(180)
Journal
ofIndian
andBuddhist
Studies
Vol.
64,
No.
3,
March
2016
The
Sequential
Arising
of
VijnNanas
in
the
Early
Yogacara
and
the
Sarvastivada
TAKATSUKASA
Yttki
1.
Introduction
The
Paficavijn-dnaketyasarriprayukta
bhamih.
(PBh)
andthe
Manobhami
(MBh),
the
first
two
sections of
the
Yogacarabhtimi,
present
valuable materialsfor
the
study of earlyYogAcara
epistemology;unfbrtunately
however,
wehave
fbund
some occasional,but
serious,
problems
in
the
critically
established
Sanskrit
text
ofthese
sections.In
Takatsukasa
[2o14:
184],therefore,
I
reconsidered aproblematic
passage
by
verifyingthe
readings ofthe
single extantSanskrit
manuscript andthen
proposed
an emendationto
the
edited
text.
According
to
the
emendedtext,
the
MBh
postuiates
that
only one vijn-ana can arisein
one
moment,theugh
it
does
not explicitly mentionwhether a simultaneity of six vijnNanas
is
possible
or notInstead,
the
MBh
ratheremphasizes
the
relative subsequence of vijnnyanas:any single sensoryperception
cannot arise sequentiallyin
two
moments.On
the
otherhand,
asdiscussed
below,
the
5arvfistivada,
which alsodenies
the
possibility
of a simultaneous arising of vV'nNanas,permits
that
a sensoryperception
canarise
immediately
after a sensoryperception
in
the
Apidamo
da
piposha
lun
Pnj
eemeza
Jkl
eevai9th
(Skt.
*Mahavibhasa,MVi),
Previous
studies onthis
topic
onlyintroduce
orexame
thiqie
shilttu)
em
in
the
MVi,
and
they
do
not comparethe
description
directly
with other
texts,
nordo
they
examinethe
distinction
between
the
two
theories.
i)In
this
paper,Iwould
like
to
fbcus
onthe
YbgacarabhUmi
asthe
representative ofthe earlyYogacara
andMVi
asthe
representative oftheSarvastivada,
in
orderto
point
outthe
difTerent
waysin
whichthey
expoundthe
sequence of vijnNanas, as well as aThe Japanese Association of Indian and Buddhist Studies
NII-Electronic Library Service The JapaneseAssociation of Indian and Buddhist Studies
TheSequentialArisingofVijnNanasintheEarlyYogacaraandtheSarvAstivada
(TAKATsuKAsA>
(181)
2,
The
Early
Yogic5ra
in
the
PBh
and
the
MBh
The
MBh
explainsthe
sequentialarising
ofthe six vijnnyanasasfbllows:
A
pentad
of sensoryperceptions
cannot arise sequentiallyin
two rnoments.Nor
canthere
be
amutual arising
[efthese
five]
immediately
after each other[ofthese
five].
Immediately
afterthe
pentad
of sensoryperceptions
has
arisenin
one moment, mental consciousness arisesnecessarily. 2>
Thus,
any offive
sensoryperceptions,
whetherthe
samekind
of or adifferent
kind
o£
cannot arise sequentiallyin
two
moments.Also
a closely relatedpassage
from
the
PBh
elaboratesthe
case where wecognize
a visual object asfbllows:
Then,
in
the
case where visualperception
has
arisen,three
minds areperceived.
[They
are]in
order,
(1)
aupanipatika: the suddenly occurring[mind],
(2)
paryesaka:
the
searching[mind],
and(3)
nis'cita:the
determined
[mind].
Of
these,
the
first
is
nothingbut
visualperception,
andthe
[other]
two
are mental consciousnesses, 3)The
PBh
names each ofthe
three
minds accordingto
the
sequentialprocessjust
aswe usually suppose
how
we cognize an object.As
for
the
mental consciousnessimmediately
afterthe
sensoryperception
in
the
above
MBh,
the
PBh
namesit
paryesaka.
That
is
to
say;the
earlyYogacara
understandsthat
once a sensoryperception
suddenlyoccurs, a searching mental consciousness necessarily arises
immediately
thereafter.
3.
The
Sarvistivida
in
the
MVi
Next,
we examinethe
MVi's
exposition.The
MVi
interprets
the
Apidamo
fozhi
lun
Pqte
rkptrerw
wh
passage4)
"Howmany
pratyayas
for
a manadyatanaY
Cyichu
kal!),
does
a[given]
manadyatanaX
function
as?It
functions
as[four
pratyayas:]
ahetu-pratyaya,
asamanantara-, an
alambana-,
and an adhipati-."And
the
interpretation
continues asfo11ows:
,
.
,
And
manadyatana contains sixkinds
[of
vijn-a-nas].That
is
to
saMfrom
a vi$ualperception
uptoa mental consciousness, Among these
[six
vijnltanas],a visualperception
Xfunctions
as apratyaya,
a samanantaru-, and an adhipati-for
a visualperception
Y,
but
does
notfunction
as analambana-
.
.
.
[To
function
as a]samanantarapratyaya meansthat
a visualperception
Y
arisesimmediately
afterthe
visualperception
X...It
is
the
same as where a visualperception
X
functions
as[.
.,a
samanantarapratyaya,..]
fbr
a visualperception
Y, thatis
to saM a visualperception
functions
as[a
collection ofpratyayas]for
perceptions
rangingfrom
the
auditoryto
-
1223
-(182)
TheSequentialArisingofVijfidnasintheEarlyYogAchraandtheSarvdstivada
(TAKATsuKAsA)
the
tactile.
A
visualperception
functions
as ahetu-pratyaya,
a samanantara-, analambana-
and anadhipati-fbra
mental consciousness.,.Itis
the
sarne as where a visualperception
functions
as[...a
samanantarapratyaya . ..]for
six vijn-a-nas,that
is
to
saMperceptions
rangingfrom
the
auditoryto
the
tactile
[function
as a collectionofpratyayas]for
six vijn"'anas, ,. . 5)The
interpretation
continuously mentions andpermits
the
sequential relationship ofthe
mental consciousnessto
a mental consciousness, andthe
sequential relationship ofthe
mental consciousnessto
five
sensoryperceptions,
as well.The
MVi,
therefore,
permits
that
anykind
ofvijn-ana can ariseimmediately
after another vijnana, regardless oftype.
As
we confirmed above,the
MBh
does
notpermit
the
possibility
of asensory
perception
arising sequentiallyin
two
moments.In
regardto
this
point,
therefore,
there
is
a cleardistinction
between
these
two
texts.
We
also notice afurther
difference
about
how
to
expound
the
sequence ofthe vijn-anas,The
MVi
explains
this
in
relationto
four
pratyayas.
In
particulag
samanantarapratyqya(dengwnjian
yuan
gA,!t,,
eebi),
defines
the
sequence eftwo
vijn-a-nas.The
PBh's
expositionproceeds
asif
associated withthe
practical
epistemicprocess
just
as we usually supposehow
we cognize an object,whereas
the
MVi,
in
contrast, only explainsthe
relationshipbetween
anytwo
vijn-anasgiving
the
impression
ofa rather abstract and automatic explanation.Further,
the
MVi
continues
its
argumentby
consideringthe
problem
in
the
sequence ofsensoryperception
asfo11ows:
Do
five
sensor:y; visual, etc.,perceptions
ariseimmediately
after each other, or not?Yuqie
shis say `'Five sensory visual, etc.,perceptions
cannot ariseimmediately
after each otherbecause
all[perceptions]
arisefrom
a mental consciousnessimmediately
afterthat."
Apidamo
lunshis
Nee
reEvadeBM
say "Thefive
sensory, visual,etc.,perceptions
can allariseimmediately
after eachother,
Otherwise,
it
contradictsthe
theory
in
the
Geayun
Nrk
[in
the
Apidamo
fhzhi
lun].
As
jt
saystA
dulpkhe"ndrtya
X
(kugen
g"),
functions
as ahetu-pratyaya,
asamanantara-, and anadhipati-for
aduhkhe"ndrtya
X
but
does
notfunction
asanalambana-."'
6)Thus,
the
YZiqie
shis assertthat
allperceptions
arisefrom
mental consciousnessimmediately
afterits
occurrence.That
is
to
saM a sensoryperception
necessarily arisesimmediately
after
the
mental consciousness.On
the
otherhand,
the
MBh
has
emphasizedthat
a mental consciousness necessarily arisesimmediately
afterthe
The Japanese Association of Indian and Buddhist Studies
NII-Electronic Library Service The JapaneseAssociation of Indian and Buddhist Studies
TheSequentialArisingofVijffa-nasintheEarly\ogicaraandtheSarvastivada
(TAKATsuKAsA)
(183)
appropriate
to
differentiate
these
standpoints, eventhough
they
do
notboth
permit
the
sequential arising ofsensoryperceptions.
The
Apidamo
lunshis,
onthe
otherhand,
permit
the
sequential arising of sensoryperceptions.
The
basis
they
adduceis
the
theory
in
the
Gertyun
in
the
Apidamo
lbuhi
lun,
') andtheir
standpointis
predicated
ontwo
points.
One
is
the
theory
in
the
Gertyun.
A
duhkhe"ndrtya
X
functions
as asamanantarupratyayafor
adulpkhendrtya
"Lthat
is
to
say aduhkhandrtya
Y
can ariseimmediately
after aduhkhEndrtya
X.
The
otherpoint
is
that
aduhkhe"ndrtya
canbe
united(sampiztyukta)
with nothingbut
five
sensoryperceptions.
This
is
asis
shown,fbr
instance,
in
the
Apidamo
fdyunzu
lun
pmEmebetlith,EllLth,8)
Apidamojieshenzu
lun
lliifeemeptmpfi)[Etth,9)
etc.Therefbre
their
standpoint
does
notderives
straightforwardlyfrom
a relation of vijn-anas,but
indirectly
from
a relation of vedanato
vedana" and vedanato
vijn-ana, as a result ofthe
examination ofdharrnas.4.
Conclusion
In
this
papenIhave
comparedthe
PBh,
the
MBh,
andthe
Mvi
onthe
problem
ofthe
sequential arising ofsix vijn-anas,and
in
sodoing
clarifiedthe
points
summarizedbelow.The
earlyYogacara
(as
representedin
the
PBh
andthe
MBh)
and
the
Sarvastivada
(as
represented
in
the
MVi)
hold
contrarypositions:
whilethe
PBh
andthe
MBh
deny
the
possibility
ofthe
sequential arising of sensoryperceptions.
the
MVi
permits
that
anykind
ofvijnNana canarise
immediately
after another vijnnyana,regardless
oftype.
Further,
there
is
an obviousdistinction
between
the
meansby
whichthey
expoundthe
sequence ofvijn-anas.The
earlyYogacara
in
the
PBh
andthe
MBh
expound a sequence of vijn-anasthat
are associated withpractical
epistemicprocesses.
The
Sarvastivada
in
the
MVi,
onthe
otherhand,
onlyexpound
the
rather abstract relationshipbetJween
anytwo
vijn'a'nas.
The
standpoint ofApidamo
lunshi
derives
from
a relation of vedanato
vedana and vedanato
vijfiana.The
distinction
correspondsto
the
difference
between
the
Yogacara,
who considerthe
practice
of
Yoga
important,
andthe
Sarvastivada,
whofocus
onthoroughly
examiningdharmas
andtheir
systems.Notes1)
See
Nishi
[1975:
262-264],
Takasaki
[1982:
10-11].2)
MBh
58.13-15,
As
for
the
textual
emendation, see Takatsukasa
[2014:
notes 7,8]. 3)PBh
10.2-3.As
fbr
the
textual
ernendation,-(
184
)The
Sequen
廿al
Msing
ofvi
’
hanas
in
the
Early
Yog
百cAra andthe
Sarv
百stiv五da
(
TAKATsuKAsA
)
see
Takatsukasa [
2014 :n・te 3]
.
4
)
Apidam ・fcuhi
lun
T
n・.
1544
, v・1
、
26
,
984b4−5,
5)MVi
T
vo1,
27,
682a7−
b1
:然 意処 有
六種 . 謂
眼 識 乃 至意
識.
此 中 眼 識与
眼 識為因 ,等 無 間,増
上,非
所縁 … …等無 間者,謂
眼 識等 無
聞 眼 識 現在 前… …
如 眼 識 与 限 識,
眼 識与耳鼻舌 身識 亦爾.眼
識 与意識 為 因,等 無間
t所縁 .増
上… …如
眼 識 対 六 識耳鼻
舌身
識対
六 亦爾
……,
6)Mvi
Tvol .27
,682b1−6
:問.眼等 .
五識
展転 無間
現
在前
不,
答
,
諸瑜伽師
説 .眼
等
五識展転無 間
不現
在 前.皆従 意識 無間
生故.阿毘達 磨諸論 師 言.
眼等
五識 展転皆
得
無
間而起.
若
不爾 者,
違根
蘊説 .如彼 説,苦根 与
.
苦根 為
因, 等
無 間,
増 上,非所縁 ,
7
)Tno ,
1544,
vol,
26,
gg4a9−
10.
Thereis
also an argument onthe
sequential arising ofsensoryperception
in
Wushi
piposha
lun
五事
毘 婆 沙 論 (
Tno
.
1555
, voL28
,992a25 −
b2
)
whoseposition
andbasis
is
the
same asthe
MVi .
However , Apidan
baj
’
iandu
iun
阿毘 曇
八健 度論 (
T
no.
1543,
vol,
26,869c19),
whichis
translated
in
383 (earlier than Apidamo
fazhi
lun
)
,
says :‘
‘
A
duhkhEndriya
is
ahetu
−
pra
りyaya
and an adhipati−
fbr
aduhkh2ndn
’
ya
,but
is
not a δlambana
−
and not a samanantara−
[
fbr
adu
れ
kh6ndr
り
7α]
.
”
According
to the
Apidan
bajiandu
lun
,Apidamo
lunshi
lose
their
basis
.
lfthe
passage
is
not misinterpretation,
it
meansthat
the
theo
厂y
mighthave
changed,
8
>T
no.
1537, voL 26,498bl
−
3.
9
)
Tno,
1540
, vol.
26,616c23−24.
AbbreViations
−amdPrimary
Sources
Ms
Sanskrit
manuscript(
ltsfacsimile
is
preserved
in
the
G6ttingen
State
andUniversity
Library, no
.
xc 14/
28;and in the IsIAo Library」Envelope no.
5−6/B
),
PBh ,
MBh
The
Ybg
ごcδbh
便η1ゴqfAc
の
y
αAsariga.
Part
L
Ed .
Vidhushekhara
Bhattacharya.
Calcutta
:The
University
ofCalcutta ,1957.
Mvi
*
Mahavibhalia
(
Ch .
Apidamo
da
pip
。sharun
阿毘 達 磨 大 毘 婆 沙 論 )Tno ,1545
, vol
.
27
,la3
−1004a9.
・TranS.XUanzang
玄奘 .
Secondary
L
韮teratUres
Nishi
Giya
西義雄
1975.
Abidatsuma
Bukkyo
’
no
kenkya
’Sono
shinsδ to shimei阿 毘達 磨 仏教
の研 究
:その
真相
と使命
.
Toky
αKokush
。Kank6kai .
Takasaki
Jikid6
高 崎
直
道 .
1982,
“
Yugagy6 −
ha
nokeisei
”瑜 伽行 派
の形成 .
ln vol.
8 of K6za DajijδBuklD
,6
:YuiShiki
shiSδ講
座大 乗仏 教
1唯識思想 ,
ed.
Hirakawa
Akira 平 川彰
, Kajiyama
YUichi 梶
山 雄
一
,andTakasakiJikid6高崎直
道,1−42.
Tokyo
:ShunjUsha .
Takatsukasa
Yilki.2014,
“
The
Problem
ofthe
Simultaneous
Arising
ofSix
V
σ
齎η 矼s:In
the
P
α匝cα吻肖d
ηαk
の
1α5α7ηρπ〜yuk
亡αbh
αη1f andthe
M
αηoとh
直mf.
”IB
κ62〔
3)
:184−
188.
(
This
research was supportedby
aGrant−in−Aid
ofM 重shimaKaiun
Memorial
Foundation.
)
Key words