peace in Contemporary South Asia: The State, Democracy and Social Movements, Oxon, Routledge, pp. 3–19. Palshikar, Suhas (2017), ‘India’s Second Dominant Party System’, Economic and Political Weekly, March 25, Vol. LII, No. 12, pp. 12–15. — (2019), ‘Toward Hegemony: The BJP Beyond Electoral Dominance’, in Chatterji, Angana P., Thomas Blom Hansen, and Christophe Jaffrelot (eds), Majoritarian State: How Hindu Nationalism Is Changing India, New Delhi, HarperCollins Publisher, pp. 101–115. Palshikar, Suhas, Sanjay Kumar, and Sandeep Shastri (2019), ‘Post-poll survey: explaining the Modi sweep across regions’, The Hindu, May 26, 2019 (https://www.thehindu.com/elections/lok-sabha-2019/post-pollsurvey-explaining-the-modi-sweep-across-regions/article27250054.ece last access on February 15, 2021). Rajan, S. Irudaya (2020), ‘COVID-19-led Migrant Crisis: A Critique of Policies’, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. LV, No. 48, pp. 13–16. Savarkar, V. D. (1989), Hindutva (6th edition), Bombay: Veer Savarkar Prakashan. Shastri, Sandeep (2019), ‘Leadership sweepstakes and the Modi factor’, The Hindu, May 21, 2019 (https:// www.thehindu.com/elections/lok-sabha-2019/leadership-sweepstakes-and-the-modi-factor/article27189676. ece, last accessed on February 15, 2021). Singh, S. K., Vibhuti Patel, Aditi Chaudhary, and Nandal Mishra (2020), ‘Reverse Migration of Labourers amidst COVID-19’, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. LV, Nos. 32 & 33, pp. 25–29. Sircar, Neelanjan (2020), ‘The Politics of Vishwas: Political Mobilization in the 2019 National Election’, Contemporary South Asia, vol. 28, No. 2, pp. 178–194. Vaishnav, Milan and Jamie Hintson (2019), ‘India’s New Fourth Party System’, Seminar, 720 (http://www. india-seminar.com/2019/720/720_milan_and_ jamie.htm, last accessed on February 15, 2021). Vanaik, Achin (2017), Hindutva Rising: Secular Claims, Communal Realities, New Delhi: Tulika Books. — (2020), ‘Citizenship Amendment Act: Who is an Indian Citizen?’, The Leaflet, September 17, 2020 (https://www.theleaflet.in/citizenship-amendment-act-who-is-an-indian-citizen/, last accessed on October 19, 2020). Yadav, Yogendra (1999), ‘Electoral politics in the time of change: India’s third electoral system, 1989–99’, Economic and Political Weekly, 21–28 August, pp. 2393–2399.. (NAKAMIZO Kazuya, Graduate School of Asian and African Area Studies, Kyoto University, nakamizo@asafas.kyoto-u.ac.jp). The Politics of Obedience. 57.

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Table 1  Performance of major parties in the 2015 and 2020 Bihar state assembly election
Figure 1 shows the results. Despite the surge of the anti-CAA movement nationwide, 61% of  voters  supported  the  CAA
Figure 1  CAA and party support in the 2020 Bihar state assembly election
Figure 3  Abolition of Article 370 and party support
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