Translation of Experience into Thought: Mori Arimasa?s experience from a cross‑cultural studies perspective
著者 Rauber Laurent
journal or
publication title
翻訳の文化/文化の翻訳
volume 16
page range 51‑62
year 2021‑03‑31
出版者 静岡大学人文社会科学部翻訳文化研究会
URL http://doi.org/10.14945/00028158
Translation of Experience into Thought:
Mori Arimasaʼs “experience” from a cross-cultural studies perspective
1) Introduction
MoriArimasawasraisedasaProtestant,specializedattheImperialUniversity ofTokyoinPascalandDescartes,andmorebroadlyinmodernFrenchthought (particularlyoftheseventeenthcentury).AfterWWII,in1950,attheageof40, hewenttoFranceforaone-yearscholarship.Hefinallydecidednottoreturnto Japan.InFrance,whileworkingasateacherofJapaneselanguageandculturein Paris,hewroteanumberofpersonalessayswhichwerepublishedinJapan1.In theseessays,hedevelopedquiteanoriginalphilosophicalreflectioncenteredon theconceptof“experience”.
Morididnotgoasfarastocreateaphilosophicalsystem,evenifitseemsto havebeenoneofhispurposes,atleastatonepoint.AsDeleuzewrites,thework ofaphilosopheistocreateconcepts2.Isthe“keiken/taiken”（経験／体験）dichot- omy(anoppositionoftwoformsofexperiences)tobeconsideredaconcept?Itis verydifficulttojudgeifthesetwoordinaryJapanesewordscanbereferredtoas conceptssincetheydidnʼtclearlymanagetogainanindependentlifeasanidea;
evenmoresowith“experience”,atermMorifrequentlyusedandwouldhave placedatthecenterofhisprojectedphilosophicalsystem.
Laurent Rauber
1 Twoseriesofworksareparticularlyworthytocite.By the rivers of Babylon,whichconsistsofthe followingworks:Babiron no nagare no hotori nite,『バビロンの流れのほとりにて』,1957,Nagare no hotori nite,『流れのほとりにて』,1959,Jômon no katawara nite,『城門のかたわらにて』,1963,Sabaku ni mukatte,『砂漠に向かって』,1970,Arano ni mizu ha wakite,『荒野に水は湧きて』,1979(posthumous).
AnothergroupofessayconsistsofHarukanaru nôtorudamu,『遥かなるノートル・ダム』,1967(Price ofJapanʼsMinistryofCulture,1968),Tabi no sora no shitade,『旅の空の下で』,1969,Kigi ha hikari wo abite,『木々は光を浴びて』,1972,Tôzakaru nôtoru damu,『遠ざかるノートル・ダム』,1976 (posthumous).
2 GillesDeleuze,FélixGuattari,Quʼest-ce que la philosophie ?,LesEditionsdeMinuit,1991
Regardless,bytodaystandards,Moriwasaphilosophe,sincehedidspecialize inFrenchphilosophyinuniversity,taughtitasanassistantprofessorintheUni- versityofTôkyô,andwrotemanypapersandbooksonthesubject.Itwasalsohis lifetimeinterest.ButwecansaythatwhatreallymakesMoriaphilosopheisthe dedicationtohisphilosophicalreflectionandideas.Henevergaveupthinking aboutculture,thought,humankindandtheworld,anditwasclearlyanattitude thatremindsusoftheancientphilosophy,thatisphilosophyasamorale,Stoicism inparticular,inwhichthoughtisalmostareligiousmatterthatengagesalltheself.
Evenso,Moriʼsphilosophicalreflections,althoughmaturedthroughthecultur- alcomparisonbetweenEuropeandJapan,lacktheobjectivitythatcouldhave madethemreallyvaluableinhumansciencesandparticularlyincross-cultural studies.Thisisthematterofthispaper,tomakeclearthelimitationsofMoriʼs philosophyandbringpsychologyasatoolofreflectionforMoriʼs“experience”.
2) The problem of ethnocentrism in Moriʼs “keiken/taiken”
In“keiken”,Moriviewedthe“experience”ofindividualsinanidealsociety, whereindividualsarefreeandresponsible,opposedtoeachotherwhilelinkedby asocialcontract.This“keiken”originatesindoubt,possesstheprinciplesofRea- son(cogitoandauto-criticism)andFaith(belief),andisopenedtowhatisheter- ogenousofit.“Taiken”onthecontrary,isthe“experience”inacommunityunited bybloodorrace,whereindividualsarenotreallyseparatedfromeachotherbut ratheraredefinedrelativetooneanother;asinafamily,wherethechildmakes themotherandinreturnthechildisdefinedbyhavingparents,thatis,theyarenʼt independentindividuals.
Withthe“keiken/taiken”dichotomy,Morisucceededintranslatingsomeofthe essenceofFrenchclassicalphilosophy,thatistosaysomefundamentalpartof Frenchculture(atleastthepartrepresentedbyDescartes,PascalandBergson, andnotunrelatedtoexistentialism),notonlyintohisownsubjectiveframework butalsointoJapanese.Inotherwords,hemanagedaprofoundtranslationof thoughtbetweenthetwocultures.
Unfortunately,whatwasself-criticisminthemindofDescartes,Pascal,and Bergson,andaimedatthedogmatismthatwas(andstillis)everywhereinsociety ingeneral(orFrenchsocietyinparticular),becameinMorithematterofacom-
parisonofFranceandJapan,where“keiken”and“taiken”arenowseparatedand respectivelygivenasrepresentativeofFranceandJapan.Thus,Franceisviewed asasocietyconstitutedbyfreeandresponsibleindividuals,whileJapanisacom- munityofnon-individualswherefreedomandresponsibility,thatistosaysubjec- tivity,doesnʼtexist.
ContrarytotheintentionsofDescartes,Pascal,andBergsontoshowtheway toteachthereasonsforpeopletobemoreopen-minded,Moricondemnedthe JapanthatcouldnʼtandwouldnʼtbeliketheWest.Althoughhewasnʼttheonly oneatthetime,thefactMoristayedoutofJapanfrom1950to1966(returning onlyoncein1955todivorce),anddidnʼtseethetremendouschangesofthecoun- trythatoccurredafter1955,canpartlyexplainwhyhemaintainedthiscritical discourse.Meanwhile,Japanwasontheroadtobecomingthe“numberone”
economy,andintellectualswerestartingtoreevaluateJapaneseculturewithmore confidenceandself-esteem3.
UnlikethecharacterfromAesopsʼfable,The Man and the Lion,Moriturned theunfaircomparisonofJapanandtheWest(orFrance)tohisowncountryʼs disadvantage.Atthetimeofhisdeparturein1950,MoricarriedwithhimJapanʼs intellectualclimate,withitsoverridingpostwarnegativityagainstJapaneseculture;
andhisnegativeattitudeonlygrewstrongerinFranceasasortofnegative“cul- turalreaffirmation”(DanMatsumoto,Culture and Psychology,2nded.,2000).
Asmentionedabove,thisattitudeofnegativitywasproclaimedbyJapanese intellectualsatthetimeofMoriʼsdeparturefromJapan.SociologistAokiTamot- sudescribestheatmospheresurroundingJapaneseintellectualsdirectlyafterthe lossofJapaninthePacificWar,andwhilesomewereMarxistsandothersMod- ernists,allsharedthesamefundamentalviewandcriticizedJapanforitspre-mod- ern,irrational,undemocraticelementsandfeudalrests:
Thewayof“positioningJapan”intheworld“sincetheMeijiperiod”has beenaccomplishedbyJapanese“intellectuals”–theydefinedtheplaceof JapanesesocietyandculturebyopposingittotheWest=Americansocietyʼs modelof“modernization”and“democratization”–Thiswasemphasized
3 AokiTamotsu青木保,Nihonbunkaron no henyô 『「日本文化論」の変容』,Chûôbunko,1999.
onceagaininpostwarJapan,astheir“worldview”setduringthewarwhich hadplacedthe“raceofYamato”asthesuperiorraceintheworldandhad labeledthe“EnglishandAmericanbarbarians”asinferior,wasreversed again,thistimeurging[Japan]toadmitthe“specificity”ofthe“negatively
（否定的）andinferiority”ofitssociety.4
ThereasonthatcanexplainMoriʼsdespairisthatheconsideredthepassagefrom
“taiken”to“keiken”impossible.ItisalsoanideainspiredbyFrenchcultureand theideaof“disproportion”(whichappearsinDescartes,Pascal,andBergson)5, andwhichissurelytobeconnectedinalargerviewwiththeJudeo-Christianʼs traditionoftherevealedreligion,whichhasitselfinfluencedFrenchculture(and theWesttosomeextent).
Moreover,Moriʼsethnocentrismisclearlytobeparalleledwiththeopposition between“civilization”and“culture”,whereonlycivilization(=theWest)isuni- versal.ThisisanideathatmaturedintheFrenchEnlightenmentperiod(eighteenth century),andneedlesstosay,isstillvividlylivinginFrenchrepublicanism.The connectionofMoriwiththisideologyofEnlightenmentisclear:
WhenIsaycivilization,Imeanaculturewhichcontainsatleastinasense auniversality,likeGreekcivilization,Romancivilization,Byzantinecivili- zation,TangcivilizationorGothiccivilizationoftheMiddle-Ages.Accord- ingly,Francegavebirthtoacivilization.6
Furthermore,“thought”（思想）itselfisregardedasEuropeanproperty:
Actually,thoughtconstitutestheessentialpartofEuropeancivilization,and becausethereisclearlytheconsciousnessthatthoughtisEuropeanthem- selves,consciouslyorevenunconsciously,thepossessionortheabsenceof
4 Ibid.,p.67.
5 SeeLaurentRauber,“Mori Arimasa no ʻKeiken no tetsugakuʼ ni okeru eikyô to sôzô” 「森有正の『経 験の哲学』における影響と創造」,inRitsumeikan gengo bunka kenkyû 「立命館言語文化研究」,v.
28,n.3,2017,p.221-231.
6 MoriArimasa 森有正,Babiron no nagare no hotori nite 『バビロンの流れのほとりにて』,in Mori Arimasa zenshû『森有正全集』,v.1,Chikumashobô,1978,p.20.
thoughtis,infact,amarkertodistinguishEuropefromwhatisnotEurope.7 WecanseethatMoriʼscomparisonlegitimatesaquiteethnocentricandbiased conception:
WhatisimportantisthatthosepossibilitiesareonthesideoftheWestand notonthesideoftheaforementionedEasterncivilization,anditshouldnot bemissedatanyprice.8
KatayamaKyôichi,aJapanesewriterwhoseemstosharethispointofview,tells usmoreaboutthisdespair.ForKatayama,“[Mori]becameabletoseeobjectively, fromEurope[weunderline],JapanandJapanesepeople,andfromthatmoment, hewasstillgrippedbyafeelingofdespairforJapanandJapanesepeoplewho werereflectedinhiseyes”9,adding,“IfyoustandinfrontoftheCollègedeFrance andyouthinkaboutJapan,itisimpossiblenottofeelsomewretchedness.”10Ka- tayamacontinues:
IthinkthatallJapanesehavealreadyfeltmoreorlessanimpressionof inferiorityanddespairfacingEuropeancivilization.Eventoday,wetendto saytheexactoppositeoftheWestbyemphasizingJapaneseBuddhistart againstChristianreligiousart,Japanesewoodblockprintsagainstmodern paintings,HôryûjiagainstNotre-Dame,MurasakiShikibuagainstProust.
Infact,bythecompositionofcomparisonorcontrast,wetrytolandonour feetinthesingularityandtheuniquenessofJapanesecultureandtradition.
Bygivingup,byfallinginwithitsomehowandmakingthingsvague,we deflecttheproblem.11
7 Keiken to shisô『経験と思想』,op. cit.,p.34.
8 MoriArimasa,Nagare no hotori nite 『流れのほとりにて』,in Mori Arimasa zenshû 『森有正全 集』,v.1,op. cit.,p.292.
9 KatayamaKyôʼichi 片山恭一,Doko e mukatte shinu ka 『どこへ向かって死ぬか』,NHKshuppan, 2010,p.127.
10 Ibid.,p.130.
11 KatayamaKyôichi,“Mori Arimasa” 「森有正」,in Kodawari jinbutsu den 『こだわり人物伝』,v.5, n.11,NHKshuppan,2009,p.110.
Tosumup,Morisubscribedtothestereotypeopposingtheindividualisticsociety oftheWestversusthecollectivisticsocietyofJapan,whichwasatthetimere- gardedasthereasoningbehindthesuperiorityoftheWest.
Now,however,itisacceptedasfactthateachsocietyorcultureencouragesthe creationofitsownparticularself-construct,forexamplebygivingvalueonone sideto“sociallydisengagedemotions”andontheotherto“sociallyengagedemo- tions”,andthusdemonstratingthattheabove-mentionedstereotypemaybeutilized bybothsidesinavarietyofwaystojustifythesuperiorityoftheirvalues.How- ever,anumberofstudieshavealsosuggestedthattheJapanesecouldbeinfact bejudgedequallyindividualisticorperhapsevenmoresoiftestedoncriteriathat aremoremeaningfulinregardtoJapanesesociety.Theyalsorevealthatthein- terrelated(interpersonal)andisolated(independent)aspectsofthe“self”arein- tertwined,andarebothimportantinthedevelopmentofa“matureself”.12
MoritriedtoviewJapanfromaFrenchperspective(andwhynot?),butthere wasafundamentalproblemofethnocentrisminhisview(withoutevenmention- ingotherproblemslikethefalse“equivalence”(Matsumotoʼsterm),inthecom- parisonbetweenFranceandJapan,whereFrance,EuropeandtheWestare typicallyblurredalltogether).Wewillseetheconsequencesofsuchaprejudice.
3) “Experience” as the universal human reality
AkiyamaShunperceivesaproblematicpointwhilereadingMori,andespecial- lyTôzakaru Nôtoru-Damu:“experience”,beingofthesamekindforanyindivid- ual(i.e.universal),expressesitselfatthesametimeindifferentculturalmodels thatarequitedifferentfromeachother,andleadMoritotalkabouta“Japanese experience”andan“Europeanexperience”.Itseemsthenthereisboth“experience asanelementaryprincipleofallhumanexperience,and[different]experiencein EuropeandJapan”13.Fromoneperspective,thereisa“humanexperience”(uni- versalexperience),andfromanotherperspective,theoppositionbetweenEuro- peanexperienceandJapaneseexperience,namelythedichotomy“keiken/taiken”, butitseems,anditisthepointofthispaper,thatMorididnʼtmakeclearenough
12 SeeDavidMatsumoto,Culture and Psychology,Wadsworth,2000,chap.3.
13 AkiyamaShun秋山駿 ,“Experienceisthegroundforlife”「経験こそ生きることの根底」,Mori Arimasaʼs complete works,v.III,Annexn°4,p.18.
theseparationofthesetwoperspectives,associatingmoreorless“experience”on theuniversalleveland“keiken”(asaproperEuropeanexperience),thusblurring thedifferencebetweenanuniversalfactandculturallydefinedvalues.
Fromnowon,however,wewillconsideronlythisuniversal“experience”(as separatedfromtheotherlevelandthusEuropeanexperience).Moriwrites:
Descartes,thefatherofmodernrationalism,hasseparatedthedomainsof mindandmatterdistinctly.Rationalismwasestablishedwhenthedimension ofthemind,whichcontrolpureconceptsandlogic,andthedimensionof thematterwhichistheobjectofscience,wasseparated.Butthen,Descartes leftinasummarywaythemethodologicalresearchoflogicandscience about“man”,wheremindandmatterareboundandmixed.Hefoundout afterthatthereisonlyexperiencetoguideman.Andonecanonlygrasp theprinciplesandthestructureofthatexperienceaposteriori.Experience cannotbeinvestigatedmethodologically.WhatIcall“experience”isessen- tiallythat.14
IfDescartesdidnʼtpursuehisresearchon“experience”,asMoriputsit,itisclear- lybecauseitcanʼtbeapproachedwithsatisfyingscientificmethods(bywhichall scienceisboundtostudyonehomogenousdimensionorobject,and“experience”
issomethingtooheterogenoustostudyassuch).Inaddition,forthephilosophe ofLaFlèche,experienceisnʼtreality,thelattertoberatherobjectivelyinherentto
“ideas”.ThisistheparadoxicalpointinthethoughtofMori,aswepointedout previously,toattributehimselfaconceptualinheritancefromDescarteseventhough theirthoughtsseemquitedivergentfromthebeginning15.AsforMoriinExperience and Thought(Keiken to shisô,『経験と思想』)forexample:
ItwasthediscoverythatI,myentourage,Japan,theinternationalscene, everythingwasanexperiencethatincludesthemall.Letmerepeat–Iʼm
14 MaruyamaMasao丸 山 正 雄 ,KinoshitaJunji 木 下 順 二 ,MoriArimasa,“Experience,Individual, Society” 「経験・個人・社会」,in Tenbô『展望』,Chikumashobô,Jan.1968,p.19.
15 SeeLaurentRAUBER,“LeparadoxedeMoriArimasaàproposdelʼexpérience”,in Ritsumeikan gengo bunka kenkyû 『立命館言語文化研究』,v.28,n.1,2016,p.291-302(inFrench).
notatallsayingitwasmyexperience.Itmeansthatforme,realityitselfis experience,andinreturn,experience is realityitself.16
…
Butthefactthatrealityitselfisexperiencewasinmesincethebeginning, Ithink.17
Wehavealreadymentionedthatthissentenceisverysimilartothewordsof NishidaKitarôinZen no kenkyû.18Theysharetogethertheunderstandingof“ex- perience”asthefundamentalhumanreality,andsinceNishidaisinfluencedby theJapaneseZentradition,MoriisclosertotheJapanesethoughtthathedescribed himself.Notably,hesometimestalksabout“place”(basho)of“experience”,aterm whichremindsusofNishida19.
Bothofthemunderstanduniversal“experience”assomethingunknowableby science(thatistosayneitherpredictablenorexplainablebyconceptsorwordsor measures);itissomethingthathasa“chimericalappearance”,whichundergoes transformation,andwhichisrevealedtousaposteriori.Inotherwords,“experi- ence”isunintelligibleassuch,althoughitconstitutesthetruepersonalportionof eachindividual.
Andthisisbasedontheparticularityof“experience”whichisanextreme- lyembarrassingthingthatrefuseallexplanation,butwithoutwhichthe ultimateessenceoftheindividualisfundamentallylost.20
Elsewhere,wecanreadMoriʼsdevelopingthought:
16 Keiken to shisô,op. cit.,p.15.
17 Ibid.,p.18
18 “LeparadoxedeMoriArimasaàproposdelʼexpérience”,op. cit.
19 MorineverthelessaffirmedhisdifferencewithNishida.Asweexplainedin“LeparadoxedeMori Arimasaàproposdelʼexpérience”(op. cit.),thefinalityofMoriʼsandNishidaʼsphilosophyare differentandevenopposed.Thatistosay,asalsoshownbyMoritaMime,theformationofan individualisticselfisatthecenterofMoriʼsphilosophy,contrarilytoNishida(MoritaMime,“Mori andKierkegaard:experienceandexistence”,in Kierkegaard and Japanese thought,PalgraveMacmillan, 2008).
20 MoriArimasa,Harukana nôtoru damu 『遥かなノートルダム』,in Mori Arimasa zenshû,v.3,Chikuma shobô,1979,p.78
Bytheexpression“virginityofsensations”,Imeanadirectcontactwith Things,withouttheintermediaryofconcepts,propositionorideas.The recognitionofthiscontactitselfiswhatIcall“experience”,and“sensations”
arenotonlypartof“experience”21.
Inthispassage,Moristatesclearlythat“experience”consistsintheacknowledge- mentofthedirectcontactbetweenhumanandthingsandthatthecontentof
“experience”consistsinthesensationsthemselves,ourfeelings,achangeinour- selves.
Morialsorarelyevokesthe“innersolicitations”（内的促し）,afeelingorurgeto dosomething,astheoriginof“experience”.“Innersolicitations”initiatethegrowth ofan“experience”,whichinturn,throughtheprocessof“definition”（定義）,i.e.
togivefreshmeaningtowordswithourown“experience”,becomeanoriginal
“thought”.
4) To understand Moriʼs “experience” with Vygotsky
LetʼspausehereandtalkaboutLevVygotsky,whofrommyperspectiveisakey thinkertounderstandMori.MorididnʼtactuallyknowtheworksofVygotsky, notablybecauseVygotskywasnʼttranslatedintheWestbeforeMoriʼsdeath,and moreimportantly,becauseMorirejectedpsychology,somethingunbelievablenot onlytodaywhentalkingaboutstudiesofcultureandhumanbeing,butalsoinhis time.Nevertheless,MoriandVygotskyhavesomepointsincommon.
Firstly,Vygotskywasapsychologistwhoreadmanyphilosophersandwriters andcitedthemintheveryheartofhispsychologicalstudies.Vygotskywasalsoa literaturecritic,andhisfirstmajorworkwasaboutart.Thus,Descartes,Bergson andDostoevskyarethefewofamanythatoccupiedacentralinteresttobothMori andVygotsky.Secondly,VygotskyandMoriwere“outsiders”respectivelyinpsy- chologyandphilosophy.Bothweremoreinterestedinthemethodologicalprocess oftheirdomain,inotherwords,aboutwhatshouldbethesubjectofthestudyin theirfield.Lastbutnotleast,Vygotskyʼslifelongpreoccupationwastounderstand
21 MoriArimasa,Kigi ha hikari wo abite 『木々は光を浴びて』,in Mori Arimasa zenshû,v.5,Chikuma shobô,1979,p.47.
Manasawhole(notspecificallymentalillnessortypicalpsychologicalissues,for example),andparticularlytheprocessofthought,aswithMori.
ThemainideasVygotskyexposedinThought and Language22canbesummarized asfollows:thoughtandverbalspeech(useoflanguage)areinanintertwinedre- lationbutarenotthesamething;thoughtfindsnotitsexpression,butitsrealiza- tioninspeech,thatistosay,verbalexpression(inaphraseorabook)isnʼta mirrorofthought,butthethoughtmadeflesh,i.e.“thoughtisbornthroughwords”.
Asanyonecanagree,thatprocessfromthoughttospeechisadifficultone.For Vygotsky,“Thoughtmustfirstpassthroughmeaningsandonlythenthroughwords”.
Thoughtisneithermeaningnorwords(oralorwrittenlanguage),butthereisa mediationbetweenthoughtandwords:wordmeanings.However,thoughtitself originatesin“motivation”(e.g.desires,needs,interests,emotions).Thus,wecan establishasimilitudeofstructurebetweenthemodelsofVygotskyandMorias showninthetablebelow:
22 LevVygotsky,Thought and Language(Revisedandexpandededition),TheMITPress,2012.
ForVygotsky motivation thought wordmeanings speech ForMori inner
solicitations orsensations
experience definition thought
WecanseenowthatMoriʼsunderstandingoftheprocessfromsensationstoex- pressioninwordshasfundamentallythesamestructureasVygotskyʼs.Although theyrecognizedthatsocietyandcultureinfluencetheindividualthroughlanguage, theybelievedtheindividualretainsfundamentalindependencebymeansofhis singular“innersolicitations”(Mori)or“motivation”(Vygotsky).
5) The translation of experience into language
WehavementionedVygotskywords,“thoughtisbornthroughwords”,andthe wayhedescribes“speech”asthe“realization”of“thought”(“experience”inthe caseofMori).Vygotskysaysalsothatthoughthasitsowngrammar,differentfrom
theoneofapeculiarlanguage.ThatmeansthatforVygotsky,experiencetolanguage isatransformationfromnon-verbalfeelingstospeechorwritings,throughmean- ingandwords.
Onthecontrary,Moriconsideredthepassagefrom“experience”to“thought”, thestephecallsalso“definition”,asa“transparament”（透明化）.
Thus,MoriheldthesameconfusionasEmileBenvenisteforexample:compar- ingJapaneseandFrench,heviewedthemultiplicityofpersonalpronounsused dependingontherelationbetweenthelocutorandtheinterlocutorinJapanese (“watashi”,“ore”,“boku”,...)astheproofofthenon-existenceofaonetrue“self”
(eachpronounstandingfora“relativeself”),whileinFrenchtheoneandonly personalpronounsforoneself,“je”(“I”),stoodforhimasthemarkerofa“unique self”thusthe“ego”.Itdidnʼtcometohismindthatwordsarenʼtjustsuperposed tothoughts,andthatitisnotbecausealanguageusemanydifferentpersonal pronounsornoneinthesentence,thatthepersonwhospeaksdonothaveaclear consciousnessofhimself23.
Morisawin“je”thedirectandtransparentexpressionoftheoneandtrue“ego”, whenthevariouspronouns“watashi/ore/boku/...”stoodforhimastheprooffor thenon-existenceofatrueself.
Mori considered the translation from “experience” to “thought”, of feelings into words, as a process of transparency, and not as a process of transformation.
Fromthispoint,itwaseasytoconcludethat“keiken”andits“I”stoodforthe true“experience”,and“taiken”onlyforadeformation,inwhichonecannottrace backanindependentindividual“I=ego”,thuscondemningJapanesesocietyor cultureasawhole.
Infact,itwasjusthismistake,tosuperposeorconfoundtheuniversal“ego”in
“experience”withtheword“je”(“I”)inwrittenorspoken“thought”(orinVygot- syʼsterms,toconfoundthe“I”of“thought”withthe“I”of“speech”,thetwobe- longingtodifferentgrammars).
ThatiswhyinMori,theword“keiken”standssometimesforsomethinguniver- sal(transcendingcultures),andsometimesforsomethingparticular(foundin
23 ForBenveniste,onehastosay“I”tobean“I”.EmileBenveniste,“Delasubjectivitédanslelangage”, inProblèmes de linguistique générale,v.I,Gallimard,1996,p.260.
Frenchculture),asAkiyamaremarked.
6) Conclusion
Inthispaper,weshowedtheethnocentrismunderlyinghisculturalcomparison betweenJapanandtheWest,whichisbiasedbyideologicalprejudicesandlimit- edbyalackofapsychologicaldescriptionoftherelationbetweencultureand individual.
Morihasconcentratedhisreflectionontheproblemof“experience”,thencom- paredtwotypesorformsofit,“keiken”and“taiken”,whichheopposedtoeach other,astheintelligentsiaoftheEnlightenmentdidwith“civilization”and“culture”.
ItisashameMorididnʼtadoptamorerelativisticandpsychologicallyinformed cross-culturalperspective.
Thetransparentprocessfrom“experience”to“thought”,thatMorisoughtin European“keiken”,opposedwiththedeformed“taiken”ofJapaneseculture,appears tobeirrevocablyerroneous,justasthedistinctionbetween“keiken”and“taiken”, thatistosay“civilization”and“culture”.
