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Vol.64 , No.3(2016)205高務 祐輝「初期瑜伽行派と説一切有部における「識」の継起」

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(1)

(180)

Journal

ofIndian

and

Buddhist

Studies

Vol.

64,

No.

3,

March

2016

The

Sequential

Arising

of

VijnNanas

in

the

Early

Yogacara

and

the

Sarvastivada

TAKATSUKASA

Yttki

1.

Introduction

The

Paficavijn-dnaketyasarriprayukta

bhamih.

(PBh)

and

the

Manobhami

(MBh),

the

first

two

sections of

the

Yogacarabhtimi,

present

valuable materials

for

the

study of early

YogAcara

epistemology;

unfbrtunately

however,

we

have

fbund

some occasional,

but

serious,

problems

in

the

critically

established

Sanskrit

text

of

these

sections.

In

Takatsukasa

[2o14:

184],

therefore,

I

reconsidered a

problematic

passage

by

verifying

the

readings of

the

single extant

Sanskrit

manuscript and

then

proposed

an emendation

to

the

edited

text.

According

to

the

emended

text,

the

MBh

postuiates

that

only one vijn-ana can arise

in

one

moment,

theugh

it

does

not explicitly mention

whether a simultaneity of six vijnNanas

is

possible

or not

Instead,

the

MBh

rather

emphasizes

the

relative subsequence of vijnnyanas:any single sensory

perception

cannot arise sequentially

in

two

moments.

On

the

other

hand,

as

discussed

below,

the

5arvfistivada,

which also

denies

the

possibility

of a simultaneous arising of vV'nNanas,

permits

that

a sensory

perception

can

arise

immediately

after a sensory

perception

in

the

Apidamo

da

piposha

lun

Pnj

eemeza

Jkl

eevai9th

(Skt.

*Mahavibhasa,

MVi),

Previous

studies on

this

topic

only

introduce

or

exame

thiqie

shi

lttu)

em

in

the

MVi,

and

they

do

not compare

the

description

directly

with other

texts,

nor

do

they

examine

the

distinction

between

the

two

theories.

i)

In

this

paper,Iwould

like

to

fbcus

on

the

YbgacarabhUmi

as

the

representative ofthe early

Yogacara

and

MVi

as

the

representative ofthe

Sarvastivada,

in

order

to

point

out

the

difTerent

ways

in

which

they

expound

the

sequence of vijnNanas, as well as a

(2)

The Japanese Association of Indian and Buddhist Studies

NII-Electronic Library Service The JapaneseAssociation of Indian and Buddhist Studies

TheSequentialArisingofVijnNanasintheEarlyYogacaraandtheSarvAstivada

(TAKATsuKAsA>

(181)

2,

The

Early

Yogic5ra

in

the

PBh

and

the

MBh

The

MBh

explains

the

sequential

arising

ofthe six vijnnyanasas

fbllows:

A

pentad

of sensory

perceptions

cannot arise sequentially

in

two rnoments.

Nor

can

there

be

a

mutual arising

[efthese

five]

immediately

after each other

[ofthese

five].

Immediately

after

the

pentad

of sensory

perceptions

has

arisen

in

one moment, mental consciousness arises

necessarily. 2>

Thus,

any of

five

sensory

perceptions,

whether

the

same

kind

of or a

different

kind

o

£

cannot arise sequentially

in

two

moments.

Also

a closely related

passage

from

the

PBh

elaborates

the

case where we

cognize

a visual object as

fbllows:

Then,

in

the

case where visual

perception

has

arisen,

three

minds are

perceived.

[They

are]

in

order,

(1)

aupanipatika: the suddenly occurring

[mind],

(2)

paryesaka:

the

searching

[mind],

and

(3)

nis'cita:

the

determined

[mind].

Of

these,

the

first

is

nothing

but

visual

perception,

and

the

[other]

two

are mental consciousnesses, 3)

The

PBh

names each of

the

three

minds according

to

the

sequential

processjust

as

we usually suppose

how

we cognize an object.

As

for

the

mental consciousness

immediately

after

the

sensory

perception

in

the

above

MBh,

the

PBh

names

it

paryesaka.

That

is

to

say;

the

early

Yogacara

understands

that

once a sensory

perception

suddenly

occurs, a searching mental consciousness necessarily arises

immediately

thereafter.

3.

The

Sarvistivida

in

the

MVi

Next,

we examine

the

MVi's

exposition.

The

MVi

interprets

the

Apidamo

fozhi

lun

Pqte

rkptrerw

wh

passage4)

"How

many

pratyayas

for

a manadyatana

Y

Cyichu

kal!),

does

a

[given]

manadyatana

X

function

as?

It

functions

as

[four

pratyayas:]

a

hetu-pratyaya,

a

samanantara-, an

alambana-,

and an adhipati-."

And

the

interpretation

continues as

fo11ows:

,

.

,

And

manadyatana contains six

kinds

[of

vijn-a-nas].

That

is

to

saM

from

a vi$ual

perception

up

toa mental consciousness, Among these

[six

vijnltanas],a visual

perception

X

functions

as a

pratyaya,

a samanantaru-, and an adhipati-

for

a visual

perception

Y,

but

does

not

function

as an

alambana-

.

.

.

[To

function

as a]samanantarapratyaya means

that

a visual

perception

Y

arises

immediately

after

the

visual

perception

X...It

is

the

same as where a visual

perception

X

functions

as

[.

.,a

samanantarapratyaya,.

.]

fbr

a visual

perception

Y, that

is

to saM a visual

perception

functions

as

[a

collection ofpratyayas]

for

perceptions

ranging

from

the

auditory

to

-

1223

(3)

-(182)

TheSequentialArisingofVijfidnasintheEarlyYogAchraandtheSarvdstivada

(TAKATsuKAsA)

the

tactile.

A

visual

perception

functions

as a

hetu-pratyaya,

a samanantara-, an

alambana-

and an

adhipati-fbra

mental consciousness.,.It

is

the

sarne as where a visual

perception

functions

as

[...a

samanantarapratyaya . ..]

for

six vijn-a-nas,

that

is

to

saM

perceptions

ranging

from

the

auditory

to

the

tactile

[function

as a collectionofpratyayas]

for

six vijn"'anas, ,. . 5)

The

interpretation

continuously mentions and

permits

the

sequential relationship of

the

mental consciousness

to

a mental consciousness, and

the

sequential relationship of

the

mental consciousness

to

five

sensory

perceptions,

as well.

The

MVi,

therefore,

permits

that

any

kind

ofvijn-ana can arise

immediately

after another vijnana, regardless of

type.

As

we confirmed above,

the

MBh

does

not

permit

the

possibility

of a

sensory

perception

arising sequentially

in

two

moments.

In

regard

to

this

point,

therefore,

there

is

a clear

distinction

between

these

two

texts.

We

also notice a

further

difference

about

how

to

expound

the

sequence ofthe vijn-anas,

The

MVi

explains

this

in

relation

to

four

pratyayas.

In

particulag

samanantarapratyqya

(dengwnjian

yuan

gA,!t,,

eebi),

defines

the

sequence ef

two

vijn-a-nas.

The

PBh's

exposition

proceeds

as

if

associated with

the

practical

epistemic

process

just

as we usually suppose

how

we cognize an object,

whereas

the

MVi,

in

contrast, only explains

the

relationship

between

any

two

vijn-anas

giving

the

impression

ofa rather abstract and automatic explanation.

Further,

the

MVi

continues

its

argument

by

considering

the

problem

in

the

sequence ofsensory

perception

as

fo11ows:

Do

five

sensor:y; visual, etc.,

perceptions

arise

immediately

after each other, or not?

Yuqie

shis say `'Five sensory visual, etc.,

perceptions

cannot arise

immediately

after each other

because

all

[perceptions]

arise

from

a mental consciousness

immediately

after

that."

Apidamo

lunshis

Nee

reEvadeBM

say "The

five

sensory, visual,etc.,

perceptions

can allarise

immediately

after each

other,

Otherwise,

it

contradicts

the

theory

in

the

Geayun

Nrk

[in

the

Apidamo

fhzhi

lun].

As

jt

says

tA

dulpkhe"ndrtya

X

(kugen

g"),

functions

as a

hetu-pratyaya,

asamanantara-, and an

adhipati-for

a

duhkhe"ndrtya

X

but

does

not

function

asan

alambana-."'

6)

Thus,

the

YZiqie

shis assert

that

all

perceptions

arise

from

mental consciousness

immediately

after

its

occurrence.

That

is

to

saM a sensory

perception

necessarily arises

immediately

after

the

mental consciousness.

On

the

other

hand,

the

MBh

has

emphasized

that

a mental consciousness necessarily arises

immediately

after

the

(4)

The Japanese Association of Indian and Buddhist Studies

NII-Electronic Library Service The JapaneseAssociation of Indian and Buddhist Studies

TheSequentialArisingofVijffa-nasintheEarly\ogicaraandtheSarvastivada

(TAKATsuKAsA)

(183)

appropriate

to

differentiate

these

standpoints, even

though

they

do

not

both

permit

the

sequential arising ofsensory

perceptions.

The

Apidamo

lunshis,

on

the

other

hand,

permit

the

sequential arising of sensory

perceptions.

The

basis

they

adduce

is

the

theory

in

the

Gertyun

in

the

Apidamo

lbuhi

lun,

') and

their

standpoint

is

predicated

on

two

points.

One

is

the

theory

in

the

Gertyun.

A

duhkhe"ndrtya

X

functions

as asamanantarupratyaya

for

a

dulpkhendrtya

"L

that

is

to

say a

duhkhandrtya

Y

can arise

immediately

after a

duhkhEndrtya

X.

The

other

point

is

that

a

duhkhe"ndrtya

can

be

united

(sampiztyukta)

with nothing

but

five

sensory

perceptions.

This

is

as

is

shown,

fbr

instance,

in

the

Apidamo

fdyunzu

lun

pmEmebetlith,EllLth,8)

Apidamojieshenzu

lun

lliifeemeptmpfi)[Etth,9)

etc.

Therefbre

their

standpoint

does

not

derives

straightforwardly

from

a relation of vijn-anas,

but

indirectly

from

a relation of vedana

to

vedana" and vedana

to

vijn-ana, as a result of

the

examination ofdharrnas.

4.

Conclusion

In

this

papenIhave

compared

the

PBh,

the

MBh,

and

the

Mvi

on

the

problem

of

the

sequential arising ofsix vijn-anas,and

in

so

doing

clarified

the

points

summarizedbelow.

The

early

Yogacara

(as

represented

in

the

PBh

and

the

MBh)

and

the

Sarvastivada

(as

represented

in

the

MVi)

hold

contrary

positions:

while

the

PBh

and

the

MBh

deny

the

possibility

of

the

sequential arising of sensory

perceptions.

the

MVi

permits

that

any

kind

ofvijnNana can

arise

immediately

after another vijnnyana,

regardless

of

type.

Further,

there

is

an obvious

distinction

between

the

means

by

which

they

expound

the

sequence ofvijn-anas.

The

early

Yogacara

in

the

PBh

and

the

MBh

expound a sequence of vijn-anas

that

are associated with

practical

epistemic

processes.

The

Sarvastivada

in

the

MVi,

on

the

other

hand,

only

expound

the

rather abstract relationship

betJween

any

two

vijn'a'nas.

The

standpoint of

Apidamo

lunshi

derives

from

a relation of vedana

to

vedana and vedana

to

vijfiana.

The

distinction

corresponds

to

the

difference

between

the

Yogacara,

who consider

the

practice

of

Yoga

important,

and

the

Sarvastivada,

who

focus

on

thoroughly

examining

dharmas

and

their

systems.

Notes1)

See

Nishi

[1975:

262-264],

Takasaki

[1982:

10-11].

2)

MBh

58.13-15,

As

for

the

textual

emendation, see Takatsukasa

[2014:

notes 7,8]. 3)

PBh

10.2-3.

As

fbr

the

textual

ernendation,

(5)

-(

184

 

The

 

Sequen

廿

al

 

Msing

 of 

vi

 

hanas

 

in

 

the

 

Early

 

Yog

百cAra and 

the

 

Sarv

百stiv五

da

 

TAKATsuKAsA

see 

Takatsukasa [

2014 :n・te 3

 

4

Apidam ・

fcuhi

 

lun

 

T

 n・

1544

 v・

1

 

26

, 

984b4−5,

 

5)MVi

 

T

vo1

27,

682a7

b1

然 意処 有

種 . 謂

眼 識 乃 至

此 中 眼 識

眼 識

為因 ,等 無 間,増

,非

所縁 … …等無 間者,謂

眼 識

等 無

聞 眼 識 現

在 前… …

如 眼 識 与 限 識

眼 識

与耳鼻舌 身識 亦爾.眼

識 与意識 為 因,等 無間

t

所縁 .増

… …如

眼 識 対 六 識

耳鼻

六 亦

……,

  

6)Mvi

Tvol .27

682b1−6

問.眼等 .

展転 無間

在前

不,

諸瑜伽師

説 .眼

識展転無 間

在 前.皆従 意識 無間

故.阿毘達 磨諸論 師 言.

五識 展

転皆

而起.

不爾 者,

蘊説 .如彼 説,苦根 与

苦根 為

, 等

無 間

増 上

,非所縁 ,

  

7

)Tno ,

1544

 vol

26

 gg4a9

10

There  

is

 also an  argument  on 

the

 sequential  arising  ofsensory  

perception

 

in

 

Wushi

 

piposha

 

lun

毘 婆 沙 論 (

Tno

1555

, voL 

28

992a25 −

b2

whose  

position

 and  

basis

 

is

 

the

 same  as 

the

 

MVi .

However , Apidan 

baj

iandu

 

iun

毘 曇

健 度論 (

T

 no

1543,

 vol

26,869c19),

 which  

is

 

translated

 

in

383 (earlier  than Apidamo  

fazhi

 

lun

 says :

A

 

duhkhEndriya

 

is

 a 

hetu

pra

yaya

 and  an  adhipati

fbr

 a

duhkh2ndn

ya

, 

but

 

is

 not  a δ

lambana

and not a samanantara

fbr

 a 

du

kh6ndr

According

 to the

Apidan

 

bajiandu

 

lun

Apidamo

 

lunshi

 

lose

 

their

 

basis

 

lfthe

 

passage

 

is

 not misinterpretation

 

it

 means

that

 

the

 

theo

y

 might  

have

 changed

  

8

>T

 no

1537

, voL  26,498bl

3

  

9

Tno

1540

, vol

26,616c23−24.

AbbreViations

−amd  

Primary

 

Sources

Ms

   

Sanskrit

 manuscript

lts 

facsimile

 

is

 

preserved

 

in

 

the

 

G6ttingen

 

State

 and  

University

        

Library, no

 xc 14

28;and  in the IsIAo Library」Envelope  no

5−6/B

PBh ,

 

MBh

 

The

 

Ybg

ごcδ 

bh

便η1ゴ

qfAc

y

α

Asariga.

 

Part

 

L

 

Ed .

 

Vidhushekhara

 

Bhattacharya.

 

Calcutta

        

The

 

University

 ofCalcutta ,1957

Mvi

  

Mahavibhalia

Ch .

 

Apidamo

 

da

 

pip

。sha 

run

阿毘 達 磨 大 毘 婆 沙 論 )Tno ,1545

, vol

27

 

  

  

 

  

la3

−1004a9.

TranS.XUanzang

奘 .

Secondary

 

L

teratUres

Nishi

 

Giya

西

義雄

1975.

 

Abidatsuma

 

Bukkyo

 no 

kenkya

’ 

Sono

 shinsδ to shimei

阿 毘達 磨 仏教

研 究

 

  

その

真相

使命

Toky

α

Kokush

。 

Kank6kai .

Takasaki  

Jikid6

高 崎

道 .

1982,

Yugagy6 −

ha

 no 

keisei

瑜 伽行 派

形成 .

ln vol

8 of K6za Dajijδ

 

 BuklD

6

YuiShiki

 shiSδ

大 乗仏 教

1

唯識思想 ,

ed

 

Hirakawa

 

Akira 平 川彰

, Kajiyama  

YUichi 梶

 

  

山 雄

,and  

TakasakiJikid6高崎直

道,

1−42.

 

Tokyo

: 

ShunjUsha .

Takatsukasa

 

Yilki.2014,

The

 

Problem

 of 

the

 

Simultaneous

 

Arising

 of 

Six

 

V

σ

齎η 矼s:

In

 

the

  

P

α匝cα

d

ηα

k

1α5α7ηρπ〜

yuk

亡α

bh

αη1f and  

the

 

M

αηoと

h

直mf

IB

κ62

3

:184

188

This

 research  was  supported  

by

 a 

Grant−in−Aid

 ofM 重shima  

Kaiun

 

Memorial

 

Foundation.

Key  words

 perception

 v顳ηα

 

Ybgac

吾ra 

Sarv

且stiv巨

da

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